Nova Law Review 33, 1 by ,
Nova Law Review
Volume 33, Issue 1 2008 Article 1
Nova Law Review 33, 1
Nova Law Review∗
∗
Copyright c©2008 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
1: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 33 FALL 2008 NUMBER 1
Articles
The Constitutional Implications of Government Funding
for Florida's Primary Voting Process: Is It
Constitutionally Permissible to Publicly Fund
the Two Major Parties' Primaries to the Exclusion
of All Other Political Parties? ........................... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. M itchell W Berger
Gregory A. Haile 1
Tort Law: 2005-08 Review of Florida Case Law .............. William E. Adams, Jr. 21
2007-2008 Survey of Florida Law Affecting
Business Owners ....................................................................... Barbara Landau 81
Wyche v. State: A Case Analysis ................................................... Milton Hirsch 137
2007-2008 Survey of Florida Public
Em ploym ent Law ........................................................................... John Sanchez 169
2007-2008 Survey of Florida Gambling Law ........................... Robert M. Jarvis 231
Combating the "Baby Dumping" Epidemic:
A Look at Florida's Safe Haven Law ............................ Stacie Schmerling Perez 245
Article I. The Role of the Florida Courts in
Protecting the Uninsured from Being
Overcharged for Emergency Medical Services ................................. David Stahl 269
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/1
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT
FUNDING FOR FLORIDA'S PRIMARY VOTING PROCESS: Is
IT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE TO PUBLICLY FUND
THE Two MAJOR PARTIES' PRIMARIES TO THE EXCLUSION
OF ALL OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES?
MITCHELL W. BERGER
GREGORY A. HAILE*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1
11. BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THEIR FUNDING IN
THE UNITED STATES ..................................................................... 3
III. THE FOUNDATION OF THIS REPUBLIC-NO STATE GOVERNMENT
SHALL INTERFERE WITH ANY INDIVIDUAL'S FREEDOMS OF
ASSOCIATION OR ASSEMBLY ........................................................ 6
A. Freedom of Assembly ................................................................ 6
B. Freedom of Association ............................................................... 7
IV. GOVERNMENTALLY FUNDED CLOSED PRIMARY SYSTEM AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE .......................... 8
V. IF GOVERNMENTS ARE INVOLVED IN FUNDING PRIMARIES, CAN
THEY LIMIT FUNDING TO JUST THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
PARTIES? ......................................... . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . .  11
A. Framers' Views on Parties ........................................................ 11
B. The State Funding of Democratic and Republican Party Primaries
to the Exclusion of All Others Implicates and Perhaps Violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ........... 12
1. United States Supreme Court Decisions ............................ 13
2. Florida Statutes Outright Deny Primaries-Let Alone Funding
for Primaries-to Minor Political Parties .......................... 15
V I. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 18
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nelson v. Dean,' a recent opinion by the Chief Judge of the Northern
District of Florida, Robert L. Hinkle discusses numerous aspects of the con-
* Authored by Mitchell W. Berger, Chairman of the law firm of Berger Singerman, and
Gregory A. Haile, Attorney at the law firm of Berger Singerman. Special thanks to Greg
Popowitz, Nova Southeastern University School of Law, Class of 2009, Laurence Krutchik,
Nova Southeastern University School of Law, Class of 2009, and Iryna Ivashchuk, University
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stitutionality of the Florida primary voting process.2 Among the issues dis-
cussed, although not thoroughly explored, is the funding of Florida's primary
voting process.3 Specifically, Chief Judge Hinlde presents this question
where he writes at the end of his opinion:
To be sure, plaintiffs hinted at oral argument that if their constitu-
tional and Voting Rights Act challenges to the DNC's exclusion of
Florida delegates was rejected-as has now occurred-plaintiffs
might assert that the change of the primary date itself was uncons-
titutional or violated the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs carefully
did not, however, actually assert that claim. The claim will not be
addressed unless and until actually presented. Leave to amend will
be granted. The granting of leave ought not, however, be read as a
suggestion that claims of this type would, or would not, have me-
rit.
Thus, is it unconstitutional for Florida to fund the primary voting system, yet
simultaneously employ a closed primary system that precludes all except
registered Democrats from voting in Democratic primaries, and precludes all
except registered Republicans from voting in Republican primaries, without
implicating the constitutional right to the freedom of association and the
competing Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Furthermore, is it unconstitutional for the state to fund the participation
of the Democratic and Republican parties in the primary voting system, yet
refuse to fund the participation of a minor party in the primary voting sys-
tem? At the very least, the rights to the freedoms of assembly, association,
and equal protection are implicated.6 Interestingly, Florida appears to have
established one of the most exclusive primaries, in that it is a closed primary
which specifically precludes minor political parties from participating in the
primaries, thereby denying minor political parties funding which is available
for the Republican and Democratic state funded primaries.7 These very rele-
vant and timely issues are explored below.
of Florida School of Law, Class of 2009 for their invaluable research efforts that greatly con-
tributed to this article.
1. 528 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Fla. 2007).
2. See generally id.
3. Id. at 1274-75.
4. Id. at 1283.
5. Id. at 1279-80.
6. Nelson, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
7. Id. at 1279-80.
(Vol. 33
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II. BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THEIR FUNDING IN
THE UNITED STATES
The Democratic and the Republican parties select their presidential no-
minees at the "national party convention[s] held [in] the summer of each
presidential election year. ' 8 In each state, presidential nominees receive del-
egates to the national conventions through caucuses, state conventions, or
primary elections.9 Caucuses and conventions are party funded meetings
where attendees choose nominees for the national convention.' ° In a prima-
ry, the registered voters choose the nominee by voting through a secret bal-
lot."
States employing the primary election system do so through state sta-
tutes providing for one of four different types of primaries: closed, open,
blanket, or semi-closed. 2 In a closed primary, which Florida has adopted,
"only persons who are members of the political party ... can vote on its no-
minee" who must be from their party. 3 Independents or members of another
political party cannot vote in the closed primary. 4 Each party sets a specific
deadline before the election by which one must register with that party or
change their party affiliation in order to vote in the primary.'5 In a semi-
closed primary, "a political party may invite only its own registered members
and voters registered as Independents to vote in its primary. In open pri
maries, anyone, "regardless of party affiliation, may vote for a party's nomi-
nee, . . . limited to that party's nominees for all offices ... [thus one] may
not, for example, support a Republican nominee for Governor and a Demo-
cratic nominee for attorney general."' 7 In a blanket primary, voters are not
limited to voting only for candidates of one party, but instead they can vote
for any candidate even if that candidate is affiliated with a different party.8
8. Leonard P. Stark, You Gotta Be on It to Be in It: State Ballot Access Laws and Pres-
idential Primaries, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 137, 138 (1997).
9. Id.
10. See Nelson, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
11. See Wagner v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 1954) (stating that a primary election is a
"selective mechanism by which the members of a political party express their preference in..
. selection of ... party's candidates for public office... [and] are not in reality elections, but
are simply nominating devices").
12. David A. Chase, Note, Clingman v. Beaver: Shifting Power from the Parties to the
States, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1935, 1939-40 (2007).
13. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000) (emphasis in original).
14. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 587 (2005).
15. See id. at 606.
16. Id. at 581.
17. Jones, 530 U.S. at 576 n.6.
18. Id. at 570.
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For decades, the primary system has been the most used delegate selection
system in the United States.
19
The primary election was developed as a way to choose presidential
nominees within the context of political parties.2' Although the United
States Constitution does not mention political parties, they emerged due to a
clash of notions between Alexander Hamilton's idea of a strong federal gov-
ernment and limited government advocated by Thomas Jefferson.2' As polit-
ical debate over the form of government continued, "[b]y the 1796 elections,
Federalists and Republicans" began organizing separate campaigns with par-
ty leaders having power over the nominations.22 The Republican Party soon
split into two smaller factions, the Democratic-Republican Party and the Na-
tional-Republican Party.23 Each party organized caucuses-informal meet-
ings-to choose party candidates for the national convention. 24 Because of
the concerns that small caucuses do not represent the will of the population,
party members began choosing delegates for the formal nomination meetings
in a convention. 21 Conventions, however, were criticized for a lack of trans-
parency, since party leaders influenced the nominations.26 Therefore, in late
nineteenth/early twentieth century, a primary developed as a delegate selec-
tion process, which, through secret vote, eliminated the problems raised by
the informal selection process of caucuses and conventions. 27 Once the states
began conducting primary nomination elections, the states became involved
19. Joanna Klonsky, The Caucus System in the U.S. Presidential Nominating Process,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Mar. 3, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15640/caucussystem-in-the-us-presidentialnominating-pro
cess.html.
20. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1989).
21. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Roy R. Ray Lecture: Freedom of the Press in Time of War, 59
SMU L. REV. 1663, 1663-64 (2006); see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE
REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 140, 198-99 (2000); Thomas B. McAffee, Natural Substance
Above All: The Utopian Vision of Modem Natural Law Constitutionalist, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISc. L.J. 501, 525 (1995).
22. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARv. L. REv. 2311, 2320 (2006).
23. Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: An Histori-
cal Framework-A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I: From the Founding of the Re-
public Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1041, 1050 (2006).
24. John R. Labbd, Comment, Louisiana's Blanket Primary After California Democratic
Party v. Jones, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 721, 722 (2002).
25. Deidra A. Foster, Comment, Partisanship Redefined: Why Blanket Primaries Are
Constitutional, 29 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 449, 451 (2006).
26. Leonard P. Stark, Note, The Presidential Primary and Caucus Schedule: A Role for
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in supervising the conduct of those elections, including the regulation of who
could vote in party primaries. 8 However, the original justification for that
regulation was to ensure that the nominees of the parties were elected in a
fair and impartial manner by the members of the party.29 The primary soon
became not only a delegate selection process of a particular party, but it was
enacted as a law in many states.3° In 1903, Wisconsin was the first state to
pass a law requiring the presidential nominees for the national convention to
be elected in the primary.31 Since then, states have passed laws which speci-
fy the criteria for state elections.32
Although political parties run presidential primaries, states fund and
pass various laws regarding the primaries.33 In the 1970s, campaign reform
proposals were elevated by the national attention paid to campaign fundrais-
ing abuses brought in light by the Watergate investigations. 34 In 1974, at the
height of the Watergate crisis, the federal government instituted a system of
matching public funds for presidential primaries and full public financing of
presidential general elections by amending the Federal Election Campaign
Act.35 In 1976, public money was used to fund a United States presidential
election for the first time.
36
"[T]he first public financing within the jurisdiction of the United States"
took place in Puerto Rico in 1957. 37 Costa Rica and Argentina, in 1954 and
1955, respectively, "were the first modem countries to formally provide pub-
lic fund[ing] for political parties. 38 Iowa, Maine, Rhode Island, and Utah
became the first states in America to enact public financing. 39 Maryland,
Minnesota, and New Jersey followed suit in 1974 with "the first partial pub-
lic financing systems."'4 By 2007, there were twenty-seven states that pro-
28. See id. at 332.
29. See id. at 332-33.
30. See Klonsky, supra note 19; Stark, The Presidential Primary, supra note 26, at 333.
31. Foster, supra note 25, at 452.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 453.
34. See Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft
Money System, 24 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIs. 167, 167 (1998).
35. Kenneth D. Katkin, Campaign Finance Reform After Federal Election Commission v.
McConnell, 31 N. KY. L. REv. 235,239 (2004).
36. See Scott D. Slater, Comment, Where the Bucks Stop: An Analysis of Presidential
Telephone Solicitations Under 18 U.S.C. § 607, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 851, 879 n.247 (1998).
37. Benjamin J. Wyatt, The Origins of State Public Financing of Elections (Apr. 2002)
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Wesleyan University), available at
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vided some form of public subsidy in state elections.4' Out of those states,
eleven offered public funds to political parties for both general elections and
primary campaigns.4" Maine, Arizona, and Vermont follow the Clean Elec-
tions Plan under which the candidates may only receive public funds.43
I1. THE FOUNDATION OF THIS REPUBLIC-NO STATE GOVERNMENT
SHALL INTERFERE WITH ANY INDIVIDUAL'S FREEDOMS OF ASSOCIATION OR
ASSEMBLY
Necessarily, whether a party has a closed, semi-closed, open, or blanket
primary, one's First Amendment rights will be implicated; specifically, the
First Amendment right of the freedom to associate and the First Amendment
right to the freedom to assemble. 44 Most notably, a closed primary system
creates a prohibition on who one can vote for.45 Let's address, in turn, how
the freedom of assembly and the freedom of association are implicated, and
how some courts have dealt with them.
A. Freedom of Assembly
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging.., the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."' The right of assembly guaranteed in the Federal Constitution to the
people is not restricted to the literal right of meeting together to petition the
Government "'for a redress of grievances.' ' 47 According to one federal dis-
trict court, "the First Amendment itself is merely a limitation against federal
abridgment of the rights embodied in that amendment., 48 However, "the
[F]ramers of the Fourteenth Amendment, [which was] adopted after the Civil
War, made clear that no state or local government could censor political ex-
41. Id.
42. Wyatt, supra note 37.
43. Id.
44. See Chase, supra note 12, at 1939, 1941, 1950-52.
45. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 843 (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
513 (1939)).
48. Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 881 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
[Vol. 33
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pression."49 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "pre-
vents any denial of [this right] by the states."5
When the First Congress was debating the Bill of Rights, it was con-
tended that there was no need to separately assert the right of assembly be-
cause it was subsumed in freedom of speech.5 Mr. Page of Virginia re-
sponded, however, that at times "such rights have been opposed, and [that]
people have . . . been prevented from assembling together on their lawful
occasions.... If the people could be deprived of the power of assembling
under any pretext whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privi-
lege contained in the clause. 52 The motion to strike "assembly" was de-
feated.53
B. Freedom of Association
Although the word "association" does not appear in the First Amend-
ment, the freedom of association is derived from the First Amendment free-
doms of speech and assembly.' The freedom to associate "necessarily pre-
supposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association
and to limit the association to those people only.
55
A political party's right to choose its own nominees is a core associa-
tional activity.56 This is because "the inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a
political party may seriously distort its collective decisions. 57 As the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, political parties have associa-
tional rights, and one of those rights is the right to choose the "'standard
bearer who best represents the party's ideologies."'58 In Tashjian v. Republi-
can Party of Connecticut,59 the United States Supreme Court held that the
Connecticut statute requiring voters of any party primary to be registered
49. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and Our Posterity, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573,
577 (1994).
50. Thompson, 421 F. Supp. at 881.
51. 1 ANNALS OFCONG. 731-32 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
52. Id. at 732.
53. Id. at 733.
54. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357 (1997); Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
55. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122
(1981).
56. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359-60.
57. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122.
58. See March Fong Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224
(1989) (quoting Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir.
1975)).
59. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
2008]
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members of the party, conflicted with the Republican Party's rule permitting
"voters not affiliated with any political party-to vote in [the] Republican
primaries," and "deprive[d] the Party of its First Amendment right to enter
into political association with individuals of its own choosing."'  The Court
observed that "[tlhe Party's determination of the boundaries of its own asso-
ciation, and of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals,
is protected by the Constitution.' While "[t]he State has wide latitude to
regulate elections to ensure that they are fair and honest. . . the State cannot
first require parties to nominate by primary election, and then structure the
primary elections to deprive the parties of their First Amendment rights. 62
IV. GOVERNMENTALLY FUNDED CLOSED PRIMARY SYSTEM AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE
Florida's statute establishing its closed primary system specifically
states:
In a primary election a qualified elector is entitled to vote the offi-
cial primary election ballot of the political party designated in the
elector's registration, and no other. It is unlawful for any elector to
vote in a primary for any candidate running for nomination from a
party other than that in which such elector is registered.
63
Also, Florida case law has, for more than seventy years, held that "no one is
entitled to vote in a party primary absent a declaration of his party affiliation
as a member of the particular party whose primary is being held."'  Al-
though no one appears to have challenged whether the aforementioned law
60. Id.at210-11.
61. Id. at 224.
62. Brief for the Petitioners-Appellant at 19, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, No. 99-401
(9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2000). "California need not have a primary system at all. But if California
chooses to conduct primary elections, it must respect the political parties' freedom of associa-
tion." Id. (citing Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 218).
63. FLA. STAT. § 101.021 (2008).
64. State ex rel. Gandy v. Page, 170 So. 118, 120 (Fla. 1936).
The primary election laws of this state clearly require participants in primary
elections, whether as voters or candidates, to specially register for that purpose....
For primary elections a declaration of party affiliation on the primary election
books is indispensable to qualify one to participate in such primary elections. Ab-
sent such declaration of party affiliation, the registrant is not entitled to be consi-
dered as a legally registered member of the party whose affairs he seeks to partici-
pate in so far as primary elections... are concerned.
State ex rel. Hall v. Hildebrand, 168 So. 531 (Fla. 1936).
[Vol. 33
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violates a Florida citizen's freedoms to associate and assemble, the United
States Supreme Court has addressed this issue on several occasions.65
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the government's
ability to restrict the rights of individuals to participate in the primary
process for numerous reasons. For example, in Rosario v. Rockefeller (Ro-
sario I1),66 the United States Supreme Court rejected the citizens' argument
that "their First and Fourteenth Amendment right of free association with the
political party of their choice" was violated because of New York's delayed
enrollment scheme.67 An integral part of the scheme was that to participate
in a primary election, a person must enroll before the preceding general elec-
tion.68 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "Allowing enrollment
any time after the general election would not have the same deterrent effect
on raiding for it would not put the voter in the unseemly position of asking to
be enrolled in one party while at the same time intending to vote immediately
for another."'69 For this reason, New York's scheme required an insulating
general election between enrollment and the next party primary.70 "The re-
sulting time limitation for enrollment [was] thus tied to a particularized legi-
timate purpose, and [was] in no sense invidious or arbitrary."'" Further, "the
statute merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they had
to meet in order to participate in the next primary. 72
The United States Supreme Court again recognized the propriety of re-
stricting participation in the primary process in Anderson v. Celebrezze.73 In
fact, the Court specifically recognized that "[a]lthough these rights of voters
are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the [s]tates on candidates'
eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters'
rights to associate or to choose among candidates. '74 The Court recognized
that, "'as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elec-
tions if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."' 75 The Court concluded:
65. See generally Rosario v. Rockefeller (Rosario II), 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
66. Id. at 752.
67. Id. at 758.
68. See id. at 757.
69. Rosario v. Rockefeller (Rosario 1), 458 F.2d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. See Rosario 11, 410 U.S. at 758.
71. Id. at 762.
72. Id. at 757.
73. 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
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To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted com-
prehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provi-
sion of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qua-
lifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or
the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some de-
gree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with
others for political ends. Nevertheless, the State's important regu-
latory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondi-
scriminatory restrictions.
76
In New York State Board of Elections v. L6pez Torres,7  regarding a
New York State Supreme Court justice election-as opposed to a presiden-
tial election-the Court "considered it to be 'too plain for argument,' that a
State may prescribe party use of primaries or conventions to select nominees
who appear on the general-election ballot.... That prescriptive power is not
without limits. '78 In California Democratic Party v. Jones,79 for example,
the Court invalidated California's blanket primary on First Amendment
grounds, reasoning that it permitted non-party members to determine the
candidate bearing the party's standard in the general election. 80 The Court
"acknowledged an individual's associational right to vote in a party primary
without undue state-imposed impediment.
81
In Kusper v. Pontikes,8 ' the Court invalidated an Illinois law that re-
quired a voter wishing to change his party registration so as to vote in the
primary of a different party to do so almost two full years before the primary
date. 83 But Kusper does not cast doubt on all state-imposed limitations upon
primary voting.84 In Rosario II, the Court upheld a New York State require-
ment that a voter enroll in the party of his choice at least thirty days before
the previous general election in order to vote in the next party primary.
Similar to the facts in Rosario II, in Florida, party changes must be
made by the end of the twenty-ninth day before the primary election. 86 As
such, it would appear that, in and of itself, Florida Statutes, section 101.021,
making it "unlawful for any elector to vote in a primary for any candidate
76. Id.
77. 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
78. Id. at 798.
79. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
80. Id. at 586.
81. See Llpez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 798.
82. 414U.S. 51 (1973).
83. Id. at 57, 61.
84. See generally Rosario I, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
85. Id. at 757,762.
86. FLA. STAT. § 97.055 (2008).
[Vol. 33
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running for nomination from a party other than that in which such elector is
registered" would pass constitutional muster. 87 Furthermore, the twenty-nine
day requirement to change party affiliation, based on United States Supreme
Court precedent, is not overly burdensome and does not violate one's free-
doms to associate and assemble.88
V. IF GOVERNMENTS ARE INVOLVED IN FUNDING PRIMARIES, CAN
THEY LIMIT FUNDING TO JUST THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
PARTIES?
A. Framers' Views on Parties
The Framers abhorred the "idea of political parties, representing institu-
tionalized divisions of interest.'' 89 This is the type of divisive political think-
ing that the Framers attempted to flee.90 In fact, the Framers "attempted to
design a 'Constitution Against Parties"' and curtail any tide of political com-
petition that might "divide coalitions of officeholders and cut through the
constitutional boundaries between . . . branches."9' Notwithstanding, in
1790, the Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, "began to recruit mem-
bers of Congress" to support "his economic development program."92 Tho-
mas Jefferson and James Madison intensely opposed the program, and the
two sides began to collect public support for their respective positions.93
By 1796, there were two competing parties: the Federalists and the Re-
publicans. 94 By 1797, its members were not only specifically identified as
Federalist or Republican, but they regularly and almost strictly voted along
party lines.9 The institutionalized division of interest that the Framers had
so desperately tried to steer clear of had been born.96
Such partisan politics that propagated divisive interests was harmful to
the separation of powers doctrine, and the Framers knew it.97 Pursuant to the
separation of powers doctrine, the executive branch has to be "genuinely
87. FLA. STAT. § 101.021.
88. See FLA. STAT. § 97.055; Rosario 11, 410 U.S. at 758 (holding that a New York law
establishing a thirty day deadline for voter affiliation is valid).
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independent!" 98 In fact, the Framers initially rejected ideas that the President
should obtain appointment by Congress." Any such requirement would be
wholly antithetical to executive independence."°  Notwithstanding, party
caucuses in Congress were the primary vehicle for selecting presidential
candidates.'' In fact, the Framers' vision of numerous candidates, as op-
posed to the presidential electoral process with just two political parties, was
meant to preclude the political and fundraising dominance that the Republi-
cans and Democrats enjoy today. l" Contrary to the Framers' intent, mem-
bers of smaller parties have little to no chance of having a successful presi-
dential campaign. 3
B. The State Funding of Democratic and Republican Party Primaries to
the Exclusion of All Others Implicates and Perhaps Violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Limiting the state funding of primaries to the Democratic and Republi-
can parties contributes to the political and fundraising dominance discussed
above. z" First Amendment freedoms to assemble and associate necessarily
conflict with equal protection concerns, because the support of one or two
political organizations with public financing to the exclusion of others impli-
cates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 5 Of
course, these First Amendment freedoms are entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment to protection from infringement by the States."° Consequently,
limiting the state funding of primaries exclusively to the Democratic and
Republican parties is the centerpiece of the constitutional uneasiness because
of the potential violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 0 7 That is, does limiting funding of primaries to just two politi-
cal parties invidiously discriminate against all other parties in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause?
98. Id. at 2321.




103. See Benjamin D. Black, Note, Developments in the State Regulation of Major and
Minor Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 111 (1996).
104. See id. at 111-12.
105. See id.
106. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964).
107. Black, supra note 103, at 135-36.
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1. United States Supreme Court Decisions
In one of the most cited and well recognized cases regarding the limit-
ing of funding to the Democratic and Republican primaries, Williams v.
Rhodes, 1 8 the Court was confronted with a state electoral structure that "fa-
vor[ed] two particular parties-the Republicans and the Democrats-and in
effect tend[ed] to give them a complete monopoly."' 9 The Court held un-
constitutional the election laws of Ohio as they violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as in combination they "made
it virtually impossible for a new political party, even though it [had] hun-
dreds of thousands of members, or an old party, which [had] a very small
number of members, to be placed on the state ballot" in the 1968 presidential
election."' The state laws made "no provision for ballot position for inde-
pendent candidates as distinguished from political parties,' and a new po-
litical party, in order to be placed on the ballot, had "to obtain petitions
signed by qualified electors totaling [fifteen percent] of the number of ballots
cast in the last preceding gubernatorial election."'"12 But this requirement was
only a preliminary hurdle." 3 Although the Ohio American Independent Par-
ty in the first six months of 1968 had obtained more than 450,000 signa-
tures-well over the [fifteen percent] requirement"4--Ohio had nonetheless
denied the party a place on the ballot, by reason of other statutory "burden-
some procedures, requiring extensive organization and other election activi-
ties by a very early date,"" 5-"including the early deadline for filing peti-
tions and the requirement of a primary election conforming to detailed and
rigorous standards."'" 6 Justice Douglas candidly stated:
Ohio, through an entangling web of election laws, has effectively
foreclosed its presidential ballot to all but Republicans and Demo-
crats. It has done so initially by abolishing write-in votes so as to
restrict candidacy to names on the ballot; it has eliminated all in-
dependent candidates through a requirement that nominees enjoy
the endorsement of a political party; it has defined "political party"
108. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
109. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 24.
111. ld. at26.
112. Id. at 24-25.
113. Williams, 393 U.S. at 25.
114. Id. at 26.
115. Id. at 33.
116. Id. at 27.
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in such a way as to exclude virtually all but the two major par-
ties. 11
7
While Williams seemed adamantly opposed to a state law that appeared
to create a duopoly shared by the Democrats and Republicans, 1 8 in American
Party of Texas v. White," 9 the Court found other differential treatment to-
wards the minor parties constitutional.' 2" The Court was confronted with
whether a state law prohibiting a minor party from not having a primary elec-
tion, but relegating it to a convention, was invidiously discriminatory and in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 1
The Court rejected assertions of invidious discrimination. 22 Specifically, the
Court rather conclusorily refused to find that "the convention process [was]
invidiously more burdensome than the primary" process. 23 The appellant
could not demonstrate discrimination of "some substance" nor could the ap-
pellant demonstrate any offense to the Constitution.
24
The White Court, however, did seem to validate a threshold requirement
for a government funded primary election for a minor political party when it
dealt with whether a Texas provision "provid[ing] for public financing from
state revenues for primary elections of only those political parties casting
200,000 or more votes for governor in the [prior] general election" violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 25 The Court upheld the validity of the provi-
sion, reasoning that a political party should not be made to bear the burden of
the additional expense of a state required primary election. 126 Furthermore,
the Court also held that the State was justified in not providing funding to
political parties which had not previously shown such widespread public
support. 27 The Court specifically stated: "[W]e cannot agree that the State,
simply because it defrays the expenses of party primary elections, must also
finance the efforts of every nascent political group seeking to organize it-
self. 12
8
117. Id. at 35-36 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
118. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
119. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
120. Id. at 794-95.
121. Id. at781.
122. Id. at 793-94.
123. Id. at 781.
124. White, 415 U.S. at 781-82.
125. Id. at 791-92.
126. See id. at 793.
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2. Florida Statutes Outright Deny Primaries-Let Alone Funding for Pri-
maries-to Minor Political Parties
In each year in which a general election is held, a primary election
for nomination of candidates of political parties shall be held on the
Tuesday 10 weeks prior to the general election. The candidate re-
ceiving the highest number of votes cast in each contest in the prima-
ry election shall be declared nominated for such office. If two or
more candidates receive an equal and highest number of votes for the
same office, such candidates shall draw lots to determine which can-
didate is nominated.
129
Whenever any special election or special primary election is held
as required in s. 100.101, each county incurring expenses resulting
from such special election or special primary election shall be
reimbursed by the state. Reimbursement shall be based upon ac-
tual expenses as filed by the supervisor of elections with the coun-
ty governing body. The Department of State shall verify the ex-
penses of each special election and each special primary election
and authorize payment for reimbursement to each county af-
fected. 3 0
So how do these laws apply to minor political parties seeking to conduct
a primary election-they do not. 3 ' The primary election method of nominat-
ing candidates is not available to minor political parties. 132 Pursuant to sec-
tion 97.021(17), Florida Statutes, a minor political party is defined as fol-
lows: A "'[m]inor political party' is any group as defined in this subsection
which on January 1 preceding a primary election does not have registered as
members [five] percent of the total registered electors of the state."'133
129. FLA. STAT. § 100.061 (2008).
130. FLA. STAT. § 100.102 (2008).
131. See State ex rel. Merrill v. Gerow, 85 So. 144, 146 (Fla. 1920).
132. See generally State ex rel. Barnett v. Gray, 144 So. 349 (Fla. 1932); Gerow, 85 So. at
146 (stating that the rights and powers conferred and granted by the primary election laws are
limited to those political parties that, at the general election for state or county officers preced-
ing a primary, polled more than five percent of the entire vote cast in the state).
While the Florida Election Code provides that qualified candidates for nomi-
nation to an office are entitled to have their names printed on the official primary
election ballots, this provision necessarily means the qualified candidates of the so-
called major political parties because the primary election laws apparently apply
only to such parties.
21 FLA. JUR. 2d Elections § 120 (2005).
133. FLA. STAT. § 97.021(17) (2008).
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Notably, the aforementioned statutory requirements are similar to the
statutory requirements set forth in White and Williams v. Rhodes. In light of
the historically significant failure of laws like this to provide any footing for
third parties who seek a primary election, it seems clear that the application
of this in Florida raises constitutional concerns and this issue needs to be
revisited. In Florida, if a third party wished to conducted a primary election,
and on January 1, 2008, decided that it wanted to be placed on the presiden-
tial primary ballot for the primary election that took place on January 29,
2008-the date of Florida's primary-the third party would have to rely on
whether it met the five percent threshold during the last race, which was the
gubernatorial race which took place in November 2006.134 This is a deadly
blow to any third party, as historically, third parties tend to grow their sup-
port and constituents nationally, as exemplified by the significant support
garnered by Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Robert LaFollette, Eu-
gene Debs, Henry Wallace, Strom Thurmond, George Wallace, John Ander-
son, and H. Ross Perot, each of whom garnered at least seven percent of the
votes during the elections. 135 However, the chance of third parties reaching
the five percent threshold in Florida at the time of the previous gubernatorial
election is practically nonexistent given the nature of our political history and
how third parties, or any political party, are formed and emerge to national
prominence. Indeed, the first two parties, the Federalists and the Antifede-
ralists, were formed around supporting and opposing national issues and
agendas. 36 Of course, during any particular primary, the Democrats and
Republicans have their established base, and that established base will likely
remain intact from one primary to the next. 37 However, that maintenance of
an established base is not necessarily with any of the third parties, which
usually flow from national grassroots efforts that are catalyzed by some fi-
nancial and/or political distress that occurred since the previous primary.'
It is this national uprising, as opposed to the limited likelihood of a statewide
uprising, that gives any third party a chance to succeed. Clearly, the present
primary system institutionally supports the maintenance of the Democratic
and Republican bases of support.
134. See id.
135. Paula Shaki, Third Parties Influential in Past, Present Elections, available at
http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/1996-jan-dec/1996_oct/1996-10-
07 the -daily-collegianr1996-10-07d0l-004.htm (Oct. 7, 1996); Results of Presidential Elec-
tions, http://www.usconstitutional.net/elections.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
136. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 22, at 2319.
137. See generally James Bennet & Keith Bradsher, Republicans Again Courting Demo-
crats and Independents, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 2000, at Al.
138. See generally id.
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Moreover, the present primary system financially supports the mainten-
ance of these respective bases of support. In fact, the state funding for the
Democratic and Republican primaries in Florida averaged over $5 million in
2008." 9 Third parties do not get any support through state funding. Thus,
each of the two established major parties has a $5 million advantage over any
third party seeking to have a primary."4
Notwithstanding the unlikely occurrence of any minor party achieving
the five percent threshold, if the threshold is hurdled,
[any group of citizens organized for the general purposes of elect-
ing to office qualified persons and determining public issues under
the democratic processes of the United States may become a minor
political party of this state by filing with the department a certifi-
cate showing the name of the organization, the names of its current
officers, including the members of its executive committee, and a
copy of its constitution or bylaws. It shall be the duty of the minor
political party to notify the department of any changes in the filing
certificate within 5 days of such changes.'
41
More importantly, if a Florida citizen has concluded that her political
interests are not represented by the major political parties, and she seeks to
exercise her rights to political association and assembly via a minor political
party, pursuant to section 103.091(4), Florida Statutes, she will not be al-
lowed to participate in the primary:
Any political party other than a minor political party may by rule
provide for the membership of its state or county executive commit-
tee to be elected for 4-year terms at the primary election in each
year a presidential election is held. The terms shall commence on
the first day of the month following each presidential general elec-
tion; but the names of candidates for political party offices shall not
be placed on the ballot at any other election. The results of such
election shall be determined by a plurality of the votes cast. In such
event, electors seeking to qualify for such office shall do so with the
Department of State or supervisor of elections not earlier than noon
of the 71st day, or later than noon of the 67th day, preceding the
primary election. The outgoing chair of each county executive
committee shall, within 30 days after the committee members take
office, hold an organizational meeting of all newly elected members
139. See generally Beth Reinhard & Rob Barry, Florida Lucrative for McCain, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 22, 2008, at 6B.
140. See generally id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 97.021(17) (2008).
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for the purpose of electing officers. The chair of each state execu-
tive committee shall, within 60 days after the committee members
take office, hold an organizational meeting of all newly elected
members for the purpose of electing officers.1
42
The burden created by the Florida Legislature appears to have over-
stepped its constitutional boundaries as delineated by the Equal Protection
Clause.143 As discussed in Williams v. Rhodes, the state legislature violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it makes it
"virtually impossible for a new political party... to be placed on the state
ballot."' 44 Like the Ohio statute in Williams, Florida statutes have placed on
minority parties an unconstitutionally high hurdle in front of third party can-
didates running for president. 45 In light of the clear enhancement that the
Florida statutes give to the two major parties by aiding their members ability
to engage in the freedoms to associate and assemble by funding their prima-
ries with upwards of $5 million each, in conjunction with their failure to aid
minor parties in the same way, and the considerable tension with the Equal
Protection Clause stemming from, the application of the Florida statutes, as
well as the United States Supreme Court's rulings, make it "virtually imposs-
ible for a new political party ... to be placed on the state ballot."'146 Accor-
dingly, a serious constitutional challenge could be mounted against Florida's
presidential primary as it is presently constituted. 47 As previously stated,
historically, third parties only emerge from presidential election cycles, not
gubernatorial election cycles. As such, relying on gubernatorial election
cycles deliberately inhibits the growth of third parties to the benefit of the
two major parties making this state action constitutionally suspect. Florida
has debilitated any opportunity for a third party to succeed as a presidential
candidate. 48 In effect, Florida has unconstitutionally institutionalized a two
party system. 49
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment rights to associate and assemble for the purpose
of advancing shared beliefs, including political beliefs, are two of the most
142. FLA. STAT. § 103.091(4) (2008).
143. See id.
144. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968).
145. FLA. STAT. § 103.091(4); see generally Williams, 393 U.S. at 23.
146. Williams, 393 U.S. at 24.
147. See generally id.
148. See generally FLA. STAT. § 103.091(4).
149. See generally id.
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precious rights provided to each citizen of this nation. The Framers held an
unabashed obsession for protecting these rights, and these rights are to be
protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
infringement by any state. 50 Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court
will opine on the constitutionality of Florida's statutes, but application of
previous Supreme Court case law, and the facts of how modem third parties
emerge in American politics, appear to make the constitutional viability of
Florida's statutes increasingly suspect.
150. See generally Williams, 393 U.S. at 23.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey reviews major tort cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida and Florida District Courts of Appeal that cover substantive tort is-
sues that were published between the time period of July 2005 until July
2008. It will also cover some federal cases that address Florida substantive
tort law issues. In addition, section XIII deals with tortious conduct that oc-
curs on cruise ships. Although these cases are primarily controlled by admi-
ralty law, the cruise ship industry is a growing and important business in
Florida and elsewhere, and the liability of the cruise industry for injuries
occurring on cruise ships is becoming an area of concern to the increasing
number of persons taking cruises as well as governmental officials. The time
period begins where the last Tort Law Review Survey created for Nova Law
Review ended. It will thus discuss cases that interpret the provisions of sta-
tutes and defenses that deal with elements that constitute the definitions of
the same. It will focus on cases that address provisions or issues for the first
time, clarify areas that have created confusion, or change existing under-
1. See generally William E. Adams, Jr., Tort Law: 2003-05 Review of Florida Law, 30
NOVA L. REV. 75 (2005) [hereinafter Tort Law II].
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standings. Therefore, this article will follow the conventions followed in
selecting cases for discussion utilized in prior Tort Law Survey articles.2
II. DUTY
The dispute over what creates a duty is a legal question that frequently
arises in Tort cases, and the past three years have been no different in Flori-
da's appellate courts. As can be seen, the question of who has a duty and its
extent has arisen in a range of contexts.3 As is the custom, a number of cases
have concerned duties to persons injured in automobile accidents.4 Cases
have arisen concerning the obligations of public utilities and schools.'
In Hewitt v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. 6 the First District Court of
Appeal addressed the duty owed to someone injured by a stolen vehicle, in
which the owner had not secured the keys.7 At this particular Avis car lot, at
least thirty-seven cars, between November 1999 and May 2000, were re-
moved by employees and "rented" or entrusted to other drivers.' "[B]y Feb-
ruary 2001, managerial employees . . . were aware that vehicles had been
missing from the lot.. . ."9 Despite this knowledge, Avis did not establish
safeguards to prevent theft or other wrongful removal and use of its cars.' °
The stolen car at issue in this case "was last seen in Avis's possession on
February 23, 2001, and Avis determined [that] it was missing [on] February
2. See, e.g., id. As in past articles, it does not address every single appellate opinion,
but instead focuses on cases that deal with substantive elements. See, e.g., id. Therefore, it
does not deal with cases primarily focused on evidentiary or procedural issues.
3. See generally Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977); Mi-
ami-Dade County v. Deerwood Homeowners' Ass'n, 979 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2008); Dent v. Dennis Pharmacy, Inc., 924 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Franco v.
Miami-Dade County, 947 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Fernandez v. Fla. Nat'l
Coll., Inc., 925 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Horton v. Freeman, 917 So. 2d
1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Almarante v. Art Inst. of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 921 So.
2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Hewitt v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 912 So. 2d 682
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Pascual v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 911 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Roos v. Morrison, 913 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Grunow
v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 904 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Biglen v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 910 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
4. See Vining, 354 So. 2d at 54; Hewitt, 912 So. 2d at 682; Roos, 913 So. 2d at 59.
5. See Franco, 947 So. 2d at 514; Almarante, 921 So. 2d at 703; Pascual, 911 So. 2d at
152.
6. 912 So. 2d at 682.
7. Id. at 683.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 683-84.
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26, 2001, [but] did not report it [as] stolen until April 5, 2001."" On April 7,
the car collided with the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.' 2 At
the time of the accident, it was Avis's policy to not report a car as stolen until
thirty to forty-five days after it was missing to avoid "customer[s] legitimate-
ly in possession" from being charged with theft. 3 After the accident, Avis,
implemented security measures to prevent theft, which included "chang[ing]
gate locks, park[ing] vans in front of the gates, install[ing] security cameras,
and hir[ing] a night security guard."' 14
The defendant argued that it had no duty to prevent theft, and that the
theft was a superseding, intervening cause. 15 The court correctly analogized
this case to those involving vehicle owners leaving keys inside the vehicle.1
6
Although those cases referenced Florida's statute directing vehicle owners to
not "leave a vehicle unattended without removing the key," the court ex-
tended the rationale to other situations where a defendant creates a foreseea-
ble zone of risk.17 In this case, where theft was rampant, management failed
to take prompt action, and thefts were not promptly reported, the court
deemed it up to the fact finder to determine whether the "defendant's con-
duct created a foreseeable zone of risk, giving rise to a duty to lessen the
risk.""8 Since duty is a question of fact, it would be more accurate to say that
the jury should determine if the duty was breached, but holding that Avis
could be considered liable seemed appropriate. 9 The court also accurately
concluded that it was a jury question as to whether the intervening act of the
theft was a superseding cause.z
The First District Court of Appeal considered whether a vehicular pas-
senger could undertake a duty to others by providing advice to a driver in
Roos v. Morrison.2 ' The "plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle" struck
by a sport utility vehicle, in which the "[d]efendant, Christopher Morrison,
was a rear seat passenger. 2 2 Morrison was asked by the driver of the SUV if
11. Hewitt, 912 So. 2d at 684.




16. Hewitt, 912 So. 2d at 684 (citing Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d
54, 55 (Fla. 1977)).
17. Id. at 685-86.
18. Id. at 686.
19. See id. (citing Deese v. McKinnonville Hunting Club, Inc., 874 So. 2d 1282, 1287
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
20. See id.
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he could safely back up on a roadway, which was blocked by traffic. 23 The
court held that Morrison could be held liable if it was decided that he "agreed
to determine whether the . . . path of travel was clear and failed to use rea-
sonable care in making that determination." 24 Recognizing the potential im-
pact of transferring liability from "driver[s] with mandated insurance cover-
age to ... passenger[s] who may" not have coverage, the court certified to
the Supreme Court of Florida the following question as "one of great public
importance:"
MAY A VEHICULAR PASSENGER BE HELD LIABLE TO
ANOTHER VEHICULAR PASSENGER IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WHERE THE POTENTIALLY LIABLE PASSENGER WAS IN
A SUPERIOR POSITION TO THE DRIVER OF THAT
PASSENGER'S VEHICLE TO OBSERVE A POTENTIAL
HAZARD AND GAVE AFFIRMATIVE ADVICE TO THE
DRIVER WHICH RESULTED IN A COLLISION WITH THE
OTHER PASSENGER'S VEHICLE?25
What duty is owed by a utility company in providing power for traffic
signals? This issue was considered in Pascual v. Florida Power & Light
Co.,26 by the Third District Court of Appeal.27 Carlos "Pascual's vehicle
collided with a ... police car" at an intersection with "an inoperable traffic
signal., 28 Florida Power and Light (FPL) sent technicians to repair a trans-
former the day before the accident.29 The plaintiffs alleged that "the pres-
ence of rodent droppings around the transformer" should have caused the
utility company to realize that rodents were the cause of the power outages.3"
The plaintiffs also alleged that FPL negligently turned off "the grid and traf-
fic signal" when they returned to repair the transformer on the day of the
accident.3' FPL filed a motion to dismiss, denying that they owed a legal
duty to the plaintiffs.32 The court held that by undertaking to repair the failed
transformer, it "assumed a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner., 33 Fur-
ther, FPL assumed a duty to warn pursuant to its contractual agreement "with
23. Id.
24. Id. at 67.
25. Id. at 68.
26. 911 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).




31. Pascual, 911 So. 2d at 153.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 154.
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the [c]ounty to notify them of . . power [outages] within 15 minutes or
less."34 However, the court refused to find that FPL had a duty "to maintain
electrical current to the intersection. 35
The Third District Court of Appeal found no duty to exist for a pharma-
cy in a case involving a motorist who fell asleep and collided with plaintiff's
vehicle in Dent v. Dennis Pharmacy, Inc.36 Garrett Dent "allege[d] that the
prescribing doctor told [Paula] Sparenberg not to drive while taking the [me-
dication]," but that the pharmacist "placed a 'use caution driving' label on
the prescription bottle," thus, negligently causing her to drive when she
should not have. 37 The plaintiff asserted that this created a voluntarily under-
taken duty by the pharmacy. 3 The court found that the pharmacy had done
no more than required by Florida law, and that Dent was an unknown or un-
identifiable third party beyond the foreseeable zone of risk.39
What duty does a school district owe a student injured on an alleged
field trip? The Third District Court of Appeal considered this in Fernandez
v. Florida National College, Inc.40 "Iris Yadira Fernandez... was injured
and her daughter, Claudia Lorena Fernandez ... died" in an accident in a
motor vehicle operated by Jorge Luis Cisneros, a teacher at Florida National
College (FNC).41 FNC offers classes in English for Speakers of Other Lan-
guages, which includes required field trips.42 Teachers are "required to sub-
mit a field trip authorization form to FNC" and students are "to submit a
signed form releasing FNC from liability. '43 Field trips were to "take place
during the scheduled class period," participation would affect grades, and
students were to "provide their own transportation." 44 Mr. Cisneros took the
students on a field trip to Key West after the end of the class period.45 He
"did not inform FNC [nor] ask the students to sign ... release[s]." 46 "[Tihe
excursion [also] did not affect the students' grades . . ,,47Mr. Cisneros
34. Id.
35. Id. at 155 (citing Levy v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 798 So. 2d 778,781 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
36. 924 So. 2d 927,928, 930 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
37. Id. at 928-29.
38. Id. at 929.
39. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 465.003(6) (2005); FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 64B 16-
27.820(1)(d), (e) (1993).
40. See 925 So. 2d 1096, 1100 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
41. Id. at 1098.
42. Id. at 1099.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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"us[ed] his personal credit card" to rent two vans that were used to transport
the students.48 "Mr. Cisneros lost control of the van" that he drove, in which
Mrs. Fernandez and her daughter were passengers.4 9 The court held that Mr.
Cisneros was not "acting within the course and scope of his employment"
and "the plaintiffs failed to allege that [he] was [acting as] FNC's apparent
agent at the time of the accident.,
50
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed another duty issue in
Franco v. Miami-Dade County.51 A unit of Miami-Dade County Fire Rescue
arrived at the home of Ida Franco pursuant to a call concerning Wessner's
mother, Ida Franco." Franco was suffering from chest pains and Fire Rescue
determined that her condition was "'critical' and 'unstable.' 53 Wessner
asked that her mother be transported to South Miami Hospital where a cardi-
ologist was waiting to treat Franco.54 Instead, she was transported to "the
closest facility that provided" critical care pursuant to Fire Rescue protocol.5
The court ruled that Fire Rescue had a "duty when it diagnoses, treats, and
transports patients in... emergency situation[s]," but that it did not breach it
when it adhered to its protocol that determined "the closest appropriate hos-
pital."56
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the duty of a homeown-
ers association in regard to a tree that it had planted in Miami-Dade County
v. Deerwood Homeowners' Ass'n.57 Patricia Perdomo "tripped and fell on a
[c]ounty sidewalk."58 She and her husband "alleged that roots from a tree
near the sidewalk. . . created a vertical separation" that caused the fall.5 9 In
addition to suing the County, the plaintiffs also sued the Deerwood Home-
owners' Association that planted the tree and its lawn maintenance company,
Techlawn. ° The County argued that it, and the Perdomos, relied upon
Deerwood and Techlawn to maintain the tree.61 The court noted that the Su-
preme Court of Florida has previously "held that private landowners are not
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1099-100.
50. Fernandez, 925 So. 2d at 1100-01.
51. 947 So. 2d 512, 516-17 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).




56. Franco, 947 So. 2d at 517.
57. 979 So. 2d 1103, 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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liable for injuries caused by subterranean roots growing under public rights-
of-way."62 Therefore, absent specific facts that showed that either "Deer-
wood or Techlawn undertook to maintain the" roots or repair the sidewalk,
the county could not show that either had voluntarily undertaken a duty.63
Gratuitous planting and maintaining of a tree for nine years was insuffi-
cient.64 The court noted that the pleadings did not allege that either party had
"trimmed a tree root near the sidewalk, repaired the sidewalk, or agreed with
the County to perform... such tasks. 65
In Grunow v. Valor Corp. of Florida,66 the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal considered the duty owed by a wholesale sporting goods distributor in
regard to a firearm legally sold.67 Pamela Grunow, "personal representative
of the estate of Barry Grunow, appeal[ed] .. . a final judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict" entered on behalf of the defendant.68 Nathaniel Brazill was a
suspended student, who retrieved a gun from his grandfather's bedroom and
returned to school to shoot his school counselor. 69 First, however, he stopped
at a classroom, in which Barry Grunow was the teacher, to speak to two of
his friends.70 When Grunow refused to permit the students to leave the class-
room, Brazill shot and killed him with a Raven MP-25, also known as a
"Saturday Night Special."71 Grunow's lawsuit claimed that Valor was "lia-
ble for failing to implement feasible safety mechanisms such as external
locks and/or lock boxes. 72 The court acknowledged that "Florida does not
recognize a cause of action for negligent distribution of a non-defective fire-
arm. 7 3 The court found that "no special relationship [existed] between Va-
lor and either Brazill or Grunow," that Brazill's criminal conduct was not
foreseeable, and that a product is not negligently designed 74 "because the
design used was not the safest possible. 75
62. Deerwood Homeowners' Ass'n, 979 So. 2d at 1104 (citing Sullivan v. Silver Palm
Props., Inc., 558 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1990)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Jd. at 1105.
66. 904 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
67. See id. at 553.
68. Id. at 553.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Grunow, 904 So. 2d at 553.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 554.
74. Id. at 556.
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In Biglen v. Florida Power & Light Co.,76 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal also considered the duty element in relation to a utility company.77
The plaintiff, Michael Biglen, operated "an aerial lift machine, that came into
contact with an overhead power line owned and maintained by" Florida
Power & Light.78 Biglen's job "included parking the machines for storage
and ... raising the booms. ' 79 The power lines "were 'open and obvious to..
. the casual observer,"' and nothing blocked the plaintiffs line of vision.'
The court upheld the summary final judgment in favor of the defendant,
holding that it owed no duty to the aerial lift operator because:
[Ilt was not reasonably foreseeable that an employee would care-
lessly and unreasonably violate the company's guidelines, training,
and the clear warning labels on the machine itself, and lift the
boom far beyond the one or two feet necessary to complete the
task, so high that it contacted a power line.
81
In Horton v. Freeman,82 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed
the duty owed by a married couple to a minor child in their custody and care
while his mother attended to a family emergency.83 The plaintiff appealed
her dismissed complaint in the wrongful death action concerning her son's
death from a drug overdose.' The plaintiff alleged that "the defendants
created an environment for the use of drugs, . . . negligently allowed the use
of illegal drugs,... [and] failed to call an ambulance.... [or] provide appro-
priate care when they knew or should have known that the decedent had
overdosed. ' 5  The court held that the defendants voluntarily assumed "a
duty to care for and supervise a minor. ,86 It clarified that it was "not ex-
pand[ing] premises liability... [for] social host[s] to seek medical attention
for a guest unless [the] host... voluntarily undertak[es the] duty. 817
In Almarante v. Art Institute of Fort Lauderdale, Inc.,"8 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal considered the duty element owed by a private school
76. 910 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
77. Id. at 408.
78. Id. at 406.
79. Id. at 407.
80. Id.
81. Biglen, 91OSo. 2dat412.
82. 917 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
83. Id. at 1065.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1067.
87. Horton, 917 So. 2d at 1067.
88. 921 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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to its students in a busy urban environment. 89 The plaintiff was "struck by a
speeding motorcycle" while crossing a busy highway, "returning to her resi-
dence." 90 The school dormitory buildings were constructed on each side of
the highway.9 "There [was] no pedestrian signal, cross-walk, bridge or other
safety device" to cross the highway.92 "Two previous accidents involving
pedestrian crossings [had] recently occurred ... [and s]chool officials [had]
contacted the Florida Department of Transportation" seeking installation of
safety devices.9 3 The student claimed that she was compelled to cross the
highway to conduct routine student functions. 94 The court reversed a dismis-
sal of the complaint, holding that the school's placement of its dormitories
"on either side of a busy urban highway, requiring [students to cross] on a
daily basis" created a foreseeable zone of danger.95
What duty is owed by a fitness center to a customer suffering a cardiac
event while using its equipment?96 The Fourth District Court of Appeal con-
sidered this duty in L.A. Fitness International, L.L.C. v. Mayer.97 "Alessio
Tringali died as a result of a cardiac arrest ... while using a stepping ma-
chine at L.A. Fitness .... 98 The defendant's sales representative "told the
receptionist to call 911 ."99 Because the representative believed "that Tringali
was having a seizure or a stroke," he did not attempt cardiopulmonary resus-
citation (CPR)."° The plaintiffs medical expert testified that the deceased's
"condition was treatable with defibrillation [and that] CPR could have been
'used to increase the likelihood"' that defibrillation would have been suc-
cessful when applied later.'0 ' Another expert testified that the defendant fell
below industry standards by not having a defibrillator, by not "screen[ing]
individuals prior to their commencing exercise and by failing to employ a
medical liaison."'0
2




93. Almarante, 921 So. 2d at 704.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 705.
96. See L.A. Fitness Int'l, L.L.C. v. Mayer, 980 So. 2d 550, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
97. Id. at 557.
98. Id. at 552.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 553.
102. Id. at 555.
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The court observed that "the duty owed by a health club owner" to a pa-
tron was a matter of first impression. 3 It reviewed cases from other juris-
dictions concerning the duty of business owners to injured patrons and found
that, as a general principle, "summoning medical assistance within a reason-
able time" is what is required.'0° The court held that even if it was required
to render first aid, it was not required "to perform skilled treatment, such as
CPR." 10 5 The court also refused to find that the defendant had a "duty to
have a defibrillator."' 6
The Fourth District reversed a jury verdict in a restaurant slip and fall
case in Izquierdo v. Gyroscope, Inc.1"7 Izquierdo obtained a verdict against
the defendant, owner and operator of Giorgio's Grill, where the plaintiff
"slipped and fell on a wet napkin.' 0 8 The "restaurant, which became a night
club after certain hours... had a tradition of both ... wait staff and custom-
ers [tossing] paper napkins into the air as the music played." "No one would
pick . . . up" the napkins from the floor, which sometimes became wet as
drinks were spilled.'09 The plaintiff had been to the restaurant five or six
times and "knew of the napkin-throwing tradition." ' 0 The jury found for the
defendant, finding "no negligence on its part." '' The appellate court re-
versed the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, finding that the
verdict was "contrary to the undisputed evidence. 11 2 Although the plaintiff
was aware of the napkin-throwing tradition and the danger was arguably
open and obvious, the court held that such knowledge did not negate the de-
fendant's duty to make "reasonable efforts to keep the premises free from
transitory foreign objects."' 1 3
In Kazanjian v. School Board of Palm Beach County," 4 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court also considered the duty element in another school case; this one
involving a public high school." 5 The father of a student who was killed in a
car accident after she and her friends left the school without authorization,
103. Id. at 557.
104. Id. at 558.
105. Id. at 559.
106. Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 562.
107. 946 So. 2d 115, 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).




112. Izquierdo, 946 So. 2d at 118.
113. Id. at 118 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.0710(1) (2004)).
114. 967 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
115. Id. at 261.
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brought suit against the school board. 1 6 Although the school made auto-
mated calls to parents when students were absent from class, the deceased
student's friend testified that the deceased intercepted the calls before her
parents could receive them." 7 The court refused to hold the school board
responsible for supervising students off school property. 1 8 After reviewing
similar cases from other jurisdictions, the court concluded that a high school
student skipping school does not "pose an 'unreasonable risk"' that creates a
duty." 9 The court further held that sovereign immunity applied to the School
Board because its decision concerning its attendance policies was a "discre-
tionary planning level polic[y]. ' 12°
In Luque v. Ale House Management, Inc.,12 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal considered the duty of a bar for serving alcohol to an obviously in-
toxicated person who was then injured in an automobile accident.122 "Luque
was a regular customer" of the Orlando Ale House. 23 On the day in ques-
tion, "he was served.., several beers."' 24 While driving home, a car "cut in
front of him," causing him to swerve and have an accident."2 The plaintiff
claimed that section 768.125 of the Florida Statutes, which states that "[a]
person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages" may be liable if he "kno-
wingly serves [someone] habitually addicted to the use of' alcohol and the
person is injured as a result of the intoxication, 26 defined a cause of action. 27
The court agreed that the plaintiff had a cause of action and denied the de-
fendant's argument that it could not be found to be the cause of the accident




117. Id. at 262-63.
118. Id. at 264.
119. Kazanjian, 967 So. 2d at 267.
120. Id. at 268.
121. 962 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).




126. FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (2007).
127. Luque, 962 So. 2d at 1063.
128. Id. at 1065-66.
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Although generally a question of fact, appellate courts do review causa-
tion cases, particularly those involving questions of proximate cause.'29 The
question of when an intervening cause becomes a superseding one is a ques-
tion that is sometimes difficult to resolve. During the time period covered by
this article, a number of cases have arisen.
The Third District Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment on
proximate cause grounds in East Coast Electric v. Dunn.130 Allen Dunn and
Clifford Stewart, while employed by Florida Power and Light, "were se-
riously injured while testing an uncovered bus bar.' 13 ' The "bar was manu-
factured by General Electric [and] shipped . . . to East Coast without the
proper covers ('end caps').' ' 32 "East Coast, a licensed electrical contractor,"
installed the bus bars. 13 3 Dunn and Stewart sued both General Electric (GE)
and East Coast. 134 GE "filed motions for summary judgment," arguing that
East Coast's "'decision to supply power to the building,"' which caused a
"phase flash" that injured the plaintiffs, was a "superseding and intervening
cause" that absolved GE. 35 GE had warned East Coast "that the busway
system should not be energized."' 36 The court upheld the summary judgment
for GE, holding that East Coast's "act of energizing the busway system was
[reckless and] 'so far beyond the realm of foreseeability that, as a matter of
law and policy,' [GE could not] be held liable for the Plaintiffs' injuries."'137
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered a proximate cause issue
in a products liability case in Lindsey v. Bell South Telecommunications,
Inc. 38 Mark Lindsey, a mechanic, "used a tire changing machine" that was
supposed "to handle tires with a rim diameter of up to 20 inches," but was
problematic with "19 inch or 19.5 inch tires."' 39 Lindsey used a tire iron to
help the machine break the bead on the tire. 4° Other employees told the
plaintiff's employer that the machine was having problems with "19 and 19.5
129. E. Coast Elec. v. Dunn, 979 So. 2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1019.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Dunn, 979 So. 2d at 1019.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1020.
137. Id. at 1021.
138. 943 So. 2d 963, 964-65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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inch tires."'' Once, while using the tire iron, it slipped and Lindsey almost
fell over, which caused a herniated disk. 4 2 The manufacturer argued that
Lindsey's use of the metal bar was a superseding intervening cause.'43 The
court noted that the jury could have found that his conduct was not "'so un-
usual, extraordinary or bizarre"' as to relieve the defendant of liability. 4"
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the liability of the De-
partment of Children and Family Services (DCF) in regard to a child abuse
complaint in State v. Amora145 "[T]he Miami Children's Hospital (MCH)
called the DCF hotline because" of concern about a child, Marissa Amora,
who had been admitted to the hospital."* The child's x-ray revealed "a frac-
tured clavicle, for which the mother had no explanation.' ' 147 Despite this and
other concerns expressed to the Department, DCF failed "to contact the fa-
ther, to staff the case with a [Child Protection Team] and to conduct a home
study [before the child] was released from the hospital. ' 148 After release, the
child was physically abused by the mother's boyfriend, causing serious,
permanent injuries." 9 Marissa's adoptive parents sued DCF for negligently
investigating the complaint.50 DCF argued that it was not "the legal cause of
the injuries."'' The court ruled that there was competent substantial evi-
dence to support a verdict against the Department.
52
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered whether the deceased's
illegal conduct was a superseding cause in Kaminer v. Eckerd Corp. of Flor-
ida. 53 "Kaminer died as a result of ingesting Oxycontin" obtained from a
fraternity brother.5 4 "The fraternity brother got the drug from his roommate,
a pharmacy technician who had stolen it from his employer, Eckerd... Eck-
erd did not argue that it was not negligent, but [instead argued that the de-
ceased's] criminal conduct in ingesting the drug" precluded recovery.'55
Although "there was no evidence ... that [the deceased] knew the nature of
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Lindsey, 943 So. 2d at 965.
144. Id. at 965-66 (quoting Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 899 So. 2d 1105, 1116
(Fla. 2005)).
145. 944 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 433.
148. Id. at 435.
149. Id.
150. Amora, 944 So. 2d at 435.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 436.
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the drug," the court held that "knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled
substance can be presumed from actual possession."' 56 The court further




Over the years, the impact rule has caused disagreement and confusion
in Florida appellate courts. 58 This has continued to be the trend in recent
decisions.'59 During the past three years, the Supreme Court of Florida has
issued two opinions concerning its scope."6 In addition, the district courts
have also tried to discern when it should be applied.' 6' The debate about
what types of causes should not be bound by the rule also continues.
The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a conflict amongst the district
courts concerning the impact rule in Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, L.L. C. '
62
The Court reviewed an appeal of a "summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant[]," the hotel. 63 The plaintiff, Mrs. Willis, was robbed at gunpoint in
a parking lot across the street from the hotel, which the plaintiff asserted was
the location where she was instructed to park and assured that it was safe by
the security guard employed by the service that was contracted to provide
security to the hotel.' 64 "[A] gun was placed to her head as she" exited her
rental car and the gunman also instructed her to lift her clothing as he
"patt[ed] down her exposed body."'' 65  She also claimed that "the security
guard refused to provide assistance" after the robbery. 66 The Court, in a per
curiam opinion, held that a negligence case could proceed because the plain-
156. Id. (citing Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 171 (Fla. 2002)).
157. Kaminer, 966 So. 2d at 454-55.
158. See Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Willis
v. Gami Golden Glades, L.L.C. (Willis II), 967 So. 2d 846, 847-48 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
159. See generally id.
160. See id.
161. See Brady v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc., 948 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); Reiser v. Wachovia Corp., 935 So. 2d 1236, 1236 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(per curiam); Matsumoto v. Am. Burial & Cremation Servs., Inc., 949 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Woodard v. Jupiter Christian Sch., Inc. (Woodard 1), 913 So. 2d
1188, 1190 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
162. Willis I, 967 So. 2d at 846, 848.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 848-49 (citing Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, L.L.C. (Willis 1), 881 So. 2d 703,
704 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
165. Id. at 849 (citing Willis I, 881 So. 2d at 704).
166. Id. (citing Willis 1, 881 So. 2d at 704).
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tiff had "sustained multiple types of contact [that] qualify as an impact." '67
Chief Justice Lewis, in a concurring opinion, sought to clarify that a physical
injury is not required when there has been an impact upon the plaintiffs per-
son.'68 Justice Pariente agreed with this interpretation of the rule, but con-
curred to express her opinion that the Court should recede from the rule.169
She would replace it with a traditional foreseeability analysis. 70 On the oth-
er hand, Justice Wells argued in dissent that the rule required the Court to
"objectively test[] the reliability of claims for emotional distress," which he
apparently believes requires a "physical injury or manifestation."'' Similar-
ly, Justice Cantero argued in dissent that the rule in Florida has always re-
quired "physical injury or 'manifestation."" 72 After reviewing the case law
and disagreeing with the interpretations of that line of cases by the majority
and concurring opinions, he argued that if some physical manifestation is no
longer required, then the plaintiff should be required to "prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that she [sustained] severe emotional distress" which
was foreseeable.'73
The Supreme Court of Florida also reviewed the rule's application in an
HIV claim in Florida Department of Corrections v. Abril.174 The plaintiff, "a
senior licensed practical nurse at the Hendry County Correctional Institution
(HCCI), [gave] unprotected mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to an inmate,"
who "was infected with hepatitis C.' 75 Abril sought to have HIV and hepa-
titis testing "through the department's workers' compensation [center],
which declined ... because it [decided] that the resuscitation did not expose
her to a risk of infection."'' 76 "[T]he institution's chief medical officer sub-
mitted a blood sample ... to ... a laboratory under contract with the State..
.,,1 The laboratory faxed results indicating that Abril had tested positive
for HIV to "unsecured fax machine[s] in the institution's business office and
... in ... the [Department of Corrections'] offices of Chief Health Servic-
es."'1 78 A number of employees not authorized to receive the results became
167. Willis 11, 967 So. 2d at 850.
168. Id. at 855 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
169. Id. at 861 (Pariente, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 863.
171. Id. at 864-65 (Wells, J., dissenting).
172. Willis 11, 967 So. 2d at 877 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 876-77.
174. 969 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
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aware of them.179 It was later determined that the test results were a false
positive and therefore incorrect. 8 °  The plaintiff argued that section
381.004(3)(f), Florida Statutes, which outlines that 1I1V test results are con-
fidential, created a duty on the part of the defendant.18 ' The Court agreed
that this statute, along with those recognizing confidentiality in medical
records, created a duty to handle the test results with reasonable care.' 82 It
also ruled that the impact rule does not bar the action because the damages
arising from the statutory breach would be emotional in nature.'83 In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Pariente repeated her argument that the impact rule
should be replaced with a traditional foreseeability analysis."8 Similarly,
Justice Cantero argued that the Court should not continue to create ad hoc
fact-specific exceptions.'85 Justice Bell argued in dissent that creating a new
tort cause of action in addition to the criminal and administrative remedies
provided by the statute was contrary to legislative intent.186
The First District Court of Appeal reviewed claims for negligent han-
dling of a dead body in Brady v. SCI Funeral Services of Florida, Inc. 187 The
court reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defendant funeral service,
which acknowledged that it had buried the plaintiffs' newborn son in an un-
lawfully shallow grave. 188 The trial court had ruled that the "impact rule
precluded an award . . . under a negligence [claim]." '189 The appellate court
held that the plaintiffs could proceed under a negligence claim where the
"alleged misconduct is willful and wanton," rejecting the trial court's re-
quirement that a claim be made of "gross negligence, or tortious interference
with a dead body." 19°
Who qualifies as a close personal relative for the purpose of bringing an
emotional distress claim? The First District Court of Appeal considered
whether stepchildren could qualify in Watters v. Walgreen Co. 91 The appel-
lants claimed that the pharmacy negligently provided instructions "on pre-
scription pain medication," resulting in their stepfather dying from an over-
179. Abril, 969 So. 2d at 203.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 205.
182. Id. at 205-06.
183. Id. at 207-08.
184. Abril, 969 So. 2d at 208 (Pariente, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 212 (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id. at 216 (Bell, J., dissenting).
187. 948 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
188. Id. at 978-79.
189. Id. at 978.
190. Id. at 978-79.
191. 967 So. 2d 930, 931 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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dose. 9 2 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants in the
negligent infliction of emotional distress action because the appellants were
not related by blood or adoption.'93 The First District Court of Appeal con-
cluded that this interpretation was too narrow and the close family relation-
ship requirement needed to be assessed on a "case-by-case" basis, rejecting
interpretations from the "Third and Fourth District[s] ... to the extent that
they require[d] a formal 'legal relationship."fl94
In Matsumoto v. American Burial & Cremation Services, Inc., ' the
Second District Court of Appeal decided an appeal that reviewed a directed
verdict in favor of the defendant funeral home in an emotional distress
case. 196 The case was filed by Ms. Matsumoto claiming that the defendant
had "tortiously interfered with the body of her deceased father" by cremating
it. 197 The court determined that the claim was not one "for outrageous con-
duct causing severe emotional distress." 198 The plaintiff had been estranged
and not in contact with her father for over two years, but claimed that he
desired a "military funeral and burial."' 99 On the other hand, the deceased's
companion, who "held a general power of attorney," and the deceased's
brother, testified that the deceased had directed "them to cremate his re-
mains. ' '200 The court correctly held that the conduct of the funeral home was
not only not outrageous, but in fact in compliance with section 470.002(18),
Florida Statutes, which specifies that a deceased body is to be disposed of by
the "legally authorized person," who was, in this case, the deceased's broth-
er.201 The court further held that the funeral home was not under "a due dili-
gence requirement" to search for relatives of a higher priority, such as the
daughter in this case, whom the brother and companion had claimed had no
knowledge of how to contact Ms. Matsumoto. °2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered a "negligent infliction
of emotional distress" claim in Woodard v. Jupiter Christian School, Inc.
(Woodard 1)203 "The minor plaintiff was a student at the [defendant's institu-
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 933-34.
195. 949 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
196. Id. at 1055-56.
197. Id. at 1056.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Matsumoto, 949 So. 2d at 1056.
201. Id. at 1057 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 470.002(18) (2002) (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. 913 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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tion], a private Bible-centered school .... ,,2o4 Administrators at the school
directed Todd Bellhorn, a secondary teacher/chaplain, "to question and coun-
sel [the plaintiff] about his sexual orientation. ' '20 5  "Bellhorn assured the
[plaintiff that] their conversation was confidential. 2 °6 The plaintiff "dis-
close[d that] he was homosexual. '2 7 "Bellhorn relayed the information to..
. school[] administrators, who ...disclosed the information to others ...
[and] expelled the student .... "20 The plaintiff claimed that he "was berated
by the press and the [school's] president.., and shunned by his schoolmates
as a result of the disclosure." 2°9 The plaintiff argued that the court should
recognize it as another exception to the impact rule, analogous to the excep-
tion approved by the Supreme Court of Florida for breaches of confidentiali-
ty between a psychotherapist and patient in Gracey v. Eaker.210 The court
declined to create another exception and instead certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida the following question: "Does the impact rule preclude a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of the breach
of confidential information provided to a clergyman? ' 21,
Judge Stone concurred, arguing "that a teacher designated as a 'chap-
lain' . . . even [at] a Christian school, is not a [clergy] member. ' 212 On the
other hand, Judge Farmer dissented, arguing that "the impact rule does not
apply [in cases] in which the injury is predominantly emotional... 'such as.
invasion of privacy [cases]." 213 Thus, he opined that it should "not apply
to breach of confidentiality" cases, such as allegedly occurred in this case.21 4
The Supreme Court of Florida discharged jurisdiction of the case-
leaving it somewhat clear what their position on the issue might be.2 15 Jus-
tice Pariente dissented to the discharge, arguing that the Fourth District Court
of Appeal's opinion is at odds with the Supreme Court of Florida's decisions
in Gracey and Abril, discussed above.216 Justice Pariente repeated her asser-
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1190.
207. Id.
208. Woodard 1, 913 So. 2d at 1190.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 356 (Fla. 2002) (stating that breach of
confidentiality between psychotherapist and patient was an exception to the impact rule).
211. Id. at 1191-92.
212. Id. at 1192 (Stone, J., concurring).
213. Woodward 1, 913 So. 2d at 1192 (Farmer, J., dissenting) (quoting Kush v. Lloyd, 616
So. 2d 415, 422 (Fla. 1992)).
214. Id. at 1194.
215. See Woodard v. Jupiter Christian Sch. (Woodard If), 972 So. 2d 170, 170 (Fla. 2007)
(per curiam).
216. Id. (Pariente, J., dissenting).
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tion that Florida should abandon the impact rule.2 17 Further, she argued that
the "case is substantially similar to [other cases where the Court has] recog-
nized exceptions to the impact rule. 218 As explained by Justice Pariente, the
treatment received by Woodard by the press, the president of the school, and
his schoolmates "'is at least equal to that typically suffered by the victim of a
defamation or an invasion of privacy. '219 Certainly, it should be no more
difficult to recognize that emotional distress probably resulted from "the
breach of the confidentiality in this case" than it was in the Gracey and Abril
cases. 220  Further, as the dissent points out, the discharge leaves unclear
whether the Court was deciding that the impact rule precluded recovery or
that the plaintiff did not have "a valid underlying cause of action" in regard
to the act of the teacher.22'
The Fifth District Court of Appeal applied the impact rule in Reiser v.
Wachovia Corp.,222 in which Scott Reiser, the plaintiff, "was confronted in
the bank's lobby by four hooded, armed" bank robbers.2 3 One of the "gun-
men held a rifle" to Reiser's head while the other robbers opened the vault
and stole cash. 24  Reiser claimed emotional trauma, but "[t]he trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of the bank., 225 The appellate court held
that a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim cannot be recognized
"in the absence of a physical impact or injury. 226
V. DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES
The liability for the use of a dangerous instrumentality has been ad-
dressed in a number of cases. 227 As will be seen, at least one case has also
considered the impact of federal legislation in this doctrinal area.228 What
217. Id. at 171.
218. Id.
219. Id. (quoting Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 356 (Fla. 2002)).
220. See Woodard II, 972 So. 2d at 171.
221. Id. at 172 n.I.





227. See generally Kumarsingh v. PV Holding Corp., 983 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); Saullo v. Douglas, 957 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Estate of Villa-
nueva v. Youngblood, 927 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Ming v. Interamerican
Car Rental, Inc., 913 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Fischer v. Alessandrini, 907
So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Festival Fun Parks, L.L.C. v. Gooch, 904 So. 2d 542
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
228. See Kumarsingh, 983 So. 2d at 601.
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vehicles should be considered dangerous instrumentalities for purposes of
this doctrine has also been considered.229
The Second District Court of Appeal considered the impact of legisla-
tive modifications of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Fischer v.
Alessandrini.2 ° "Dean James Alessandrini was killed after Jeffrey Salerno,"
who was driving a truck belonging to Salerno's father-in-law, John Fischer,
hit the motorcycle driven by Alessandrini. 23' Fischer had loaned the truck to
his son, who then lent it to the defendant. 32 The court held that the legisla-
tion's limit on liability was applicable in this case.233 It rejected the trial
court's interpretation that Fischer was not protected because he did not lend
the truck to Salerno, noting that the doctrine to which this limitation applied
made owners liable for use by someone other than the original permissive
user.
234
The Second District Court of Appeal also considered an appeal in a
dangerous instrumentality case in Estate of Villanueva v. Youngblood.235 T.
Patton "Youngblood took [his] Lexus to Extreme Auto Sales & Accessories,
Inc., and consigned it there for sale. 236 One of the latter's principals, Teddy
Aponte, drove the car home and to a Christmas party where he "was in-
volved in [an] accident that killed Mr. [Reinaldo] Villanueva. ' '237 Although
Youngblood did not expressly limit Extreme Auto's use, he assumed that it
,"238 cutrfsd"oetn h
would be used "solely for test drives. The court refused "to extend the
'shop' exception to the" dangerous instrumentality doctrine to this situa-
tion.239 The court also held that summary judgment was not appropriate for
Youngblood on the issue of whether "the theft or conversion exception" was
appropriate and on the issue of the scope of the consent.2'
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the impact of the federal
Graves Amendment upon the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Kumar-
singh v. PV Holding Corp.24 "Juan Ortiz crashed his rental car into the Ku-
229. See Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071, 1071, 1072 (Fla. 1984).
230. 907 So. 2d at 571.
231. Id. at 570.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 571-72 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)(3) (2005)).
234. Id.
235. 927 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
236. Id. at 956.
237. Id. at 957.
238. Id. at 956.
239. Id. at 959.
240. Villanueva, 927 So. 2d at 960.
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marsinghs' vehicle," injuring Mr. Kumarsingh. 242 "The plaintiffs filed suit
against [the defendants,] ... alleging vicarious liability as owners/lessors of
the car, and negligent entrustment. ''243 The appellate court held that the act
"supersedes and abolishes all state vicarious liability laws as... appl[ied] to
lessors of motor vehicles for causes of action filed ... after ... the effective
date of [the] statute," August 10, 2005.2'
In Festival Fun Parks, L.L C. v. Gooch,245 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal considered whether "a go-kart amusement ride operated on an en-
closed track" could be considered a dangerous instrumentality. 246 The plain-
tiff was injured when his go-kart crashed into a wall after being bumped by
another go-kart driven by an unidentified driver.247 Concession go-karts at
such tracks "range in top speed from 14 MPH at a family-type track to 18-20
MPH at tracks ... for older drivers. 248 The court looked at various Florida
Statutes that define "motor vehicle" and concluded that a go-kart amusement
ride did not fit comfortably in those definitions, but acknowledged that such
definitions were not controlling in any event. 249 Instead, it examined whether
the instrumentality was "peculiarly dangerous in its operation" and compared
the go-kart to golf carts,25° which were deemed by the Supreme Court of
Florida to be dangerous instrumentalities in Meister v. Fisher.25 ' The court
noted that golf carts were extensively regulated similar to automobiles and
that they were capable of causing serious injury.252 By contrast, the court did
not feel that this type of go-kart was similar in either of these aspects. 253 It,
therefore, "conclude[d] that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine does not
apply to concession go-karts. ''2M
In Ming v. Interamerican Car Rental, Inc.,255 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal also addressed the dangerous instrumentality doctrine 6.25  The defen-
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 601.
245. 904 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
246. Id. at 544.
247. Id. at 543.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 545.
250. Festival Fun Parks, LLC., 904 So. 2d at 544-46 (citing Meister v. Fisher, 462 So.
2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 1984); S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 631 (Fla. 1920)).
251. 462 So. 2d at 1071.
252. Festival Fun Park, LL.C., 904 So. 2d at 546.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 913 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
256. Id. at 653.
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dant, Interamerican, rented a car to Callie Robinson.257 Robinson's daughter,
Leslie, struck and killed Robert Doyle in the rental car on the way "to her
mother's workplace." '258 Leslie was on probation and had her driver's license
revoked "at the time of the accident." '59 Callie never gave express permis-
sion to her daughter to drive the car.260 The court noted that rental car com-
panies were still responsible for damages caused by the operation of the ren-
tal vehicle unless the breach of custody of the vehicle amounted to conver-
sion or theft. 261 The court reversed the summary judgment entered on behalf
of Interamerican, because of "issue[s] of material fact on the [conversion]
issue. These included the fact that the car was used "during the rental
term," neither Interamerican nor Callie reported the car as stolen prior to or
after the accident, "Interamerican made no demand to possess the car," and
"Leslie was driving the car to give it to her mother" so she "had no intent to
possess the car ... longer than necessary to" give possession to the autho-
rized driver. 63 Chief Judge Pleus dissented on this part of the holding be-
cause he deemed it unreasonable to believe that Interamerican would have
agreed to permit Leslie to drive the car with a suspended license and that it
had no knowledge of her use prior to the accident.264 The court also reversed
the summary judgment entered on behalf of Callie Robinson because it be-
lieved there was evidence to support implied consent to drive the car because
she knew that Leslie had driven her vehicles previously, the keys were argu-
ably left in the open, there was a familial relationship, and her conduct after
the accident reflected a lack of consent.265
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered this doctrine as applied to
the lessee of the tractor of a tractor-trailer in Saullo v. Douglas.266 "Jessie
Douglas, a professional truck driver, was driving a tractor-trailer rig .... 267
"[T]he trailer was fully owned by Dart" Transit Company, but "[t]he tractor
was owned by Mr. Douglas" and permanently leased to Dart. 268 Douglas
"detached the trailer in the far right-hand lane of a four-lane roadway" so that
257. Id. at 652.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Ming, 913 So. 2d at 652.
261. Id. at 653 (citing Stupak v. Winter Park Leasing, Inc., 585 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla.
1991)).
262. Id. at 654.
263. Id. at 655.
264. Id. at 658 (Pleus, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Ming, 913 So. 2d at 657-58.
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he could use the tractor to help his brother remove his brother's car from
mud in which it was stuck.269 Douglas "directed his brother's girlfriend to
park her car behind the trailer and to activate the [car's] emergency" [flash-
ing signals]. aT Saullo swerved his automobile in order "to avoid the trailer
and the automobile," and was killed when his car "slammed into a tree." '271
The court first discussed competing interpretations of federal statutes and
regulations governing the liability of interstate motor carriers in regard to
leased vehicles.272 Some courts had interpreted the regulations to impose
strict liability upon the lessees, while others only held the carrier liable if the
driver was acting within the scope of his employment. 273 The court con-
cluded that the latter view was the better interpretation. 274  The appellate
court concluded that the trial court had correctly concluded that "Douglas
was not acting within the scope of his employment" in leaving the trailer on
the roadway in order to extricate his brother's car from the mud.275 Never-
theless, as lessee of the tractor, and as the entity that permitted Douglas to
operate it, the court held that Dart was in the best position to assure safe op-
eration and was "subject to vicarious liability for" Douglas' negligence. 276
VI. TOBACCO CASES
The Supreme Court of Florida again visited the ongoing tobacco litiga-
tion in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.277 As previously discussed in earlier
summaries in this law review, Florida courts have been dealing with litiga-
tion against tobacco companies for the past few years.278 In addition to the
Engle case, the district courts are also reviewing tort claims brought against
various cigarette-makers. 279 The Supreme Court of Florida case involved a
number of issues and split the court on some of them.280
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 82.
272. Id. at 84.
273. Id. at 84-85.
274. Id. at 86.
275. Id.
276. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 87.
277. 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
278. See, e.g., William E. Adams, Jr., Tort Law: 2001-2003 Survey of Florida Law, 28
NOVA L. REV. 317, 327-30 (2004) [hereinafter Adams, Tort Law I ].
279. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1282 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
280. Id. at 1254-55.
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The case originated as a nationwide class action of smokers and their
survivors, but the Third District "reduced the class to" Florida smokers.281
The trial court then divided this complex action into three separate trial phas-
es.282 "Phase I consisted of a year-long trial [devoted entirely to] the issues
of liability and entitlement to punitive damages [to] the class as a whole., 283
On July 7, 1999, "the jury rendered a verdict for the Engle Class and against"
the tobacco companies on all counts. 284 "Phase II was divided into two
[parts] .... ,,285 Phase 1-A was to resolve "entitlement and amount of com-
pensatory damages [to] the three individual class representatives-Frank
Amodeo, Mary Farnan, and Angie Della Vecchia. ' '286 Phase 11-B was to
determine the "total lump sum punitive damage award... [to] the class as a
whole.
287
"At the conclusion of Phase 11-A, the jury" awarded a total of $12.7
million dollars in compensatory damages offset by the comparative fault of
the individual class members.2 88 At the conclusion of Phase 11-B, the jury
awarded a lump sum to the entire class of $145 billion in punitive damag-
es.289 Post verdict motions and appeals followed. °
First, the Court addressed the claim by defendants of the res judicata ef-
fect of the settlement agreement reached by the State of Florida and many of
the defendants in this action in a prior lawsuit filed by the State in 1995,
seeking reimbursement of Medicaid funds expended to treat victims of to-
bacco-related illnesses.29 Several theories were advanced in the suit, which
also sought punitive damages. 292 Settlement was reached in 1997.293 The
Court unanimously concluded that the settlement agreement between the
State of Florida and many of the defendants in that case did not preclude a
punitive damages award in this case because "the Engle Class relied on...
injuries personal to the class members," as opposed to the claims of the State
based on the general interest of all citizens. 294
281. Id. at 1256.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1256-57.




289. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1257.
290. Id. at 1257-58.
291. Id. at 1258.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1261.
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"A majority of the Court ([Justices] Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and
Quince) conclude[d] that an award of compensatory damages [was] not [re-
quired before] a finding of entitlement to punitive damages. 2 95 This is be-
cause this group believed that the two types of awards serve distinct purpos-
es.296 A different majority-Justices "Wells, Anstead, Pariente, and Bell-
conclude[d, however, that] a finding of liability is required before [an] en-
titlement to punitive damages can be determined, and that liability is more
than a breach of duty."297 Further, the Court determined that the amount of
"the punitive damages award[ed] was. . . excessive. '"298 Although declining
"to impose a bright-line ratio" between the amount of compensatory damag-
es and punitive damages, the Court found the disparity between the two in
this case to violate constitutional notions of due process. 299 It explained that
"few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensa-
tory damages, to a significant degree," would satisfy this standard.300 Thus,
the ratio of 145 to 1 in this case was problematic. 30 1 Further, it stated that
before determining the appropriateness of the amount of the punitive damag-
es, as opposed to simply entitlement to the same, a determination of the
compensatory damages for the entire class needed to be made, as opposed to
the assessment here of compensatory damages for the three representatives
alone.0
2
The Court agreed with the Third District that the original trial plan
needed to be altered.30 3 Originally, Phase IH of the trial was "to decide the
individual liability and compensatory damages claim[] for each" member of
the class--estimated to be approximately 700,000.304 The Court concluded
that continued treatment of the matter as a class action was not feasible be-
cause of individualized issues of "legal causation, comparative fault, and
damages., 30 5 The Court held that class members could individually litigate
their claims with "the Phase I common core findings ... hav[ing] res judicata
effect in those [individual] trials. ''3°6 These would not include findings of
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages,
295. Id. at 1262.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1265 n.8.
299. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1264-65.
300. Id. at 1264.
301. Id. at 1265.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1258.
305. Id. at 1268.
306. Id. at 1269.
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which the Court deemed to require individualized determinations. 3 7 The
Court also reminded trial counsel to guard against improper arguments, al-
though it declined to reverse the judgments because of the statements made
in this case.30 8 The Court noted that some of counsel's arguments that were
race-based or pled for nullification of the law had been subject to successful
objection. °9
The Second District considered the application of design defect theory
to tobacco cases in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Arnitz.310 Arnitz, who ob-
tained a jury verdict, argued that the cigarettes were defectively designed
because of a curing process that increased the level of carcinogenic sub-
stances in the tobacco and additives that made them easier to inhale and in-
creased the speed of nicotine absorption into the cells.311 The court rejected
the defendant's argument that federal law pre-empted "the design defect
claim."
312
The Fourth District has also considered the application of tort law to to-
bacco cases in Ferlanti v. Liggett Group, Inc.3 13 It also held that the plaintiff
was not pre-empted from bringing tort claims in tobacco cases.314 Further, it
reversed the summary judgment for the defendants because there were ge-
nuine issues of material fact concerning the design of the cigarettes and
"whether the risks associated with smoking cigarettes were open, obvious,
and common knowledge. ,31 5 Finally, it ruled, that judicial notice of "wheth-
er the dangers of smoking were common knowledge [was inappropriate]
when ruling on the" summary judgment motion.316
The Fourth District further considered the application of Engle and the
other Florida tobacco cases in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis.3 17 Liggett ap-
pealed a jury verdict in favor of Beverly Davis, who prevailed on the theories
of negligence and defective design.31 8 Davis smoked Chesterfield cigarettes
from 1951-74.319 "In 2001, [she] was diagnosed with lung cancer., 320 Her
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1271.
309. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1273 (agreeing that some of the remarks injecting race into the
case were improper).
310. 933 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 698.
313. 929 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
314. Id. at 1174.
315. Id. at 1175.
316. Id. at 1176.
317. 973 So. 2d 467,470-73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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negligence claim was based upon her argument that Liggett was negligent in
continuing to manufacture cigarettes after it became known that cigarettes
posed a significant health risk to smokers. 32' Liggett argued that the negli-
gence claim was pre-empted by federal law, which permits the continued
production of cigarettes. 322 The court agreed that the negligence claim in this
case was barred because Congress had refused to ban tobacco products and
the allowance of negligence claims for continued production, therefore, con-
flicted with congressional intent.
32 3
The court next addressed the strict liability design defect claim. 324 First,
the court held that the federal government's decision to permit the continued
manufacture of cigarettes prevented the application of the risk-utility test to
this particular design defect claim, even if Florida ultimately recognized it as
an appropriate test for other design defect cases.325 The court next addressed
how the ordinary consumer test applied to this claim. 326 The trial court had
instructed the jury in regard to this claim that '"[a] product is unreasonably
dangerous because of its design if the product fails to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect, when used as intended or in a manner rea-
sonably foreseeable by the manufacture." '' 327 It rejected Liggett's claim that
plaintiffs must prove that its cigarettes presented dangers greater than that
"expected by the ordinary consumer., 328 Although Congress recognized in
1968 that health risks existed and ordered warnings on cigarette packs, the
court noted that there was evidence presented up until that time that "the
average consumer may not have known of the dangers., 329 The court also
rejected Liggett's argument that the plaintiff was required to prove a safer
alternative design, and instead stated that it was a factor to consider in design
defect cases.33°
VII. RELEASES
In 2003, the Forth District Court of Appeal ruled that a mother could
not bind her child to an agreement "to arbitrate potential personal injury
321. Id. at 470.
322. Davis, 973 So. 2d at 470.
323. Id. at 472-73.
324. Id. at 470.
325. Id. at 474.
326. Id. at 474-75.
327. Davis, 973 So. 2d at 470.
328. Id. at 474.
329. Id. at 474-75.
330. Id. at 475.
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claims" in Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc.331 Since that case, Florida
district courts have tried to determine the limits of its holding.332 This sec-
tion will review some of those cases which have tried to discern which crite-
ria will void a waiver provision signed by a parent of a minor child.
The Second District Court of Appeal considered the enforceability of an
exculpatory clause in a release in Murphy v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of
Lake Wales, Inc.3 33 When Elizabeth Murphy joined the YMCA, she signed a
waiver "which include[d] the following ... provision[s]: . . . 'I understand
that even when every reasonable precaution is taken, accidents can some-
times still happen. .. I understand that this release includes any claims based
on negligence.'
334
Murphy was injured "while using exercise equipment at the YMCA[]"
facility.335 Noting that "[e]xculpatory clauses are disfavored and ... con-
strued against the party claiming" waiver,336 the court ruled that the "reason-
able reader might be led to believe that the waiver [only] extends ... to...
injuries that were unavoidable 'even when every reasonable precaution' had
been taken. 3 37 Therefore, summary judgment for the defendant was re-
versed.338
The Third District also considered the enforceability of a waiver provi-
sion signed by a parent in Krathen v. School Board of Monroe County.339
Krathen and her parent signed a release from liability so that Krathen could
participate as a cheerleader. 340 She was injured during a practice.34' After
reviewing other district court cases and the Shea case, the court held that this
release was binding because the parent in this case had decided that cheer-
leading was a beneficial activity for her daughter.342
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the ability of parents to
bind their children with pre-injury releases in Fields v. Kirton.3 43 "Bobby
331. 870 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 908 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2005).
332. See, e.g., Fields v. Kirton, 961 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
Krathen v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe County, 972 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
333. 974 So. 2d 565,566 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 567-68 (citing Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 580 So.
2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions., 571 So. 2d 92,
94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
337. Id. at 567-68.
338. Murphy, 974 So. 2d at 569.
339. 972 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 889.
343. 961 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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Jones was the primary residential parent for his fourteen year old son, Chris-
topher." 344 Christopher lost control of his all terrain vehicle at the Thunder
Cross Motor Sports Park, and was killed in the accident.3 5 His father had
signed a release for the activity. 346 The court, referencing cases such as
Shea, acknowledged that parents may execute waivers for "obtaining medi-
cal care, insurance, or participation in school or community sponsored activi-
ties. 347 The court, however, indicated that these waivers were different from
one which "impacts the minor's estate and... property rights. 348 The court
held that "a pre-injury release executed by a parent" will not be enforced. 349
The court recognized that the decision conflicted with one from the Fifth
District.35° The court, therefore, certified the following question to the Su-
preme Court of Florida:
WHETHER A PARENT MAY BIND A MINOR'S
ESTATE BY THE PRE-INJURY EXECUTION OF A
RELEASE.35'
The Southern District of Florida also attempted to discern Florida law
on parental releases for minors' injuries in In re Complaint of Royal Carib-
bean Cruises Ltd.35 2 The father and his son were injured when the jet ski that
they rented from an entity owned by Royal Caribbean was hit by another jet
ski, also rented from the same entity.353 After reviewing the Florida case law
discussed in this article, it held that this was "a private activity provided by a
for-profit business" and therefore the release signed by the father could "not
be enforced against his minor child. ' '35 Despite winning on this issue, the
court granted summary judgment because the plaintiffs were unable to dem-




347. Id. at 1129 (citing In re Complaint of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 403 F. Supp. 2d
1168, 1173 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
348. Fields, 961 So. 2d at 1129-30.
349. Id. at 1130.
350. Contra Lantz v. Iron Horse Saloon, Inc., 717 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998); see id.
351. Fields, 961 So. 2d at 1130.
352. 403 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1169 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
353. Id. at 1169-70.








Florida courts have also had the opportunity to decide when the persons
or entities who engage in tortuous conduct are immunized from liability.
This has most often arisen in regard to actions by governmental agents acting
within the scope of their duties. Who qualifies and what types of actions are
protected have been reviewed in a number of cases during the time period
covered by this article.
In Jibory v. City of Jacksonville,356 the First District Court of Appeal re-
fused to permit sovereign immunity or a good faith defense from allowing
the plaintiff's case to proceed beyond summary judgment.357 Jibory brought
a false imprisonment claim for an arrest on a warrant that was void because
he had previously been arrested on the warrant over two years earlier.358 The
City had "failed to delete the warrant from its computer records., 359 The
City argued "that it had no legal duty under principles of sovereign immunity
to accurately maintain its records and that [its] officers ...acted in good
faith., 360 The court rejected the arguments that the defendant had no duty or
was protected by sovereign immunity.361 Because the warrant was void be-
cause it had previously been executed, the court also refused to allow the
City to claim the good faith defense.362
The First District Court addressed another immunity issue in regards to
child abuse reports in the case of Urquhart v. Helmich,363 which involved an
appeal of a final summary judgment of a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in a claim against a doctor who erroneously reported to
authorities that the plaintiffs had abused their daughter.364 The plaintiffs
"took their then twenty-eight day old daughter to the Fort Walton Beach
Medical Center emergency room" because of breathing problems that she
365
was experiencing. Pursuant to a CT scan ordered by defendant, "the radi-
ologist who interpreted the scan," Dr. Helmich, indicated that the child had a
skull fracture that was caused by either birth trauma or child abuse.366 The
plaintiffs told the physician that the child had been removed "from the birth
356. 920 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
357. Id. at 667.
358. Id. at 666-67.
359. Id. at 667.
360. Id.
361. Jibory, 920 So. 2d at 667.
362. Id. at 668.
363. 947 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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canal with forceps," but she did not think that the fracture was caused by
that.367 She recommended other tests, which were declined by the parents.
The court interpreted the immunity provisions found in the Florida Sta-
tutes regarding child abuse reports. 369 Section 39.203, provides "a general
grant of immunity to a person who makes" a good faith report that a child
has been abused.37 ° Section 39.201, requires "medical doctors and other
health care professionals who have reasonable cause to suspect" abuse or
neglect, to report their suspicions to the appropriate state authorities. 371 The
court read the two provisions together to conclude that the doctor would have
immunity if there was objective evidence of reasonable cause to suspect
abuse.372 Further, it found that even lacking reasonable cause, the doctor
retained immunity from civil liability if the report was made in good faith.373
In this case, the court still held that, as a matter of law, the court could de-
termine reasonable cause existed despite allegations by the plaintiffs that a
subsequent CT scan showed no skull fracture and that the doctor made the
report out of spite because of arguments with the parents.374
The First District considered the provisions of another immunity statute
in Andrew v. Shands at Lake Shore, Inc.37 5 The plaintiffs alleged that their
fifteen year-old son, Dustin, died as a result of a radiologist at Shands Hos-
pital whose unreasonable failure to properly examine a CT scan, which
would have revealed a malignant tumor.376 Shands is engaged in a joint ven-
ture with the University of Florida College of Medicine, acting through the
Board of Trustees, in which all radiologists permitted staff privileges are
employed by the College of Medicine.377 The appellate court held that sec-
tion 768.28(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which immunized the radiologist
from tort liability in this case, does not protect a third party private entity
such as Shands, which is "jointly responsible for the radiologist's con-
duct. 378
The Fourth District considered the qualified immunity of inspectors
from the Department of Agriculture and a sheriffs deputy who arrested the
367. Id. at 540-41.
368. Urquhart, 947 So. 2d at 540-41.
369. See id. at 541.
370. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 39.203 (2008).
371. Urquhart, 947 So. 2d at 541; see FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2008).
372. Urquhart, 947 So. 2d at 542.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 543.
375. 970 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 889.
2008]
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
plaintiff in Vaughan v. Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Ser-
vices.379 The inspectors entered Vaughan's property to inspect his citrus
trees without a warrant. 380 After Vaughan refused entry, the inspectors called
the Broward County Sheriffs Office and Deputy Weller appeared and ar-
rested Vaughan.381 The court considered whether section 581.031(15)(a),
Florida Statutes, which gives a general grant of power to inspectors "'to en-
ter into... any place' thought to house or contain anything that could threat-
en agricultural interests" and section 581.184, Florida Statutes, which re-
quires the sheriff to assist and protect department employees in obtaining
such access, immunized the defendants from suit.382 The majority conceded
that the defendants' actions violated the Fourth Amendment, the arrest was
invalid, and that the sheriffs office and state could be required to compen-
sate the plaintiff.383 However, the court held that "reasonable public officials
in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the defen-
dants could have believed [that] the law authorized entry without a war-
rant., 384 The majority believed this, in part, because inspectors at the time
were routinely entering property without warrants.385 Judge Farmer argued
vigorously in dissent that the actions of the defendants violated settled Fourth
Amendment law, and that a general immunity statute did not shield their
actions.386 As he noted, the statutes do not dispense with "the requirement of
a warrant" and there were no exigent circumstances giving the inspectors the
right to claim a good faith belief.
387
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the immunity of a hos-
pital in a false imprisonment case in Montejo v. Martin Memorial Medical
Center (Montejo /). 388 Luis Alberto Jimenez, an undocumented Guatema-
lan, "sustained brain damage and severe physical injuries" in an automobile
accident. 389 He "was transported to Martin Memorial Medical Center [and
then] transferred to a skilled nursing facility. ' 390 Because his injuries ren-
dered him mentally incompetent, Montejo Gaspar Montejo was appointed his
379. 920 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. ld. at 652.
383. Id. at 652-53.
384. Vaughan, 920 So. 2d at 653 (citing Walsingham v. Dockery, 671 So. 2d 166, 172
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 654 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 659.
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guardian.391 "Jimenez was readmitted to [the hospital] on an emergency ba-
sis" on January 26, 2001.392 He was still in the hospital in November, and
"Montejo filed a guardianship plan," seeking skilled care for the following
twelve months.393 Martin Memorial intervened, seeking "permission to dis-
charge Jimenez" and transport him to Guatemala.394 The circuit court
granted the hospital's request, but "Montejo filed a motion to stay the court's
... order."395 Although the court ordered the hospital to respond to the mo-
tion, the hospital proceeded to transport Jimenez to the airport in an ambul-
ance and then to Guatemala via private plane.396 The district court reversed
the trial court's order because of "insufficient evidence that Jimenez could
receive adequate care in Guatemala [and] because 'the trial court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to authorize"' Jimenez's deportation. 397
Montejo then filed a lawsuit claiming that Jimenez had been falsely im-
prisoned "in the ambulance and on the airplane. 3 98 The defendant argued
that it was immune because its actions were done pursuant to an order valid
at the time of its actions. 399 The court pondered the question of whether the
action was done without legal authority or color of authority.4°° The court
held that legal authority may be met "by irregular or voidable process, but"
not void process.4 °1 It held that an order that lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion was void.4 °2 The hospital claimed that it was entitled to absolute im-
munity for an act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding, but
the court rejected that these acts were protected by the litigation privilege
because the actions were not during the proceeding or pursuant to "an effort
to prosecute or defend [the] lawsuit. ''4°3 It also rejected the defendant's
claim of qualified immunity as afforded state agents because the hospital was
not acting as a governmental agent executing the order.4°4 While reversing
the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, the court indicated that it was a
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1267.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 1267-68.
396. Id. at 1268.
397. Id. at 1268 (citing Montejo v. Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (Montejo 1), 874 So. 2d
654, 658 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
398. Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1268.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1268-69.
401. Id. at 1269.
402. Id.
403. Montejo 11, 935 So. 2d at 1270.
404. Id. at 1271.
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question of fact to be resolved at trial as to whether the hospital's "actions
were unwarranted and unreasonable.' 4
5
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered how immunity statutes
applied in a defamation case against a psychologist who reported suspected
sexual abuse to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) in Ross v.
Blank.4°6 The plaintiff's "wife met with Blank, a practicing psychologist...
in connection with [her] divorce. 4 °7 In one session, she brought her older
daughter to discuss a situation in which the daughter had showered with the
plaintiff.40 8 After consulting with a colleague who advised Blank that "there
was sufficient evidence" to report possible child abuse, "Blank made a report
to DCF."409 The plaintiff sued, arguing in part that because Blank waited
from March 19, when she was informed of the alleged showering episode,
until June 10, when she actually reported it, she did not suspect child abuse
had occurred. 410 The plaintiff argued that the report was made to retaliate
against him for banning her "from further involvement with the children."41
Citing Urquhart, the court agreed with the First District that motivation was
irrelevant where a professional with mandatory reporting allegations has a
reasonable basis to suspect abuse." 2 The court held that a reasonable basis
existed.413 In addition to being told of the showering episode, the plaintiff's
wife also told Blank that the plaintiff "kept naked pictures of the daughters
on his desk and in his car.' 414 The court also rejected defamation claims
against Blank for statements that she made to a court-appointed custodial
evaluator and the guardian ad litem involved in the custody dispute that
Blank believed the plaintiff was a pedophile.415 These statements were pro-
tected by the litigation privilege. 6
The Fourth District considered another defamation appeal and the issue
of immunity in Cassell v. India.417 India was a police officer injured while
attempting to arrest a suspect.418 He asked for light duty work, but "contin-
405. Id. at 1272.
406. 958 So. 2d 437,439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).




411. Ross, 958 So. 2d at 439.





416. Ross, 958 So. 2d at 441.
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ued to work out using light[] weights," activity approved by his doctor.419
His supervisor, Cassell, believed that his weight training "was inconsistent
with [the] light duty assignment and" reported this to his superior officer and
the city's insurance department, who "placed India under surveillance. 42 °
After observing India lifting weights, the "department [then] contacted the
Florida Department of Insurance (DOI) to request a fraud investigation. 42'
Another officer approached Cassell on three separate occasions to ask about
"rumors that India was.., to be arrested. ' 22 On the third occasion, Cassell
indicated that he was. 23 Cassell also told a PBA representative that India
had not gotten hurt on duty.424 The PBA representative believed "that Cas-
sell was trying to influence him to deny India a disability pension, [so the
representative] complained to Internal Affairs" about Cassell's accusation. 5
The court concluded that it had no difficulty concluding that Cassell's state-
ments to "superior officers and representatives" were absolutely privileged
because he was authorized to report suspected fraud. 426 Cassell was also
privileged to tell the PBA representative that he believed a fraudulent claim
was being considered. 27 The court was more troubled about the statements
to a subordinate, but ultimately held that a statement concerning "a depart-
ment rumor of worker's compensation fraud... [by someone with] personal
knowledge of the circumstances [and in response to an inquiry was] suffi-
cient to bring [it] within the scope of Cassell's duties." 28 It also concluded
that the immunity applied to an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim also brought by India.429
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the "liability of law en-
forcement officers and their governmental employers in [relation to] the ex-
ecution of an arrest warrant and ... taking [a person] into custody" in Wil-
lingham v. City of Orlando.43° Mr. Willingham's wallet was stolen and soon
thereafter he discovered that his identity had been used unlawfully by Craig
Caldwell when the latter was charged for speeding. 3' Mr. Willingham got
419. Id.
420. Id. at 191-92.
421. Id. at 192.




426. Id. at 194.
427. Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 195.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 196.
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the speeding charge dismissed because of mistaken identity.432 Several years
later, Officer Wayne Costa of the Orlando Police Department arrested Wil-
lingham outside of his residence on an outstanding warrant "for failure to
redeliver a hired vehicle. ' '433 Willingham protested "that his identity had
been stolen and ... offered to get documentation," but Costa chose not to
investigate the mistaken identity assertion. 434 Willingham was confined for
five days, until an investigation of his assertions was completed.435 Willing-
ham sued the officer for false arrest and sued his employer, the City of Or-
lando, and Orange County, which operated the jail where he was taken, for
false imprisonment and false arrest.436 Officer Costa claimed immunity un-
der section 768.28(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which immunizes officers
from tort liability or suit for acts within the scope of employment "unless
[the] officer ... acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose., 437 The court
held that summary judgment for the officer is not appropriate if "a reasona-
ble trier of fact could possibly conclude that the conduct was willful and
wanton," and also that probable cause is an affirmative defense in a false
arrest claim.438 The court noted that false imprisonment requires that "the
detention [be] without color of legal authority," unlike malicious prosecution
where "the detention is malicious, but under ... due form[] of law., 4 3 9 The
court held that the officer was immune because he "acted reasonably under
the circumstances in fulfilling the nondiscretionary requirements of his posi-
tion ... even if it was mistakenly issued."440 It also upheld summary judg-
ment for the city and county on the ground that "[t]he responsibility to en-
force the law[] for the [public] good [does not create] a duty to act with care
toward[s] any... individual." 44 1
IX. PRIVACY/DEFAMATION
The First District Court of Appeal reversed a jury verdict in a false light
invasion of privacy case in Gannett Co. v. Anderson."2 The plaintiff in the




435. Willingham, 929 So. 2d at 46.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 46-47 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (2003)).
438. Id. at 48.
439. Id.
440. Willingham, 929 So. 2d at 49.
441. Id. at 50.
442. 947 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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companies for an article that he argued "impl[ied] that he ... murdered his
wife."4 3 He originally filed a claim for libel, but because some of the ar-
ticles were beyond the two-year statute of limitations for libel, he amended
his complaint and argued that the privacy claim was controlled by the four-
year statute for unspecified torts, section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes."4
After noting that the false light tort is not universally accepted and that the
Supreme Court of Florida had not directly recognized it, the court concluded
that the Supreme Court of Florida had tacitly recognized its potential exis-
tence.4 5 The court held that since "the plaintiffs false light claim [was] not




It reached this conclusion because this claim was based upon the harm to the
plaintiffs reputation as a result of the alleged false impression raised by the
article.47 It certified, however, that this decision conflicted with a case from
the Second District Court of Appeal.4 8
Can a witness in a medical malpractice case sue defendant doctors who
try to get him disciplined for testimony provided? In Fullerton v. Florida
Medical Ass'n (Fullerton 1),449 the First District Court of Appeal addressed
this issue7. ° Dr. John Fullerton testified "in a medical-malpractice [case]
brought against [Dr.] Jonathan B. Warach, [Dr.] Pravinchandra Zala, and
[Dr.] Joseph 0. Krebs. ' '451 The lawsuit "resulted in a judgment exonerating
them., 452 The defendant doctors sent a letter to the Florida Medical Associa-
tion (FMA) seeking discipline against Fullerton, complaining that Fullerton's
"testimony fell below reasonable professional standards, [and] was made 'for
the sole purpose of propagating a frivolous lawsuit for financial gain,' and
that he. . . 'presented false testimony and false theories.'4 53 Fullerton sued,
alleging several theories, including defamation.454 The defendants argued
that "section 766.101, Florida Statutes (2003), and the federal Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (HCQIA), immun-
443. Id.
444. Id. at 2,4.
445. Id. at 6 (citing Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc'd Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678
So. 2d 1239, 1252 (Fla. 1996)).
446. Id. at 7.
447. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 10.
448. Id. at 11 (citing Heekin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 789 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001)).
449. 938 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).




454. Fullerton I1, 938 So. 2d at 589.
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ize[d] the FMA" and individual doctors from these claims.455 The court held
that Florida's peer-review statute was created to "evaluat[e] and improv[e]
the quality of health care" so it refused to extend the immunity provisions to
review testimony given by a doctor.456 The court noted that defamatory
statements in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged.457 In reviewing
the HCQIA, the court agreed that it also did not immunize the defendants in
this case.458
In University of Miami v. Ruiz, 4 59 the Third District Court of Appeal re-
viewed the right of physicians to claim the protection of the Neurological
Injury Compensation Act (NICA), section 766.316, Florida Statutes.460 The
Ruiz' "pre-registered at Jackson North Maternity Center" for medical care.46 1
Mrs. Ruiz received a pamphlet that indicated that the hospital participated in
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.462 "The hos-
pital representative did not discuss the brochure" nor did the brochure indi-
cate that any staff physicians were participants in the plan.463 Three weeks
later, Ruiz's "baby was delivered.., and was born with significant and per-
manent brain damage. '4 64 In their malpractice action, the plaintiffs com-
plained that they were not given proper notice of NICA.4 65 The court re-
jected that the defendant physicians were excused from giving notice be-
cause Mrs. Ruiz arrived in an emergency condition.466 The court accepted
the plaintiffs' arguments that the physicians had three weeks after registra-
tion with the hospital to provide notice and that the hospital's notice was
inadequate to provide notice of the physicians' participation.467
The Third District Court of Appeal considered a defamation case
against an employer and its human resources manager in American Airlines,
Inc. v. Geddes.468 The plaintiff became involved in disputes with fellow em-
ployees concerning the placement and use of personal computers brought to
455. Id.
456. Id. at 591.
457. Id. at 592 (citing Fariello v. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2004)).
458. Id.
459. 916 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
460. Id. at 868.
461. Id. at 867
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Ruiz, 916 So. 2d at 867.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 869.
467. Id.
468. 960 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
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work by the employees. 469 One employee reported that the plaintiff "had
threatened to 'cut out his intestines. ' '470 Plaintiff denied the statement, al-
though "he admitted to using other than 'church talk"' to the complainant.47'
Meenan, the human relations supervisor, investigated and talked to various
employees who were identified as witnesses.472 She then gave the plaintiff a
"'first advisory"' which apparently included a suspension.473 The plaintiff
alleged that the "investigation was maliciously motivated because of a prior
suit against his employer. 'A 74 The jury, in a confusing verdict, exonerated
the human relations supervisor, but found American Airlines guilty.475 The
court reversed the verdict because there was no evidence of a defamatory
statement made to a third party.476 All statements made between "execu-
tive/managerial employees are considered to be the corporation talking to
itself," statements made to persons identified as witnesses were a part of the
investigation, and statements made to other employees in the plaintiff's de-
partment who wanted to know why the plaintiff was disciplined were in the
interest of "the disciplinary practices of [the] employer and... the safety and
security of [the] workplace. 4 77
In Charles v. State,4 7 8 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the
defamation claim of a discharged employee.479 Charles, an employee of the
Department of Children and Families (Department), was, pursuant to de-
partmental policy, advised of termination of his employment in the presence
of another employee.48° In this instance, the witness was a Department hu-
man resources employee.48' Charles repeatedly asked why he was being
dismissed and was told it was "because of his 'criminal lifestyle.' Charles
alleged that this statement was" untrue and defamatory.482 The appellate
court ruled that the statement was not actionable where the communication
was invited by the claimant under the invited defamation defense.483
469. Id.
470. Id. at 832.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Geddes, 960 So. 2d at 832 (emphasis added).
474. Id.
475. Id. at 833.
476. Id. at 834.
477. Id.
478. 914 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
479. Id.
480. Id. at 2.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Charles, 914 So. 2d at 3-4.
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When are words that can be viewed differently by different groups con-
sidered defamatory? This issue was one of the ones considered by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.484 The plaintiff's
stepson, an employee and member of the defendant, Jews for Jesus, Inc.
(Jews for Jesus), provided copy for the latter's newsletter, which was also
posted on the group's website, that implied that the plaintiff had converted
her religious beliefs and had become a member of the organization.485 The
plaintiff sued, claiming: "1) false light invasion of privacy, 2) defamation,
and 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress," in addition to "negligent
training and supervision. ' , 86 The court first considered whether the informa-
tion could be considered defamatory since the members of Jews for Jesus
would have considered the alleged actions to reflect positively about the
plaintiff's character.487 However, the website was viewed by others beside
the members, and in fact, the plaintiff discovered the material by one of her
relatives.488 The court acknowledged that one view of defamation considers
information "defamatory if the plaintiff is prejudiced in the eyes of a sub-
stantial and respectable minority of the community. 489 In fact, this is a posi-
tion expressed by Comment e to section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.490 However, because the Supreme Court of Florida has not adopted
this comment, the court declined to adopt it, and upheld dismissal of the de-
famation claim. 4 9 1 Similarly, because the organization considered the alleged
actions positively, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
could not succeed.492 The court was more troubled by the false light
claim. 493 False light claims permit persons to argue that something "highly
offensive to a reasonable" man could be recognized.494 It noted that depth of
feelings about religion could cause someone to feel aggrieved when falsely
accused of converting religion.495 However, it also recognized that no Flori-
da appellate court had expressly affirmed a judgment on a false light claim,
although tacit acknowledgment existed.496 Therefore, it reversed dismissal
484. 944 So. 2d 460,465-66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
485. Id. at 462.
486. Id. at 462-63.
487. Id. at 465.
488. Id. at 466.
489. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 465.
490. Id. at 465-66.
491. Id. at 466.
492. Id. at 467.
493. See id. at 468.
494. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 467.
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of this count and certified "the following question as being one of great pub-
lic importance: Does Florida recognize the tort of false light invasion of
privacy, and if so, are the elements of the tort set forth in section 652E of
Restatement (Second) of Torts? ' 4 9 7
The Fourth District Court of Appeal decided an invasion of privacy ap-
peal in Straub v. Scarpa.498 The defendant sent a letter to members of her
homeowners association asking them "to provide her with proxy rights to
vote for a slate of' candidates for board positions. 499 The letter asserted that
the "owners would be better represented by" persons who only included ne-
cessary expenditures in the operating budget and that the upcoming budget
"contain[ed] very expensive items... hav[ing] nothing to do with the opera-
tion of [the] community. ' '5°° The court upheld the dismissal of the suit, not-
ing that it was an attempt to stifle political speech, because it did not mention
the defendant by name nor describe him and its content "was not 'highly
offensive to a reasonable person.'
5 0
In Alan v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. ,502 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal addressed a defamation claim by a practicing attorney arrested and
"charged with [being] accessory after the fact to murder, threats or extortion,
tampering with a witness, and solicitation to commit perjury. '50 3 "Alan vi-
sited an alleged eyewitness to the murder," which his client was accused of
committing. 5°4 Alan was acquitted of the two charges that were not dropped
by the State.5°5 The Post used information obtained from the arrest warrant,
probable cause affidavit, and "evidence and testimony presented" at trial.
506
Noting that "[a] newspaper 'has a qualified privilege to report accurate-
ly on information received from government officials,"' the appellate court
agreed with the trial court that "the published statements were fair, accurate
and impartial. 5
07
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided an appeal of an alleged
slander in Scott v. Busch.50 8 Plaintiff Marie Melton-Treworgy ran a "bed and
497. Id.
498. 967 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
499. Id. at 439.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 438-39 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977)).
502. 973 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
503. Id. at 1178.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 1178-79.
507. Alan, 973 So. 2d at 1180.
508. 907 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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breakfast business by renting rooms in her home."5°9 The defendant, "Randy
Bush, and her husband own[ed the] home adjacent to Treworgy."5 ° After
"bad feelings developed between the parties," Bush ran for a seat on the
Flagler Beach City Commission.51 ' During a public meeting, the defendant,
"[w]hile looking directly at the [p]laintiff, . . . angrily stated that a person in
her neighborhood had obtained an illegal permit."5 1 2 The plaintiff alleged
that both persons who had and some who had not attended the meeting ques-
tioned her "about obtaining illegal permits and ... questioned her honesty
and integrity." 5 3 The appellate court disagreed with the trial court that this
"statement was a pure opinion," which is not actionable, because the defen-
dant "did not disclose the factual basis [for] her opinion ... [nor state that] it
was just her opinion., 514
The federal Southern District Court of Florida considered Florida defa-
mation law in a case brought by a professional basketball player against a
newspaper, a newspaper columnist, and the owner of the Phoenix Suns pro-
fessional basketball team in Fortson v. Colangelo.15 Fortson, a professional
basketball player with a history of committing flagrant fouls and a reputation
of being a rough player, sued the defendants concerning statements made
about him following an incident in a game in which he was called for a fla-
grant foul that caused a Suns player to break his wrist, and that earned Fort-
son a $1000 fine and three-game suspension.516 Colangelo made statements
that were broadcast and published in the media, after the game, that referred
to Fortson as a "thug., 517 The columnist, Peter Vecsey, wrote a column that
also referred to Fortson as a "vacant lot[]" and "meaningless mass." 51 8 Vec-
sey also accused Fortson of "mugging" defenseless rivals, "maliciously des-
tabilizing a player in mid-flight," "thugg[ing] out," and "attempted mur-
der., 519 The court refused to find that these statements were defamatory. 50
First, the court explained that pure opinion or rhetorical hyperboles are not
actionable. 521 The court stated that the line between factual statements and




513. Scott, 907 So. 2d at 664.
514. Id. at668.
515. 434 F. Supp. 2d 1369,1372-73 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
516. Id. at 1373-75.
517. Id. at 1376.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 1376-77.
520. Fortson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1385.
521. Id. at 1379.
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these kinds of comments is difficult to draw, but one for the court to deter-
mine as a matter of law. 22 The court noted that the test is one that requires
the statement to be considered in its totality and in context.2 3 The court held
that Colangelo's statements about the plaintiff being a thug would not lead
the "reasonable listener of any sports program" or any reasonable reader of a
sports section to infer that Fortson "'was a vicious criminal of [any] sort. '524
Similarly, the court found that the reasonable reader would not have inferred
from Vecsey's statements that Fortson was a criminal. 25 It also noted that
these statements were published in a column that clearly would lead the
reader to believe that at least some of the assertions were matters of opi-
526nion.
X. PREMISES LIABILITY
The duty owed by a landowner towards persons who enter his property
has been an issue long debated in the common law. Historically, the com-
mon law has varied the duty depending upon the status of the entrant and the
condition that injures him. As has been the case in past survey articles,527
Florida courts have considered various aspects of this doctrinal area during
the past three years.12' This includes a Supreme Court of Florida case at-
tempting to clarify one of its precedents.529
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the duty of a landowner in re-
gard to conditions on the land that extend into the public right-of-way so as
to create a foreseeable traffic hazard in Williams v. Davis.530  "Twanda
Green, an employee of Diamond Transportation Services, Inc., was . ..
transporting vehicles in a procession from one rental car location to anoth-
er. '531 Green was killed when the car she was driving "was struck by a dump
truck" while Green was attempting a turn at an intersection. 32 Green's estate
"claimed that foliage on the property" of Williams, which abutted the inter-
section, "obstructed Green's view of other traffic as she approached the in-
522. Id.
523. Id. (quoting From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 57 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1981)).
524. Id. at 1381.
525. Fortson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1385.
526. Id. at 1381.
527. See Adams, Tort Law I1, supra note 1, at 81.
528. See e.g., Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 2007).
529. See id.
530. Id. at 1052, 1054.
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tersection. 5 3  The Court noted that the evidence did not indicate that the
foliage "extended [beyond] the bounds of the property," which was critical
for its holding.534 The Court referenced the holding of Whitt v. Silverman,535
which held that a commercial landowner could be liable for injuries to pede-
strian passers-by for a failure "to provide safe egress to vehicles exiting the
premises. '  However, the Court was unwilling to extend this duty to pri-
vate owners of residential property in regard to foliage that does not extend
beyond the property.537
When is the owner responsible for injuries on property that it has
leased? The Second District Court of Appeal considered this issue in Russ v.
Wollheim.538 Russ was injured "while descending a ladder on the premises of
Dinettes Unlimited, Inc., during his employment with the corporation.
5 39
Dinettes leased the property from the Wollheims.5 ° Mr. Wollheim was
"president and chief executive officer of Dinettes. '54' Although a lessor can
avoid liability for injuries to an invitee, the court held that it could not if the
lease fails to confer complete and exclusive possession and control of the
premises to the lessee.542 The lessor had not done so in this case where the
lease permitted "the lessee to 'alter, add to and improve the [piroperty sub-
ject to [1Iessor's prior written approval.' ' 543
Does a business invitee lose that status by engaging in violent acts to-
ward another customer? The Second District Court of Appeal addressed that
question in Byers v. Radiant Group, L.LC.54 A violent conflict erupted be-
tween the occupants of two vehicles in the parking lot of a convenience store
owned by the defendant. 545 Tragically one person was killed and another
seriously injured when the driver of one of the cars "drove his vehicle direct-
ly into" the other two.5" The injured survivor and estate of the deceased
brought a negligence action against the driver and the owner of the store.547
The trial court concluded that the deceased and the survivor changed their
533. Williams, 974 So. 2d at 1055.
534. Id. at 1055-56.
535. 788 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2001).
536. Williams, 974 So. 2d at 1058-59 (citing Whitt, 788 So. 2d at 222).
537. Id. at 1063.




542. Id. at 1287.
543. Russ, 915 So. 2d at 1287.
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status from business invitees to uninvited licensees or trespassers by being
instigators of violence.548 The appellate court refused to equate this situation
to those where an invitee changes status "by going to a part of the premises
that was off-limits" or by staying past the expiration of the invitation.5 49 Al-
though the court conceded that "a particular act of violence" could potential-
ly cause someone to forfeit his status, such as committing a robbery on the
premises, it was unwilling, as a matter of law, to say that the acts in this case
rose to that level at the summary judgment stage.55° A concurrence by Judge
Altenbernd clarified that he thought that a jury could ultimately determine
that the status was lost if an invitee "intentionally ... remain[s] on the prop-
erty to engage in a . . . brawl, [instead of] as a matter of self-defense. 551
Altenbernd noted that depending upon which version of the facts that a jury
believed, the deceased may have been committing a felony by beating anoth-
er person and a car with a baseball bat and thus would be precluded from
recovery by "section 768.075(4), which prevents a property owner from be-
ing held liable under a negligence theory to an individual who is injured
while committing or attempting to commit a felony. 552 It was also under
dispute whether the survivor "was [also] committing or attempting to commit
a felony" during the brawl. 3
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the duty owed a tenant in
Smith v. Grove Apartments, L.L. C.5 54 The plaintiff, Franklin L. Smith, "fell
from his step ladder [while] attempting to clear and trim overgrown foliage
above the parking lot" of the apartment complex where he was a tenant.
55
"Smith had repeatedly complained to the landlord . . . [that] tree branches
and vines over the parking lot ... were scratching vehicles, causing power
outages, and hitting motorists in the eyes as they... enter[ed] and exit[ed]
their vehicles. 556  Florida Power and Light trimmed trees that impacted
power lines, but "declined Smith's request to [do further] trim[ming]. '
Smith then decided to engage in self-help by taking it upon himself to do the
trimming of vegetation that he considered necessary to alleviate the remain-
ing problems.558 The landlord argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
548. Id. at 508 (referencing circuit court ruling).
549. Byers, 966 So. 2d at 509.
550. Id. at 510.
551. Id. at 511 (Altenbemd, J., concurring).
552. Id. at512-13.
553. Id. at 513.




558. Id. at 584.
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landlord was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries." 9 The appel-
late court recognized that a landlord has a "statutory duty to [keep] common
areas in a safe condition."56 The court held that the plaintiff was clearly
within the class meant to be protected by the statute.56' The court then held
that summary judgment for the defendant had to be reversed because the
issue "of whether the tenant's own actions was an intervening and indepen-
dent cause ... so as to relieve the landlord of any liability" was a factual one
upon which reasonable minds could disagree.562
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of a lan-
dlord in regard to an injury off premises in Ramirez v. M.L. Management
Co.563 A child, who was a tenant in the defendant's apartment complex, was
bitten by another tenant's pit bull "in a park adjacent to the... complex. 564
"The park was advertised by the.., complex as an amenity" to its tenants.565
The complex rules specifically prohibited pit bulls.566 The fact that the pit
bulls were "occasionally . . . loose in the complex" had been reported to the
management, but the owner "had not been asked to leave for violation of the
rules. 5 67 The court held that a jury could find a landlord liable for injuries
beyond its premises if it extends its operations, which could be found here
where the landlord invited its tenants to take advantage of the park as an
568amenity. Further, the landlord had a duty to undertake reasonable precau-
tions to protect its tenants from a vicious dog owned by another tenant of
which it had knowledge.569
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of a lan-
downer in a case to a plaintiff who "aggravated a knee injury while 'shooing
cows' that had wandered onto his property from adjacent property" in Flori-
da Power & Light Co. v. Morris (Morris 1/).570 "The cows were owned by
Jose Ruiz who occupie[d] the F[lorida] P[ower &] L[ight] property under a
written license .... ",57 In a prior appeal of the case, the court had reversed a
559. Smith, 976 So. 2d at 585.
560. Id. at 586 (referencing FLA. STAT. § 83.51(2)(a)(3) (2007)).
561. Id. at 587.
562. Id. at 589.
563. 920 So. 2d 36, 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
564. Id. at 36-37.
565. Id. at 36.
566. Id. at 37.
567. Id.
568. Ramirez, 920 So. 2d at 38.
569. Id. at 39.
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dismissal of the complaint.572 The court noted that a landowner could "be
liable to a third party if ... he retain[ed] a possessory interest in the property
... [or] responsibility for maintenance and inspection" of it.573 As owners of
stock are statutorily liable for damages caused when such stock are willfully,
intentionally, carelessly, or negligently allowed to stray or run at large,574 the
court held that FPL was not liable absent assumption of liability in the li-
cense. 575 The court therefore reversed the judgment against FPL because the
license agreement did "not impose a duty upon [the landowner] to construct,
repair, or maintain the fence. 5 76 In addition, FPL's retention of the "right to
enter the premises" did not constitute control so as to impose a duty.
577
Judge Farmer disagreed in a dissent which argued that the license needed to
shift the duty to maintain the fence to the licensee before FPL could avoid
liability.57 ' He also argued that as a licensee, the plaintiff did not exclusively
occupy the land as a tenant would and thus FPL did retain "plenary rights of
control as [an] owner. 5
79
Is a parking lot bumper an open and obvious dangerous condition? That
depends upon the circumstances according to the Fifth District in Aaron v.
Palatka Mall, L.L.C.58° A shopping mall patron tripped over the bumper and
claimed that the mall did not "maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition" or warn "of the dangerous condition. 581  The court held that
summary judgment was inappropriate where the plaintiff alleged that the
bumpers were "almost the same color as the base of the . . . lot; ... there
were only two bumpers;" it was dark, raining and misty, and the "lot was
poorly lit.
582
572. Morris v. Fla. Power & Light Co. (Morris 1), 753 So. 2d 153, 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
573. Morris 11, 944 So. 2d at 410.
574. FLA. STAT. § 588.15 (2008).
575. Morris II, 944 So. 2d at 413.
576. Id. at413.
577. Id.
578. Id. at 415 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
579. Id.
580. 908 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
581. Id. at 576.
582. Id. at 578-79.
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Some of the district courts have also dealt with a number of product lia-
bility claims in the past three years.583 This has included whether a motor
home can be considered a product for strict liability purposes."84 Courts have
also been asked to clarify the extent of design defect liability doctrine.585 As
was discussed in Section VI, this doctrine has also been at issue in the tobac-
co cases.
586
In Cataldo v. Lazy Days R.V. Center, Inc.,587 the Second District Court
of Appeal considered a matter of first impression in Florida, concerning the
possibility of strict liability doctrine to sellers of "used and reconditioned
motor home[s]. ''588 Approximately nineteen months after purchasing the
motor home, Mr. Cataldo "inadvertently engaged the switch," retracting the
steps to the motor home while turning on the lights for it.589 Cataldo later fell
while stepping from the door, and sustained injuries ultimately causing his
death.590 The appellate court first held that although a motor vehicle can be a
dangerous instrumentality, the injury in this case "arose from its function as a
home," not a motor vehicle.5 91 The court then noted that other district courts
in Florida had refused to extend strict liability to sellers of used products in
592design defect cases. After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, con-
cerning the liability of sellers of used products, the court found that there was
no consensus on extending liability.593 Although the Second District refused
to extend the doctrine in this case, it did certify as a question of great impor-
tance, the following question: "CAN A FLORIDA COURT IMPOSE STRICT
LIABILITY ON THE SELLER OF A USED AND RECONDITIONED
MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED AND
UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS?,,
5 94
583. See generally Cataldo v. Lazy Days R.V. Ctr. Inc., 920 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); Vincent v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 944 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Kohler
Co. v. Marcotte, 907 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Plaza v. Fischer Dev., Inc., 971
So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Rivera v. Baby Trend, Inc., 914 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
584. Cataldo, 920 So. 2d at 175.
585. Plaza, 971 So. 2d at 919.
586. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
587. 920 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
588. Id. at 175.
589. Id. at 176.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 177.
592. Cataldo, 920 So. 2d at 178.
593. Id. at 179.
594. Id. at 180.
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The Second District also considered a product liability case in Vincent
v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,595 which involved "a patient controlled analgesia (PCA)
pump ... [that] allegedly malfunctioned [during surgery,] delivering an
overdose of morphine . . . that . . . totally and permanently disabled" the
plaintiff. 96 The court rejected the argument of defendants, who designed the
pump, that they could not be held liable for negligent design where "an in-
tervening manufacturer or distributor" existed.597
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed a products liability case in
Kohler Co. v. Marcotte.98 Kohler manufactured the engine in a lawn mower
that injured Timothy Marcotte whose "hand came [into] contact with the
rotating plastic air intake screen."' 99 "Magic Circle Corporation ... manu-
facturer of the lawn mower," "unilaterally decided not to" cover the screen
with a protective guard.6" The court held that since "[t]he engine was not
'defective in itself ... operated ... as it was designed" and any danger "was
open and obvious .... Kohler had no duty to warn., 601 The court deemed it
Magic Circle's responsibility to determine if a guard was necessary. 6"2
Whether something is a product or not was addressed in Plaza v. Fisher
Development, Inc. ,603 by the Third District Court of Appeal.604 The plaintiff,
"an employee of Pottery Barn, was ... injured when he fell onto a conveyor
system" that delivered products from the storage area to the retail area.60 5
Fisher was the general contractor for construction of the store where the
plaintiff was injured.60 6 The Third District upheld the summary judgment for
Fisher because the conveyor system was "a structural improvement to real
property," and therefore not a product subject to strict liability.6 7
The Fourth District considered the liability of a distributor of baby strol-
lers in Rivera v. Baby Trend, Inc. 60 8 Baby Trend, the distributor and marke-
ter, was granted summary judgment because it did not possess "the stroller at
any point in the chain of distribution. '60 9 The court held that possession was
595. 944 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
596. Id. at 1085.
597. Id. at 1086.
598. 907 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
599. Id. at 597.
600. Id. at 597, 98.
601. Id. at 600.
602. Id. at 601.
603. 971 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
604. Id. at 920.
605. Id. at 919-20.
606, See id. at 920.
607. Id. at 924.
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a factor to be considered in a strict liability action, but lack of possession
would not preclude liability. 1 ° Where, as here, the defendant was the seller
and marketer and "had some control over the design," summary judgment
611was deemed inappropriate.
XII. MALPRACTICE
The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed an attorney malpractice claim
in Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Security National Servicing Corp.
(Stern 11).612 The appellee, Security National, accused Stern of accidentally
dismissing a timely filed mortgage foreclosure action instead of the untimely
filed action that he had filed on the same cause.613 His pursuit of the untime-
ly action was fruitless as it was ultimately rejected at summary judgment.6 4
"[T]he mortgage and note were assigned several times," and Security Na-
tional was assigned both during appeal of the botched foreclosure.615 Stern,
who accidentally dismissed the wrong action, admitted that he had commit-
ted malpractice.616 Stern represented Security National during the first month
or two of the appeal. 617 The trial court judge in the malpractice action en-
tered summary judgment against Security National because it lacked an at-
torney-client relationship with Stern when the malpractice occurred.6 18 The
Fourth District reversed, holding "that 'the malpractice action was trans-
ferred incident to the transfer of the note and [action]. '"'619 Justice Bell,
speaking for the Court, first explained that Security National lacked standing
for the legal malpractice action for acts committed by Stem while
representing a prior holder of the note and mortgage. 620 Further, he argued
that Florida follows the majority rule that legal malpractice claims are not
assignable. 621' This required him to explain that it was different from the case
of Cowan Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. v. Kaplan,622 which permitted assign-
610. Id. at 1104.
611. Id. at 1105.




616. Id. at 965.
617. Stem H, 969 So. 2d at 965.
618. Id.
619. Id. (quoting Sec. Nat'l Servicing Corp. v. Law Office of David J. Stem P.A. (Stem 1),
916 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
620. Id. at 966.
621. Id. at 967.
622. 902 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2005).
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ment where it was expressly assigned and the malpractice involved prepara-
tion of placement memoranda intended to benefit not just the corporation,
but all those relying upon the documents in the case.623 In a concurring opi-
nion, Chief Justice Lewis agreed with the result, but disagreed that Kaplan
was wrongly applied by the district court.624 As he noted, any detrimental
actions taken by an attorney in regard to a foreclosure will clearly flow to
"subsequent holders of the note and mortgage. '625 Justice Pariente dissented,
arguing that this case was similar to Kaplan because both involved "general
assignment[s] in a commercial setting ... [of] a panoply of... rights, duties
and obligations. 626 She also noted that the rule in this case protected a "neg-
ligent attorney at the expense of [a] mortgage holder[], who [was] engaged in
legitimate commercial transactions. 627 Justice Quince wrote a separate dis-
sent, also arguing that the "sale of mortgage loans" does not involve the type
of unique and personal duties that preclude the assignment of malpractice
628actions.
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved a conflict concerning the appli-
cation of the physician financial responsibility law629 in medical malpractice
actions against hospitals where the physician holds staff privileges. 630 Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded "that the Legislature did not
intend to impose civil liability on hospitals [that do not] ensure that physi-
cians ... granted staff privileges comply with [statutory] financial responsi-
bility requirements., 631  Lena Horowitz claimed that Dr. Derek V. Jhagroo
negligently "examin[ed] and treat[ed] her right thumb in his office., 63 2 Ulti-
mately, her thumb had to be amputated by Dr. Jhagroo at the Plantation Gen-
eral Hospital.633 After obtaining a final judgment against Dr. Jhagroo, the
plaintiff was unable to collect the judgment because of his "fail[ure] to main-
tain malpractice insurance or otherwise comply with [statutory] financial
responsibility requirements., 634 The Court first acknowledged that it had
"recognized a common law duty on the part of... hospitals.., in granting
623. Stern II, 969 So. 2d at 968.
624. Id. at 971 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
625. Id. at 972.
626. Id. at 972-73 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
627. Id. at 973.
628. Stern 11, 696 So. 2d at 974-75 (Quince, J., dissenting).
629. FLA. STAT. § 458.320 (2006).
630. See Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2007).
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staff privileges to physicians. 6 35 However, it noted that this duty had been
to select medically competent physicians.636 It declined to extend the "com-
mon law duty ... to monitor the financial responsibility of physicians" and
further concluded that the text "stat[ing] intent, purpose, and general regula-
tory [intent] of chapter 458" did not support imposing a statutory duty on
hospitals to do SO.
637
The Third District Court of Appeal considered agency and proximate
cause issues in a medical malpractice case in Guadagno v. Lifemark Hospit-
als of Florida, Inc.638 The plaintiff's wife injured her leg in a minibike acci-
dent.639 At the emergency room, "she signed admission documents stating
she understood that the emergency room doctor was an independent contrac-
tor."640 Although the "discharge instructions did not [advise] how to avoid
deep vein thrombosis," the doctor testified that he verbally advised her to
stay mobile."4 In fact, the decedent stayed immobile, "[a] clot.., developed
... dislodged and traveled to her heart, causing sudden death. ' '642 The appel-
late court held that even if the doctor's instructions fell below the standard of
care that alone was not enough to establish that proper instructions would
have prevented the injury.643 It held that proximate cause required that the
plaintiff show that it was more likely than not that the allegedly negligent
instruction caused the injury.6' It also rejected the apparent authority argu-
ment because the principal needs to create the appearance of authority for the
claim to succeed, and the hospital here expressly disavowed that the emer-
gency room doctor was its agent.645 It is the action of the principal, not the
belief "of the person dealing with the purported agent" nor the acts of the
purported agent, that controls.646
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the standard to be ap-
plied in a medical malpractice case in Edwards v. Simon.6 7 The plaintiff
visited Dr. Strain seeking treatment for her shoulder, which was injured in a
635. Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 180.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 181,186-87.
638. 972 So. 2d 214, 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
639. Id. at 216.
640. Id. at 217.
641. Id.
642. Id.




647. 961 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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fall in the shower.64 He advised against surgery.649 "She then went to Dr.
Simon who recommended [and performed] surgery," which did not relieve
the pain.65 Dr. Strain testified that surgery was not necessary, but declined
to testify "whether defendant negligently performed the surgery" or whether
it violated the standard of care.651 The appellate court held this was sufficient
to present a triable issue on the standard of care.652 In dissent, Judge May
argued that she would have treated the testimony differently and it did not
raise an issue of whether the defendant had violated the standard of care.653
The Fourth District Court considered the application of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act654 to a malpractice action in
Nwosu ex rel. Ibrahim v. Adler.655 The plaintiff was vaccinated by her pedia-
trician, who "negligently injected the needle into her buttocks causing [per-
manent] nerve damage to the sciatic nerve. 656 The first complaint was dis-
missed for failure by the plaintiff to follow "administrative procedures in the
Vaccine Act., 657 The court ruled that this harm was not a vaccine related
injury as defined in the act because it was an injury caused by the way that
the vaccine was administered as opposed to the liquid in the vaccine.658
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered whether a doctor has a
duty to a person about whom he was consulted, but never accepted as a pa-
tient in Jackson v. Morillo.659 Jackson went to St. Cloud Hospital because of
extreme pain in his eye, which had a foreign object enter it the previous
day.660 The emergency room physician consulted Dr. Morillo by tele-
phone.661 "Morillo was listed on a consultation directory available to emer-
gency room physicians. ' 62 Morillo never consulted with the plaintiff and
specifically told the emergency room physician that he was not accepting the
plaintiff as a patient. The district court held that summary judgment was
648. Id. at 973.
649. Id. at 973-74.
650. Id. at 974.
651. Id.
652. Edwards, 961 So. 2d at 975.
653. Id. at 976-77 (May, J., dissenting).
654. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2005).
655. 969 So. 2d 516, 517 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
656. Id.
657. Id.
658. Id. at 518.
659. 976 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
660. Id.
661. Id.
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As has been discussed in a previous law review article, the application
of tort law principles to maritime law is one that has caught the attention of
federal courts in Florida. 665 Although generally bound by maritime law, the
cruise industry has not been able to completely avoid liability by registering
666their ships in other countries. As cases in the prior article and the ones
discussed below indicate, American courts will not relieve the industry from
having any duty towards their passengers.
The Southern District Court of Florida reviewed a claim involving a
cruise ship passenger who contracted bacterial enteritis from food ingested
on her cruise in Bird v. Celebrity Cruise Line, Inc. 668 After concluding that
the claim was controlled by admiralty law, the court then addressed the
plaintiff's breach of warranty of merchantability claim. 669 The court refused
to recognize such a claim, particularly in this case, where the contract specif-
ically disclaimed any warranty as to food or drink.670 The court also refused
to recognize a strict liability claim, noting that the Eleventh Circuit and Unit-
ed States Supreme Court had only recognized strict liability in cruise ship
cases in which crew members engaged in wrongful intentional acts.67'
The Southern District granted a summary judgment in another cruise
case in Isbell v. Carnival Corp.672 The plaintiffs cruise was re-routed be-
cause of a hurricane and stopped at Belize, where "the [d]efendant's cruise
director described the 'Cave Tubing and Rain Forest Exploration' excur-
sion. ' ,6 73 "[Plassengers [had been] advised not to travel in Belize without
joining a Carnival approved and supported excursion. 674  Amongst other
allegations, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant told her "that 'any 90-
year old woman' could safely enjoy the excursion. ' '675 "Plaintiff [also] al-
664. Jackson, 976 So. 2d at 1129.
665. Adams, Tort Law I, supra note 278, at 331-32.
666. See id. at 331.
667. See id.
668. 428 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
669. Id. at 1279.
670. Id. at 1280.
671. Id. at 1281-82.
672. 462 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2006).





: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
REVIEW OF FLORIDA TORT CASE LAW
lege[d] that she... asked [diefendant's employee who was selling the tickets
to the excursion 'if there were any alligators, snakes, bugs, spiders, anything
she needed to be concerned about."' 67 6 Plaintiff claimed that she was told
"that there was no need for concern." 677 "The excursion consisted of floating
down a river in [a] rain forest, in and out of caves, [in] an inner tube. 678
Plaintiff was "bitten by a snake., 679 The court ruled "that 'a general promise
that the trip will be "safe and reliable" does not constitute a guarantee that no
harm will"' occur.680 The court also ruled that the plaintiff needed to demon-
strate that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the danger-
ous condition, herein, the poisonous snake. 681' Additionally, the court found
that the danger was apparent or obvious.682
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
The Third District Court of Appeal decided a rear-end collision case in
Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Saleme.683 Trooper Lo-
zano left the right shoulder of a highway to pursue a speeding motorcyclist
by crossing from the right hand lane across the center and into the left lane.68
Saleme, who was pursuing the speeding motorcycle over a hill, skidded into
the rear of the patrol car.685 Florida has recognized three different fact pat-
terns that may rebut the presumption that the negligence of the rear driver in
a rear-end collision is the sole proximate cause of the accident. 686 The de-
fendant argued that the fact pattern concerning sudden and unexpected stops
or lane changes applied to this case. 687 The court held that this could not
apply where the motorcyclist had testified that he saw the lane change and
the defendant's other witness did not testify that there was a sudden lane
change.688 It also held that the presumption was not rebutted even if there
had been a sudden lane change because the defendant was accelerating his
676. Id.
677. Isbell, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
678. Id.
679. Id. at 1234-35.
680. Id. at 1237 (quoting Wilson v. Am. Trans Air, Inc., 874 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.
1989)).
681. Id.
682. Isbell, 462 F. Supp. 2d. at 1238.
683. 963 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
684. Id. at 970-71.
685. Id. at 971.
686. Id. at 972.
687. See id.
688. Saleme, 963 So. 2d at 973.
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vehicle and was at least one-hundred yards ahead of the nearest vehicle be-
hind him.689 The dissent argued that the majority incorrectly engaged in fact
finding and should have permitted the case to proceed without the presump-
tion because the defendant had submitted conflicting evidence.
69
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed a conversion case in Jo-
seph v. Chanin.691 The plaintiff, "Lena Chanin, lived with Meyer Joseph in
his condominium... until his death" and made contributions to a checking
account in the latter's name only.6 92 The roommates agreed to pool their
joint living expenses and to each contribute $1100 a month into the account
for shared expenses.693 After Joseph's death, the plaintiff "discovered that
[the] average joint expenses had been only $900 per month [and that Joseph]
had taken money from the.., account to pay personal expenses and... fund
a separate savings account."'694 The plaintiff sued Joseph's daughter, Barba-
ra, as beneficiary of the savings account on three different theories.695 The
jury found for the plaintiff on the conversion theory.696 The appellate court
held that the checking account was held in joint tenancy with a right of sur-
vivorship and that a "joint tenant may bring a conversion action against
another joint tenant who wrongfully appropriates more than his share of the
money." 697 As beneficiary of the funds in the savings account, she became
liable by exercising dominion over those funds, knowing of the plaintiff's
claim. 69
8
The Fourth District Court considered the liability of an employer in
Martin v. Gulfstream Metal Plating, Inc.6' The plaintiff was walking her
employer's dog who ran around her "to reach another dog owned by" anoth-
er employee of the company, which was unattended.700 The dogs were be-
having in playful behavior, but the plaintiff's feet became entangled in the
leash, which caused her to fall.70 ' The other dog was regularly brought to
work and left unattended. 72 The court noted that landowners are not liable
689. Id. at 975.
690. Id. at 981 (Cortifias, J., dissenting).





696. Joseph, 940 So. 2d at 485-86.
697. Id. at 486.
698. Id.
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for injuries off premises involving a dog not owned, maintained, nor con-
trolled by the landowner.70 3 It also re-affirmed that
an employer is not liable for injury caused to a third party by [an]
employee's dog if ... bringing ... the dog to [the] work site: 1)
"is not consented to or encouraged by the employer," 2) is "of no
benefit to the employer," 3) is "not within the scope of the em-
ployee's duties," and 4) "the employer has no knowledge of the vi-
cious propensities of the animal. ' 7 4
The Fourth District Court found that the Underground Facility Damage
Prevention and Safety Act (UFDPSA) 7 5 exculpated a utility company and
locating contractor for failure to mark underground utilities prior to excava-
tion work. 706 "[T]he City of Margate [called] in a locate request to One-
Call," a statutorily-created corporation that "serves as the interface between
excavators and underground facility operators" so that the former can give
notice to all utilities of intent to excavate for work to be performed; but, the
address given was inaccurate, and the work did not commence within the
time period designated. 70 7 The plaintiff was injured from an electrical shock
sustained at the excavation site.708 The court held that the statutory scheme
exculpated the utility and its locating contractor and also "supersede[d] any
common law on the" subject.7°
The Fourth District Court of Appeal resolved a lawsuit between law
firms in a tortious interference with contract claim in Kreizinger v. Schlesin-
ger.71 °
Patricia Gates [retained] Loreen Kreizinger to represent her and
her daughter in a medical malpractice action. After five years of..
. representation .... on the eve of docket call for ... trial....
Gates contacted Scott Schlesinger and the Sheldon J. Schlesinger,
P.A., law firm. Gates made Schlesinger aware of Kreizinger's re-
703. Id. at 689.
704. Martin, 977 So. 2d at 691 (quoting Roberts v. 219 S. Atl. Blvd., Inc., 914 So. 2d
1108, 1109 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
705. FLA. STAT. § 556.101 (1997).
706. Martin v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 909 So. 2d 555, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(per curiam).
707. Id. at 555-57.
708. Id. at 556.
709. Id. at 558 (citing Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
710. 925 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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presentation .... The next day Schlesinger arranged and paid for
Gates to fly to Fort Lauderdale from ... Pensacola.
71 1
Gates terminated employment with Kreizinger and retained Schlesin-
ger.712 Kreizinger argued that the "purchase of the plane ticket constituted an
act of intentional and unjustified interference." '713 Because "[t]he lawyer-
client relationship is an 'at will' contract" and Gates sought out Schlesinger,
the court held that "no intentional and unjustified interference is present.' '74
The Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected a third-party claim by the
owner and driver of an automobile involved in an accident in Huet v. Mike
Shad Ford, Inc. 715 The defendant Huets claimed that the accident was caused
by the negligent repair by Mike Shad Ford.716 The court ruled that indemni-
fication and contribution from subsequent tortfeasors was not recognized.7 17
Instead, the remedy for the Huets was to file an "equitable subrogation
[claim] against Mike Shad Ford. 7 18
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Florida law concerning
false imprisonment in Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc. 7 9 John-
son was accused by a store clerk of inappropriately touching her while he
was shopping in the defendant's store.720 Two store managers and a security
guard escorted him to an office, "where he was detained for one to two
hours., 721 The court ruled that if the employees' allegations were true, John-
son would have been guilty of breach of the peace, a misdemeanor.722 How-
ever, the court also held that it was unlawful for persons who had not wit-
nessed the misdemeanor to detain him.
723
XV. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion indicates, Florida courts continued to clari-





715. 915 So. 2d 723, 724 (Ha. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
716. Id. at 725.
717. Id. at 726.
718. Id. at 726-27.
719. 437 F.3d 1112, 1114 (1lth Cir. 2006).
720. Id.
721. Id.
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to provide more guidance on the application of the impact rule. Based upon
the split of opinions and the attempts by courts to subsequently apply their
decisions, more guidance appears to be necessary in the future. In addition,
Florida courts continue to struggle with the disposition of the individual
claims in the massive class action filed against tobacco companies. More
appeals will most likely occur requiring more clarification of the many issues
involved in this litigation. It is likely that more clarification will also be ne-
cessary to determine when parents can sign binding releases for their minor
children. Otherwise, it is likely that courts will continue to determine the
scope of the duty and proximate cause elements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of Florida appellate decisions rendered in the past year could
be said to affect the conduct of business in Florida.' This survey does not
attempt to deal with them all. Only cases addressing matters of first impres-
sion, involving conflicts between the District Courts of Appeal or questions
stated by a District Court to be of great public importance and certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida, or cases clarifying or expanding existing prin-
ciples of law have been included.2
1. See Barbara Landau, 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners,
32 NOVA L. REV. 21, 22 (2007) [hereinafter Landau, 2006-2007 Survey]. This survey picks
up where last year's survey left off. Id. The topics included are similar to last year's survey,
there being noteworthy cases in most of the same areas, and several new topics have been
added. Id. at 22-23.
2. See id. A few cases did not fit squarely into any of these categories, but the facts or
application of the law was unusual. Id.
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11. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Arbitration
Mr. Johnson, the chief operating officer of Rocksolid Granite, Inc.
(Corporation), executed an agreement with All Top Granite, Inc. (All Top)
signing "only in his capacity as the chief operating officer of [the Corpora-
tion.]",3 The agreement contained an arbitration clause.4 A dispute devel-
oped and All Top began arbitration against both Mr. Johnson, in his individ-
ual capacity, and the Corporation.' Mr. Johnson first asked the arbitrator,
and then the trial court, to prohibit the arbitration against him since he signed
the agreement only in his official capacity and not individually.6 Although
All Top conceded that the agreement had been signed by Mr. Johnson only
in his official capacity, the trial court, relying on Alterra Healthcare Corp. v.
Estate of Linton,7 ruled that Mr. Johnson had to arbitrate the claims against
him.8 The ruling was appealed by Mr. Johnson, and the Fourth District Court
of Appeal reversed.9 The appellate court distinguished Alterra Healthcare
Corp., stating that the situation there was the reverse of the case under con-
sideration.'0 In Alterra Healthcare Corp., it was a party bound by the arbi-
tration provision who was seeking to avoid arbitration, the party there being
found to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract.1" On the other hand,
explained the Fourth District, in Johnson v. Pires,2 it was a nonparty who
sought to avoid arbitration.13 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that
there are several theories under which a non-signatory may be bound by an
arbitration agreement, one of which is agency theory. 4 However, the court
found that the agency exception does not apply when a person signs only in




7. 953 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
8. Johnson, 968 So. 2d at 701.
9. Id. at 701-02.
10. Id. at 701.
11. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 953 So. 2d at 579. It should be noted that Alterra Health-
care Corp. involved both situations, that is, a nonparty to the agreement seeking to compel a
nonparty to arbitrate. See id. at 578-79. The nonparty who sought arbitration was found to be
subject to the arbitration clause under the doctrine of "respondeat superior." Id.; see also
McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 357 (1st Cir. 1994).
12. 968 So. 2d at 700
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his or her corporate capacity, 5 citing Charter Air Center, Inc. v. Miller 6 and
McCarthy v. Azure. 7 The Fourth District concluded that arbitration could
not be forced on Mr. Johnson, although "[it is thus apparent that ... [he]
could have enforced the arbitration provision against [All Top] who agreed
to arbitrate."' 8
B. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement
In an earlier incarnation of Architectural Network, Inc. v. Gulf Bay Land
Holdings II, Ltd. (Architectural Network 1),9 discussed in the last survey,'
the Second District Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court for
an evidentiary hearing to determine if Architectural Network, Inc.'s attorney
"had [the] authority to settle" the litigation between Architectural Network,
15. Id. at 702.
16. 348 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
17. 22F.3d351 (lstCir. 1994).
18. Johnson, 968 So. 2d at 702. Unlike the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Johnson,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in McCarthy, held that a nonparty to
the arbitration agreement, the appellant there could not compel a party to the agreement to
arbitrate. McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 363. Although, as the First Circuit noted, there are exceptions
to this rule. See id. at 356-57. The court stated that:
[plerhaps most important from a policy standpoint, adopting appellant's proposal
would introduce a troubling asymmetry into the law.... In appellant's scenario,
then, the agent, though he could not be compelled to arbitrate, nonetheless could
compel the claimant to submit to arbitration. In other words, an agent for a dis-
closed principal would enjoy the benefits of the principal's arbitral agreement, but
would shoulder none of the corresponding burdens. He would have found a way,
contrary to folklore, to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.
Id. at 361.
The First District Court of Appeal in Alterra Healthcare Corp. allowed a nonparty-the em-
ployee of Alterra Healthcare Corporation-to bring the arbitration action. Alterra Healthcare
Corp. v. Estate of Linton, 953 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
The First District Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of respondeat superior applied to
make Alterra Healthcare Corporation's employees subject to the arbitration agreement. Id. at
578-79. However, the First District was not called upon to address what would have hap-
pened had the situation been reversed, that is, if it was the other party-here a third-party
beneficiary-that had sought arbitration against the employee of Alterra Healthcare Corpora-
tion. Id. at 579. If the employee had then objected to the arbitration, under the court's reason-
ing, it appears that the employee would have been compelled to arbitrate. See id. On the
other hand, the Fourth District did not explain in Johnson why it was "apparent" that Johnson,
the employee/officer, could enforce arbitration, while it could not be enforced against him.
Johnson, 968 So. 2d at 702. Johnson brings into clear focus the First Circuit's expression of
concern in McCarthy about "a rule that [would] allow a party to use the courts to vindicate his
rights while at the same time foreclosing his adversary from comparable access." McCarthy,
22 F.3d at 361.
19. 933 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
20. See Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at 33-34.
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Inc. and Gulf Bay Land Holdings II, Ltd.2' The trial court held the required
evidentiary hearing and enforced the settlement agreement, with final judg-
ment entered for Gulf Bay Land Holdings H, Ltd.22 Architectural Network,
Inc. appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal reversed.23 Gulf Bay
Land Holdings II, Ltd. failed to meet its burden of proof, which required it to
show that Architectural Network's attorney had the "'clear and unequivocal'
authority to settle" the case on behalf of Architectural Network, with the
Second District Court of Appeal reiterating that the "courts have been very
stringent in what they find to be... 'clear and unequivocal.'
24
HJI. BUSINESS ENTITIES AND AGREEMENTS
A. Franchises
Can an officer or a shareholder of a corporate franchisor be held perso-
nally accountable for violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act (FDUTPA), sections 501.201-501.213 of the Florida Statutes,
or the Florida Franchise Act, section 817.416 of the Florida Statutes?25 Yes,
according to the Fifth District Court of Appeal in KC Leisure, Inc. v. Ha-
ber.2 6 KC Leisure, Inc. (KC) alleged that it paid $50,000 to Relay Transpor-
tation, Inc. (Relay) for what Relay described as a "license" but that, accord-
ing to KC, was actually a franchise agreement allowing KC to sell and rent
electric vehicles.27 Eleven months after the payment was made, KC tried,
without success, to have the agreement rescinded, sending "written notice to
Relay" and its officer and stockholder, Mr. Haber.28 KC then sued Relay,
Mr. Haber, and others alleging that Mr. Haber was an active participant in a
scheme by Relay to provide misleading, incomplete, and incorrect informa-
tion to KC as the franchisee, thus violating FDUTPA and the Florida Fran-
chise Act.29 The trial court concluded that liability under FDUTPA is im-
posed only "on 'sellers and not their shareholders or individuals who act for
21. Architectural Network I, 933 So. 2d at 733-34.
22. Architectural Network, Inc. v. Gulf Bay Land Holdings II, Ltd. (Architectural Net-
work 11), 989 So. 2d 662, 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
23. Id. at 663.
24. Id. (quoting Weitzman v. Bergman, 555 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
25. See KC Leisure, Inc. v. Haber, 972 So. 2d 1069, 1071 n.2, 1075 n.3 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); FLA STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 817.416 (2005).
26. See KC Leisure, Inc., 972 So. 2d at 1071.
27. Id. at 1071-72.
28. Id. at 1072.
29. Id. at 1072, 1075.
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[them].'" 30 The trial court also "found no specific allegations that Mr. Haber
personally participated in" alleged to be in violation of the Florida Franchise
Act.3 ' The complaint against Mr. Haber was then dismissed by the trial court
with prejudice.32 The trial court was wrong on both counts said the Fifth
District Court of Appeal.33 The allegations were sufficient to state a claim
under FDUTPA against Relay.34 Further, if there is corporate liability, there
may be individual liability, provided that it is proved that the "individual
defendant actively participated in or had some measure of control over the
corporation's deceptive practices. ' 35 Finding nothing in the case law under
the Federal Trade Commission Act that per se prevents suing an officer or
shareholder of a corporate franchisor for deceptive trade practices,36 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal concluded that KC's allegations, that Mr. Haber
directly participated in the conduct giving rise to FDUTPA violations, were
sufficient as against Mr. Haber.37 Likewise, the allegations set forth a cause




Minority shareholders who disagree with the majority's decision on ma-
jor corporate transactions, such as the sale or transfer of all of the corpora-
tion's assets, have the right to have their shares valued-appraisal rights-
and bought back by the corporation.39 The issue in Williams v. Stanford°
was whether or not the statutory appraisal rights procedure was the exclusive
remedy available to the dissenting minority.41 The action causing offense to
the minority shareholders in Williams was the majority shareholders' alleged
engineering of the transfer of all of the assets held by the old corporation to a
30. Id. at 1072.
31. KC Leisure, Inc., 972 So. 2d at 1075.
32. Id. at 1072, 1075.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 1073.
35. Id.
36. KC Leisure, Inc., 972 So. 2d at 1073. The FDUTPA claim in count one was based on
deceptive and unfair trade practices "in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)." Id. at 1072.
37. Id. at 1074.
38. Id. at 1075.
39. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So. 2d 722, 726-27 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(1) (2003)).
40. Id. at 722.
41. Id. at 724.
[Vol. 33
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new corporation that excluded the old corporation's shareholders.42 The old
corporation's assets were transferred to the new corporation in return for the
new corporation's assumption of the liabilities of the old corporation. 43 No
money changed hands."a Separate from the exercise of their appraisal rights,
the minority shareholders brought a shareholder-derivative action against,
inter alia, the new corporation and the majority shareholder asking for res-
cission of the asset transfer, and the "imposition of a constructive trust" on
the profits of the new corporation. 45 The minority shareholders alleged "un-
fair dealing and breaches of fiduciary duty [over a period of] several years,"
resulting in the lowering of the value of the old corporation's shares. 46 The
essential question in this case, according to the First District Court of Ap-
peal, is whether the appraisal rights statute prevented "judicial scrutiny of the
transfer of ... assets from" the old corporation to the new.47 The appellate
court answered that question in the negative and went on to hold that addi-
tional remedies, including rescission and "the imposition of a constructive
trust," may be available to the minority shareholders.4a The court observed
that it was the first Florida appellate court's duty "to interpret the governing
provision[], . . .section 607.1302" of the Florida Statutes, as amended in
2003.49 The First District Court of Appeal concluded that if minority share-
holders can "raise facially sufficient and serious allegations of unfairness,"
their relief would not be "limited to the statutory remedy of offering up their
shares for a fair price."50
Cassedy v. Alland Investments Corp.51 involved a demand for a corpo-
rate accounting.52 Alland Investments Corporation (Alland) was formed as a
Florida corporation for the purpose of buying Texas real estate and develop-
ing it.53 Mr. Cassedy invested $315,000 in the enterprise.54 The real estate
purchase was never completed and, at the end of June 1999, Mr. Cassedy
asked Alland for a full accounting.55 About a week later, Alland sent Mr.
42. Id. at 725.
43. Id.
44. See Williams, 977 So. 2d at 725.
45. Id. at 726.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 730-31.
49. Williams, 977 So. 2d at 727.
50. Id. at 724.
51. 982 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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Cassedy "a 'single page accounting summary"' attached to correspondence
to the effect that Alland had "'the rest of the year' to complete a compre-
hensive accounting. 56 Additional correspondence followed between the par-
ties that summer and, on August 18, 1999, Alland wrote to Mr. Cassedy stat-
ing that Mr. Cassedy had the summary since July 6, 1999, and that no pa-
perwork evidencing efforts to buy the real estate was ever sent to Alland.57
Alland was subsequently dissolved.58 On June 15, 2006, after the corpora-
tion had been dissolved, Mr. Cassedy filed suit seeking a final accounting.
59
Alland moved for summary judgment arguing that the action "was barred by
the statute of limitations because [it was] in 1999" and that Mr. Cassedy's
claim accrued.60 The trial court granted the motion, and Mr. Cassedy ap-
pealed.61 The First District Court of Appeal agreed with Alland in that, even
though the accounting action was an equitable action, the statute of limita-
tions did apply.62 However, regardless of whether the five-year contract sta-
tute of limitations contained in section 95.11 (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes is
applicable to written contracts or the four-year statute of limitations on oral
contract actions set forth in section 95.11(3)(k) of the Florida Statutes is
applied, Mr. Cassedy's suit was not barred.63 According to the First District
Court of Appeal, the statute of limitations did not start "to run in 1999 be-
cause there [was] no repudiation of the duty to provide a final accounting. '
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
The main issue in Lanoue v. Rizk 65 was whether the Ontario or the Flor-
ida statute of limitations controlled in an action brought by a lender against a
borrower.66 The borrower, while in Ontario, simultaneously signed a prom-





61. Cassedy, 982 So. 2d at 720.
62. Id.
63. Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 95.11(2)(b), (3)(k) (2008).
64. Id.
65. 987 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
66. Id. at 725. In addition to deciding the conflict of law issue, the Third District Court
of Appeal concluded that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the lender, as
there was an issue of fact regarding who made certain late payments. Id. at 727. For the
statute of limitations to be tolled under the Ontario statute, part payment must be made ."by
the person against whom the claim is made or by the person's agent."' Id. (quoting Limita-
tions Act, 2002 S.O., ch. 24, Sched. B, § 13(11)). The proceeds of the loan were to be used
for a restaurant located in Key Biscayne, Florida. Id. at 725. There were three borrowers: 1)
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issory note and a general security agreement which contained a description
of the collateral given as security for the loan.67 The general security agree-
ment (GSA) was referred to in the promissory note; the note providing that
"'[flor prepayment terms and special conditions," the GSA was to "be read
in conjunction with [the] note and all said terms shall apply to"' the note.""
The promissory note did not address the issue of choice of law, but the GSA
did.69 The choice of law provision in the GSA provided that "'the laws of
the Province of Ontario and the State of Miami"' would govern.7 ° The refer-
ence to "Miami" was determined by the trial judge to be a scrivener's error-
the State of Florida having been intended-and the Third District Court of
Appeal agreed.7' With that issue resolved, the Third District Court of Appeal
still had to choose between the law of Ontario and Florida; it chose Ontario.
72
Since the lawsuit was in Florida, Florida choice of law rules had to be con-
sulted first.73 For causes of action sounding in contract, Florida follows the
rule of lex loci contractus.74
V. CONSUMER RIGHTS
A. Deceptive Trade Practices
Auto leasing customers of S.D.S. Autos, Inc. (S.D.S.) and Brumos Mo-
tor Cars, Inc. (Brumos) brought a class action against S.D.S. and Brumos
under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).7 5
Although the lessees had signed leases requiring arbitration and containing
express class action waivers, the trial court denied the motions of S.D.S. and
Brumos, and refused to dismiss the class action suit based on the arbitration
provision.76 The leases recited that they were governed by the Federal Arbi-
the appellant Lanoue; 2) a corporation that was dissolved prior to the lawsuit; and 3) a third
party who was not made a party to the lawsuit. Lanoue, 987 So. 2d at 725-26.
67. Id. at 726. The opinion does not make a reference to any "collateral" other than the
note. See id. at 725-27.
68. Id. at 726.
69. Id.
70. Lanoue, 987 So. 2d at 726.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 727.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing, among other cases, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d
1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006), noted in Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at 41-43).
75. S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski (S.D.S. Autos 1), 976 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
76. Id. at 603.
20081
89
: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
tration Act (FAA). 77 S.D.S. and Brumos appealed.78 The First District Court
of Appeal acknowledged that the FAA represents 'clear federal policy'
favoring arbitration, and that states cannot require persons who have con-
sented to arbitration to later resort to a lawsuit, except where contract de-
fenses would render the contractual provisions invalid under state law, 79 cit-
ing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Thomas.8" The
First District also noted that the United States Supreme Court stated in Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd"' that arbitration agreements are to be 'rigo-
rously enforced."' 8 2 The First District expressed due regard for federal pro-
nouncements on the sanctity of arbitration agreements but observed that state
law may "invalidate an arbitration provision without [offending] the FAA
'[if] the law at issue governs contracts generally and not arbitration agree-
ments specifically.' "83 The First District Court of Appeal then reviewed the
remedial nature of FDUTPA and, affirming the order of the trial court, held
that barring auto leasing customers from pursuing class actions where each
claim might be small would frustrate the benefits and intent of FDUTPA.8
The class action waiver in this case was inconsistent with Florida's public
policy and therefore unenforceable.
In a related short per curiam decision on consolidated appeals by S.D.S.
and Brumos, the First District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's class
action certification in S.D.S. Autos, Inc. v. Chrzanowski (S.D.S. Autos J)86
under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(b)(2)-(b)(3) "of two classes of
consumers" covered by FDUTPA.87 The court cited its decision in Davis v.
Powertel, Inc.,88 where it held that:
[I]n a class action for damages under FDUTPA, class certification
does not require proof of each individual putative class member's
actual reliance on an alleged deceptive act because an actionable
deceptive trade practice is one which is "likely to deceive a con-
77. Id. at 604.
78. Id. at 603.
79. Id. at 605 (quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221).
80. 482 U.S. at 483.
81. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
82. S.D.S. Autos 1, 976 So. 2d at 605 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 490).
83. Id. (quoting Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306 (1 1th Cir. 2002)).
84. Id. at 608, 611.
85. Id. at611.
86. 982 So. 2d I (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
87. Id. (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(2)-(3)).
88. 776 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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sumer acting reasonably in the same circumstances," not one upon
which any individual plaintiff "actually relied."
89
C. Warranties
Larrain and Sotomayor (Buyers) bought a 2001 Ford Expedition from
Bengal Motor Co. Ltd. (Bengal Motor) in 2005.90 As part of the transaction,
the Buyers were given a limited warranty for the car.91 They signed a sepa-
rate agreement with Bengal Motor to arbitrate any disputes that might arise
from the dealings between Bengal Motor and the purchasers. 92 The automo-
bile was allegedly defective and Bengal Motor did not successfully repair it
during the term of the warranty.93 Larrain and Sotomayor then sued Bengal
Motor alleging, among other things, violation of warranties under the Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act.94 The trial court granted Bengal Motor's motions
to compel arbitration, and Larrain and Sotomayor appealed. 9 The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.96 The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and the "single document rule," adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission, recognize that the parties may agree to alternate dispute resolu-
tion, but language to this effect must be in the same document as any warran-
ty extended. 97 The "single document rule" was not satisfied as there were
two documents here, the warranty and the arbitration agreement.98
89. S.D.S. Autos II, 982 So. 2d at 1 (quoting Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974).
90. Larrain v. Bengal Motor Co., 976 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
91. Id.
92. Id. The agreement provided that arbitration applied to any claim, including claims of
the purchaser and the dealer arising "from a 'relationship with third parties who do not sign'
the agreement. Id. Could those nonparties be compelled to arbitrate? Could those nonparties
compel the parties to arbitrate? If so, under what circumstances? See McCarthy v. Azure, 22
F.3d 351, 361-63 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a nonparty to an arbitration agreement cannot
compel a party to the agreement to arbitrate); Charter Air Ctr., Inc. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 614,
616-17 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a non-signatory, under the agency excep-
tion, is not bound by an arbitration agreement when it is signed in his or her official capacity).
93. Larrain, 976 So. 2d at 13.
94. Id. at 13-14.
95. Id. at 14.
96. Id. at 14-15.
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In this offer and acceptance case, Mr. Dougherty, an attorney,
represented both "his mother, Kathleen Dougherty, and his fiancde's solely-
owned corporation, Franklin Pond, Inc." (the buyers)." Specifically, Mr.
Dougherty had section 1031 like-kind exchange funds that had to be used for
the purchase of other real estate. l 0 Mr. Dougherty had dealt with Mr. and
Mrs. Ricci before, and he knew the Riccis were trying to sell certain real
estate.10 ' After Mr. Dougherty contacted Mr. Ricci, Mr. Ricci showed up at
Mr. Dougherty's office with "a proposed contract" for the sale of their real
estate for 1.5 million dollars.10 2 The proposed contract, an offer, had already
been signed by Mr. and Mrs. Ricci.10 3 Mr. Dougherty made some changes to
the proposed contract, inserted the names of the buyers, signed and initialed
the agreement on their behalf, as buyers, and arranged for the earnest money
deposit to be made to Mr. Ricci.' 4 Mr. Ricci also initialed the changes. 5
When Mr. and Mrs. Ricci did not close the sale after they had been asked,
and failed to cure a title defect, the buyers brought an action against Mr. and
Mrs. Ricci seeking specific performance."° The action was dismissed, and
the buyers appealed.0 7 The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. °8 A
contract for the purchase of real estate that could be specifically enforced did
not come into being. 9 The changes Mr. Dougherty made to the proposed
contract amounted to a counteroffer to Mr. and Mrs. Ricci."0 Mr. Ricci
agreed to the counteroffer, but Mrs. Ricci did not."' The court found no
support for the buyers' "argument that Mr. Ricci had.., apparent authority





104. Franklin Pond, Inc., 979 So. 2d at 388.
105. Id.
106. Id. At this point, Mr. Dougherty had become one of the buyers, his mother having
assigned to him her interest under "the purported contract." Id.
107. Id. at 387.
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to act on" Mrs. Ricci's behalf to accept the counteroffer, and there was no
evidence that Mrs. Ricci ratified the changes and Mr. Ricci's actions.'
12
B. Remedies
Mastec, Inc. v. TJS, L.L. C.113 involved a complicated fact pattern con-
cerning a protracted real estate sale transaction, title defects, construction of
a Florida Association of Realtors preprinted form VAC-6 10/00 and
amendments to the form, numerous extensions, and subsequent attempted
extensions of the closing date." 4 The trial court decided that Mastec, Inc.
(Seller) breached the contract and granted the request by TJS, L.L.C., and
Lakeland Granite and Marble, Inc. (Buyers) for specific performance." 5 The
Seller appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal held that as pro-
vided in the contract, 1 6 time was of the essence, the real estate contract expi-
ration date was February 15, 2004, and "the [c]ontract called for concurrent
performances by the" Buyers and Seller."7 Actually tendering payment to
the Seller and demanding conveyance of title by Seller, were conditions
precedent to ordering specific performance." 8 The trial court did not make
any finding that there had been a tender prior to February 15, 2004, nor, said
the Second District Court of Appeal, could the trial court have so found on
the evidence presented. " 9 There having been no tender, the Seller was not
obligated to convey.
20
112. Id. at 388-89. The trial court's finding that Mr. Dougherty did not have the required
express authority to act on behalf of the buyers provided additional support for the Fifth Dis-
trict's affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of the action against the Riccis. Franklin Pond,
Inc., 979 So. 2d at 389. Ratification by the other buyers of Mr. Dougherty's acts was not
discussed. Id. It would appear that the result would have been the same even if the buyers
had ratified Mr. Dougherty's acts, since the appellate court found no acceptance of the counte-
roffer by Mrs. Ricci. See id. at 388-89.
113. 979 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
114. Id. at 286-89.
115. Id.at290-91.
116. Id. at 292. The Second District Court of Appeal made at least two references to the
fact that "[t]he 'time is of the essence' provision" was in bold print. Id. at 286 n.3.
117. Mastec, 979 So. 2d at 292.
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C. Right of First Refusal
Old Port Cove Condominium Ass'n One v. Old Port Cove Holdings,
Inc. (Old Port 1),121 involving a right of first refusal, and reviewed in the
2006-2007 Survey, 2 2 made its way to the Supreme Court of Florida. 13 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal had ruled that the common law rule against
perpetuities had been retroactively abrogated by section 689.225 of the Flor-
ida Statutes-the developer having argued that the rule applied to the right of
first refusal at issue-with the result that the right of first refusal was upheld
as against the developer. 2 4 The Fourth District acknowledged that its abro-
gation holding put it in conflict with Fallschase Development Corp. v. Bla-
key, 2 5 and it certified the question. 12 6 In addition, the Fourth District indi-
cated that it had some doubt as to whether the rule against perpetuities ap-
plied to the right of first refusal in the first place, but the Fourth District did
not decide that issue because of its determination as to the abrogation of the
common law rule against perpetuities. 27 The Supreme Court of Florida, as a
matter of first impression, held that "the rule against perpetuities does not
apply to rights of first refusal.', 128 The Supreme Court of Florida also ruled
that section 689.225 of the Florida Statutes did not have retroactive effect. 29
The Court thereby affirmed the Fourth District Court of Appeal as to result,
while agreeing with the First District in Fallschase that section 689.225 of
the Florida Statutes did not have retroactive effect. 130 Fallschase was disap-
proved "to the extent it [found] that the common law rule [against perpetui-
ties] applie[d] to rights of first refusal.' 3' Instead, rights of first refusal are
to be "analyzed under the rule [against] unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion."
132
121. 954 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
122. Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at 65.
123. See Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass'n One (Old Port II),
986 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2008).
124. See id. at 1281.
125. 696 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
126. Old Port 1, 954 So. 2d at 746-47.
127. See id. at 743-44.




132. Id. at 1288.
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D. Exculpatory Clauses
The Applegates' daughter, age five, was injured at camp while partici-
pating in a water skiing wakeboard activity. 33 The Applegates had signed a
liability exculpatory agreement on behalf of their daughter and themselves.'34
The Applegates sued Cable Water Ski, L.C. (Cable), the operator of the
camp, for negligence and sought damages for injury to their daughter, and
included a loss of services claim in the complaint. 35 The trial court awarded
summary judgment to Cable finding that the exculpatory clause was an un-
ambiguous waiver of the claims by the Applegates.'36 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Cable with re-
spect to the Applegates' loss of services claim, which was not contested on
appeal. 37 The Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that exculpatory agree-
ments are not looked at favorably by the law on public policy grounds
When a minor is the subject of a liability exculpatory clause favoring a
commercial enterprise, Florida-as parens patriae-has "a strong intent to
protect children from harm."'39 Consequently, the appellate court concluded
that the exculpatory clause was unenforceable for reasons of public policy. 40
However, in so deciding, the court emphasized that its ruling was "limited to
commercial enterprises.' 4' The court certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance: "WHETHER A
CONTRACT CONTAINING AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE, SIGNED
BY A PARENT ON BEHALF OF HER CHILD, IN FAVOR OF A
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE, IS ENFORCEABLE TO DEFEAT THE
CHILD'S ACTION TO RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE CHILD AS A RESULT OF THE ENTERPRISE'S
NEGLIGENCE."1 42 The court also went to some lengths to explain its view
that the public policy result might have been different had the defendant been
a "not-for-profit, community-based organization."
'143






138. Applegate, 974So. 2dat 1114.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1115.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1116.
143. Applegate, 974 So. 2d at 1115-16.
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E. Limitation of Damages
The Second District Court of Appeals set out in detail the facts of Paul
Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps S. Corp. 4 Briefly stated, Alps South Corp. (Alps)
made medical devices and Paul Gottlieb & Co. (Gottlieb) supplied special
fabric to Alps. 14' Alps incorporated the fabric into the liners it made for use
by amputees with prosthetic devices) 46 Although Alps' customers were
pleased with the new liners, it was not long before the situation changed.
47
After Gottlieb provided different fabric to Alps without Alps' consent, Alps
began to get complaints from its customers.'48 Alps' and Gottlieb's relation-
ship worsened. 4 9 Alps did not pay a bill from Gottlieb, and Gottlieb sued
Alps. 50 Alps filed a counterclaim for damages alleging breach of warran-
ty.' 5' Gottlieb was awarded nearly $29,000 in damages on its claim for non-
payment. 52 The damage award to Alps on its counterclaim was almost
$695,000, consisting mainly of lost profits, and Gottlieb appealed. 53 The
Second District Court of Appeal characterized the case as a "'battle of the
forms."",154 The back of Gottlieb's finished goods contract provided that
"BUYER SHALL NOT IN ANY EVENT BE ENTITLED TO, AND
SELLER SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INDIRECT OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE, INCLUDING,
WITHOUT BEING LIMITED TO, LOSS OF PROFIT, PROMOTIONAL
OR MANUFACTURING EXPENSES, INJURY TO REPUTATION OR
LOSS OF CUSTOMER.' ' 55 The Alps purchase order did not contain the
liability limitations of the Gottlieb contract. 56 As the court noted, "[t]his
dispute arises from the common, but risky, commercial practice where the
seller and buyer negotiate a contract involving goods by exchanging each
others' standardized forms.' 57 However, section 672.207 of the Florida
Statutes, contained in Florida's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, is
144. Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps S. Corp., 985 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 3-4.
148. Id. at 4.




153. Id. Exactly $633,939.04 of the award represented lost profit. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at
9.
154. See id. at 5.
155. Id. at4.
156. See id. at 5-6.
157. Id. at 4.
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supposed to resolve the issue of differing forms used between merchants that
cover the same transaction.' Specifically, a contract between merchants
can be formed despite an acceptance that contains new or modified terms,
even though a contract may not have been formed under the "common law
mirror image rule.' ' 159 Under section 672.207(2) of the Florida Statutes, ad-
ditional terms, for example, Gottlieb's damage limitation clause, "become a
part of the contract unless:" 1) acceptance is limited, by the express terms of
the offer, to the terms of the offer; or 2) the additional terms result in a ma-
terial alteration of the contract; or 3) notice of objection to the additional
terms "has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after no-
tice of [the additional terms] is received. '16° The Second District determined
that under the facts of the case, the only issue to be decided was whether the
Gottlieb damages limitation clause constituted a material alteration of the
contract. 161 Alps, as the party seeking to exclude from the contract the dam-
ages limitation clause-which it admitted it had not read at the time-had
the burden of proving a material alteration. t6 To carry its burden, Alps had
to demonstrate that the damages limitation clause had the effect of causing it
unreasonable "surprise or hardship."'163 As to surprise, the Gottlieb contract
with the damages limitation clause "was the sixth in a series" of contracts
between the parties, all of which contracts had the clause, and thus, Alps did
not carry its burden of proof as to surprise. 64 As to hardship, Alps failed to
inform Gottlieb of major ramifications of Gottlieb's breach of contract, thus
not indicating any severe economic hardship. 165 Alps did not meet its burden
of proving hardship."6 Gottlieb's limitation of damages clause was a part of
the contract.167  Therefore, Alps could not recover lost profits or other con-
sequential damages.' 68 However, Alps could recover direct "benefit-of-the-
bargain" damages and incidental damages. 69 The case was reversed and
remanded for the determination of Alps' direct and incidental damages. 7'
158. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at 5-6.
159. IM at 6.
160. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 672.207(2) (2007)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 6-7.
163. Gottlieb, 985 So. 2d at 7.
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F. Attorney's Fees - Prevailing Party
Padula & Wadsworth Construction, Inc. (Contractor) hired Port-A-
Weld, Inc. (Subcontractor), and the subcontract between them contained a
relatively unique attorney's fees provision.' 7' In addition to providing that
the party that did not prevail would be liable for all attorney's fees and court
costs of the prevailing party, the clause provided that "a party shall not be
considered as a 'prevailing party' if its recovery shall be less than 75% of its
claim amount."1 72 The subcontractor sued the contractor, alleging nonpay-
ment of the balance due under the subcontract, and a claim for attorney's
fees and court costs were included. 73 The contractor filed a compulsory
counterclaim. 174 The trial court ruled that the contractor prevailed as to the
subcontractor's claim and the subcontractor prevailed on the contractor's
compulsory counterclaim. 175 The trail court said that "attorney's fees for
both sides, [were] a wash"'' 76 Appeals followed, and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, in Port-A-Weld, Inc. v. Padula & Wadsworth Construction,
Inc., ' 77 reversed the trial court's decision as to attorney's fees and costs. 78
Since "compulsory counterclaims are not, . . .as a matter of law," claims
distinct from the main claim, there cannot, where there is a compulsory
counterclaim be more than one winner; "one party must prevail.' 79 The
court rejected the idea that there could be a tie in an action for breach of con-
tract. 80 Thus, under the Supreme Court of Florida's test in Moritz v. Hoyt
Enterprises, Inc.,181 the prevailing party is the one in fact winning on the
significant issues.12 Finding that the subcontractor won on the significant
issues before the trial court, the Fourth District pointed out that the inquiry
could not end there in light of the seventy-five percent requirement in the
subcontract.'83 The question presented was "whether the 'significant issue'
test" under Moritz can be modified contractually.' 4 The court noted that
171. Port-A-Weld, Inc. v. Padula & Wadsworth Constr., Inc., 984 So. 2d 564, 566, 568-69
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
172. Id. at 567-68.
173. Id. at 566.
174. Id. at 569.
175. Id. at 568.
176. Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 568.
177. Id. at 564.
178. Id. at 566.
179. Id. at 569.
180. Id.
181. 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1992).
182. Id. at 810.
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depending on how it was determined, the subcontractor may have been a
sixty percent winner or it may have been a more than eighty percent win-
ner.185 Was "the contractual 75% threshold in" the subcontract enforceable
or was it "contrary to public policy?"'86 Calling it "a matter of first impres-
sion," the court determined that the Supreme Court of Florida's "significant
issue" test cannot be altered by contract. 187 The Fourth District agreed with
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in P & C Thompson Bros. Construction
Co. v. Rowe 88 that a provision under which a party may actually prevail but
yet has to pay the other party's attorney's fee "can be seen as" against public
policy. 89 In addition, the attorney's fee reciprocity statute, section 57.105(7)
of the Florida Statutes, was cited by the court as additional support for the
conclusion that the seventy-five percent winner provision in the subcontract
was against public policy.' 9° The subcontractor was entitled to recover fees
and costs.'9'
In M.A. Hajianpour, M.D., P.A. v. Khosrow Maleki, P.A.,' 92 decided
two months before Port-A-Weld, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found
that the parties had "battled to a draw" and concluded that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to award attorney's fees under a prevail-
ing party provision where the "court determine[d] that neither party pre-
vailed."'193 Hajianpour is not mentioned in Port-A-Weld.'94
In another attorney's fee case, Skylark Sports, L.L.C. (the tenant) ob-
tained a judgment against Islander Beach Club Condominium (the landlord)
based on a lease dispute. 95 The trial court awarded attorney fees and costs to
the tenant of approximately $192,000 based on the following provision in the
lease: "ATTORNEY'S FEES: In the event that either party incurs legal fees
or costs in the enforcement of this Lease or any provision hereof, whether
185. Id. at570.
186. Id. at569.
187. Id. at 569-70.
188. 433 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
189. Id. at 1389.
190. Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 569-70. Section 57.105(7) of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides, with respect to contracts entered into after October 1, 1988, "[i]f a contract contains a
provision allowing attorney's fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to
enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney's fees to the other party
when that party prevails in any action." FLA. STAT. § 57.105(7) (2008).
191. Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 570.
192. 975 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
193. Id. at 1290 (citing Merchs. Bonding Co. v. City of Melbourne, 832 So. 2d 184, 186
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
194. See generally Port-A-Weld, 984 So. 2d at 564.
195. Islander Beach Club Condo. v. Skylark Sports, L.L.C., 975 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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suit is filed or not, shall be entitled to recover and to receive payment of rea-
sonable attorneys' [fees] and costs incurred by the other party."' 96 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal reversed the fee award because the court found that
the fee provision "clearly makes no sense."' ' The provision did "not reflect
any clear intention... as to whom, when, and how attorney's fees or costs
should be allowed."'98 The trial court's reading into and rewriting the clause
so as "to make it a prevailing party" clause was improper, as was its interpre-
tation of the word "by" as meaning "from."'"
G. Action Against State
ContractPoint Florida Parks, L.L.C. (ContractPoint) "entered into a
concessions" contract with the Florida Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (DEP).2°° DEP had legislative authority to make the contract.2"1 Even-
tually, ContractPoint sued DEP for breach of contract.2 2 ContractPoint won
the lawsuit and was awarded damages exceeding $600,000.203 DEP raised
section 11.066 of the Florida Statutes as a bar to enforcement of the judg-
ment.2' Specifically, DEP relied on section 11.066(3) which reads in part
that "[n]either the state nor any of its agencies shall pay or be required to pay
monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an
appropriation made by law." 205 The trial court ruled in DEP's favor but the
First District Court of Appeal reversed, certifying the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
DOES SECTION 11.066, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY
WHERE JUDGMENTS HAVE BEEN ENTERED AGAINST
THE STATE OR ONE OF ITS AGENCIES IN A CONTRACT
ACTION?, ,2°
196. Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 1211.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, L.L.C., 986 So. 2d 1260, 1262
(Fla. 2008).
201. Id. at 1263.
202. Id. at 1262.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LL C., 986 So. 2d at 1265 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 11.066(3)
(2008)).
206. Id. at 1261-62.
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The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative finding
that section 11.066 of the Florida Statutes was intended to apply to judg-
ments against the state in the "exercise of its police powers [citing] the Citrus
Canker Eradication Program,' '207 and not to judgments resulting from con-
tract actions. 8 The Court noted that its decision in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp.
v. Department of Corrections2°9 predated the legislative enactment of section
11.066.210 The Court opined that, in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp., with respect to
legislatively approved contracts, the legislature intended that they be binding
on private parties, the state, and "entities of the state., 21  Being deprived of
the means to judicially enforce a judgment for breach of contract renders the
contract illusory. 2  As a matter of first impression, the Court held "that sec-
tion 11.066 was not intended to and does not apply to valid judgments aris-
ing from the breach of a legislatively authorized express, written contract by
the State or any of its agencies. 213 Justice Wells, joined by Justices Cantero
and Bell, dissented.214
VII. DEEDS AND TAx SALES, MORTGAGES, LIs PENDENS, AND PARTITION
A. Deeds and Tax Sales
In Jones v. Flowers,1 5 the United States Supreme Court held that when
a taxing authority mails a notice of a real estate tax sale and the notice is
returned to it unclaimed, due process requires the taxing authority to "take
additional, reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the" owner of the
property to be sold.216 The Jones decision was controlling in Patricia Wein-
garten Associates, Inc. v. Jocalbro, Inc.17 The Marion County Clerk sent
notices to Patricia Weingarten Associates, Inc. (Weingarten) of real estate
tax sales for failure to pay real estate taxes with respect to fourteen parcels of
real estate.2 " As required by section 197.522(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
207. Id. at 1267.
208. Id. at 1266-67 (citing Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 870 So. 2d
774, 785 (Fla. 2004)).
209. 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
210. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, L.L.C., 986 So. 2d at 1268.
211. Id. (quoting Pan-Am Tobacco Corp., 471 So. 2d at 5).
212. Id. at 1270.
213. Id. at 1272.
214. Id. at 1272-79 (Wells, J., dissenting).
215. 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
216. Id. at 225.
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notices were sent to Weingarten "by certified mail with return receipt re-
quested."2 9 The notices were sent "to four different addresses" and all of the
notices were returned unclaimed.22° The Marion County Clerk then "pub-
lish[ed] the notice of the application for tax deeds" on the property.22' The
notice was published in a local newspaper of general circulation as required
by statute.222 No response from Weingarten to the published notices was
received by the Clerk and "tax deeds were issued" to Jocalbro, Inc. (Jocal-
bro) for Weingarten's parcels. 2 3 Weingarten had previously given notice to
the Marion County Tax Collector of its current Missouri address.224 In fact,
the Marion County Tax Collector sent to Weingarten, at its correct Missouri
address, tax bills for other Marion County property owned by Weingarten.225
Jocalbro successfully brought an action against Weingarten to quiet title to
the property. 6 Weingarten appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded.227 The notice of the tax sale, as provided, did not
satisfy the due process requirements under Jones.228 Publishing notice of the
sale in a local newspaper was inadequate under the circumstances. 29 Once
the notices were returned to the clerk as unclaimed, it was incumbent on the
clerk to take additional, reasonable steps to give adequate notice as required
under Jones.30
In a slightly later case, South Investment Properties, Inc. v. Icon Invest-
ments L.L. C,231 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached a different result
on facts similar to the facts of Patricia Weingarten Associates, Inc. 32 What
were the factual differences that distinguished South Investment Properties,
Inc. from Patricia Weingarten Associates, Inc.? In South Investment Proper-
ties, Inc., the property owner, Icon Investments, changed its address, but did
not give notice to the property appraiser.233 In addition, no forwarding ad-
dress was given to the post office. 34 The clerk of court mailed tax sale no-
219. ld. at 562.
220. Id. at 563.
221. Id. at 564.
222. Patricia Weingarten Assocs., 974 So. 2d at 564.




227. Patricia Weingarten Assocs., 974 So. 2d at 561.
228. Id. at 561, 565.
229. Id. at 564.
230. Id. at 563-64 (citing Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225 (2006)).
231. 988 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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tices to Icon Investments by certified mail, return receipt requested, at the
last address of Icon Investments known to the property appraiser. 5 In this
case, someone, but not the owner, signed for the certified mail and receipts
were returned to the clerk.236 The clerk also published notice in the appropri-
ate newspaper, and the sheriff posted notice at the property address known to
it.237 The notice given satisfied due process in this case.238
B. Mortgages
Alma O'Connell, her son, and O'Con Manufacturing, Inc., a company
owned by them, borrowed $825,000 from Union Planters Bank-now Re-
gions Bank-and gave the bank a promissory note (Note 1) secured by Alma
O'Connell's guaranty and "a security interest in the assets of her compa-
ny. ' ,239 She then borrowed another $400,000 from the bank.24° For this loan,
she gave the bank another promissory note (Note 2) and Note 2 "was secured
by a mortgage on real [estate she] owned."' 1 The mortgage was recorded
and referenced as Note 2.242 Note 2 contained what is known as a "dragnet
clause. 243 The dragnet clause not only referred to the mortgage as securing
the $400,000 loan, but also as security for "any other liabilities, indebtedness
or obligations of [O'Connell] to [Regions] Bank, however or whenever
created."'244 This language is broad enough to include Note 1.245 Note 2 was
not recorded and did not refer to Note 1.246 Starlines International Corp.
(Starlines) bought a fifty percent interest in the mortgaged real estate from
Alma O'Connell.247 Starlines read Note 2, which contained the dragnet
clause, and apparently asked Alma O'Connell if there was any pre-existing
debt owed to the bank.248 According to Starlines, she said "no." 249 Starlines
235. Id.
236. S. Inv. Props., Inc., 988 So. 2d at 1118.
237. Id. at 1116.
238. Id. at 1118.
239. Starlines Int'l Corp. v. Union Planters Bank, 976 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1173-74.
242. Id. at 1174.
243. Id.
244. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1174.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1176.
247. Id. at 1174.
248. Id. at 1177.
249. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1177.
2008]
103
: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
did not inquire of "the [b]ank as to the existence of a pre-existing debt".
After default on Note 1, the bank foreclosed its mortgage. 251 As a result,
Starlines lost its equity in the property.252 Starlines' position in the trial court
was that "its interest in the ... property was superior to that of the [b]ank. 253
It was "a subsequent purchaser without notice" of Note 1.254 The trial court
entered summary judgment for the bank finding that the mortgage secured
Note 1 because of the dragnet clause in Note 2.255 The trial court reasoned
that the mortgage itself was recorded, and it referred to Note 2, which placed
Starlines on "inquiry notice" of Note 1.256 Thus, the trial court found that
Starlines had notice and its interest was not superior to the bank's interest. 57
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal aligned itself with the Third
District Court of Appeal in United National Bank v. Tellam,258 finding the
rule in Tellam to be the appropriate rule to apply when the issue presented
involves the enforcement of a dragnet clause against a person who is not the
borrower.2 59 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in Tellam, held that in order for a dragnet clause to be
enforceable with respect to pre-existing obligations and debts, the clause
must "specifically identif[y] by name" the debt or obligations secured.26°
The Fourth District, however, noted that there is an exception to the specific-
ity requirement of Tellam.6 If "it can be shown that the third party other-
wise had notice that the specific pre-existing debt at issue was to be included
within the grasp of the dragnet clause," the clause will be enforced.262 The
Fourth District acknowledged that it had upheld dragnet clauses263 as against
borrowers, but not, as here, as against a third party. 264 The summary judg-
ment was reversed because of the existence of an issue of fact: Whether
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1173.
252. Id. at 1176.
253. Id. at 1175.




258. 644 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
259. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1176.
260. Id. at 1175 (citing United Nat'l Bank v. Tellam, 644 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
261. Id. at 1176.
262. Id.
263. See generally Robert C. Roy Agency, Inc. v. Sun First Nat'l Bank of Palm Beach,
468 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
264. Starlines Int'l Corp., 976 So. 2d at 1176.
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Watermark Marina of Palm City, L.L.C. (Watermark), as buyer, and the
Nickersons, as seller, entered into a contract for purchase and sale of real
estate.266 When the Nickersons did not close on the sale, Watermark sued
them seeking specific performance.267 Watermark filed a notice of lis pen-
dens, and the trial court required a $200,000 bond to be filed by Water-
mark.268 When the lis pendens expired, Watermark did not extend it.269 Wa-
termark then requested that the bond be discharged and that Watermark be
permitted to substitute corporate stock to cover payment of damages, if any,
to the Nickersons for damages found to have resulted from the prior record-
ing of the lis pendens. 2o The Nickersons objected to the substitution, but the
trial court allowed it." Certiorari review was sought by the Nickersons 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the writ and quashed the lower
court order that allowed the substitution of the stock for the lis pendens
bond.273 The court agreed with the Nickersons that section 48.23(3) of the
Florida Statutes, as implemented by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.610(b), required a bond.274 The statute "allow[s] courts to control notices
of lis pendens as injunctions" and under the rule a bond is required before a
temporary injunction may be granted. 5 The trial court's decision to require
a bond in the first place is a matter of discretion.276 But once the trial court
exercises its discretion to require a bond, a bond must be posted.277 "A
pledge of collateral simply is not a bond." 8 Judge Polen dissented, and
would not have granted certiorari.279
265. Id. at 1177.
266. Nickerson v. Watermark Marina of Palm City, L.L.C., 978 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).




271. Nickerson, 978 So. 2d at 189.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 190.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. Nickerson, 978 So. 2d at 190.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 191 (Polen, J., dissenting).
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How strong does a litigant's claim to real property have to be to support
maintenance of a lis pendens placed on the subject property?280 That was the
question considered by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Nu-Vision,
L.L.C. v. Corporate Convenience, Inc.281 Corporate Convenience, Inc. (les-
sor) entered into a commercial lease agreement with Nu-Vision, L.L.C. (les-
see). 2  Prior to the execution of the lease agreement, the lessee sent the les-
sor a letter that contemplated a purchase of the property by the lessee.283 The
letter went on to say that "'a contract will follow"' if the letter was signed by
both of the parties.284 The letter was signed by both parties, but a contract
never followed.285 The parties signed the lease agreement, which had only
"one oblique reference" to a possible purchase of the leased property by the
lessee, and a contract for sale and purchase was never made between the
parties. 28' The lessor sued the lessee for eviction based on nonpayment of
rent.287 The lessee counterclaimed for specific performance based on its
"purchase option" agreement, and the lessee filed a notice of lis pendens
against the real estate.288 The lessor moved to discharge the lis pendens and
its motion was granted. 289 The lessee petitioned for certiorari review of the
dissolution of the lis pendens.29° Certiorari was denied.291 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal noted that a writing signed by the person to be charged
292
and containing essential terms for the sale and purchase of real estate, was
required to support an action for specific performance. 293 All the lessee had
was a letter naming the parties, with the address of the property, "and a slid-
ing scale for the purchase price., 294 The majority of the court found those
elements "insufficient to support [an action] for specific performance. 295
280. See generally Nu-Vision, L.L.C. v. Corporate Convenience, Inc., 965 So. 2d 232
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
281. Id. at 232, 234.
282. Id. at 233.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Nu-Vision, L.L.C., 965 So. 2d at 233-34.
286. Id. at 233-34.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 234.
289. Id. at 233.
290. Nu-Vision, L.LC., 965 So. 2d at 233.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 234 (citing De Vaux v. Westwood Baptist Church, 953 So. 2d 677, 681 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). De Vaux was reviewed in Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 1, at
55-56.
293. Nu-Vision, LLC., 965 So. 2d. at 234.
294. Id. at 234-35.
295. Id. at 235.
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Since the lessee's counterclaim for specific performance failed to state a
claim on which relief could be granted, lessee failed, as a matter of law, to
"'establish a fair nexus between the apparent legal or equitable ownership of
the property and the [underlying] dispute [described] in the lawsuit.'" 296 Fair
nexus requires a "'good faith, viable claim. ,, 297 The claim here failed to pass
that test.298 The majority said it would be unfair and "contrary ... to public
policy to allow" flimsy claims to support lis pendens. 299 Judge Thompson
dissented.300 He would have quashed the lower court's order based on Chi-
usolo v. Kennedy. °1
In Shields v. Schuman, °2 one of several additional lis pendens cases de-
cided during the survey period,3°3 Shields was a twenty-five percent share-
holder in a corporation that owned certain real estate. ° Schuman owned the
remaining seventy-five percent of the stock in the corporation.0 5 Schuman
caused the corporation to enter into a contract to sell the real estate to Blue
Water VII, L.L.C. (Blue Water), despite the fact that Shields objected.30 6
Shields sought to enjoin the consummation of the sale claiming that the price
was not high enough.3 7 A notice of lis pendens was also filed by Shields.30 8
Posting of a bond of $8,500,000 was required by the trial court as a condition
"to maintain the lis pendens." 309 The bond was not posted, which resulted in
the dissolution of the lis pendens. 310 Blue Water then sought dismissal of
two counts of the complaint, claiming there was a cloud on Blue Water's
title.3" Blue Water requested, as an alternative, that Shields be required to
post a bond to maintain the two counts.312 The trial court, although reluctant
296. Id. at 234 (quoting Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. 1993)).
297. Id. (quoting Bergmann v. Slater, 922 So. 2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006)).
298. Nu-Vision, L.L.C., 965 So. 2d at 234.
299. Id. at 235.
300. Id. at 236 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
301. Id. (relying on Chiusolo, 614 So. 2d at 493).
302. 964 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
303. See, e.g., Real Invs., L.L.C. v. Oaks Group, Inc., 973 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); Suarez v. KMD Constr., Inc., 965 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
304. Shields, 964 So. 2d at 813.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 813-14.
308. Id. at 814.
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to do so, required Shields to post bond if he wished to continue the lawsuit. 1 3
Shields filed a petition for certiorari." 4 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
granted the writ and the order requiring bond was quashed.3"5 The trial
court's order requiring a bond "not related to a lis pendens, violate[d]
[Shields's] constitutional right of access to the courts. 316
D. Partition
Brothers Nick and Peter Geraci owned approximately 290 acres of real
estate in Hillsborough County described as "ripe for development. '317 The
brothers did not get along; Peter wanted out of the business relationship, and
eventually, Peter sued Nick alleging that the real estate "was not divisible
without prejudice to the owners" and sought an order directing that the prop-
erty be sold.318 Nick denied that the real estate was indivisible and counter-
claimed seeking the appointment of three commissioners pursuant to section
64.061(1) of the Florida Statutes for the purpose of effectuating the parti-
tion.319 Instead, the trial court held "an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the property could be [partitioned] without prejudice to either broth-
er. ' 320 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that the real es-
tate could not be partitioned and a public sale of the real estate was or-
dered. 32' Nick appealed arguing that the trial court was required to appoint
commissioners who would make the call as to whether the real estate could
be divided in kind without prejudice to the parties, citing sections 64.061(1)
and 64.071(1) of the Florida Statutes.322 Describing the case as "a matter of
first impression, 323 the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court on the strength of section 64.061(4) of the Florida Statutes.324 The
Second District Court of Appeal held that section 64.061(4) allowed the trial
court to bypass the appointment of commissioners process and go directly to
313. Id. at 813-14.
314. Shields, 964 So. 2d at 813.
315. Id. at 814.
316. Id.




321. Id. at 905-06.
322. Geraci, 963 So. 2d at 907.
323. Id. at 905.
324. Id. at 907.
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The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT), in connection with
"the widening of State Road 40 west of Ocala," filed a suit seeking to con-
demn part of the real estate owned by System Components Corporation (Sys-
tem Components).326 System Components then purchased additional real
estate on which to build a new facility and, in the interim, leased space to
which it temporarily relocated the business.327 DOT and System Compo-
nents agreed on everything but the proper calculation of damages to the
business pursuant to section 73.071(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes.325 System
Components argued that damages were measured by "the total value of the
business" on the date of taking-as if the company no longer existed.329
DOT's position was that the measure of damages was "actual damages" less,
or mitigated by, value that could be attributed to "the relocation and conti-
nu[ed] operation of the business. '330 The trial court instructed the jury to
make both calculations.33 ' According to the jury, "the total value of the busi-
ness was $2,394,964.00," but considering "the relocation and continuing
operation of the business," damages were $1,347,911.00.332 The trial court
awarded System Components the latter amount, and System Components
appealed.333 System Components relied on Department of Transportation v.
Tire Centers, L.L. C.,334 where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
business damages provided in section 73.071(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes
are not subject to mitigation by an "'off-site cure.' 33 5 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal noted that while there might not be a "'duty to mitigate'
325. Id.
326. Sys. Components Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 985 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 688-89.
329. Id. at 689.
330. Id.
331. Sys. Components Corp., 985 So. 2d at 689.
332. Id.
333. See id.
334. 895 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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business damages" on the part of the condemnee, once relocation of the
business was accomplished and business continued, the benefit of doing so
must be offset against the total value of the business. 336 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court and certified such conflict with the
Fourth District Court of Appeal.337
In another case, the DOT obtained an order of taking, in July 2001, for
Parcel 104 in Indian River County alongside State Road 60 for the purpose
of widening the road.338 St. John's Water Control District filed a counter-
claim for inverse condemnation of Parcel 104A.339 After trial on May 30,
2006, on the counterclaim, the trial court awarded the Board of Supervisors
of St. John's Water Control District more than five million dollars for Parcel
104A, using the trial date for valuation and compensation under section
73.071(2) of the Florida Statutes.340 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded for a new trial and re-valuation. 34 "[Ijn an inverse
condemnation proceeding, .... the better rule"' is to use the date of appropria-
tion for purposes of valuing compensation.342
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Workers' Compensation
Gayer was employed by Labor Finders of Broward, Inc. (Labor Find-
ers), a provider of temporary workers. 43 Labor Finders paid Gayer an hourly
wage, and Gayer received workers' compensation coverage through Labor
Finders.344 Fine Line Construction & Electric, Inc. (Fine Line) "leased"
Gayer from Labor Finders and put him to work.345 His job required the use
of "a tall folding ladder and an electric drill," and while performing the work,
Gayer fell off the ladder that had been furnished to him by Fine Line.' He
336. Id. at 692.
337. Id. at 693.
338. Dep't of Transp. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 981 So. 2d 605, 605 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
339. Id. at 606.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. (quoting County of Volusia v. Pickens, 439 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983)).
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was severely injured.347 Was the ladder defective in some way and its manu-
facturer liable?348 That was difficult to determine because the ladder "could
not be located."349 Gayer sued Fine Line claiming spoliation of evidence,
that is, the ladder. 350 Fine Line successfully 'moved for summary judgment,
arguing that it had no duty to preserve the ladder under section 440.39(7), [of
the] Florida Statutes, because [it] was not Gayer's 'employer.' ' 351  The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. The claim for spoliation de-
pends on there being a "duty to preserve evidence. 353 The Fourth District
found this duty in section 440.39 of the Florida Statutes and quoted the
Third District Court of Appeal in General Cinema Beverages of Miami, Inc.
v. Mortimer,354 stating that "[t]he point of section 440.39 is to preserve caus-
es of action against third-party tortfeasors and to impose a duty of coopera-
tion to that end. 355 But was Gayer an employee of Fine Line and thus owed
a duty by Fine Line to preserve evidence?356 The Fourth District referred to
what it called "the majority rule under the doctrine of lent employment., 357
"[I1f the general employer simply arranges for labor without heavy equip-
ment, the transferred worker then becomes the employee of the special em-
ployer." 358 From there, the court had little difficulty concluding that Fine
Line was "a special employer of a borrowed employee"--Gayer-and fit
within the definition of "employer" used in section 440.39.
In Doe v. Footstar Corp., 6 the parents of a minor child, as her next
friends and guardians, brought an action against Footstar Corporation (Foots-
tar) for damages resulting from the alleged negligent hiring of their daugh-
ter's supervisor at Footstar, claiming the supervisor had assaulted their
daughter.36' The trial court ruled that the action against Footstar was barred
347. Id.
348. See Gayer, 970 So. 2d at 426 n.1.
349. Id. at 425.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 426.
352. Id.
353. Gayer, 970 So. 2d at 426 (quoting Flagstar Cos. v. Cole-Ehlinger, 909 So. 2d 320,
322-23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
354. 689 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
355. Gayer, 970 So. 2d at 427 (quoting Mortimer, 689 So. 2d at 279).
356. See id. at 426-28.
357. Id. at 428.
358. Id. at 427 (quoting Folds v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 875 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2004)).
359. Id. at 428-29.
360. 980 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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by the workers' compensation exclusivity rule, section 440.11 of the Florida
Statutes.362 The Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged that the re-
sult seemed harsh, but that "[t]here is no exception to the exclusive remedy"
rule under section 440.11.363 Therefore, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed.36
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
State v. Young 365 is a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case involv-
ing a warrantless search by police of a computer furnished by an employer to
an employee at the employer's place of business-in this case, a church.366
Suffice it to say, that if the employer does not have a clearly articulated,
widely circulated, written policy allowing it to search computers it has pro-
vided its employees at work, then in the absence of valid consent or a valid
warrant, search of a computer by police will be subject to fact laden scrutiny
under the Fourth Amendment as to whether the employee had a legitimate
expectation of privacy.367 In Young, the police seized a clergyman's comput-
er at the church relying on permission to do so from another employee of the
church who was not the clergyman's supervisor. 68 The evidence obtained
from the computer and later related statements by the clergyman were sup-
pressed by the trial court.3 69 The State appealed, and the First District Court
of Appeal affirmed. 370 The church did not have a specific policy regarding
its access to employees' computers.37' In the absence of an explicit policy
concerning inspection of computers, can it be said that the employee had a
legitimate expectation of privacy concerning his computer?372 Under the
facts of this case-"focus[ing] on the operational realities of the
workplace"-the court concluded that this employee did.373 The employee's
office was not regularly shared with anyone else, the office could be
locked-there were three keys to the office door and the employee had two
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1267-68.
364. Footstar Corp., 980 So. 2d at 1268.
365. 974 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
366. Id. at 606, 608.
367. See id. at 609 (citing State v. Purifoy, 740 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1999)).
368. Id. at 606-07.
369. id. at 608.
370. Young, 974 So. 2d at 606.
371. Id. at 612.
372. See id. at 608-09.
373. Id. at 609.
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of the keys-when absent, the employee kept the door locked, and the em-
ployee's computer was not on a network with any other computer.374 The
employer's ownership of the computer did not matter because the employee
"was the sole regular user.' 375 However, an employee would not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy if a third party has or "reasonably appears to
have common authority over the" property-a computer-and the third party
gave consent to the search.376 That circumstance was not present here.377
The court noted that police may rely on a third party's apparent common
authority to give consent if the reliance is reasonable, even in the absence of
actual authority.378 The appellate court found that in this case, the facts did
not support a finding that the church employee giving permission to the po-
lice search had common authority, nor was it reasonable for the police to
think that he did.379 The clergyman's statements given to the police after the
recitation of the Miranda warning38 were also suppressed as being "fruit of
the poisonous tree."381
X. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GOVERNANCE
The President of the Greenwich Association, Inc. (Association), "on be-
half of the unit owners," signed an agreement with Greenwich Apartments,
Inc. that settled a dispute over the use of a parking garage.382 In May 2001,
shortly after the agreement was signed, the circuit court entered a final order
dismissing the lawsuit, and the settlement was incorporated into the order.
383
There was no appeal. 38' The problem was that the settlement agreement was
never put to a vote of the Association's unit owners.385 The Association
brought suit against Greenwich Apartments, Inc. in April 2005.386 The Asso-
ciation asked the court to reform or cancel the settlement agreement alleging
374. Id. at 611.
375. Young, 974 So. 2d at 611.
376. Id. at 609 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
377. Id. at 612.
378. Id. at 610.
379. Id. at 612.
380. Young, 974 So. 2d at 607.
381. Id. at 610 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), and Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 387 (1920)).
382. Greenwich Ass'n v. Greenwich Apartments, Inc., 979 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 3d
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an ultra vires act on the part of its then president that amounted to fraud.387
The trial court granted Greenwich Apartment Inc.'s motion for summary
judgment on the basis of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b).388 Ac-
cording to the trial court, this rule required the Association to bring its action
"within one year of the" court's earlier final order, that is, by May 2002,
which it did not do.389 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) requires that
relief from a court's final judgment, decree, or order based on, inter alia,
intrinsic or extrinsic fraud, "'misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party"' must be brought within a year of the court's order.3 90 The
Third District Court of Appeal found the 2001 judgment to be voidable, but
not void, and therefore, the exception to the one year rule applicable to void
judgments did not apply.39' The rule, however, does not put a limit on the
relief from judgment a court may grant for fraud on the court.392 As to fraud
on the court, the Third District Court of Appeal determined that cognizable
"[f]raud upon the court" in this case had to be extrinsic fraud defined as
"where a party is prevented from 'trying an issue before the court and the
prevention itself becomes a collateral issue to the cause. ' 393 By contrast,
intrinsic fraud is "'the presentation of misleading information on an issue
before the court that was tried or could have been tried.' 394 The Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal found that the complaint of fraud on the court was in-
trinsic, if fraud at all, and was time barred by Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.540(b).3 95
XI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNET
Mr. O'Shea sued Cordis Corporation (Cordis) and Johnson & Johnson
alleging that he was injured as a result of a defective "stent implanted in
him., 396 As part of the discovery process, Mr. O'Shea made requests for
production of documents which Cordis claimed were confidential proprietary
387. Greenwich Ass'n, 979 So. 2d at 1118.
388. Id. at 1117;FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.540(b).
389. See id; see Greenwich Ass'n, 979 So.2d at 1117.
390. Id. at 1118 (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)).
391. Id. at 1118-19.
392. Id. at 1118; see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
393. Greenwich Ass'n, 979 So. 2d at 1118 (quoting Parker v. Parker, 950 So. 2d 388, 391
(Fla. 2007)).
394. Id. (quoting Parker, 950 So. 2d at 391).
395. Id. at 1119.
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trade secret items.397 Mr. O'Shea's attorney asked for an order that would
allow him to disclose to other lawyers confidential information gleaned dur-
ing discovery.398 The trial court issued such an order containing procedures
designed to maintain confidentiality. 399 The trial court also denied Cordis's
motion to prohibit Mr. O'Shea's attorney from sharing the confidential in-
formation with other attorneys, regardless of their involvement in collateral
litigation concerning the stent.'"° Cordis petitioned for certiorari review of
the trial court's order.4°' The petition was granted, and the trial court's order
was quashed. °2 By not limiting "sharing" confidential information to coun-
sel in collateral litigation over the stent, the trial court's order was too
broad. 3 Cordis demonstrated the order's potential of causing it irreparable
harm.4' Judge Farmer dissented.4 5
XII. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. Jurisdiction
Aspsoft, Inc. (Aspsoft) sued WebClay, Inc. (WebClay), and Mr. Allen
alleging "breach of an oral contract."4°6 Mr. Allen, a North Carolina resi-
dent, was the registered agent and president of WebClay. °7 WebClay's prin-
cipal place of business was also in North Carolina.4 8 Did Florida's long-arm
statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes, justify the trial court's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over both WebClay and Mr. Allen?4°9 Aspsoft
397. id. at 1164-65.
398. Id. at 1164,
399. Id. at 1165,
400. Id.
401. O'Shea, 988 So. 2d at 1164.
402. Id. at 1164, 1168.
403. Id. at 1168.
404. Id. at 1166.
405. Id. at 1168.
406. Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761,763-64 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
407. Id. at 764.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 765. The Fifth District Court of Appeal's description of the contents of the
affidavits submitted by the parties does not include an indication that payments by WebClay
to Aspsoft were expressly required to be made in Florida. Id. at 764. The Fifth District Court
of Appeal concluded that:
[T]he facts set forth in Aspsoft's amended complaint and affidavits are sufficient to
support the conclusion that personal jurisdiction over WebClay by the Florida
courts is proper pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute since the affidavits state that
WebClay breached the parties' oral contract by failing to make payments which
were due to be made in Florida.
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alleged that WebClay, represented by Mr. Allen, hired Aspsoft to do soft-
ware consulting for WebClay and agreed to pay Aspsoft in response to in-
voices to be sent to WebClay by Aspsoft every two weeks. ° Aspsoft sub-
mitted affidavits stating that all work done by Aspsoft for WebClay occurred
in Florida.4" The trial court, relying on the recommendations of a General
Magistrate, dismissed the suit against WebClay and Mr. Allen with preju-
dice.412 The trial court found that the defendants did not have the minimum
amount of contacts with Florida for the court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over them.4 13 The trial court also found that Florida's statute of frauds,
section 725.01 of the Florida Statutes, barred the breach of contract claim. 414
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice in favor of Mr. Allen.415 However, it reversed the trial court as to
WebClay.416 Citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,4 17 the Fifth District
subjected the facts to a two-part jurisdictional analysis: "(1) whether the
facts set forth one or more of the predicate acts enumerated in section 48.193
of the Florida Statutes; and, if so, then (2) whether the facts set forth the
defendant's minimum contacts with Florida necessary to satisfy federal con-
stitutional due process requirements., 41 8 "[M]inimum contacts are estab-
lished if the court finds that 'the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum [sitate are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there."'419 The court observed that under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (g)
of the Florida Statutes, "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on
a business or business venture in [the] state [and b]reaching a contract in this
state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in
this state," are sufficient acts to justify personal jurisdiction over an entity,
therefore, paying Aspsoft's invoices conferred jurisdiction on Florida courts
over Webclay. 420 The Fifth District Court of Appeal had no problem con-
cluding WebClay had these minimum contacts with Florida and could "rea-
Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 766. However, in its amended complaint, Aspsoft alleged that
some payments were made to it in Florida. Id. at 763-64.
410. Id. at 764.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. See Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 764.
414. Id. at 768-69.
415. Id. at 769.
416. Id.
417. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
418. Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 765.
419. Id. (citing Glovegold Shipping, Ltd. v. Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening, 791
So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
420. Id. at 766.
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sonably anticipate being haled into court there".42' As to the statute of frauds
ground for dismissing Aspsoft's lawsuit, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
held that only if the oral contract could not possibly be performed within the
statute's threshold of one year could the statute of frauds be said to apply.
422
Aspsoft's complaint against WebClay was reinstated.423
In Renaissance Health Publishing, L.L.C. v. Resveratrol Partners,
L.L. C,424 Renaissance Health Publishing, L.L.C. (Renaissance), a Florida
corporation, brought a trade libel action in Florida against Resveratrol Part-
ners, L.L.C. (Resveratrol), "a Nevada limited liability company., 425 Renais-
sance asserted that the court had jurisdiction over Resveratrol under Florida's
long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes. 426 "The trial court
granted [Resveratrol's] motion to dismiss" for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.427 Renaissance appealed.428 Resveratrol did not maintain an office,
employ agents, own any real estate, have any bank accounts in Florida, or
solicit customers by direct mail or advertise in "magazine[s] or periodical[s]
delivered to Florida" or by means of "Florida based broadcast or cable adver-
tising., 429 Resveratrol sold its competing product, Longevinex, on its inter-
active website.43° "In the three-year period prior to" the lawsuit, Resveratrol
made sales "to Florida residents through [its] website" which sales
"represented 2.4% of [its] total gross domestic sales."'43' During the same
period, eighty-six of its books and e-books were sold to Florida residents for
a total of $2101.83.432 The Fourth District Court of Appeal not only found
that the requirements of section 48.193 were satisfied, it also found sufficient
minimum contacts to satisfy the due process requirements under Venetian
Salami Co. 433 What tipped the scales in this case is that Resveratrol's web-
site was an interactive website as opposed to a passive website.434
421. Id. at 766-67 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297).
422. Id. at 769.
423. See Aspsoft, Inc., 983 So. 2d at 769.
424. 982 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
425. Id. at 740.
426. See id. at 740-41.
427. Id. at 741.
428. Id.




433. Id. at 741-42 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989)).
434. Renaissance, 982 So. 2d at 742 (citing Westwind Limousine, Inc. v. Shorter, 932 So.
2d 571, 575 n.7 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
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B. Venue
The genesis of the appeal in McWane, Inc. v. Water Management Ser-
vices, Inc.435 was a lawsuit against several defendants from several states for
breach of contract and breach of warranty based on damages alleged to have
resulted "from the structural failure of' a pipeline that carried water to St.
George Island, in Florida's panhandle.436 It appears that the plaintiff, Water
Management Services, Inc., a Florida corporation, objected to "the enforce-
ment of a . . .contractual forum selection provision" to jurisdictions other
than Florida.4 37 The trial court agreed that the contractual forum selections
should not be enforced. 438 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed.43 9 A
contractual forum selection provision will not be enforced if it can be shown
that by enforcing the provision, the party's "trial in the agreed-upon forum
'will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court."' 4  Some inconvenience and extra
expense is not enough to overcome a contractual provision." 1 In the case
presented, the "legally and factually interrelated claims and cross-claims
alleging structural damage to a single line of pipe by multiple defendants
from multiple states" supported the trial court's decision." 2
XII. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. Assignment of Lease
In Leesburg Community Cancer Center v. Leesburg Regional Medical
Center, Inc.,"4 Leesburg Regional Medical Center (Regional), as lessor, in
1985, made "a thirty-year ground lease with Leesburg Real Estate Asso-
ciates, Inc." (Associates), as lessee. 4 The purpose of the lease was to allow
"Associates to develop and operate [a] ...cancer treatment center on the
property." 445 The lease forbade Regional from operating "a competing can-
435. 967 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
436. Id. at 1007.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 1007-08.




443. 972 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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cer treatment center ... within ... Regional's 'primary service area' during
the" lease term.446 Associates had the right to assign or sublet "all or part of
its leasehold."" 7 All assignments and subleases were to be made "subject to
the terms" of the original ground lease, and the ground lease's terms had to
be incorporated by Associates "into any assignment or sublease" made by
it.448 Associates promptly sublet the property to Leesburg Community Can-
cer Center (Cancer Center), "a limited partnership formed by" Associates'
shareholders.449
In 2000, Regional bought Associates' leasehold interest for $1,900,000,
with the intention of allowing Regional to participate in a nearby competing
cancer treatment facility.450 Regional's position was "that the exclusivity
clause" in the lease was personal between it and Associates.451' Regional
argued that its purchase of Associates' leasehold interest extinguished the
exclusivity clause. 52 Cancer Center, as sublessee, sought declaratory relief
on the issue of the extinguishment of the exclusivity clause. 3 The trial court
granted summary judgment to Regional and Cancer Center appealed.454 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed.455
The general rule is that privity of contract does not exist between a les-
sor and sublessee.456 Without privity between Regional and Cancer Center,
Cancer Center had no right to enforce any of the lease covenants.457 Had this
been an assignment of the leasehold interest from Associates to Cancer Cen-
ter, then Cancer Center would be standing "in the shoes of the assignor. 4 58
The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that it was clear that a sublease, not
an assignment, was intended, and the parties behaved in this fashion. 459 "If
the parties had intended to create a non-compete covenant between Leesburg
Regional and any sublessee of Real Estate Associates, they could have easily
said so in the ground lease.
446. Id.
447. Id.





453. Leesburg Cmty., 972 So. 2d at 205.
454. Id. at 204.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 206.
457. See id.
458. Leesburg Cmty., 972 So. 2d at 206 (quoting Lauren Kyle Holdings, Inc. v. Heath-
Peterson Constr. Corp., 864 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
459. Id.
460. Id. at 207.
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B. Personal Guarantee of Lease
In Fairway Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Locust Gardens,461 Fairway
Mortgage Solutions (tenant) "entered into a five-year" lease with Locust
Gardens (landlord).4 62 The lease was signed "on behalf of the tenant" by
Fernando Recalde, its president."63 "[D]irectly below the signature line" was
the following, which was hand-printed: "FERNANDO RECALDE,
PRESIDENT. ' '464  Below that line, was the following: "* NOTE-
PERSONAL GUARANTY THE TENANT SIGN[A]TURE ABOVE ALSO
INDICATES ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONALLY GUARANTEEING THIS
LEASE AND IS BEING FREELY GIVEN AS PER SECTION 'G' OF
THIS LEASE."465
The lease agreement provided that the tenant and guarantor would be
"jointly and severally liable. '466 "In March 2006, the tenant contacted a real
estate [agent], who had [been] the landlord's leasing agent" and informed the
agent that the tenant was relocating and needed "assistance in finding a sub-
tenant., 467 The tenant failed to make the April 2006 and later rent pay-
ments.468 The landlord sued for possession, "damages, and breach of guaran-
ty. ' '469 The tenant argued that the landlord "failed to mitigate damages," and
Mr. Recalde claimed that the guaranty language had been added to the lease
agreement after the lease was signed "without his knowledge or consent.
' 470
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the landlord on the
issue of mitigation of damages and Mr. Recalde's guaranty.47' The tenant
and Mr. Recalde appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal left un-
disturbed the summary judgment in favor of the landlord concerning mitiga-
tion of damages.472
The landlord's duty to mitigate damages by trying to re-let the property
did not begin until it had retaken possession.473 That occurred in August
461. 988 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
462. Id. at 679.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 679-80.





471. Locust Gardens, 988 So. 2d at 680. The parties stipulated that the landlord was en-
titled to possession. Id.
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2006, and by November 2006, the landlord had obtained a replacement te-
nant for part of the square footage leased.474 The landlord had, in fact, miti-
gated damages.4 75 However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
summary judgment with respect to the guaranty finding that there were still
genuine issues of material fact regarding the validity of the guaranty.476 A
signature on a document that follows the word "by," plus descriptive words
identifying the signor "'as a corporate officer or ... similar [position], does
not create personal liability for the' signor unless the contract has language
to the contrary.477
C. Payment into Court Registry
In Blandin v. Bay Porte Condominium Ass'n.,478 Mr. Blandin owned
land on which "a ten-unit condominium building" is located.479 In 1971, Mr.
Blandin, as lessor, made "a 99-year land lease with the building's develop-
er," as lessee.480 As the developer sold the units, it assigned a percentage
interest in the ground lease to the buyers-unit owners-as lessees.4 8 The
land lease had "a rent escalation clause ... based [on] the consumer price
index. 482 In 2006, "[Mr.] Blandin notified the association and unit owners"
of the amount of the increased rent.483 "[T]he unit owners failed to pay...
,484 Mr. Blandin then sent a three-day notice, but there still was no pay-
ment.485 He then filed an action "for breach of the land lease, [asking for]
possession and damages. 486 The unit owners asked the court to "determine
the amount of the accrued rent [they must] place[] in the court registry [un-
der] section 83.232" of the Florida Statutes.487
474. Id.
475. Locust Gardens, 988 So. 2d at 681.
476. Id.
477. Id. (citing Robert C. Malt & Co. v. Carpet World Distribs., Inc., 763 So. 2d 508, 510
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (where the scope of the guaranty was not spelled out in the
agreement)).
478. 988 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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"On August 22, 2007, the trial court ordered the unit owners" to pay
rent at the old rate until the new amount could be determined.488 On Novem-
ber 2, 2007, Mr. Blandin moved "for immediate final default judgment of
possession," alleging that the unit owners did not make the October or No-
vember payments.4"9 The association's new management company took the
blame for missing the payments. 490 "[T]he trial court denied Mr. Blandin's
motion" and ordered him instead to accept the late rent payments which had
been offered, as good cause had been shown for the delay.49' Mr. Blandin
appealed the denial of his motion.492 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded the matter "for the issuance of immediate writs of
possession."4 93 Subsections (1) and (5) of section 83.232 of the Florida Sta-
tutes, when read together, allow the trial court to extend the tenant's time to
make rent payments only if the court exercises its discretion before the pay-
ment due date, not after.494 If "a tenant fails to timely pay pursuant to a court
order, the court" loses the discretion to extend the due date and must "enter
an immediate default for possession, without further notice or hearing." '495
XIV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
In Braswell v. Ryan Investments, Ltd. ,496 Mrs. Braswell had obtained
judgments against her husband, now deceased, resulting from "his failure to
make payments" to her under a marital settlement agreement entered into in
2000.' 9' The marital home-which Mrs. Braswell no longer occupied-
"had been titled in the name of Ryan Investments, Ltd.," (Corporation) since
its purchase in 1997.498 Relying on what is called "'outsider reverse corpo-
rate piercing' theory, ' 49 Mrs. Braswell tried to execute her judgments by
levy on the home alleging that the Corporation was her husband's "alter ego
and that he" titled the property in the corporate name to defraud her.' ° The
488. Blandin, 988 So. 2d at 667.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 668.
492. Id.
493. Blandin, 988 So. 2d at 670.
494. Id. at 669.
495. Id.
496. 989 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
497. Id. at 38.
498. Id.
499. Id. (citing Estudios, Proyectos e Inversiones de Centro America, S.A. v. Swiss Bank
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trial court rebuffed her attempt to execute on the home.50 The Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed.5 °2 The Third District acknowledged that the cor-
porate veil can be pierced when the "'controlling shareholder form[s] or
use[s] the corporation to defraud creditors"' for pre-existing obligations.5 3
The corporation itself can also be held liable to satisfy the debts of the con-
trolling shareholders when they "'have formed or used the corporation to
secrete assets"' thus avoiding "'preexisting personal liability.,' 50 4  These
remedies were not available to Mrs. Braswell. 50 5 The marital home had been
held in the Corporation's name for three years prior to the marital settlement
agreement.5l
The obligations of Mr. Braswell to Mrs. Braswell came into being after
the home had been titled in the corporate name, not before.50 7 It was no se-




Mr. Tringali was a member of L.A. Fitness International (L.A. Fitness),
a health club.5° Mr. Tringali fell from the stepping machine he was using at
an L.A. Fitness facility, and he died of heart failure.51° Mr. Tringali's
"daughter, as personal representative of' her father's estate, sued L.A. Fit-
ness for wrongful death, alleging that the health club had a "duty to render
aid during a medical emergency" and: 1) failed to medically screen her fa-
ther; 2) failed to use cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR); "3) failed to have
an automatic external defibrillator (AED) on its premises and to use it on
[her father]; and 4) failed to properly train its employees" to deal with medi-
cal emergencies.5 1' A judgment was entered against L.A. Fitness, awarding
501. Braswell, 989 So. 2d at 39.
502. Id. at 41.
503. Id. at 38 (quoting Estudios, 507 So. 2d at 1120).
504. Id. at 39 (quoting Estudios, 507 So. 2d at 1120).
505. Id.
506. Braswell, 989 So. 2d at 39.
507. Id. at 38.
508. Id. at 38-39.
509. L.A. Fitness Int'l, L.L.C. v. Mayer, 980 So. 2d 550, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
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damages of $619,650, and L.A. Fitness appealed. At trial, there was testi-
mony to the effect that Mr. Strayer, an employee of L.A. Fitness, was certi-
fied in CPR.513 Immediately upon learning that a patron was in distress, Mr.
Strayer "told the receptionist to call 911," which she did.514 Testimony of the
employees and witnesses differed as to how much time elapsed between the
time of the 911 call and the arrival of the paramedics, as well as to the
amount of time that elapsed between the time Mr. Tringali collapsed and the
emergency medical technicians arrived. 515  The estimates were generally
about four minutes after the 911 call, but perhaps up to twelve minutes after
Mr. Tringali collapsed.516 Mr. Strayer examined Mr. Tringali in the mean-
time and decided against CPR as he thought it might "make matters
worse." '517 The Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that it appeared that
the duty of an owner of a health club to an injured customer was a matter of
first impression in Florida.5t 8 Referring to its decision in Estate of Starling v.
Fisherman's Pier, Inc.,519 the Fourth District Court of Appeal approved the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 314A, "that a proprietor is under an
ordinary duty of care to render aid to an invitee after he knows or has reason
to know the invitee is ill or injured., 520 Citing decisions from other states,
the Fourth District concluded that L.A. Fitness fulfilled its duty to Mr. Trin-
gali by calling for paramedics "within a reasonable time. '52' The court re-
versed the trial court's judgment and remanded.522 Along the way, the
Fourth District also pointed out that the Florida Legislature had failed to
strengthen Florida's Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13 of the Florida Sta-
tutes.523 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that statutory protection
for persons like Mr. Strayer was illusory. 524 Had Mr. Strayer performed CPR
on Mr. Tringali, he could have been subjected to liability for failure to per-
512. Id. at 556.
513. Id. at552.




518. Id. at 557.
519. 401 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
520. Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 557 (citing Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge, 271
S.E.2d 335, 338 (W. Va. 1980)).
521. Id.at561-62.
522. Id. at 562.
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form it properly.525 Mr. Strayer's assessment of Mr. Tringali's condition and
decision to forego CPR did not expose him to liability.526
B. Negligent Hiring
Mr. Stander's death resulted from an automobile accident with Mr.
Braswell.527 Mr. Braswell, an independent contractor, had been hired by
Dispoz-O-Products, Inc. to transport paper goods to Florida.52 8 The personal
representative of Mr. Stander's estate sued Dispoz-O-Products for damag-
es. 529 The personal representative contended that Dispoz-O-Products should
be held liable for Mr. Braswell's alleged negligence on several grounds, in
particular, because Dispoz-O-Products was negligent in hiring Mr. Bras-
well.530 It was further "alleged that Dispoz-O-Products was negligent be-
cause it knew or should have known that "the independent contractor it hired
was inexperienced, dangerous, negligent, and unfit for the job.53" ' The trial
court dismissed the personal representative's complaint with prejudice, rul-
ing that the complaint was only conclusory and alleged no facts in support of
a cause of action for negligent hiring.532 The personal representative ap-
pealed.533 The Fourth District Court of Appeal stated the pertinent general
rule as "the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negli-
gence of the independent contractor because the employer has no control
over the manner in which the work is done. 534 The Fourth District acknowl-
edged that its decision in Suarez v. Gonzalez535 is "an exception to the gener-
al rule. ' 536 In Suarez, a landlord hired a man to install cabinets in her garage
that she was getting into condition to rent.537 The work was paid for in cash,
there was no written contract, and the landlord had no knowledge as to
whether or not the cabinet installer was licensed.5 38 The landlord did not
525. See Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 561 n.2.
526. See id. at 563 (Stevenson, J., concurring).






532. Stander, 973 So. 2d at 605.
533. Id. at 604.
534. Id. (quoting Suarez v. Gonzales, 820 So. 2d 342, 344 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
535. 820 So. 2d at 342.
536. Stander, 973 So. 2d at 604.
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even know the installer's name.539 Later, "one of the cabinets fell, [and t]he
tenant was seriously injured." 5" Because of the duty owed by a landlord to a
tenant, the exception to the general rule applied in Suarez, so the landlord
could be held liable.-41 Here, on the other hand, Mr. Stander's personal rep-
resentative alleged no facts that took this case out of the general rule.42 Ab-
sent such facts, Dispoz-O-Products owed no duty to third parties such as Mr.
Stander.543 Judge Emas dissented.5" Judge Emas would have held, "as a
matter of law, [that] a cause of action exists [in Florida] for negligent selec-
tion of an independent contractor [with respect to the shipment of] non-
hazardous goods on the highway." 5
C. Punitive Damages
Mr. Hipple, an invitee of Tiger Point Golf and Country Club (Tiger
Point), with the help of "two others, forcibly removed a handrail on Tiger
Point's" property. 546 During the process, the handrail fell on Mr. Hippie's
foot, and a bone in his toe was broken. 47 Mr. Hipple sued Tiger Point for
negligence.5 48 An affidavit filed in the action stated that "the handrail 'was
very badly rusted and in terrible shape."' 54 9 There was also evidence to the
effect that Tiger Point had notice of the handrail's state of disrepair for al-
most two weeks before Mr. Hippie was injured.550 Tiger Point unsuccessful-
ly moved for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, and the
jury then awarded Mr. Hippie comparative negligence compensatory damag-
es of slightly less than $6500 plus $85,000 in punitive damages.5 1 Tiger
Point appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal held that the trial court
should have granted "summary judgment [to Tiger Point] on the issue of
punitive damages. ''552 Mr. Hippie failed to make a reasonable showing of
entitlement to punitive damages under section 768.72(1) of the Florida Sta-
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Stander, 973 So. 2d at 604.
542. Id. at 605.
543. See id.
544. Id. at 606 (Emas, J. dissenting).
545. Id.




549. Id. at 610.
550. Id.
551. Hipple, 977 So. 2d at 609.
552. Id. at 611.
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tutes.553 He failed to demonstrate that Tiger Point's conduct was "'outra-
geous, because of. . . evil motive or ... reckless indifference to the rights of
others. ' '' 554 According to the First District Court of Appeal, punitive damag-
es require evidence of "willful and wanton misconduct of a character no less
culpable than what is necessary to convict of criminal manslaughter.
555
Neglecting, even for a considerable period of time, to repair a clearly defec-
tive handrail which results in an injury is conduct not culpable enough to
warrant punitive damages.556
D. Liability Disclaimer
The Loewes contracted with Seagate Homes, Inc. (Seagate) to build a
home for them. 57 There was an exculpatory provision in the contract that
provided, among other things, that Seagate was released from any liability to
the Loewes for personal injury resulting from Seagate's "negligence, gross
negligence, strict liability or the intentional conduct of [Seagate], its officers,
directors, owners, employees, their successors, legal representatives, and
assigns. ''558 The Loewes sued Seagate, alleging that shortly after they closed
on the purchase and moved into the home, "a bathroom closet door fell off its
track and [hit] Mrs. Loewe in the eye, causing serious . . . permanent in-
jur[y]." 5 9 Their negligence action included a claim for damages based on
Mrs. Loewe's injuries, and a count for loss of consortium.56 Relying on the
exculpatory clause, the trial court dismissed the Loewe's complaint with
prejudice. 56' The Loewes appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal
found several reasons to reverse.562 First, the exculpatory clause could not
absolve Seagate of liability based on intentional torts. 563 Second, and assum-
ing a building code violation may be an issue, a party cannot contract
away-in a contract with a person whom the building codes are designed to
553. See id. at 610 n.2 (referencing FLA. STAT. § 768.72(1) (2006).
554. Id. at 610 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 908(2) (1979)).
555. Id. at 610.
556. Hipple, 977 So. 2d at 610.
557. Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc., 987 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
558. Id. at 759-60.
559. Id. at 759.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Loewe, 987 So. 2d at 759.
563. Id. at 760 (citing Kellums v. Freight Sales Ctrs., Inc., 467 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
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protect-its responsibilities under building codes.564 Finally, the exculpatory
clause could not prevent the Loewes from bringing a claim for negligence
because of public policy protecting purchasers and the public from personal
injury resulting from improper construction by a building contractor, citing
sections 489.101 and 553.781 (1) of the Florida Statutes.65
E. Tortious Interference with Business Relationship
Weitnauer Duty Free, Inc. (Weitnauer) had a duty-free store in Port
Everglades, and Imperial Majesty Cruise Line, L.L.C. (Cruise Line), which
sailed from Port Everglades, had a duty-free store on the ship. 66 Cruise Line
"barricaded and prevented" shopping by its passengers at Weitnauer's store
while in port.567 Weitnauer sued Cruise Line for "tortious interference with a
contract or business relation[ship]. '5 68 After a bench trial, the judge entered
judgment in favor of Weitnauer, awarding it $1000 in nominal damages even
though the court had found that Weitnauer failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to prove actual damages.169 The judge also awarded $750,000 of puni-
tive damages.57' The trial court judge found Cruise Line's actions to be
"'calculated, predatory, and excessive. Cruise Line appealed, and the
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. 72 The Fourth Dis-
trict disagreed with the punitive damage award.5 73 The court relied on its
decision in Hospital Corp. of Lake Worth v. Romaguera 74 where it said that
when the issue is an award of punitive damages in the context of "tortious
interference with a business relationship, . . . 'the two most important criteria
are: 1. Whether the interference was justified, 2. The nature, extent and
enormity of the wrong.' 575 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that
Cruise Line's conduct was not outrageous or egregious enough to support
punitive damages.576 The court also reversed the award of nominal damag-
564. Id. (citing John's Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616, 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979)).
565. Id. at 760-61.
566. Imperial Majesty Cruise Line, L.L.C. v. Weitnauer Duty Free, Inc., 987 So. 2d 706,
707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
567. Id. at 708.
568. Id. at 707.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Imperial Majesty, 987 So. 2d at 708.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. 511 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/1
FLORIDA LAWAFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS
es.577 "[P]roof of actual damages is an element of a cause of action for tor-
tious interference" and Weitnauer did not prove actual damages.578
F. False Light Invasion of Privacy
In Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (Rapp 1),579 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal asked the Supreme Court of Florida if Florida recognizes the tort of
false light invasion of privacy, and in Gannett Co., Inc. v. Anderson,58° the
First District Court of Appeal asked the Supreme Court of Florida what sta-
tute of limitations applies to the tort of false light invasion of privacy.581 In
Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp (Rapp 11),582 the Supreme Court of Florida ans-
wered the first question in the negative thus mooting the question raised in
Anderson v. Gannett Co., Inc. 583 The Supreme Court of Florida, in Rapp II,
found that the tort of false light invasion of privacy was virtually indistin-
guishable from a cause of action for defamation by implication---"false sug-
gestions, impressions and implications arising from otherwise truthful state-
ments."5 4 The Court, citing Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp.585 and
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. 944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra
note 1, at 110-11.
580. 947 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra
note 1, at 108-10.
581. The question certified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal: "[d]oes Florida recog-
nize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, and if so, are the elements of the tort set forth in
section 652E of Restatement (Second) of Torts?" Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 468. The question
certified by the First District Court of Appeal: "[i]s an action for invasion of privacy based on
the false light theory governed by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation
claims or by the four-year statute that applies to unspecified tort claims?" Gannett Co., Inc.,
947 So. 2d at 11.
582. 33 Fla. L. Weekly S849, S849 (Oct. 23, 2008).
583. Anderson v. Gannett Co., Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly S856, S856 (Oct. 23, 2008). In
Straub v. Lehtinen, Vargas & Riedi, P.A., the plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of
"his second amended complaint for false light invasion of privacy." 980 So. 2d 1085, 1086
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs
allegations set forth the necessary elements to support a false light invasion of privacy claim
under Florida law, relying on Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (Rapp 1) and Gannett Co., Inc. v.
Anderson, but noted that it "previously questioned the vitality of a claim for false light inva-
sion of privacy" and joined in certifying the question previously certified by it in Rapp. Id. at
1086-87. The Supreme Court of Florida stayed Straub v. Lehtinen, Vargas & Riedi, P.A.,
pending the Court's decision in Rapp II. Rapp II, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S855-56 n.14.
584. Rapp 11, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S851 (quoting Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
649 N.E.2d 825, 829-30 (N.Y. 1995).
585. 431 So.2d 627 (Fla. 5thDist. Ct. App. 1983).
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Brown v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.,8s confirmed that Florida recognizes
the tort of defamation by implication.5 7 Defamation by implication, being "a
well-recognized species of defamation," comes with a substantial body of
law and First Amendment protections. 8 The tort of false light invasion of
privacy is lacking in this regard. 589
Of particular interest in Rapp II is the Court's adoption of comment e to
section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as "stating the appropriate
'community' standard for analyzing a defamation claim. ',590 Specifically, "a
communication is defamatory if it prejudiced the plaintiff in the eyes of a
'substantial and respectable minority of the community. '"'59  The Court's
adoption of the Restatement's "community" standard prompted an opinion
from Justice Wells, dissenting in part, who found it "plainly too vague.
' 592
XVI. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR RIGHTS
A. Garnishment
DOES AN ATTORNEY GARNISHEE HAVE A DUTY TO
ISSUE A STOP PAYMENT ORDER FOR A CHECK DRAWN
ON HIS OR HER TRUST ACCOUNT AND DELIVERED TO
THE PAYEE PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF A WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT IF THE SERVICE OF THAT WRIT OCCURS
PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THAT CHECK FOR
PAYMENT TO THE ATTORNEY'S BANK?
593
That was the question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by the
Second District Court of Appeal as being "of great public importance" in
Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A. v. First American Holdings, Inc.594 As a
matter of first impression, the Court answered in the affirmative.595 Arnold,
Matheny and Eagan, P.A. (the law firm) represented Preclude, Inc. (Prec-
lude) in an action against Greenleaf Products, Inc. (Greenleaf). 6 A $50,000
586. 440 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
587. Rapp 11, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S852.
588. Id.
589. Id. at S849.
590. Id. at S855.
591. Rapp 11, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at S850.
592. Id. at S855.




596. Id. at 631.
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settlement was obtained by the law firm on behalf of Preclude.597 Sometime
before that settlement, a $26,000 judgment against Preclude had been ob-
tained by First American Holding, Inc. (First American) in an action unre-
lated to the matter between Preclude and Greenleaf.5 98 First American served
the law firm with a writ of garnishment on June 19, 2002.59 When served
with the writ, the law firm had not yet received the $50,000 settlement check
from Greenleaf.6° The law firm responded to the writ by stating that it held
no funds of Preclude.6°1 On June 21, 2002, the Greenleaf settlement check
was received and deposited to the law firm's trust account, and the law firm
issued a net settlement check to Preclude.6°z "[O]n June 25, 2002, First
American served a second writ of garnishment on [the law firm] . . .60'
The law firm again responded to the effect that it did not have "possession or
control of any funds" belonging to Preclude.6 4 However, the check the law
firm had written from its trust account to Preclude on June 21 "was not pre-
sented to [the law firm's] bank for payment until June 28. "605 Focusing on
the requirement of section 77.06(2) of the Florida Statutes that the garnishee
be in "possession or control" of the judgment debtor's property, the Court
held that the law firm retained control of the funds represented by the check
until the check was presented for payment, and therefore, the law firm had a
duty to request a stop payment order to the bank.6' The law firm should
have inquired of its bank on June 25, 2008, "as to whether its check had been
presented for payment." 7 Next, the Court found "no reason" to distinguish
between "bank and non-bank garnishees." 8 The fact that an attorney trust
account was involved made no difference. 6 9 In response to the argument
that the law finn was exposed to liability to its client for issuing a stop pay-
ment order or to a third party holder in due course to whom the check might
have been negotiated, the Court said the "good faith" exception to a garni-
shee's liability in section 77.06(3) of the Florida Statutes would have to be
597. Id.





603. Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A., 982 So. 2d at 631.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id. at 632-35 (citing FLA. STAT. § 77.06(2) (2002)).
607. Id. at 641.
608. Arnold, Matheny, & Eagan, P.A., 982 So. 2d at 637.
609. Id. at 640.
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protection enough.610 The law firm was liable to the garnishor, First Ameri-
can Holdings, Inc.61
B. Homestead
The Supreme Court of Florida in Chames v. DeMayo,1 2 asked: "Should
this Court recede from longstanding precedent holding that the Florida Con-
stitution's exemption from forced sale of a homestead cannot be waived?
613
The Court answered with a resounding "'no. ' ' 614 The case was based on a
retainer agreement Mr. DeMayo made with the law firm of Heller &
Chames, P.A.615 The agreement read in part that "the client hereby knowing-
ly, voluntarily and intelligently waives his rights to assert his homestead
exemption in the event a charging lien is obtained to secure the balance of
attorney's fees and costs. ' 6 16 The day came when the law firm "obtained a
charging lien and final judgment against DeMayo .. .[and the] trial court
applied the lien to DeMayo's home., 617 The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court on the waiver of homestead issue, and the Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the District Court's decision.6t 8 Article X, section 4,
subsection (a)(1) of the Florida Constitution sets out the Florida homestead
exemption from forced sale.619 There are well-known exceptions to the ex-
emption for: 1) real estate taxes and assessments; 2) mortgages; and 3) me-
chanics and materialmen's liens.6 20 The Court in Chames, which cited to
Carter's Administrators v. Carter and Sherbill v. Miller Manufacturing Co.,
noted that it has held for over a hundred years that the exemption from
forced sale of the homestead "cannot be waived in an unsecured agree-
ment., 62' The Court found no reason why this precedent should not be fol-
lowed.622 Acknowledging that personal constitutional rights can be waived,
the Court held that the homestead exemption was more than personal to the
610. Id. at 641 (citing FLA. STAT. § 77.06(3)).
611. Id.
612. 972 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2007).
613. Id. at 853.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 852.
616. Id.
617. Chames, 972 So. 2d at 852.
618. Id. at 852-53.
619. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1); Chames, 972 So. 2d at 852.
620. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
621. Chames, 972 So. 2d at 852 (citing Carter's Adm'rs v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558 (1884);
Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1956)).
622. Chames, 972 So. 2d at 860.
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homestead owner.623 The homestead exemption also protects the owner's
family and the State of Florida.624
C. Construction Lien
Mary Niehaus (Niehaus) contacted Big Ben's Tree Service, Inc. (Big
Ben's) and arrangements were made for Big Ben's to cut down and remove a
damaged tree located on Niehaus's property.625 The cost was set at $4800.626
Although not stated explicitly, Big Ben's apparently did not take the remains
of the tree off the property after cutting it down, and Niehaus did not pay Big
Ben's. 627 It seems that Niehaus thought that "remove" meant hauling away
the tree after it had been cut down.628 Big Ben's thought that "remove"
meant simply moving the tree which, according to Big Ben's, is what "re-
move" means in the tree trade.629 The trial court found that this trade "par-
lance" was not explained to Niehaus and also found that her understanding of
the word "remove" was reasonable. 630 The trial court, however, concluded
that Big Ben's had a valid construction lien on Niehaus' land. 63' Niehaus
appealed to the circuit court, and the circuit court affirmed.632 She then filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the First District Court of Appeal
granted, quashing the order of the circuit court.633 The trial court determined
that "removal" meant something different to each of the parties, and there-
fore, agreement on a material term of the contract was missing.6 4 Thus,
there was no contract entered into between the parties.635 And without a va-
lid express contract, there could be no imposition of a construction lien.636
Even if an implied contract existed, an issue which the First District Court of
623. Id.
624. Id.






630. Niehaus, 982 So. 2d at 1254.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 1254-55.
634. Id.
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Appeal did not decide,637 implied contract is a "legal fiction" to prevent
unjust enrichment, and "not a contract at all. 638
D. Bank Deposit Agreement v. UCC
The Deposit Agreement between Bank of America, N.A. (Bank) and its
customer, Putnal Seed and Grain, Inc. (Putnal), required Putnal to notify the
Bank of any "'problems or unauthorized transactions"' taking place during a
bank account statement period within sixty days, as a condition to asserting
liability against the Bank for negligence.639 Under section 674.406(6) of the
Florida Statutes, described by the trial court as the default rule, a bank cus-
tomer has to notify the bank of "an unauthorized signature or alteration with-
in one year of the [pertinent bank] statement being sent to the customer. ' 64°
Putnal's bookkeeper made deposits for Putnal and somehow managed to
fraudulently obtain, in thirteen transactions, over $51,000 in cash from the
Putnal deposits made by her.64' When Putnal found out about the bookkee-
per's actions, it obtained copies of bank statements. 64 Putnal then demanded
that the Bank replace the funds in its account.63 The Bank refused on the
ground "that Putnal failed to notify it of [the] 'problems or unauthorized
transactions' within 60 days, as required [by] the Deposit Agreement.'644
Putnal sued the Bank for negligence and won on summary judgment.64 The
trial court determined that chapter 674 of the Florida Statutes applied and
that the Deposit Agreement was void, finding that the effect of the agreement
was an invalid disclaimer of the Bank's liability. 6  The First District Court
of Appeal reversed.67 The Bank was permitted to reduce the statutory noti-
fication time from one year to sixty days.64'8 This provision did not amount to
637. Id. at 1255 n.1.
638. Id.
639. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Putnal Seed & Grain, Inc., 965 So. 2d 300, 300-01 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
640. Id. at 301 (citing FLA. STAT. § 674.406(6) (2002)). It is not disclosed in the opinion
when, under the terms of the parties' agreement, the sixty-day period began to run, but that
was not an issue on appeal. Id.
641. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
642. Id. It is not stated in the opinion as to how Putnal found out about the fraud. See




646. Id. at 301.
647. Bank of Am., N.A., 965 So. 2d. at 302.
648. See id. at 301.
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a forbidden disclaimer of responsibility on the part of the Bank under section
674.103(1) of the Florida Statutes.649
E. Exempt Property
The Florida Legislature amended section 222.25(4) of the Florida Sta-
tutes, and that statute now reads, in part
[t]he following property is exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or other legal process:
(4) A debtor's interest in personal property, not to exceed $4000, if
the debtor does not claim .. . the benefits of a homestead
exemption under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution
-the real estate homestead exemption. 650 Article X, section 4, subsection
(a)(2) of the Florida Constitution also grants a $1000 personal property ex-
emption, and has for some time.651 The United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Florida was called upon to decide if section 222.25(4)
increases the personal property exemption by $3000 to $4000, or by $4000 to
$5000, for Floridians not claiming the real estate homestead exemption.652
The court stated that the legislative history of the amendment to section
222.25(4) clearly shows a legislative intention to increase by $3000 to
$4000.653 However, the court, adopting the debtor's argument, ruled that a
maximum $4000, rather than $5000, interpretation of the section would
amount to the legislature impermissibly altering or amending a constitutional
provision, that is, article X, section 4, subsection (a)(2). 654 The total maxi-
mum personal property exemption under the constitution and the statute was
held to be $5000 for "a person who does not own homestead [real estate] or
claim a homestead [real estate] exemption. ' '655
649. Id.






655. In re Bezares, 377 B.R. at 415.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A wretched man, for love of a woman and of "the child
she had borne him, "finding himself bereft of all resources,
had counterfeited money. "[Clounterfeiting was still
punished [by] death" in those days. "The woman was
arrested for" spending the very first counterfeit bill the man
had printed. She was held, but there was no evidence
against anyone else but her. She alone could identify her
lover, the source of the counterfeit funds. She refused. The
police pressed her. She continued to refuse. Finally the
chief investigator had an idea: he insinuated that the
woman's lover had become unfaithful to her; he even
arranged to present her with scraps of letters to persuade
her that there was another woman that her lover was
cheating on her. Driven to desperation "by jealousy, she
denounced her lover" and confessed everything. The man
was doomed. The two would be tried and condemned
together.
By playing the jealousy card, the chief investigator had
traded truth for anger, justice for vengeance. All this was
related to the bishop. He listened in silence. Then he asked,
Where will the man and the woman be judged?
At the court of assizes, he was told.
"And where," he asked, "will the chief investigator be
judged?"1
* B.A., University of California, 1974; J.D., Georgetown University, 1982. The author
gratefully acknowledges the contributions made in the preparation of this article by Erica
Rutner.
1. VICTOR HuGo, LEs MISERABLES (Charles E. Wilbour trans., Everyman's Library 2d
ed. 1997) (1909).
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Earl Wyche was in custody in small-town Florida on a charge of
probation violation.2 Unbeknown to him, he was also a suspect in a rape
case.3 The police, eager to obtain a Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample
from Wyche for the rape investigation-something they could have done
easily without any subterfuge 4-hit upon an ingenious, if shameful,
stratagem.
They lied to him.5
What they told him was that a local supermarket had been burgled and
that he could exonerate himself by providing a DNA sample.6 Wyche did
not know that the whole thing was a fairy tale: There was no supermarket
and there was no burglary.7 What he did know was that he hadn't burgled
any supermarkets lately, so if that was the reason the police wanted his DNA,
well, why shouldn't he provide it?8
They lied to him in another way, too.9
The police lied to Wyche by what they didn't tell him. ° They didn't
tell him about the rape case they were investigating, and they didn't tell him
that his DNA profile, once obtained, would be made available to other
government agencies conducting other investigations at other times andplaces,."
In the event, the DNA test exonerated Wyche of the rape of which he
had been suspected.' But it implicated him in an unrelated burglary. 3 Prior
2. Wyche v. State (Wyche 1), 906 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
3. See id.
4. Id. at 1144. The police could have gotten a tissue sample from which Wyche's DNA
could have been profiled in any number of ways. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming
"Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. RaV. 857,
860-61 (2006). Recall that Wyche was in custody. Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1143. Did he eat
with a fork, spoon, or "spork" provided by the jail? See Joh, supra note 4, at 860-61. Did he
drink from a glass or cup? See id at 861. Did he throw away the butt of a cigarette, or the
crust of an unfinished sandwich? See id. at 860-61. Any of these things would contain cell
tissue from which DNA might be recovered, and Wyche would have no assertable legal
interest in any of them. See id.; see also discussion infra notes 184, 185, and 190 (regarding
FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (2007)).
5. Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1143.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Wyche v. State (Wyche 11), 987 So. 2d 23, 62 (Fla. 2008) (Lewis, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 27 (majority opinion).
10. See id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 27. As discussed infra note 198, Wyche's DNA profile is now permanently on
display to every CODIS licensee, and may be examined and re-analyzed at any time without
notice to Wyche.
12. Wyche I, 906 So. 2d at 1143.
[Vol. 33
137
: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
WYCHE V. STATE
to trial on that burglary he moved to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing
that the consent pursuant to which his cell tissue was seized and analyzed
was, as a result of the deception worked upon him by the police, no consent
at all.' 4 The motion to suppress was denied, and the ensuing conviction was
affirmed on appeal to Florida's First District Court of Appeal.
5
The Supreme Court of Florida has no general criminal appellate
jurisdiction. 6  It is empowered, however, to review the decision of an
intermediate appellate court upon a certification of conflict by that court with
a decision of another intermediate appellate court.17 The First District Court
of Appeal, in affirming Wyche's conviction, in the process approving the
denial of his motion to suppress, 8 certified conflict with the opinion of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in State v. McCord;9 thus providing the
jurisdictional basis for the Supreme Court of Florida's review. 20
In a four to three ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that
Wyche's consent was constitutionally valid, the conduct of the police
notwithstanding. 2' The Court excerpted with approval the following
language from the opinion of the First District:
"[Wyche] was clearly aware of the fact that the officer wanted the
DNA sample in order to investigate a crime, and the officer did not
misrepresent the fact that he had no search warrant. The officer
did not indicate that [Wyche] had no choice regarding whether to
provide a DNA sample. [Wyche] did not acquiesce to a claim of
lawful authority."
22
In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that "Wyche was not a
stranger to police procedure .... he knew that his DNA was requested for use
in a criminal investigation, [and he] was not deluded as to the import of his
consent to search. ' 23 Viewing these circumstances as relevant, and taking




15. Id. at 1143, 1148.
16. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(1).
17. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).
18. Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1143, 1148.
19. 833 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Wyche 1, 906 So. 2d at 1144.
20. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv).
21. Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d 23, 29 (Fla. 2008).
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Justice Bell concurred dubitante for himself and Chief Justice Quince.25
Justice Bell confessed himself "disturbed by the level of intentional police
misrepresentation" visited upon Wyche, and by the prospect that similar
police "tactics, if they were to become commonplace, would destroy the
integrity of the criminal justice system."26 Triumphing over these concerns,
however, Justice Bell and Chief Justice Quince voted with the majority.27
It is the thesis of this case note that Wyche II is wrong twice over. The
law setting forth when and in what circumstances the police may use deceit
to obtain consent to search or seize is well-settled. The majority in Wyche II
ignored that well-settled law, in the process ignoring decisions from a host of
jurisdictions, state and federal, that speak with one voice as to that law.2
This is more troubling because Florida's Constitution has a dependent, not an
independent, guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. 29 Although
article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution promises that the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures... shall not be violated," section 12 was
amended in 1982 to add language providing that it was to:
be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information
would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
30
In effect, the Florida Constitution instructs the reader, "Where the law
of search and seizure is concerned, go consult general American law; I have
nothing to add to that., 31 Yet the court's opinion in Wyche II ignores the
ample body of American jurisprudence on point-jurisprudence that compels
a result at odds with the one reached by the Wyche II majority.32
Consideration of this jurisprudence, and the outcome it compels on the
Wyche II facts, forms the first section of this case note.
25. Id. at 31-32 (Bell, J., specially concurring).
26. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 32.
27. Id. at 31 (majority opinion).
28. See id. at 42-43 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
29. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 63-64 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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It is apodictic that a search or seizure that exceeds the scope of consent
is-unless supported by a warrant-unconstitutional, and the fruits of such a
search or seizure inadmissible.33 The Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in
Wyche II gives no more than passing consideration to the problems of scope
of consent presented by the Wyche II facts.34 In a more conventional context,
this might be a merely venial sin; no profound legal issues are in play when a
court considers-or fails to consider-whether, for example, consent to
search the trunk of a car subsumes consent to search packages contained
within the trunk.35 But the context in which Earl Wyche gave consent was
anything but conventional. 36 He was asked to provide a minute amount of
his cell tissue, from which whole libraries of scientific information could and
would be derived.37 That scientific information, in turn, would be made
permanently available for use by the forensic community nation-wide and
even world-wide, now and for years to come, for examination in connection
with crimes past, present, and future.38 The Supreme Court of Florida
opinion in Wyche II gives no consideration whatever to the scope of consent
issues that arise when DNA analysis and data storage is involved.39 Those
issues are addressed in the second section of this case note.
I. OF DECEIT AND CONSENT
It is sometimes said that the police may lie to obtain consent to search,
and that the ensuing search will not be deemed unlawful by reason of the
lie.n° In some sense, this is true. Suppose, for example, that a man dressed in
ordinary street clothing rings my doorbell in the middle of the night, explains
that he is interested in purchasing drugs, and asks if I have any drugs to sell
him. If I let him into my house to sell him drugs, my consent to his entry
will not be invalidated after the fact when it turns out that he is an
undercover detective and I am arrested for possession or sale of narcotics.4'
33. See, e.g., United States v. Benezario, 339 F. Supp. 2d 361, 368-69 (D.P.R. 2004).
34. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 27-28.
35. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1991).
36. See Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 27.
37. Id.
38. See Joh, supra note 4, at 875.
39. See generally Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008).
40. See, e.g., id. at 31; see also People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. App. 1996).
41. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). Once upon a time, in
that "antique world, [w]hen service sweat for duty, not for meed," WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As
You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 3, some courts condemned police deceit even in the undercover context.
See, e.g., United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D. Mass. 1954) ("Reckis cannot be
held to have consented to a search before he had any knowledge that the persons he was
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Now suppose that when I answer my doorbell I confront, not a scruffy
would-be drug buyer, but a uniformed police officer. Suppose further that
the officer informs me that he is trying to rescue my neighbor's cat which
has become stuck in a tree, and that he would like to look out my back
window to get a better view of the cat's plight. Suppose finally that these
representations by the officer are all false: There is no cat, there is no tree,
and the officer's true purpose is to gain entry to my house to see if I have
drugs. The consent I give the officer to enter my house, having been
obtained by deceit, is not a knowing and valid consent for Fourth
Amendment purposes, and any contraband or evidence seized by the officer
in my house will not be admissible at trial.42 The difference in the two
hypothetical's turns on a single, simple legal principle: All citizens have a
"duty to cooperate with the police. 43 It therefore must follow that if a police
officer comes to me bearing the accouterments of office-uniform, or badge,
or formal ID-I can and must rely upon the truth of his representations to
me; and if those representations prove to be willfully false, my ensuing
consent is a legal nullity.44 "[A]ccess gained by a government agent, known
to be such by the person with whom the agent is dealing, violates the
[F]ourth [A]mendment's bar against unreasonable searches and seizures if
such entry was acquired by affirmative or deliberate misrepresentation of the
nature of the government's investigation. 45 Conversely, if the officer comes
to me in an undercover disguise, identifying himself not as a member of the
constabulary, but as a drug buyer, I deal with him at my peril.46 I have no
duty to cooperate with him, and he has no corresponding duty to tell me the
dealing with were federal officers or that they were there for the purpose of making a
search."); see generally Commonwealth v. Wright, 190 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1963). See United
States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting in dictum that "[t]rickery, fraud, or
misrepresentation on the part of the police to gain entry naturally undermines the
voluntariness of any consent."). But the essence of undercover operations is deceit. See
Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209. For courts to hold that undercover officers may not misrepresent their
identities, purposes, etc., would be to hold that undercover operations are per se unreasonable
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 210-11. No opinion of recent vintage has gone so far.
See United States v. Montes-Reyes, 547 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Instead,
courts have drawn the obvious and meaningful distinction between deceit in the course of an
undercover operation and deceit under color of office. See, e.g., United States v. Briley, 726
F.2d 1301, 1304 (8th Cir. 1984).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1984).
43. David T. McTaggert, Reciprocity on the Streets: Reflections on the Fourth
Amendment and the Duty to Cooperate with the Police, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1233, 1244 (2001).
44. See id.
45. Little, 753 F.2d at 1438 (emphasis added).
46. See SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981).
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truth.47  If I consent to his entry into my home, I must take the
consequences.48 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals drew the distinction with
particularity:
When a government agent presents himself to a private individual,
and seeks that individual's cooperation based on his status as a
government agent, the individual should be able to rely on the
agent's representations. We think it clearly improper for a
government agent to gain access to records which would otherwise
be unavailable to him by invoking the private individual's trust in
his government, only to betray that trust.
49
A ruse entry when the suspect is informed that the person seeking
entry is a government agent but is misinformed as to the purpose
for which the agent seeks entry cannot be justified by consent.
Thus we have disapproved the entry of federal narcotics agents
accomplished with the assistance of local law enforcement officers
who knocked on the suspect's door and asked permission to
investigate a fictitious robbery.
50
This language from SEC v. ESM Government Securities, Inc.,5s was
excerpted with approval by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bosse.
Distinguishing an earlier Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Allen,53 the
Bosse court drew the undercover-versus-under-color-of-office distinction:
the earlier case "is best understood as involving concealment by [an officer]
of the fact that he was a government agent, a permissible deception, rather
than as involving misrepresentation by a known government agent of his
purpose for seeking entry."'
The recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Krause v.
Commonwealth55 involves facts not dissimilar to those of Wyche 11.56
Trooper Manar of the Kentucky State Police made an arrest for cocaine
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 316.
50. United States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
51. 645 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
52. 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
53. 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980).
54. Bosse, 898 F.2d at 116.
55. 206 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2006).
56. See Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d 23, 24 (Fla. 2008).
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possession. The arrestee told Manar that he had obtained the drugs at
Krause's home.5s Manar then showed up at Krause's residence at four
o'clock in the morning with a tale as false as the one given to Wyche: he
told Krause "that a young girl had just reported being raped by [Krause's
roommate] in the residence. He asked if he could look around in order to
determine whether her description of the residence and its furnishings was
accurate."59 Manar's ensuing search turned up drugs and drug paraphernalia,
for the possession of which Krause was prosecuted and convicted.6'
The Krause court recognized the distinction between undercover and
under-color-of-office police work.6 "The use of undercover agents and
stratagems in police investigations has long been sanctioned, and we do not
question such a practice in this opinion.'"62 But clearly Trooper Manar had
not been acting in an undercover capacity.63 He had knocked on Krause's
door bearing the customary accouterments of office, and he had asked in his
capacity as a law-enforcement officer for Krause's cooperation. 64 Therein
lay the problem.65 "Trooper Manar exploited a citizen's civic desire to assist
police in their official duties for the express purpose of incriminating that
citizen. "66 Krause was entitled, in deciding whether to consent to Manar's
request to search, to rely upon the truth and bona fides of Manar's
representations to him. 6 7
[Iff the type of ruse utilized by Trooper Manar was sanctioned by
this Court, citizens would be discouraged from "aiding to the
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals" since they
would have no way of knowing whether their assistance was being
called upon for the public good or for the purpose of incriminating
them.
68
57. Krause, 206 S.W.3d. at 923.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 924.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 926-27.
62. Krause, 206 S.W.3d at 927.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 924.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 927.
67. See Krause, 206 S.W.3d at 927.
68. Id. at 926 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973)). The
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An appellate court in Washington State reached identical conclusions in
State v. McCrorey.69 The McCrorey court began by acknowledging the
widespread acceptance of "the use of ruse entries in conjunction with
undercover police activity. 70 It then drew the critical distinction: "The case
at hand is distinguishable, however. It does not present the issue of
undercover police activity, but rather the failure to disclose the actual police
purpose."'"
It is improper for a government agent to gain entry by invoking the
occupant's trust, then subsequently betraying that trust. Members
of the public should be able to safely rely on the representations of
government agents acting in their official capacity. We conclude
that police acting in their official capacity may not actively
misrepresent their purpose to gain entry or exceed the scope of
consent given.72
Krause and McCrorey involved consent to search a residence. 73 Graves
v. Beto,74 like Wyche, involved consent to the seizure of bodily tissue.
75
Graves was arrested "on a charge of public drunkenness., 76  Shortly
afterward the police learned "that an elderly woman had been raped" and that
"[h]er description of her assailant [matched] Graves. 77  Blood had been
recovered from the scene of the rape,78 so the police chief asked Graves to
consent to giving a blood sample, assuring him "that the sample would be
used only to determine the alcoholic content of his blood" for purposes of the
public drunkenness charge.79 Graves was then charged with the rape, and
evidence that his blood type--derived from the blood he had "consented" to
69. 851 P.2d 1234 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), overruled by State v. V.L., No. 57036-6-1,
2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1824, at * 1, *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2006).
70. Id. at 1239.
71. Id. at 1240.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Krause v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 922, 923-24 (Ky. 2006); McCrorey, 851 P.2d
at 1236.
74. 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. Id. at 524. Although this may make the Graves facts closer to the Wyche facts, it is a
distinction without a difference. Whether a law enforcement officer seeks consent to enter
and search a home, or consent to seize a tissue sample, the Fourth Amendment considerations
are, for purposes of the jurisprudence of consent, the same. Id. at 525.
76. Id. at 524.
77. Id.
78. Graves, 424 F.2d at 524.
79. Id. at 525.
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give-matched that found at the rape scene was offered at trial.8° On habeas
review the federal court found Graves' "consent" to be constitutionally
invalid; to hold otherwise "would allow the state to secure by stratagem what
the [F]ourth [A]mendment requires a warrant to produce."'"
The defendants in State v. Petersen82 were suspected of having stolen
certain power tools from their former employer.83 One of the defendants,
Rogers, was approached by police officers, who told him that they wanted
his consent to search his car.' The reason they gave for wanting to search,
however, was not the true one, i.e., their desire to locate the stolen power
tools and inculpate Rogers and Petersen for the theft.85 Instead, the officers
told Rogers that they believed that the previous owner of the car, from whom
Rogers had only recently purchased it, had stashed something in the vehicle
of evidentiary value to another, unrelated, investigation.86 Rogers "consented
to the search only because he was told the officers were searching for an
object hidden in the car by a previous owner. Since his consent was obtained
by deceit, Rogers cannot be said to have waived his Fourth Amendment
rights voluntarily. 87
The Hay Transportation Assistance Program (HTAP) is a federally-
funded rebate program benefiting the agricultural industry.88 It is of little
day-to-day interest in South Florida, but it is of a great deal of interest in the
Western District of Wisconsin, venue of United States v. Hrdlicka.9 In
Hrdlicka, Special Agent Lenckus, a criminal investigator in the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture, was deputed to
determine whether Joseph Hrdlicka, his two brothers, and their businesses-
collectively the "Hrdlicka defendants"-had conspired to defraud the
government in connection with HTAP claims.'
Agent Lenckus contacted Joseph Hrdlicka and informed him that he,
Lenckus, was conducting a criminal investigation, not into the conduct of the
80. Id. at 524.
81. Id. at 524-25.
82. 604 P.2d 267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).




87. Peterson, 604 P.2d at 269; see also Barnato v. State, 501 P.2d 643, 644 (Nev. 1972)
(Consent to an animal control officer's entry into an enclosed yard for the "ostensible purpose
of checking a cat trap.., did not constitute a waiver of' Fourth Amendment rights when the
real reason for the entry was to seize a leaf from a marijuana plant).
88. See generally In re Voorhees, 294 N.W.2d 646, 647 (S.D. 1980).
89. 520 F. Supp. 403, 403 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
90. Id. at 407. Lenckus came bearing the accouterments of office: He "showed Joseph
Hrdlicka his badge and identification card." Id.
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Hrdlicka defendants, but into the conduct of others; in that regard, he asked
to see the Hrdlicka defendants' books and records.9' Hrdlicka "asked
Lenckus if his investigation would involve [the] Hrdlicka businesses: ....
[t]o this question, Lenckus replied that no audit or investigation of Hrdlicka
businesses was contemplated and that the investigation did not pertain to the
Hrdlickas' farms, but only to other farmers to whom the Hrdlickas had sold
and delivered hay."92 Relying on Lenckus's representations, Joseph Hrdlicka
consented to produce various business records.93 But "Agent Lenckus's
statement to Joseph Hrdlicka ... that the Hrdlicka businesses and farms were
not under investigation was untrue ' 94 at the time it was made, and the
Hrdlicka defendants were indicted based upon information in the business
documents produced to Lenckus. 95
The district court took it as "well-established that the official use of
fraud, trickery or misrepresentation to gain consent to a search 'naturally
undermines the voluntariness of any consent,' ' ' 96 and "therefore renders such
a search 'unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 97  The
misrepresentations at issue here were described by the court as being both
active and passive.98 "By passive misrepresentations, I refer to Lenckus's
conceded failure to inform Hrdlicka that his farms were suspected of having
made false duplicate claims under HTAP .... 99 Telling half the truth and
leaving a false implication simply isn't good enough when a badge-carrying
law enforcement officer asks a citizen to waive the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.'0° Lenckus may well have been investigating, or at least
interested in information about, HTAP abuses by farmers other than the
Hrdlickas.'' But by failing to inform the Hrdlickas that he was also
interested in their putative misconduct, he rendered their ensuing consent a
nullity.' °2
The notion that a half-truth by the police is as damning as a complete lie
appears again in State v. Schweich.10 3 There the police wanted to search the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Hrdlicka, 520 F. Supp. at 407.
94. Id. at 408.
95. Id. at 407.
96. Id. at 409 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1976)).
97. Id. (quoting United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977)).





103. See 414 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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defendant's home for two reasons: to find a gun belonging to an
acquaintance of the defendant, and to see if the defendant had narcotics. °4 In
seeking the defendant's consent, the police told him about the first purpose,
but not about the second. 05 This deception by omission-or by less than
complete candor-was sufficient to invalidate the defendant's consent."0 6
"[T]he officers intended the scope of their search to include drugs. However,
respondent was led to believe the search was necessary only to locate [his
friend]'s rifle... in connection with the assault charge against" his friend.'0 7
"The trial court properly suppressed" the narcotics for which the police were
looking, and which they found.0 8 The police statement to Schweich that
they wanted to search his apartment for his friend's gun or for evidence of
his friend's gun was true, as far as it went; but it didn't go far enough. 10 9 The
police were obliged to tell Schweich that another purpose of their search was
their desire to determine if he was in possession of narcotic drugs."0 Having
withheld this information, the police obtained Schweich's purported consent
on false pretenses, and that consent was a nullity for Fourth Amendment
purposes."'
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Slaton12 was the proprietor of a
pharmacy." 3 Narcotics detectives presented themselves at the pharmacy,
indicated that they were investigating the conduct of one Merriweather in
connection with forged prescriptions-which was, at the time, their true
purpose-and asked to see Slaton's pharmacy records."' The detectives
returned on a second occasion, purportedly for follow-up review of the
records." 5 In the interim, however, their investigation had expanded to
embrace their suspicions that Slaton himself was involved in the forgeries." 6
This change in focus of the investigation was not communicated to Slaton,
who continued to cooperate with what he had been led to believe was an
104. Id. at 228-29.
105. Id. at 229.
106. Id. at 230.
107. Id.
108. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d at 231.
109. See id. at 230.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 231.
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investigation of someone else." 7 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
explained:
[U]ntil the first search was completed, the agents' investigation
was focused upon Merriweather, as the agents truthfully disclosed.
As a result of this search, however, the focus of the agents'
investigation changed, and the agents returned to Slaton's
pharmacy with the belief that Slaton's conduct was improper.
Notwithstanding this new focus, the agents obtained entry to the
premises without any additional disclosure of purpose. One can
only conclude that in consenting to the search, Slaton relied on the
agents' earlier representations. By permitting him to continue this
reliance, the agents obtained [Slaton's] consent through deception.
Such acts amount to implied coercion. [Slaton's] consent,
therefore, was constitutionally invalid, and the search was
illegal. 118
As the foregoing sampling of case law indicates," 9 it is the universal
American rule that if a police officer comes to a citizen as a police officer,
bearing the insignia of a police officer, entitled to the cooperation due to a
police officer, there is a correlative duty on the part of that police officer to
tell that citizen the truth. 20  Breach of that duty renders any ensuing
117. Slaton, 608 A.2d at 6.
118. Id. at 10.
119. See Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[C]onsent to a warrantless
search obtained through coercion, duress or trickery, is not sufficient to overcome
constitutional infirmities"); United States v. Varona-Algos, 819 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Maudlin, No. 83-1743, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 13534, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 3,
1984) (citing United States v. Turpin, 707 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 1983)); McCall v. People,
623 P.2d 397, 403 (Colo. 1981) (en banc). The same principle is applied in federal tax cases
in which a revenue agent obtains documents or admissions via consent while at the same time
failing to disclose to the taxpayer that the agent's investigation may result in criminal charges.
See, e.g., United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1977); see also United States
v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1438 (9th
Cir. 1985).
120. See infra pp. 2-13. There is no more reckless act on the part of the writer of a law
review article than to characterize a rule of law as "universal." Of course there is the
occasional aporetic voice. In United States v. Montes-Reyes, police obtained entry into
Defendant's hotel room by telling him that they were urgently engaged in the search for a
missing little girl; once in the room, the officers searched for and found illegal weapons,
which had been the object of their investigation all along. 547 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283-84
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The court canvassed the case law and granted suppression, but was
unwilling to characterize as a "per se rule" the doctrine that an officer acting under color of
law may not obtain consent by deceit. See id. at 287 n.7. To the same effect, see United
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"consent" involuntary. But the Supreme Court of Florida's majority opinion
in Wyche II makes no reference whatsoever to any of the cases discussed
supra; not a single citation to, or acknowledgment of, Little, Bosse, Krause,
McCrorey, Petersen, Hrdlicka, Schweich, Slaton, et. al.12' These authorities
are not distinguished. They are not discussed. It is as if they never
existed. 22
Writing for the majority in Wyche II, Justice Wells framed the issue as,
"whether the fact that Wyche consented to the saliva swabs upon being told
that the DNA sample was for use in a fictitious burglary investigation
requires that the saliva swabs containing Wyche's DNA not be used in the
prosecution of an actual burglary."'' 23 In Justice Wells's view, the question
was largely foreclosed by the prior opinion of the Court in Washington v.
State,24 in which the Court held that if the police obtained a tissue sample
from an arrestee, not by deceit, but by telling him frankly and candidly what
use they intended to make of that tissue sample, they could subsequently
make additional use of that tissue sample in another, unrelated, case. 125 As
Justice Wells and the majority saw it, Washington stands for the proposition
that:
[W]hen a defendant validly consents to the giving of the bodily
substance, whether saliva, hair, or blood, for use in a criminal
States v. Benezario, 339 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (D.P.R. 2004); People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939,
942 (Colo. App. 1996).
121. See generally Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008). Slaton appears without discussion
in a string citation in the dissenting opinion of Justice Anstead, which opinion also gives some
consideration to Krause. See id. at 38-39 (Anstead, J., dissenting). See also discussion infra
note 162 and 164. Hrdlicka, Bosse, and Slaton rated a single passing reference each in the
dissenting opinion filed by Justice Lewis. Id. at 48, 52 (Lewis, J., dissenting). The Florida
precedent that comes closest to addressing this issue is Dunnavant v. State, 46 So. 2d 871, 875
(Fla. 1950), "in which we held that consent had not been established where the officers
pretended to be acting under a warrant which authorized the search .... There was thus an
element of misrepresentation in the case whereby the defendant's consent was in effect
fraudulently induced." Slater v. State, 90 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 1956). But neither Dunnavant
nor Slater is cited in Wyche II. See generally Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008).
122. Wyche's brief before the Supreme Court of Florida cited none of these cases either.
See generally Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 23. Apart from the opinion of the First District Court of
Appeal as to which review was sought, and the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
in State v. McCord, 833 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002), as to which conflict
was claimed, Wyche's brief cited exactly ten cases. Brief of Petitioner at ii, Wyche v. State
(Wyche II), No. SC05-1509 (Fla. Oct. 2005). Three were from the United States Supreme
Court; the other seven were from Florida. Id.
123. Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 27.
124. 653 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam).
125. Id. at 364; Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 27.
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investigation, the characteristics of the substance can be used in
investigations unrelated to the one for which the defendant was
told the sample was collected. This holding is logical because the
DNA profile derived from a bodily substance like saliva, hair, or
blood is a constant identifying fact that does not change or
disappear.
126
The first sentence of the excerpted paragraph flies in the face of all
American jurisprudence dealing with the scope of consent. Consent to
search or seize is a waiver of the constitutional right to be free from
warrantless search or seizure. 27 The citizen is not obliged to consent; if he
chooses to consent, he can tailor the terms of the consent as he chooses.1
28
Silly as it sounds, a householder could, as a matter of constitutional law, tell
a police officer: "You have my consent to search my house without a
warrant for as long as your partner can stand on one foot and yodel"' 29
Anything found within the time that the searching officer's partner remained
standing on one leg yodeling would be admissible; anything found after that
time would be inadmissible. 30 If a police officer asks an arrestee to provide
a tissue sample for blood- or DNA-typing as to case X, then the scope of the
consent is as to case X and as to no other case.' 3' The officer, of course, is
free to ask for a tissue sample for testing without limiting the use or purpose
to which the sample will be put. 32 If the arrestee consents on those terms, he
is stuck with them; but only if he is asked for, and consents to, something so
capacious.' Justice Wells' extrapolation from Washington that a consent to
provide cell tissue for testing in case X is a consent to the use of that cell
tissue in all cases, anywhere and anytime, stands the doctrine of scope of
consent on its head. 
134
126. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 27.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
128. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (noting that "[a] suspect may of
course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents").
129. See, e.g., United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129-30 n.3 (7th Cir. 1971)
(noting that "if government agents obtain consent or a warrant to search for a stolen television
set, they must limit their activity to that which is necessary to search for such an item")
(emphasis added).
130. See id. at 129 (quoting that "[a] consent search is reasonable only if kept within the
bounds of the actual consent") (citing Honig v. United States, 208 F.2d 916, 919 (8th Cir.
1953)).
131. Wyche I, 987 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 2008).
132. See id. at 29.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 27-28.
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Nor is this radical reinterpretation of the law of scope of consent
salvaged by the second sentence of the excerpted paragraph-that because a
DNA profile "is a constant identifying fact that does not change or
disappear," it must follow that a defendant's consent to the profiling of his
DNA in one case morphs magically into a consent to the profiling of his
DNA in all cases. 135 The scope of any consent is fixed by the intent of the
human being consenting, not by the nature-permanent or protean--of the
object as to which consent is given.'36 The notion of scope of consent is
entirely straightforward: The officer must ask for what he wants, and
confine himself to what he gets. 137 If he wants a consent broad in scope, but
is given a consent narrow in scope, he must confine himself to what he got
and not help himself to what he wanted, on pain of suppression. 38 If he
wants consent to use a defendant's cell tissue for testing on an ongoing basis,
without limitation, but he asks for and gets consent to use a defendant's cell
tissue for testing on a single occasion, he must confine himself to that single
occasion. 13 ' His failure to do so is what is known in the law, and to every
child, as "lying."'' 40 And this is true whether the object he seeks to seize or
search is as evanescent as the dew or as "constant as the northern star, [o]f
whose true-fix'd and resting quality [t]here is no fellow in the firmament.' ' 41
Proceeding on his "consent-for-one-purpose-is-consent-for-all-
purposes" premise, Justice Wells quite rightly observed that the only
remaining issue "is whether Wyche's otherwise apparently voluntary consent
was rendered involuntary by the fact that the Winn-Dixie burglary and
investigation were fictitious,"'42 or in plain language whether it is permissible
for the police, relying upon the duty of all of us to cooperate with them, to lie
to all of us. 43 He begins by referencing a case having nothing to do with
Fourth Amendment consent,'" Frazier v. Cupp.145 Its inapplicability to the
135. See id. at 27.
136. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
137. See id. 'The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object." Id.
(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982)).
138. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252.
139. See id. at 251 (holding "[tihe scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed
object").
140. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 140 (8th ed. 2004).
141. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 1.
142. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23, 28 (Fla. 2008).
143. See generally id.
144. Id. at 28.
145. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). Frazier is a confession case, not a consent case. See id. at 737.
The Wyche II majority cites repeatedly to confession cases. Id. at 28. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v.
State, 900 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam); Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003)
(per curium); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2003) (per curium); Nelson v. State, 850 So.
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consent-obtained-by-deceit context was explained four decades ago by Judge
Wisdom in his opinion in Graves v. Beto. 46
Frazier involved the admissibility of a confession under pre-Miranda
standards. When the defendant Frazier refused to confess, the
interrogating officer told him falsely that his cousin and companion Rawls
had already confessed his part.... Frazier ultimately confessed ....
[Tjhe confession, which was otherwise voluntary, was not fatally
tainted by the interrogator's misrepresentations. But in this case
we do not void the consent as to the purpose for which it was
given. In the presence of misrepresentation in its acquisition, we
simply limit the state to the purposes represented. If Frazier were
applicable, and if we were considering the quality of the consent,
we would note that Frazier dealt with the voluntariness of a
confession rather than the waiver of a right not to be searched and
that in Frazier there was a partial warning of constitutional rights
whereas Graves received no warnings.
147
Apart from its reliance on confession jurisprudence, the Wyche II Court
notes time and again that there was no duress or coercion, no threats or
promises, that induced Wyche to consent to the seizure of his DNA. 48
[The police] informed Wyche that he was suspected of committing
a burglary, albeit a fictitious burglary, and requested a saliva
sample. He did not threaten Wyche or make any promises of
leniency in exchange for Wyche's consent. Accordingly, no threat
or promise influences our evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances of Wyche's consent.
149
Entirely true-and entirely beside the point.
It is apodictic that consent, to be valid, must be voluntary and
knowing. 50 "Consent" obtained at the business end of a Louisville slugger is
not voluntary.' 5' "Consent" obtained by mendacious and deceitful
2d 514 (Fla. 2003)(per curium); Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997)(per curium);
Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977) (per curium). All of these cases deal with the law
of confession; none deal with the law of consent. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 28. The Wyche
II court recognizes as much. See id.
146. 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970).
147. Id. at 525 n.2.
148. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 30-31.
149. Id. at 31.
150. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973).
151. See, e.g., Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 31.
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exploitation is not knowing. 152 To Wyche's claim that his purported consent
was anything but knowing-to his claim that he was deliberately,
outrageously, and successfully hoodwinked-the Supreme Court of Florida
answers, in effect, "well, at least you weren't beaten with a Louisville
slugger.' 53 Entirely true-and entirely beside the point.
But what is more fundamentally troubling is the Wyche H majority's
failure to consider the substantial body of case law addressing this
question--case law from a host of jurisdictions, state and federal, that speaks
with one voice and sets forth one rule: "[A]ccess gained by a government
agent, known to be such by the person with whom the agent is dealing,
violates the [F]ourth [A]mendment's bar against unreasonable searches and
seizures if such entry was acquired by affirmative or deliberate
misrepresentation of the nature of the government's investigation."'54 As
noted previously, all citizens have a "duty to cooperate with the police."' 55 It
therefore must follow that if a police officer comes to me bearing the signs
and symbols of his office, I can and must rely upon the truth of his
representations to me; and if those representations prove to be willfully false,
the consent he elicits from me is a legal nullity.'56 The Wyche II court does
not consider this rule and reject it; it fails to consider it at all.'57
Even more disappointing is some of the language appearing in Justice
Bell's opinion: "My hope is that law enforcement will resist the temptation
to interpret this decision as an endorsement of intentional deception as
acceptable, routine police practice.' ' 158 But it requires no interpretation to
read the majority opinion "as an endorsement of intentional deception as
acceptable, routine police practice;" the majority opinion is "an endorsement
of intentional deception as acceptable, routine police practice." '59 And surely
Justice Bell is aware of how such things filter down to the level of the officer
on the street: The lengthy rescript authored by the jurist is read and reduced
to ever-more distilled versions by a succession of prosecutorial and law
enforcement authorities. By the time it reaches the station-house, it takes the
form, "Hey, the Supreme Court of Florida says it is okay to lie to the bad
guys to get them to consent!" If that was a result Justice Bell hoped to avoid,
his duty was to dissent, not to beat his breast while concurring.
152. Id. at 29 n.6 (citing Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1984)).
153. See, e.g., id. at 28.
154. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1984).
155. United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354, 1357 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
156. See SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981).
157. See Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 28.
158. Id. at 32 (Bell, J., concurring).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
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Conceding as a prefatory matter that Florida "case law has done little to
provide concrete examples of when ... trickery or intentional deception will
render a consent involuntary, ' 60 Justice Anstead offered a dissent joined by
Justice Pariente centered around the theme "that the degree and the flagrant
nature of the deception intentionally used by the police to secure Wyche's
consent" rendered that consent invalid.161 Justice Anstead was prepared to
hold as a matter of law "that consent is not voluntary where the government
obtains it by intentionally and falsely informing a person in custody that the
person is suspected of a completely fabricated crime."'62
Justice Lewis, in an even more protracted dissent-also joined by
Justice Pariente-took the opposite approach: For him, the question was not
one of law but of fact, and required an examination of the totality of
160. Wyche I1, 987 So. 2d at 38 (Anstead, J., dissenting). Justice Anstead's dissent relied
upon Krause v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2006). See id. at 39-40. It also
referenced United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989) and United States v.
Andrews, 746 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1984). See id. at 37 n. 11. Carter concerns itself exclusively,
or nearly so, with the Fifth Amendment law of confession, not the Fourth Amendment law of
consent. See Carter, 884 F.2d at 373-74. The Andrews court, after attempting to avoid the
force of its own precedent in both the United States v. Tweel line of cases and the Graves v.
Beto line of cases, concludes tepidly that although "the district court could have found from
the evidence that [the police] did trick Andrews . . . [and that therefore] this Court might
remand to the district court for such a determination," it would not do so. Andrews, 746 F.2d
at 249 n.3.
161. Wyche H, 987 So. 2d at 38 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 42. In the first post-Wyche I case, State v. Bartling, the Fourth District
appeared to apply elements of both the majority holding in Wyche I and Justice Anstead's
dissent. See State v. Bartling, 989 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). In Bartling,
Deputy Castando, eager to search Bartling's residence for drugs, obtained permission to enter
by claiming falsely "that he had received an anonymous tip that someone was dragging a dead
body in a rug outside of the apartment. When [Bartling was] asked if he would mind if [the
police] looked for a dead body, he permitted them to enter the ... apartment." Id. at 758-59.
Exploiting this pretext, the police searched for and found the drugs for the possession of
which Bartling was subsequently prosecuted. Id. at 759. Affirming the trial court's grant of
Bartling's motion to suppress, the Fourth District purported to cite Wyche II for the
proposition that where, as here, the lie told by the police was such a whopper-"we recognize
. . . [Bartling's] understandable desire to clear his . . . name of the stigma of a rape
accusation,"--suppression remains the appropriate remedy. Id. at 762. By implication, then,
the Fourth District understands Wyche II to mean that when the police tell a reasonable lie-
as, presumably, they did to Earl Wyche-suppression is excessive. See id. Whether other
Florida courts will embrace this distinction is a nice question. The Bartling court based its
decision on a second ground: that of scope of consent. Bartling, 989 So. 2d at 762. Mr.
Bartling's consent to the police entry and search was predicated upon an alleged need to find a
dead body. Id. at 758-59. The "cocaine and drug paraphernalia" which the officers found,
and which subsequently formed the basis of Bartling's prosecution, were in a cigarette pack.
Id. at 759. "[T]he search clearly exceeded the scope of consent when the police searched for
a dead body in a cigarette pack." Id. at 762. This argument seems a good deal more forcible.
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circumstances, including but certainly not limited to the circumstance of the
police having lied to Wyche.'63 Examples of other circumstances considered
relevant by Justice Lewis include: "[T]he [nature] and extent of the police
deception"; "whether the defendant was informed of' any relevant rights;
"whether the defendant was in custody" at the relevant time; "whether the
police possessed probable cause" as to the crime under investigation and the
defendant's role in it; and whether the police made any promises or
representations to the defendant to induce his consent."M Applying this
totality of circumstances test, Justice Lewis would have found Wyche's
consent involuntary. 1
65
Although both Justice Anstead's involuntary-as-a-matter-of-law
dissent 166 and Justice Lewis's involuntary-in-the-circumstances dissent
167
have much to commend them, they suffer from the fundamental infirmity
that also characterizes the majority opinion: They overlook the unifying
principle behind the considerable body of case law prohibiting the conduct
visited upon Wyche. When the police ask us-you, me, Earl Wyche-for
help or information, we have a public duty to help them if we can do so
without infracting our own rights. But the police-when we know it is the
police with whom we are dealing-have a correlative duty to be truthful in
framing their requests for help or information. Breach of their duty of
truthfulness deracinates our duty of cooperation. Nothing could be more
destructive of the role of the constabulary in a free society than a general
perception that the police exploit the appurtenances of their office to deceive
and trap, and that therefore only a fool would provide help or truthful
information to an officer who sought those things of him.
Thus, if Wyche is considered solely in light of existing precedent and
traditional principles governing the jurisprudence of consent-precedent and
163. Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 64-65 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Although Justice Lewis cited
to cases involving the law of confession, he clearly appreciated the distinction drawn in
Frazier v. Cupp between that law and the law governing consent. Id. at 49-50 (citing Frazier
v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)). Dilating on Frazier, which upheld the admissibility of a
confession obtained after the defendant had been falsely told by the police that his
codefendant had already confessed, Justice Lewis offered this highly engaging and instructive
explanation:
This form of police deception is fair because it is similar to merely bluffing in a
poker game: It does not compel suspects to incriminate themselves any more than a
large bet in a poker game compels an opponent to believe that the betting player has
a stronger hand and that he or she should correspondingly fold.
Id. at 56.
164. Wyche 1I, 987 So. 2d at 59 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 43 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 44,46 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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principles as to which there is national consensus-it fails.'68 But a
diacritical feature of the Wyche case-the fact that the object of the police
search and seizure was a tissue sample from which a DNA profile was to be
derived-gives rise to a separate, albeit equally irrefragable, refutation of the
reasoning and result in Wyche.' 69
III. How DNA BEARS UPON THE SCOPE OF CONSENT TO A SEARCH OR
SEIZURE
T[he] time was 9:05 on September 10, 1984. Professor Sir Alec
Jeffreys remembers the moment distinctly. The X-ray films of his
tests had just emerged from the machine. "At first the images
looked [like] a complicated mess," he recalls. "Then the penny
dropped. We had found a method of DNA-based biological
identification." 17
0
"The 'double helix' discovery" of the nature and structure of DNA was
made by Watson and Crick at Cambridge in 1953.'' 1.. Sir Alec Jeffrey's
DNA identification technique was first employed in a British deportation
proceeding in 1985, and shortly thereafter in a paternity dispute. 172 It leapt
onto the stage of history in what the British press rejoiced to refer to as, "the
infamous Enderby murder case."'
73
Since Sir Alec's epiphany in 1984, forensic DNA science has advanced
at a forced-march pace. By 1994, the obvious relevance of DNA science to
criminal investigation and prosecution prompted Congress to pass the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, authorizing the FBI to
168. Id. at 44,46 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
169. Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 44 (Lewis, J., dissenting).






The case had begun with the murder and rape of Lynda Mann, 15, in 1983 in the
Leicestershire village [of Enderby]. Dawn Ashworth, 15, died in a copycat killing
three years later. Police arrested a man who confessed to the second murder but
denied the first. The DNA showed that the same man had murdered both girls but he
was not the prime suspect. Some 5,000 local men gave blood samples. One, Colin
Pitchfork, eventually confessed; he had persuaded a friend to give blood on his
behalf. His DNA was a match.
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establish a national index of DNA samples from convicted offenders.174 The
FBI exercised this authority by linking databanks via the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), a software infrastructure.' All fifty state
legislatures "enacted statutes requiring convicted offenders to provide DNA
samples for ... entry into the CODIS system."'76  CODIS enables crime
laboratories around the country "to exchange and compare DNA profiles
electronically in an attempt to link evidence from crime scenes for which
there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the
system."'
177
In December of 1998, "the FBI requested that Congress enact [more
explicit] statutory authority" to allow the FBI to take DNA samples from
federal offenders for inclusion in CODIS. 178  On December 19, 2000,
Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act. 179 Pursuant to
this statute, individuals "convicted of a qualifying Federal offense" must
provide "a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample" for analysis. 8 °  After a
174. See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
175. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: NATIONAL
DNA INDEX SYSTEM, (Feb. 24, 2004), http://foia.fbi.gov/ndispia.htm [hereinafter NATIONAL
DNA INDEX SYSTEM]. It is a mistake, albeit a common one, to conceive of CODIS as a
databank, a database, a computer or group of computers. See President's DNA Initiative,
What is CODIS?, http://www.dna.gov/uses/solving-crimes/coldcaseslhowdatabasesaidlcodis/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2008). It is no such thing. See id. Such databanks and databases do
exist. See NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM, supra. The databank of DNA profiles maintained
by the FBI is NDIS, the national DNA index system. Id. Around the country various local
crime labs-in Florida, the Miami-Dade Crime Lab, for example, or the Palm Beach County
Crime Lab-maintain their own databanks; these are referred to as LDIS's, local DNA index
systems. NGA.ORG, IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY BY EXPANDING THE USE OF FORENSIC DNA,
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0702FORENSICDNA.PDF. Each such LDIS in Florida
supports and feeds into the SDIS in Tallahassee, the state DNA index system maintained by
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. See id. CODIS "is the automated DNA
information processing and telecommunications system that supports," links, and unifies the
various LDIS/SDIS/NDIS databases. President's DNA Initiative, Advancing Justice Through
DNA Technology, Levels of the Database, http://www.dna.gov/uses/database/levels (last
visited Oct. 26, 2008).




179. See generally DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546,
114 Stat. 2726 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2000)).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1), (c)(1) (2000).
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sample is collected and analyzed, the resulting DNA profile is input into
CODIS, and thereafter is available to CODIS licensees.'
18
Similarly, Florida Statute section 943.325 provides for, as to every
person convicted of a felony, 82 compulsory drawing of blood, DNA analysis,
and DNA data banking. 83 Pursuant to the statute, the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement (FDLE), Florida's statewide police agency,
and the statewide criminal laboratory analysis system shall
establish, implement, and maintain a statewide automated personal
identification system capable of, but not limited to, classifying,
matching, and storing analyses of DNA.... The system shall be
available to all criminal justice agencies. 184
DNA profiles are to be expunged from the CODIS system by the FBI
director only if the director receives a final court order establishing that the
conviction giving rise to the DNA profile has been overturned.'85 As a
condition of CODIS licensure, states are also directed to expunge DNA
records of an individual if his conviction is overturned. 186 There is, however,
so far as appears in the statute, no enforcement mechanism as to this
requirement. 87  Neither the FBI nor any other federal entity audits the
SDIS's to confirm that states are meeting their obligation to expunge records
as to defendants who were acquitted or whose convictions were overturned
181. See id. § 14135a(b). The list of qualifying federal offenses was expanded to include
any felony by the Justice for All Act of 2004. Justice For All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
405, § 203(b)(d)(l), 118 Stat. 2260, 2269-70.
182. See generally FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (2007). The statute also extends to juvenile
offenders, who under Florida law are found "delinquent" rather than "guilty." Id. §
943.325(10)(d). Florida Statutes section 947.1405(7)(a)10 and 948.03(l)(n) apply the same
requirements-redundantly, at least in part-to inmates admitted to controlled release
programs, probation, and community control. FLA. STAT. §§ 947.1405(7)(a)9, 948.03(l)(n)
(2007).
183. FLA. STAT. § 943.325. The chief judges of Florida's Fifteenth Judicial Circuit (the
felony trial court having jurisdiction over Palm Beach County) and Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit (the felony trial court having jurisdiction over Broward County, the county located
between Palm Beach and Miami-Dade) have entered administrative orders tracking the
language of the statute. In re: Required DNA Testing for Non-Sexual Offenders, Fla. Admin.
Order No. III-OO-J-1 (Aug. 9, 2000); In re: Required DNA Testing for Non-Sexual
Offenders, Fla. Admin. Order No. 4.045-8/99 (Sept. 2, 1999); see In re: Required DNA
Testing for Certain Sexual Offenders & Sexual Predators, Fla. Admin. Order No. 4.044-8/99
(Sept. 1, 1999).
184. FLA. STAT. § 943.325(8).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1) (2000).
186. Id. § 14132(d)(2).
187. See id. § 14132.
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on appeal. The burden to seek expunction is on the defendant, but no
provision of Florida law obliges any judge or any other player in the criminal
justice system to inform a defendant whose case was dismissed or conviction
overturned that he may seek, and should obtain, expunction of his DNA
profile from the CODIS system. 188 Thus, the clear requirement of the federal
statute notwithstanding, it is unlikely that any Floridian has ever benefitted
from a record expunction. 8 9
Such protection against information abuse as exists comes in two
forms. 9° First, access to CODIS data is limited for use by criminal justice
agencies for use in judicial proceedings; 91 and for use in research and
development of identification methods and quality control purposes. 9 z
Disclosure of data for any other purpose is a misdemeanor. 93 Second,
forensic analysis is done by decoding sequences of what is referred to as
"junk DNA,"'194 DNA believed not to be associated with physical or medical
characteristics (other, of course, than the characteristics sufficient to identify
the donor of the DNA). 9 5
This is gossamer armor. The universe of people employed by or
affiliated with "criminal justice agencies" of one kind or another who can
lawfully root around in CODIS and its databases is large and growing; so is
188. See generally id.
189. A Floridian convicted of a felony does not merely forfeit forever whatever
expectation of privacy he once had in his DNA profile; he actually pays for the privilege. See
FLA. STAT. § 943.325(12). Section 943.325(12) provides that unless he "has been declared
indigent by the court, the convicted person shall pay the actual costs of collecting the blood
specimens" from which his DNA profile will be derived. Id. By operation of Florida
Constitution Art. I § 19, however, such costs cannot be collected until the conviction upon
which they are based becomes final, i.e., until it is affirmed on appeal. FLA. CONST. art. I §
19. Thus, the State of Florida can force a needle into a convicted felon's arm, withdraw his
life's-blood, analyze that blood, post the fruits of that analysis to data banks from which they
will never be removed, and where they can be examined who-knows-when by who-knows-
whom, all before the first step has been taken in an appellate process designed to determine
whether the conviction in question was lawful. But the state of Florida cannot demand
payment of the few dollars in costs associated with the blood-drawing process until the court
of appeal has satisfied itself that the conviction in question was lawful. See id.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b) (2000).
191. Id. § 14133(b)(1)(A)-(B).
192. Id. § 14133(b)(2). A defendant may also obtain access to his data and the samples
from which the data were derived for criminal defense purposes. Id. § 14133(b)(1)(C).
193. Id. § 14135e(c).
194. THOMAS CURRAN, SCI. & TECH. Div., PARLIAMENT RESEARCH BRANCH, LIBRARY OF
PARLIAMENT, FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS: TECHNOLOGY AND APPLICATION 6 (1997),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp443-e.pdf.
195. See generally NSW HSC Online, Chemistry,
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the population of those who may have occasion to employ CODIS-type data
for research and development. 196 The defendant who compliantly provides a
piece of himself for DNA analysis-Wyche, for example- 97 likely does not
know that the fruits of that analysis will remain in databases until the end of
time.' 98
A year from now, or two years, or twenty, unknown and
unknowable pairs of hands and eyes, in unknown and unknowable
locations, may access that data for good or bad reasons. The
Floridian [-Wyche, for example- whose DNA records they are]
will never learn that [those] records have been examined, or when,
or where, or by whom, or for what reason .... And perhaps next
year, or the year after that, as DNA science leaps forward, the data
stored in CODIS will enable an informed examiner of that data to
know if [a given donor, Wyche, for example,] has a genetic
disposition toward [jaywalking], Aretifism, or rooting for the
Chicago Cubs. "No one [yet] knows what sort of information-
such as propensity to disease or psychological characteristics-
will eventually be able to be extracted from DNA."'
199
Nor is there great comfort to be taken from the statutory promise that
such valuable and sensitive data will be seen only by those authorized to see
it.2°° CODIS is relatively neoteric; the internal controls intended to guard it,
even more so. But as the data it contains burgeon, and the number of
authorized users burgeons, the chances for and likelihood of a loss of control
196. See Milton Hirsch, A Nation of Suspects, CHAMPION MAG., Apr. 2007, at 52.
197. Section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes concerns itself with convicted Floridians.
See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(l)(a), (b). But Rule 3.220(c)(1)(G) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure may result in the permanent recordation of the DNA profile of an arrested
Floridian, even if he is later exonerated. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(c)(1)(G) (granting Florida
courts discretion to require from a defendant "samples of defendant's blood, hair, and other
materials of defendant's body.. . after the filing of the charging document"). And because
Wyche "consented" to the analysis of his DNA, his DNA profile will remain in the CODIS
system in perpetuity, whether or not he had been convicted, whether or not his conviction had
been affirmed on appeal. See Hirsch, supra note 197.
198. Hirsch, supra note 197, at 52.
199. Hirsch, supra note 197, at 52-53 (quoting Stewart Tendler, DNA Pioneer Accuses the
Police of Being Overzealous, THE TiMEs (London), Nov. 2, 2006, at 7). Under the present
state of the law, such a convicted person has no protected Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy in the data derived from analysis of his biological tissue. See Hirsch, supra note 197,
at 54; see also United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 281 (D. Mass 2007) (stating "a
're-search' of the DNA database once constructed may not implicate the Fourth Amendment")
(citing Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489,498 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
200. See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(7).
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of data, whether intentional or negligent, must be assumed to burgeon as
well.20'
It is against the foregoing backdrop, and not in a more traditional
context, that Wyche's putative consent to the seizure of his genetic material
and its subsequent analysis must be considered. In the more traditional
context, cases involving consent issues were often, as Abraham Lincoln said
of his politics, "short and sweet, like the old woman's dance."2 2 if the police
pull the next Earl Wyche over and ask to search his car, that search will take
a matter of minutes. The search will reveal something of interest to the
police or it won't. If it does, Wyche will be arrested or investigated further.
If it doesn't, Wyche will be sent along his way. When the search is over, it's
over. There will be no sequelae, no residual consequences.2 °3
If Wyche's cell tissue is seized by the police, the seizure is a matter of
minutes. But there the similarity ends. The cell tissue will, as discussed
supra, be sent to the local crime lab where it will be DNA-profiled. °" The
cell tissue itself will be preserved by the crime lab in perpetuity.0 5 The DNA
profile will be uploaded to CODIS. °6 As of November 2005, all fifty
American states and 39 sites in 24 countries-"Belgium, Botswana, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia,
Finland, France, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland"-had
received the CODIS software from the FBI and thus had access to the
system.2 0 Wyche's DNA profile will remain in the system unless and until it
is removed, which is to say that in all likelihood it will remain in
perpetuity.2 8 If the local crime lab which holds Wyche's tissue sample
wants to re-test it next year, or the year after that, employing some new test
designed to elicit new information, Wyche is entitled to neither notice nor
hearing and will receive neither.2' If any crime lab, anywhere, wants to
201. See generally Hirsch, supra note 197. In England, "[tiwo computer disks bearing
addresses, bank account numbers and other details of about 25 million people-almost half
the British population-were popped into internal government mail and never arrived." Jill
Lawless, Data on 25M People Lost in the Mail, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 22, 2007, at A04.
202. SAMUEL G. SMITH, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 11 (1902).
203. See Hirsch, supra note 197, at 53.
204. See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(5).
205. Hirsch, supra note 197, at 54.
206. See FLA. STAT. § 943.325(6).
207. AUDIT Div., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMBINED DNA
INDEX SYSTEM OPERATIONAL AND LABORATORY VULNERABILITIES, AUDIT REPORT 06-32, at 10
n.9 (May 2006), available at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBIlaO632/final.pdf.




: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
WYCHE V. STATE
examine or analyze Wyche's DNA profile next year, or the year after that,
employing some new test designed to elicit new information, Wyche is
entitled to neither notice nor hearing and will receive neither.21 °
Traditionally, "[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's
consent [to a search or seizure] under the Fourth Amendment is that of
'objective' reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" 2t ' In
Florida v. Jimeno,21 2 the United States Supreme Court distinguished the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Wells.
213
There the Supreme Court of Florida held that consent to search the
trunk of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked
briefcase found inside the trunk. It is very likely unreasonable to
think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has
agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk,
but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.21 4
Whether it is reasonable to understand a consent to search a trunk to
include a paper bag in that trunk, but not to include a locked briefcase in that
trunk, is something that can be resolved by reference to common experience
and common expectations of privacy.215 With respect to DNA profiling and
the CODIS system, there is little or no common experience and less common
understanding. Earl Wyche was not told that the DNA sample he was asked
to give would result in information that would be available to and examined
by the police department that ultimately arrested him, for the crime for which
he was ultimately arrested; nor that it would remain available for comparison
to crime-scene evidence past, present, and future by police departments all
over the country and the world.216 He was told that he was giving a DNA
sample that could be used to exonerate him as to a burglary that neither he
nor anyone else actually committed.217 That is all he was told.218 In the
words of the Wyche II majority:
210. See id.
211. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 183-89 (1990)).
212. Id. at 248.
213. 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989), affdon other grounds, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
214. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52.
215. See, eg., id. at 251-52.
216. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 2008).
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Wyche was asked to consent and did consent to the saliva swabs
for use in a burglary investigation. [The lead investigator]
truthfully represented that the police desired a sample of Wyche's
DNA for purposes of an ongoing investigation. Wyche was
informed that the requested evidence could match or exclude him
in respect to a crime and that he was a suspect in a police
investigation. 2
19
Wyche was told he was consenting to the testing of his DNA in a
burglary investigation, a particular burglary investigation.20 He was told
that there was an ongoing investigation, a particular investigation of a
particular burglary. 22' He was told that DNA testing would match or exclude
him as to a crime, the particular crime as to which there was a police
investigation already in train. 222 He was never told-he was deliberately
prevented from knowing-that information derivative from his DNA would
be examined in connection with other pending crimes as to which the police
were presently interested, and other future crimes any time the police became
interested.23  At the end of the paragraph captioned above the Supreme
Court of Florida concluded that "Wyche was not deluded as to the import of
his consent. '2 24 It would be impossible for him to have been more deluded.
Wyche was led, deliberately, to believe that he was consenting to the one-
time examination of his DNA for the purposes of determining his
involvement or non-involvement in one crime.225 His consent extended to
that one examination for that one purpose, not to any other examination for
any other purpose.22 6 Yet he was convicted based upon the comparison of
his DNA in another case, a comparison not within the scope of his consent. 27
The Wyche II court and parties were not unaware of section 943.325 of
the Florida Statutes.28 On October 19, 2006, the court entered an order
"directing the parties to serve supplemental briefs specifically addressing the
applicability and impact of section 943.325, Florida Statutes. '2 9 Wyche
took the position that as section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes read at the
219. Wyche 11, 987 So. 2d at 30 (Fla. 2008) (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
223. See id. at 27.
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time of his prior convictions he had not been obliged to provide tissue
samples, and his orders of judgment and sentence had not required him to do
so. 2 30 That being the case, the police had no statutory authority to compel his
genetic material, and could obtain such material only pursuant to consent-
or, of course, a warrant; which concededly was not employed here. 3
Because, in Wyche's view, his consent was constitutionally defective, the
resulting DNA profile was "fruit of the poisonous tree;" and section 943.325
of the Florida Statutes was inapplicable and irrelevant.232 The prosecution
took the position that the version of section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes
in effect at the time when Wyche's tissue samples were taken provided that
such samples could be taken from a probationer presently in custody, and
that therefore the police were empowered to obtain Wyche's genetic material
for DNA profiling with or without his consent. 33
In the event, none of the opinions in Wyche II made reference to section
943.325 of the Florida Statutes. The majority opinion, as well as the two
dissenting opinions, confined themselves to the certified conflict between the
First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal on the constitutionality of consent
obtained by gross deceit under color of law. 34 Whatever the proper
interpretation of former iterations of section 943.325 of the Florida Statutes,
Earl Wyche's DNA profile is now in the CODIS system to stay, available for
inspection by all CODIS licensees at all times, for all reasons, or even for no
reason. 35 Whatever Earl Wyche consented to, he never consented to that.236
IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever else can be said of the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in
Wyche II, this much can be said with certainty: Justice Bell's professed fears
230. Id. at 16-17.
231. See id. at 18.
232. Id. at 4.
233. See Supplemental Answer Brief of Respondent at 7, Wyche v. State, 987 So. 2d 23
(Fla. 2008) (No. SC04-1509).
Neither of Wyche's prior criminal judgments required him to provide blood or
other specimens. When he committed the 1995 burglary, he was not required to do
so under the 1995 version of § 943.325. However, the requirement that he do so, in
the 2001 version of § 943.325, was in place when [the police] requested consent to
the swabs.
Id. (citation omitted).
234. See generally Wyche II, 987 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2008). As noted, Justice Bell's
concurring opinion, for himself and Chief Justice Quince did not discuss the merits of the case
but simply posed concerns about how the majority opinion would be interpreted and applied.
Id. at 32 (Bell, J., concurring).
235. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 197.
236. See Wyche II, 987 So. 2d at 25.
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will surely be realized. The Reader's Digest version of the Wyche II
holding-that police are free to tell any lie, however outrageous, however
false, to obtain a valid waiver of a homeowner's or suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights-will race through the Florida law enforcement
community like wildfire. This is no criticism of the police. On the contrary;
the police are permitted, indeed they are obliged, to avail themselves of all
investigative techniques expressly determined by the courts to be lawful.
Police officers would be recreant in their duty if they failed to employ the
extraordinary weapon that Wyche H has made available to them. That Wyche
II is at odds with all American jurisprudence in all American jurisdictions to
consider the question is of no concern to the officer on the street.
The holding in Wyche II is no doubt of profound concern to judges on
Florida's trial and intermediate appellate benches. But with respect to the
issue actually addressed and resolved by Wyche II, little remains to be said or
done. Absent the use or threat of brute force, consents obtained as a result of
police deception will be valid consents, and evidence obtained as a result of
such consents will be admissible evidence." 7
Perhaps more consequential, however, is the issue that the Wyche II
majority opinion did not address: That of scope of consent.238 Trial and
appellate judges before whom that issue comes must look beyond Wyche II.
Such judges should begin by acknowledging that consent to the seizure
of biological material for purposes of DNA profiling is a qualitatively
different thing from consent to the search of a car or a house. The
homeowner who is asked by the police, "May we search your house?" can be
expected to understand the consequences of his assent: The police will
search, and if they find evidence or contraband it will be seized, and if
evidence or contraband is seized the householder will likely be going to jail.
The suspect who is asked by the police, "May we have a cheek swab or a
blood sample?" cannot be expected to understand the consequences of his
assent: His DNA will be profiled, and the resulting profile will be posted to
interlinked databases around the country and around the world where it may
be analyzed without notice to him in connection with any and every crime
that has been, or may some day be, committed.2 39 The householder almost
certainly has an accurate understanding of the scope of his consent. The
donor of a tissue sample almost certainly has none. Florida courts must
acknowledge that distinction, and its consequences.
237. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1973).
238. See generally Wyche I, 987 So. 2d at 23 (emphasis added).
239. See H.R. REP. No. 106-900, pt. 1, at 8 (2000).
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DNA science, to the extent that it makes the criminal justice system a
less blunt instrument for separating the speckled flock from the clean, is a
boon and a blessing. As DNA science becomes more refined, its power to
aid the criminal justice process will become more profound. But the
increased sophistication and complexity of the science will increase the gap
by which the ordinary arrestee-the next Earl Wyche-will fall short of
understanding what, exactly, he is consenting to when he consents to the
seizure of his flesh. That shortfall cannot be ignored. The law must place
the burden squarely upon the prosecution and its law enforcement
functionaries to make sure that each of us understands the material
consequences of his consent. Failure to do so would be a betrayal of a core
purpose of the Fourth Amendment and its traditional protection of individual
choice as to matters implicating privacy and personal security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey examines the key developments in constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, administrative, and case law governing public employment in
Florida during 2007-08. Part II looks at such hiring issues as privatization,
background checks, nepotism, immigration, ethics, budget cuts, negligent
hiring, and the Hatch Act among others. Part III, Terms of Employment,
covers an array of issues, such as hours and wages, health benefits, workers'
compensation, unemployment compensation, public pensions, safety issues,
the internet, and post-employment restrictions. Part IV addresses legal issues
involving discipline, retaliation against whistleblowers, the First Amend-
ment, and remedies. Finally, Part V, Employment Discrimination, surveys
the major developments in the past year involving bias on grounds of race,
gender, age, disability, religion, and military service. Part VI ends with a
roundup of employment discrimination remedies.
II. HIRING ISSUES
A. Hiring Veterans
The Department of Labor runs a Web campaign, HireVetsFirst, aimed
at raising "employer awareness about the value of hiring veterans."' Despite
* John Sanchez, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University; B.A., Pomona Col-
lege (1974); J.D., University of California, Berkeley (1977); LLM, Georgetown University
(1984).
1. Jennifer C. Kerr, Congress Aims to Improve Veterans Job Assistance, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 18, 2007, at 5A.
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this effort, veterans groups criticized "a veterans outreach program" that al-
lots $161 million to states to help vets find employment as substandard. In
2008, the United States Senate approved a bill that "would help civilian em-
ployers keep jobs available for [employees] called to active military duty."'
In 2007, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs promulgated a
rule putting into effect the 2002 Jobs for Veterans Act,4 which directs federal
contractors not to discriminate against, and to take affirmative action to hire
military veterans. 5
B. Privatization
Privatization, the conversion of governmental agencies into private enti-
ties,6 continued to fuel controversy over the past year in Florida. "For years,
state and local governments have been privatizing certain functions, such as
trash collection, payroll processing and road maintenance. 7 Now, "15 or so
[United States] municipalities ... have outsourced their libraries," and critics
charge that this development constitutes "a backdoor method of union-
busting."8 Moreover, "workers will lose the right to participate in [the pub-
lic] pension system for public employees and instead will qualify for a
401 (k) program."9
The Miami-Dade Housing Agency faced "a range of financial and man-
agement scandals" since 2006, leading to a "9-month-old federal takeover"
of the troubled agency.'0 But under a deal brokered between the federal gov-
ernment and the county, the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development will end its control if the county agrees "to privatize manage-
ment of the multimillion-dollar rental-assistance program."'" Again, critics
complain that privatizing the agency will free it "of many of the government
2. Id.
3. Robert Pear, Veterans' Benefits Bill Wins Approval in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2008, at A20 [hereinafter Pear, Veterans' Benefits Bill].
4. Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Contractors and Subcon-
tractors Regarding Disabled Veterans, Recently Separated Veterans, Other Protected Veter-
ans, and Armed Forces Service Medal Veterans, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,393, 44,393 (Aug. 8, 2007)
(to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-300).
5. Id. at 44,398-99.
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (8th ed. 2004).
7. Julia Silverman, Some Cash-Strapped Cities Are Privatizing Libraries, MIAMi
HERALD, Oct. 7, 2007, at 10A.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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regulations, as well as the county pay scale, benefits and employment protec-
tions."'
12
In 2007, Broward County "trimmed expenses by privatizing park ranger
positions."' 3 In addition, "Broward County Transportation plans to privatize
a handful of bus routes."' 4 As a result of budget cuts, Florida International
University plans to "outsource services such as construction management,
real estate development and e-mail support.
15
C. Background Checks on Employees
The Census Bureau announced "that it would fingerprint and [under-
take] background checks on... [500,000] temporary workers who will go
door to door for the 2010 [census] count" to weed out criminals. 16 In 2008, a
United States House subcommittee held hearings on a measure that would
force states to provide specified "state criminal history information to em-
ployers of security guards."'7
The National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and
Certification has compiled a "nationwide list of 24,500 teachers who have
been" disciplined for a wide range of misconduct. 8 The "list is the only na-
tionwide" attempt by school districts to weed out "teachers who get into
trouble," but the public is denied access to it.19
In 2008, Florida's Department of Children & Families (DCF) "outlined
plans to better scrutinize the agency's 13,500 employees" after "a shocking
arrest of a DCF employee," in which the agency failed to discover he had "a
DUI arrest in Georgia and an outstanding warrant for his arrest... in Tex-
as."'20 In response, DCF will be fingerprinting "all employees hired after
November [6], 2006... as part of a more thorough background check.",2' In
a similar vein, "Miami-Dade County's rules for issuing chauffeur's licenses"
12. Id.
13. Amy Sherman, Deeper Broward Cuts Loom, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 2007, at 1B.
14. Id.
15. Oscar Corral, FIU Planning Layoffs to Save Money, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 16, 2008,
at lB.
16. Census Workers to Be Fingerprinted, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 2008, at A22.
17. Many States Not Implementing Checks on Security Guards' Backgrounds, Panel
Told, 76 U.S.L.W. 2519, 2519 (2008).
18. Robert Tanner, Paper Puts List of 'Problem' Teachers Online, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
22, 2007, at 8B.
19. Id.





: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
came under scrutiny after learning that "a man who'd killed his grandmother
was granted a permit to drive a cab. 22 As a result, "the Consumer Services
Department has reassigned the staffer who backgrounded" the cabbie, who
was once found unfit for trial by reason of insanity, "[a]nd it is rechecking
the backgrounds of the county's 4200 cab drivers. 23 The Department also
set up "an emergency-only paging system" by which wayward cabbies can
have their licenses pulled immediately.24
About seventy percent of employers check applicants' credit scores "be-
fore they decide to hire a candidate., 25 "The fear is that credit problems at
home create tension and distraction at work .... Moreover, employers do
not relish having to garnish employee's wages, sought by creditors, after
workers fall behind in their bills.27
D. Nepotism
Florida's Anti-Nepotism Law generally prohibits public employers
from hiring members of their families or other relatives.28 In 2008, "[t]he
Miami-Dade School Board's Ethics Advisory Committee... proposed a new
nepotism policy that would make it more difficult for employees to indirectly
supervise their relatives., 29 The Committee framed three recommendations:
"1) All employees must disclose relatives employed anywhere in the school
system; 2) [d]istrict employees cannot ... oversee a relative without School
Board approval; [and 3) flailure to disclose should result in penalties up to
and including dismissal. 3 °
News accounts of preferential treatment, that a "Fort Lauderdale police
chief's wife" received from prosecutors, was incorrectly referred to as nepot-
ism after she was not charged with attempted murder for shooting-but miss-
ing--"her husband in their home. 31 Instead of nepotism, a criminal law
22. Erika Beras, Chauffeur Licenses Reviewed, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 9, 2008, at 3B.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Julie Sturgeon, Weak Credit Raises Bills, Threatens Jobs and More, MIAMI HERALD,
July 13, 2008, at 1E.
26. Id.
27. See generally id.
28. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3135(2)(a), 760.10(8)(d) (2008).
29. Kathleen McGrory, Limitations Proposed on School Nepotism, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
30, 2008, at 6B.
30. Id.
31. Adam H. Beasley & Jennifer Mooney Piedra, Police Chiefs Wife Coddled, Critics
Say, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2008, at B 1.
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E-Verify is a voluntary federal program that allows employers to con-
firm "electronically their newly hired employees' legal [eligibility] to work
in the United States., 33 In the past year alone, use of the Web-based system
grew from 14,265 to 52,000 employers.34 The growth of E-Verify was most
pronounced "in Arizona, where a new state law" forces employers to use the
system.35 By contrast, Illinois passed a law barring employers from using E-
Verify "over questions about its accuracy. 3 6 In response, the Bush Adminis-
tration sued Illinois to enjoin the state from implementing its ban on employ-
er use of E-Verify.37 The suit claims that the Illinois law is preempted by
federal immigration law.3 8 In 2008, Virginia employers defeated bills forc-
ing all employers to take part in the E-Verify program. 9
E-Verify "matches photographs from green cards and other immigrant
work permits against a database of' over 14 million pictures.' Currently, the
federal government is drafting "regulations that would require all new feder-
al contractors to use the E-Verify system., 41 Under the system, "[fif an em-
ployee's photo doesn't match, the company has eight days to report the dis-
crepancy to the Department of Homeland Security, which investigates within
two days. 42 In June 2008, by executive order, federal contractors are forced
32. Id.
33. Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Program to Verify Worker Status Is Growing, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2008, at A19 [hereinafter Archibold, Worker Status Growing].
34. Id. By June 2008, the number had grown to 69,000 employers. Mickey McCarter, E-
Verify Faulted for Lack of Resources, Protections, HOMELAND SEC. TODAY, June 11, 2008,
available at http://www.hstoday.us/index2.php?option=com-content&dopdf= 1 &id=3746.
35. Archibold, Worker Status Growing, supra note 33.
36. Id.
37. Julia Preston, U.S. Sues Illinois to Let Employers Use Immigrant Databases, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at A18 [hereinafter Preston, U.S. Sues Illinois].
38. Id.
39. Julia Preston, Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration, N.Y. TIMEs, July 6,
2008, at Al [hereinafter Preston, Employers Fight].
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to use E-Verify, "greatly expanding the reach of the administration's crack-
down on employers who hire illegal immigrants. '43 Critics of E-Verify al-
lege that the system is "vulnerable to cheating by immigrants who used real
identity documents belonging to other people." 44 Already, a "separate rule
proposed by the administration that would use the Social Security database to
verify immigration status has been blocked by a federal court in San Francis-
CO." 4 5
In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security issued a final rule ex-
panding the definition of "constructive knowledge" of an employee who has
provided a fake Social Security number and spells out what steps employers
should take in response to no-match letters issued by the Social Security
Administration.46
In 2007, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services revised
its Employment Eligibility Verification Form, 1-9, to implement a rule that
modified the types of documents a new hire must hand to an employer in
order to prove identity and employment eligibility.47
b. Harsher Penalties Against Employers and Illegal Workers
One telling index illustrates the growing anti-immigration climate in the
United States: Fewer immigrants "are sending money home, and many cite
increased difficulties in finding well-paying jobs and mounting discrimina-
tion., 48 At the same time, "those who do send money home, now send more,
an average of $325 per remittance compared to $300 in 2006.""4
"[P]roponents of stricter immigration enforcement," however, point to the
slower growth of remittances as evidence "that the policies tightening what
was once a virtual open door to immigration are working."5 °
43. Julia Preston, Bush Orders Contractors to Vet Status of Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2008, at A11.
44. Id.
45. Id. A California federal district court extended an injunction preventing the federal
government from warning employers that they could incur liability for civil and criminal
violations of immigration law if, after finding out an employee's Social Security number does
not match government databases, they do not quickly unravel the discrepancy. Am. Fed'n of
Labor v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
46. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. 45,611, 45,612-13 (Aug. 15, 2007).
47. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBiLrrY VERIFICATION, FORM 1-9
(2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/I-9.pdf.
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In 2008, the federal government announced it would "increase fines
against employers who hire illegal immigrants by 25 percent, the first hike in
almost a decade."51 Plans are also being drafted "to increase criminal penal-
ties against 'the most egregious employer offenders.' '5 2 "The fines for em-
ployers caught knowingly hiring illegal immigrants now range from $275 to
$11,000."" Not all stricter immigration laws, however, have withstood judi-
cial scrutiny. For example, in August of 2007, "a federal judge in San Fran-
cisco temporarily held up a new federal rule that would have forced employ-
ers to dismiss illegal immigrants after 90 days."' The "92 criminal arrests of
employers still amount to a drop in the bucket of a national economy that
includes [six] million companies that employ more than [seven] million un-
authorized workers. 5
By contrast to the harsher penalties surveyed above, on November 16,
2007, the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency is-
sued guidelines spelling out "best practices" for agents to follow to identify
undocumented workers arrested during worksite enforcement actions who
are sole caregivers or have other pressing humanitarian concerns.56
c. Visa Program for Seasonal Farm Workers
The federal visa program for seasonal farm workers, the H-2A visa pro-
gram, has been increasingly tapped by farmers despite "its reputation for
being bureaucratic and expensive" thanks to "[c]ompetition for unskilled
labor" and the crackdown on illegal immigrants. States have taken the lead
with "programs to help farmers get visas for workers ... [after] Congress
failed to pass immigration legislation" in 2007.58 "Unlike other visa pro-
grams, there's no cap on the number of temporary agricultural visas .... ""
But the H-2A program fills only a fraction of farmers' needs and seventy
51. Eunice Moscoso, Employer Fines Increasing, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 23, 2008, at 2C.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Preston, U.S. Sues Illinois, supra note 37.
55. Spencer S. Hsu, Bosses Elude Worker Crackdown, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 26, 2007, at
3A.
56. Press Release, Kennedy, Delahunt Announce New Guidelines for Immigration Raids
(Nov. 16, 2007), http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-release.cfm?id=0F91969E-96EB-
4AB 1-832B-2CF4245 IB587.
57. Emily Bazar, Farmers Find Help Getting Workers' Visas, USA TODAY, July 3, 2008,
at 3A.
58. Id.
59. Id. In 2007, "the State Department issued 50,791 of the H-2A visas." Id.
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percent "of hired help on farms" are illegal immigrants.' Before qualifying
for the H-2A program, an employer must "advertise locally to prove the posi-
tions [cannot] be filled by U.S. workers."'" Once an application is approved,
"a farmer is required to provide the workers with transportation to the U.S.
and housing. 6 2 The United Farm Workers union "has agreements with
Mexico and Thailand to streamline immigrants' paperwork. '63 The Depart-
ment of Labor announced on July 3, 2007, steps for obtaining H-2B visas for
temporary foreign workers for tree planting and reforestation jobs.6'
An employer group, "Colorado Employers for Immigration Reform, is
pressing Congress for a much larger and more flexible guest worker pro-
gram., 65 Legislators in Arizona took up a bill, that "would have been the
first state guest worker program in the country.' '66
d. Border Security
Under Operation Jump Start, a two-year federal program, 6000 National
Guard members "in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas . . .
help[ed] to secure the border with Mexico., 67 Although the program is set to
end July 15, 2008, "an effort is intensifying to have [the National Guard] stay
put. '68 While the Border Patrol aims at doubling its size to 18,000 agents by
the end of 2008, state and federal officials worry that the agency will not
meet its target.69 Moreover, work on a "virtual fence, a suite of cameras,
radars and other technology ... has been plagued with delays and glitches. 7 °
Since the 6000 National Guard members have been deployed at the border,
there has been "a 39 percent drop in arrests for illegal border crossings.'
60. Id.
61. Bazar, supra note 57.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Special Guidelines for Processing H-2B Temporary Labor Certification in Tree
Planting and Related Reforestation Occupations, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,337, 36,504 (July 3, 2007).
65. Preston, Employers Fight, supra note 39.
66. Id.
67. Randal C. Archibold, Second Thoughts on Pulling the Guard from the Border, N.Y.
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2. State and Local Activity
a. Legislation
In 2008, over "1100 immigration-related bills" were introduced in forty-
four states and new laws went into effect in twenty-six states." In Florida
alone, "[t]hirteen bills were introduced" in 2008 dealing with immigration.73
The states seized "the initiative on immigration [in 2007] when Congress
abandoned an immigration overhaul pushed by President Bush. ' 74  While
some of the legislation includes pro-immigration measures, most clamp
down on "immigrant access to services and employment. ' 75 Besides bills
forcing employers to use the E-Verify system, many toughened employer
sanctions for hiring undocumented workers.76 For example, a new law in
Arizona would "suspend or revoke business licenses of employers who
'knowingly' hire illegal immigrants." 77 In 2008, employers won approval in
the Arizona Legislature of a measure aimed at narrowing the law to exclude
workers hired before 2008.78 Immigration bills died in Indiana and Kentucky
"in part to warnings from business groups that the measures could hurt the
economy. 79
In 2008, Mississippi became "the first state to make it a felony for an il-
legal immigrant to work. The measure also allows terminated employees to
sue their employer if they were replaced by an illegal immigrant.,
80
In the last decade, "over three million new residents settled in Florida;"
one-third of them were immigrants. 8' Critics of immigration claim that this
influx of immigrants to Florida "is bringing traffic, pollution, overcrowded
72. Dave Montgomery, States Forge Ahead with Sanctions, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24,
2008, at 3A [hereinafter Montgomery, States Forge Ahead]. In 2007, 1562 immigration bills
"were introduced in state legislatures ... and 244 became law." Julia Preston, In Reversal,
Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at A22 [hereinafter Pres-
ton, Reversal].
73. John P. Horan, Florida Immigration Legislation: From "Fixing Stupid" to "Dumb
and Dumber," SE. CONSTR., June 2008, at 63.
74. Montgomery, States Forge Ahead, supra note 72.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Paul Giblin, Immigration Raid in Arizona Could Test New State Law, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2008, at A19.
78. Preston, Employers Fight, supra note 39.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), Immigration in Florida,
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schools, and lack of affordable housing to the state, decreasing quality of life
and straining natural resources. ' 82
A Haitian-American immigrant organization near Fort Lauderdale, Flor-
ida, was being investigated for representing Haitian and other Caribbean
immigrants from other states that they could obtain work permits and amnes-




In response to the toughest crackdown "in two decades, employers...
are fighting back in state legislatures, the federal courts and city halls." 84
While courts, by and large, in 2007, struck down "state and local laws crack-
ing down on illegal immigration," several significant federal court decisions
have sustained such laws in 2008.85 For example, a federal court in Arizona
refused to enjoin "what is widely considered the nation's toughest law
against employers who hire illegal immigrants. 86 After a trial on the merits,
the court rejected plaintiffs' claims "that the Arizona law invaded legal terri-
tory belonging exclusively to the federal government. ' 87 Similarly, a federal
district judge in Missouri upheld a local ordinance cracking down on "em-
ployers of illegal immigrants. ' '88
By contrast, in 2007, a federal court in Pennsylvania ruled that a local
ordinance bolstering sanctions on employers who hired illegal immigrants
was preempted by federal immigration law and "violated the due process
rights of employers. 89
3. Employment Rights of Undocumented Workers
Paradoxes emerge when courts try to reconcile two seemingly conflict-
ing federal labor laws: the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
82. Id.
83. US Immigration Lawyers.com, Immigrants Flock to Florida Seeking Work Permits,
http://www.usimmigrationlawyers.com/resource.cfm/state/flarticlen7566/Imtifgrants-Flock-
to-Florida-Seeking.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
84. Preston, Employers Fight, supra note 39.
85. Preston, Reversal, supra note 72.
86. Randal C. Archibold, Judge May Not Step in to Halt Arizona Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
19, 2007, at A21.
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(IRCA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 90 While the IRCA
"made it illegal for [employers] to knowingly hire undocumented workers,"
courts have interpreted the NLRA to make clear that even illegal employees
enjoy collective bargaining rights.9' In 2002, the United States Supreme
Court ruled, in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,92 that illegally
laid-off undocumented workers could not recover back-pay from employers
who violated the NLRA. 93 In 2008, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that employers must "bar-
gain with unions that" hire undocumented workers even though, under the
IRCA, it is illegal to knowingly employ such workers. 94 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit supported its ruling in
part on language in the IRCA, making clear "that employer sanctions weren't
meant to 'undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing
law.'" 95
4. Immigration Reform
In 2008, Hispanic organizations urged the two presidential candidates,
Senators John McCain and Barack Obama, to "support-and force Congress
to pass--comprehensive immigration legislation that would create a guest-
worker program and put millions of illegal immigrants on paths to citizen-
ship. '96 Moreover, Hispanic organizations urged the candidates "to reverse
decades of inadequate representation by Hispanics in the federal workforce.
Hispanics constitute about 15 to 16 percent of the population but hold just
slightly more than 7 percent of federal jobs."97
Besides "demand[ing] citizenship opportunities for the estimated 12
million illegal immigrants in the U.S.," immigrant rights activists organized
nationwide rallies aimed at ending workplace raids and deportations.98
90. See Michael Doyle, Rulings Diverge on Laborer Rights, MIAMi HERALD, Jan. 9,
2008, at 3A.
91. Id.
92. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
93. Id. at 151-52.
94. Doyle, supra note 90.
95. Id.
96. Dave Montgomery, Hispanics Press Candidates on Immigration, Employment,
MIAMi HERALD, July 8, 2008, at A5.
97. Id.
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5. How the United States Economy Benefits from Illegal Workers
"The Social Security Administration estimates that about three-quarters
of illegal workers pay taxes that contribute to the overall solvency of Social
Security and Medicare." 99 By one estimate, undocumented workers paid
nine billion dollars in Social Security taxes alone in 2005. I° "[Y]et many
illegal immigrants fearful of deportation won't risk the government attention
that will come from filing a return even if they might qualify for a refund.' 0 1
In addition, such illegal workers are unlikely to draw Social Security and
Medicare benefits even if they remain in the United States after retirement. 102
F. Ethics
1. Disclosure Rules
In Miami-Dade County, public officials "can accept gifts of any value,
including trips, but any worth more than $100 must be reported."'0 3 An edi-
torial in the Miami Herald recommends placing a ban on all gifts because
"the recipients of the gifts are employed by the county and may be in a posi-
tion to make business decisions that could affect the givers' financial well-
being." °4
In 2008, the Miami Police Chief was fined $500 "for failing to disclose
his free use of a luxury vehicle.' 0 5 The "executive director of the Miami-
Dade Commission on Ethics and Public Trust" recommends a blanket ban on
"gifts from vendors seeking business."'0 6




102. See Katie E. Chachere, Comment, Keeping America Competitive: A Multilateral
Approach to Illegal Immigration Reform, 49 S. TEx. L. REv. 659, 673-74 (2008).
103. Editorial, Change County's Policy on Gifts, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 28, 2007, at 32A.
104. Id.
105. Charles Rabin, Dade Feels Pressure to Put Tighter Lid on Gifts, MIAMI HERALD,
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2. Double-Dipping
Miami-Dade County employees must request permission to moonlight
on a second job, a practice known as double-dipping.'0 7 A former aide to
Miami-Dade's Mayor allegedly failed to secure the necessary approval "by
working for a private company while he still held a job in county hall.' ' 8
3. Lobbying
Miami-Dade County is also weighing a recommendation "[t]hat lob-
byists or their charges report how much they are paid to influence govern-
ment."'0 9 Surprisingly, there is no Florida law "against elected officials par-
laying their status into lobbying fees-while still holding office."'' 0
A 2008 task force warned Miami-Dade commissioners that voters
would only approve a pay raise "as part of a package that included term lim-
its and a ban on commissioners holding other jobs.""'
4. Recovery of Costs and Attorney's Fees in Defense of Ethics Violations
Under Florida law," 2 a public official is entitled to recover costs and at-
torney's fees after successfully defending herself against an ethics violation
charge by proving "that 1) the complaint was made with a malicious intent to
injure the official's reputation; 2) the person filing the complaint knew that
the statements made about the official were false or made the statements
about the official with reckless disregard for the truth; and 3) the statements
were material."' 3 A Florida court read this statutory provision as not requir-
ing the official to prove the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 1
4
107. See Matthew I. Pinzur, Ex-Aide May Have Flouted Job Rules, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 23, 2007, at BI.
108. Id.
109. Rabin, Dade Feels Pressure, supra note 105.
110. Fred Grimm, Real Sludge in This Case Was Lobbying, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 17,
2008, at 3B.
111. Matthew I. Pinzur, Dade Leaders Favor Raises, Not Reforms, MIAMI HERALD, July
19, 2008, at 5B.
112. FLA. STAT. § 112.317(7) (2008).
113. Brown v. State, 969 So. 2d 553, 560 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
114. Id. at 560 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
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5. Websites and E-Mail Regulation
In 2007, "Cooper City, [Florida] commissioners approved a Web policy
[barring] elected officials from [posting] links to personal Web pages on the
city's website." ' 15 Also, other Florida public employers warned employees




On January 29, 2008, Florida voters approved a constitutional amend-
ment that "increase[d] exemptions on homesteads and business properties as
well as allow[ed] people to transfer built-up Save Our Homes property tax
savings to another homestead.' ' 17 "Revenues could fall further if property
values continue dropping ... ."'8 As a result, many state and local public
employees will either lose their jobs, see a cut in benefits or hours of work,
or end up privatized." 9 For example, Florida International University must
lay off about 200 employees. 20 "[E]ven tenured professors could lose their
jobs if the university decides to eliminate entire programs.'' Consequently,
the only growth sector is likely to be campus police.'22
In Miami-Dade, budget cuts forced "pay cuts and layoffs... [of] court-
house employees.' ' 23 The Miami-Dade School Board "discussed changing
school police officers' contracts to reduce their work year from 12 months to
1O. ' ' 124 But in July 2008, Miami-Dade Schools Superintendent "scrapped a
proposal to cut 11 schools police officers and restructure the department.' ' 25
In the face of deeper cuts in the 2008-09 budget, the school board must ei-
115. Breanne Gilpatrick, Cities Forced to Tighten Web, E-Mail, Blog Rules, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 24, 2007, at 6B [hereinafter Gilpatrick, Cities Tighten Rules].
116. Id.
117. Sherman, supra note 13; Mary Ellen Klas, Tax Cut Receives Winning Assist in S.
Fla., MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 30, 2008, at IA.
118. Matthew I. Pinzur, Budget Woes Cause Court Cuts, Layoffs, MIAMI HERALD, May 2,
2008, at 8B [hereinafter Pinzur, Budget Woes].
119. See id.
120. Corral, supra note 15.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Pinzur, Budget Woes, supra note 118.
124. Nirvi Shah, Budget Cuts Have Avoided Cutting Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, May 14, 2008,
at 8B.
125. Kathleen McGrory, Police Jobs Spared Budget Ax, MIAMI HERALD, July 16, 2008, at
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ther freeze promised increases in teachers' pay "or lay off 1188" em-
ployees.
26
H. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision
Under the emerging torts of "negligent hiring, retention, [and] supervi-
sion," an employer may be liable for foreseeable torts committed by its em-
ployees against either third parties or co-workers, even if the employee's
wrongdoing arises outside the scope of his employment, if the employer
should have known of the employee's propensity for wrongdoing.127 In
2008, a Florida court ruled that whether a school breached its duty to proper-
ly train and supervise field trip chaperones was a question of fact for a
jury. 128 Another Florida court ruled that a child care center was not liable
under the theory of negligent supervision for an injury sustained when "a
bathroom door slammed on [a child's] hand, partially amputating his pinky
finger."' 129 Furthermore, employers planning a holiday party for their em-
ployees "should consider whether they want to serve alcohol.' 30 "Things
can and do go wrong at company-sponsored gatherings-someone gets
drunk and falls down or gets in an accident on the way home. Or an em-
ployee can make an unwanted pass at another guest.' 3 ' Even street harass-
ment of passing women by construction workers may lead to discipline.
132
I. Hatch Act
Modeled after the federal Hatch Act, a measure that regulates the politi-
cal activities of public employees, 133 Florida has enacted its own law in this
area governing state and local public employees. 134 For example, "state law
makes it illegal to solicit political contributions from local or state govern-
126. Kathleen McGrory, Crew's Grim Budget Forecast: Layoffs and Cuts to Programs,
MIAMi HERALD, July 16, 2008, at lB.
127. 27 AM. JuR. 2D Employment Relationship §§ 389, 391 (2004).
128. Gearhart-Soto v. Delsman, 976 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see
Bonica v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 549 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per cu-
riam).
129. Newlan v. Acad. for Little People of W. Palm Beach, Inc., 980 So. 2d 1247, 1248
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
130. Joyce M. Rosenberg, Plan Ahead to Avoid Inviting a Lawsuit to the Office Holiday
Party, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 5, 2007, at GI1.
131. Id.
132. See Federica Narancio, Hey, Baby! Catcalls Are on Decline, MIAMI HERALD, July 6,
2008, at 3A.
133. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2006).
134. See FLA. STAT. § 110.233 (2007).
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ment employees." '35  A candidate for Congress apologized in 2008 after
"[t]housands of e-mails that promoted a candidate ... were sent to Miami-
Dade County employees. 136  Similarly, "[clampaigning for a candidate
while at a city commission meeting could be misuse of a public position.' 37
Florida law also imposes "criminal penalties for public officials who cam-
paign while working at their government jobs.' 38 In 2007, Florida's Insur-
ance Commissioner apologized for "using a state computer to help a friend's
political campaign."' 39 "Under [Miami-Dade] School Board rules, the dis-
trict's e-mail system cannot be used for political activities."' 40 In 2008, a
Miami-Dade School Board member running for reelection was criticized
after sending e-mails to teachers endorsing a candidate.'14  Under Florida's
Code of Judicial Conduct, candidates running for the bench must "refrain
from inappropriate political activity."'' 42 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled
that the Code of Judicial Conduct is violated when a candidate for the bench
commends or criticizes "jurors for their verdict, 'other than in a court plead-
ing, filing, or hearing in which the candidate represents a party in the pro-
ceeding in which the verdict was rendered.""'i 43
"Active-duty military personnel are [also] prohibited from taking part in
partisan politics."' 44 By contrast, retired officers enjoy full rights to engage
in political activism. 45 In 2008, the Department of Veterans Affairs prohi-
bited voter "registration drives among the veterans living at federally run
nursing homes, shelters for the homeless and rehabilitation centers across the
country.' ' 146 "Although veterans are not federal employees, department offi-
135. Charles Rabin, Martinez Campaign Apologies for E-mails, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18,
2008, at 5B.
136. Id.
137. Todd Wright, Politicking from Dais Angers Candidates in Race, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 31, 2007, at 3B.
138. Commissioner's Apology Accepted, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 22, 2007, at 3C.
139. Id.
140. Kathleen McGrory & Ketty Rodriguez, Candidate's Sending of E-mails Questioned,
MIAMI HERALD, July 15, 2008, at IB.
141. Id.
142. In re Amendment to the Code of Judicial Conduct-Amendments to Canon 7, 985
So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla. 2008).
143. Id. at 1074.
144. Thom Shanker, Military Chief Warns Troops About Politics, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
2008, at Al0.
145. Id.
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cials based their decision in part on the Hatch Act, which bans federal em-
ployees from engaging in partisan political activity.'
' 47
"A watchdog report found that former Justice Department officials pre-
viously broke the law by politicizing decisions on jobs and intemships.' ' 4s
The report "found that officials disproportionately weeded out those with
liberal credentials over those with conservative affiliations who were apply-
ing for the department's honors program and summer internships."' 49 "The
report by the department's inspector general and Office of Professional Re-
sponsibility found that in some instances, especially involving the hiring of
immigration judges, the improper screening was 'systematic." 50
J. Innovative Ways of Recruiting Police Officers
In South Florida, many cities are having trouble filling vacant police
jobs. '5 To remedy this chronic shortage of officers, South Florida cities
have come up with innovative techniques. For example,
[iun Fort Lauderdale, recruiters are traveling to New York in hopes
of grabbing cops from a top criminal justice college, and to mili-
tary bases to pursue people leaving the armed services. In Hallan-
dale Beach, police have started a partnership with the local high
school in hopes of getting young people interested early. And in
Miami-Dade County, police have sponsored radio ads and a re-
cruitment Web page. 152
Hallandale Beach is even asking retired police officers "to come back and
work with rookies."'
153
K. Cities Hiring Panhandlers
In 2008, Daytona Beach, Florida hopes to recruit "panhandlers to clean
the city, paying them with a stipend and a place to stay.' '1" Costing the city
147. Id.
148. Marisa Taylor, Past Hiring Bias Found at Justice, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 2008, at
3A.
149. Id.
150. Marisa Taylor, Report: Hiring Broke Laws, MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 2008, at 3A.
151. Diana Moskovitz, Wanted: Police Officers, MiAMi HERALD, Sept. 28, 2007, at lB.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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about $2500 per person, hired panhandlers would also be put through drug
and alcohol screenings.1
55
L. Appointing v. Electing Judges in Wake of Involuntary Retirement
In 2008, a Florida court ruled that a county court vacancy caused by an
involuntary retirement of a judge must be filled by election, rather than gu-
bernatorial appointment, where the vacancy occurred during the statutory
qualifying period. 
156
I. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT: INTRODUCTION
A. Hours and Wages
1. Fair Labor Standards Act Issues
a. State of Florida's Economic Growth
Although "Florida is ranked fourth in the nation for tech industry em-
ployment, and South Florida is the state's leading area for the high-tech in-
dustry, . . . industry experts say unless state officials nurture this industry,
Florida's economy will lose valuable tech businesses to other states."' 57 His-
torically, Florida's economy relied heavily on "tourism, agriculture and the
service sector," but a 2003 study highlighted "some of the road blocks on
Florida's path to attract high-paying tech jobs.... education, investment and
innovation."' 58 For example, "Florida ranks 31st in the nation in terms of
new patents per worker." 159 Florida's workers are "beset by the triple threat
of high property taxes, high insurance premiums and falling property val-
ues."' 16 "Florida has the largest percentage of renters spending 30 percent or
more of their income on rent and utilities .... 161
"Florida's minimum wage [went] ... up to $6.79 per hour" on January
1, 2008.162 "[A]bout 2 percent of the state's workforce earns a minimum
155. See Editorial, A Homeless Plan, MIAMI HERALD, July 8, 2008, at 12A.
156. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor re Appointment or Election of Judges,
983 So. 2d 526, 527-29 (Fla. 2008).
157. Bridget Carey, Tech Job Base Is Vulnerable, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 2007, at 1C.
158. Jim Wyss, Call Is Out for More Tech Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5, 2007, at 3C.
159. Id.
160. Christina Rexrode, Fla. Renters Breaking the '30 Percent Rule', MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 31, 2007, at G21.
161. Id.
162. Minimum Wage to Rise on New Year's Day, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 16, 2007, at 3C.
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wage." 163 "Florida's [minimum wage] is higher than the federal standard of
$5.85 an hour."' 64 The federal minimum wage rose to $6.55 an hour in July
2008 but is still worth less than the 1997 minimum in 2008 dollars. 165
b. Overtime
In 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) charged that the
Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department "mishandled many over-
time and minimum-wage complaints and delayed investigating hundreds of
cases for a year or more." 166 The GAO "also faulted the wage division for
reducing the number of enforcement actions it pursues each year to 29,584 in
the 2007 fiscal year, down 37 percent from 46,758 10 years earlier."
1 67
In 2007-08, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued three opinion letters
involving overtime issues: 1) Public employees who work part-time and
make above the minimum wage can receive compensatory time when they
are not eligible for overtime, but work more than their allotted hours; 168 2)
"putting on and taking off' protective safety equipment worn by meat pack-
ing employees is not a "principal activity" and, therefore, not compensable
under the FLSA; 169 and 3) police officers who work for another city while
off-duty are ineligible to have that off-duty time count in the calculation of
their overtime or regular rate of pay.
71
The FLSA carves out a number of exemptions from its overtime rules
and the following federal cases speak to the nature of these exemptions. In
2007-08, the Eleventh Circuit ruled: 1) The FLSA overtime exemption for
recreational and amusement businesses did not apply to two Florida dog rac-
ing firms because the firms did not functionally operate as separate units;
1 71
2) paramedics fall under the exemption from FLSA overtime rules for em-
ployees who "have the 'responsibility to engage in fire suppression"' and so
do not qualify for overtime; 72 3) workers providing services such as plant-
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Holly Sklar, Raise Too Little, Too Late-Make It $10 in 2010, MIAMi HERALD,
July 26, 2008, at 27A.
166. Steven Greenhouse, Department Is Criticized on Disputes over Wages, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2008, at A13.
167. Id.
168. See Dep't of Labor Opinion Letter FLSA2007-9 (May 14, 2007).
169. Dep't of Labor Opinion Letter FLSA2007-10 (May 14, 2007).
170. See Dep't of Labor Opinion Letter FLSA2007-12 (Dec. 31, 2007).
171. Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1159-60 (11th Cir.
2008).
172. Huff v. Dekalb County, 516 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11 th Cir. 2008).
2008]
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ing, fertilizing, herbiciding, and harvesting were employed in "secondary
agriculture" and thus expressly exempt from FLSA's overtime rules for
"workers 'employed in agriculture;""' 17 3 4) "mandatory travel time is ex-
empted from [overtime pay] under the Portal-to-Portal Act" amendments to
the FLSA; 17 4 and 5) "the primary duty of [defendant's] store managers was
not management" and, thus, were not exempt under the FLSA's executive
employees' exemption from overtime rules.17 5
In 2007, the U.S. Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division con-
cluded that "[t]he Florida Department of Children & Families illegally de-
nied overtime to 126 Palm Beach County abuse investigators between Au-
gust 2004 and September 2005. ''176 Ultimately, "the state agreed to pay
$166,516.51 in back wages."'177
c. FLSA Remedies
A provision of the 2008 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
amends the FLSA to raise the penalty for child labor violations from $10,000
to $11,000 per violation. 178  House and Senate Democrats introduced the
2008 Civil Rights Act, giving state employees the right to sue their state em-
ployers for damages for alleged overtime pay violations, thus overriding the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 179
In 2007-08, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the following issues involv-
ing FLSA remedies: 1) while traditional class action suits may be brought
under the FLSA, the Act also recognizes a hybrid suit known as a collective
action; 18 2) a trial court should instruct the jury on how to calculate back pay
for unpaid overtime according to the regular rate of pay standard spelled out
in the DOL bulletin where an employee is hired on a weekly salary basis;' 81
173. Sariol v. Fla. Crystals Corp., 490 F.3d 1277, 1279 (1lth Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(6) (2000)).
174. Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11 th Cir. 2007).
175. Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc. (Rodriguez I1), 518 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th
Cir. 2008).
176. Editorial, DCF Accused of Coercing Employees to Work Overtime Without Pay, Nov.
2007, http://www.local10.com/news/14586090/detail.html.
177. Id.
178. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §
302(a), 122 Stat. 881, 920 (amending 29 U.S.C § 216(e)(1)(A)(i)).
179. See Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. § 467(2)-(4) (2008); Civil
Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 467(2)-(4) (2008).
180. See Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008). The court re-
fused to certify a collective action because pay practices vary among the plants where em-
ployees seeking to intervene in collective action work. Id.
181. See Rodriguez I1, 518 F.3d 1259, 1268 (1 1th Cir. 2008).
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3) district court's finding that defendant lacked good faith and post-verdict
award of liquidated damages was not inconsistent with jury's verdict that
employees failed to establish by "'preponderance of the evidence that"' de-
fendant "had willfully violated the FLSA;' ' 82 4) attorney's fees deducted
from overall FLSA settlement amount should be reduced in accordance with
the lodestar method of calculation-i.e., hourly rate times number of hours
devoted to case; 183 and 5) in determining reasonable number of hours devoted
to case, attorney's fee is limited to "time spent drafting the complaint," not
hours that were "either of a clerical nature, unnecessary, duplicative, and/or
excessive."' An award of attorney's fees is "mandatory for prevailing
plaintiffs in FLSA cases."
' 8 5
2. Teachers' Pay
Just "[t]o make ends meet," many poorly paid teachers take on second
jobs rather than give up working in a profession they love. 186 Nationwide,
roughly "16 percent of teachers [work second] jobs outside the [school] dis-
trict during the school year."'' 87 The percentage is even greater in urban areas
"where the cost of living exceeds the national average."'' 88
Nationwide, the "average classroom teacher salary for 2005-06 [was]
$49,109 [while t]he average annual salary for Broward [County, Florida]
teachers [was] $44,000. The salary schedule for a teacher with a bachelor's
degree tops out at $70,000" in Broward.1 89
The Broward School District proposed an innovative incentive to lure
poorly-paid teachers to move here: It is "solicit[ing] ideas from developers
for four sites in Fort Lauderdale and Pompano Beach, including some exist-
ing school parking lots, on which to create as many as 300 rentals for starting
182. Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc. (Rodriguez 1), 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C353,
C357 (S.D. Fla. 2008), superseded on denial of rehearing, 518 F.3d 1259 (11 th Cir. 2008).
183. Silva v. Miller, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304-05 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
184. Azam-Qureshi v. Colony Hotel, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
185. Powell v. Carey Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
186. David A. Lieb, Poorly Paid Teachers Take on Second Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10,
2008, at 9A.
187. Kathleen McGrory, Spurred by the High Cost of Living in South Florida, Teachers
Across the Region are Dashing from Their Schools to Second Jobs, MLAMI HERALD, Feb. 12,
2008, at IA.
188. Id.
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teachers."' 90 One limitation is that "[t]he district can only use land it already
owns for the apartments. ' 91
3. Wage Gap Between Men and Women
On average, men earn more pay than women.1 92 Though the gap has
narrowed over the years, 93 several factors contribute to this fact: Women go
in and out of the workforce with greater frequency than men to raise fami-
lies; women prefer to work fewer hours to spend more time with children; '94
and residual sex discrimination still lingers.' 95 But times are changing.
According to the United States Census Bureau, "[a]s women have child-
ren later [in life, and larger numbers] work outside the home, they are also
working longer into pregnancy and returning to work" sooner than was the
case in the 1960s.
96
With the increase of the rate of women in college vastly surpassing the
increase of men in higher education, "the average inflation-adjusted weekly
pay of women has [gone up] 26 percent since 1980," while men's pay has
risen only "as much as their college graduation rate"-one percent. 1
97
"The female out-earns the male in one of every three households, a fig-
ure that has increased every year since 2000 and will rocket to about half by
2025. ' ' 198
In response to a 2007 United States Supreme Court ruling that set "time
restrictions on lawsuits over pay discrimination," Senate Democrats pro-
posed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, aimed at "giv[ing] those who believe
they were discriminated against a fair opportunity to challenge their employ-
ers in court."' 99
190. Hannah Sampson, Board's Aim: Rental Units for Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 9,
2007, at 1BR.
191. Id.
192. See David Leonhardt, A Diploma's Worth? Ask Her, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2008, at
Cl.
193. Id.
194. See Cindy Krischer Goodman, Luring Moms Back to Work, MIAMi HERALD, Dec. 20,
2006, at 1C.
195. Leonhardt, supra note 192.
196. Sam Roberts, Shifts in Pregnancy and Work, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, at Al 1.
197. Leonhardt, supra note 192.
198. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Who's the Boss?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 2008, at 1C.
199. Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Set to Block Bill Easing Limits on Pay Discrimination Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A11.
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4. Farm Workers' Wages
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that farm owners, not labor contrac-
tors, are the legal employers of farm workers "and must bear the burden of
complying with federal wage and hour laws. ' 2° In 2008, Haitian field work-
ers filed a class action "lawsuit against a South Miami-Dade farmer ... al-
leging they and hundreds of others were paid less than minimum wage."
20
'
In 2008, "[flarm-worker advocates sought to present more than 80,000
signatures to Burger King officials . . . urging the fast-food giant to join
McDonald's and Taco Bell and help boost the wages of Florida tomato pick-
ers. ' 202 Burger King resisted this pressure "because it buys tomatoes from
repackers, not from growers, so it says it has no way to get money to the
workers."2 °3
5. Income Inequality
A 2008 study "found that the wealth gap in [Florida] has been increas-
ing every year. '
21
[Overall], Florida ranks 15th in income inequality, and the gap be-
tween Florida's richest families and those in the middle is 7th larg-
est in the nation .... [M]edian household income in Broward, ad-
justed for inflation, increased just 7 percent from 1990 through
2006 and was flat in Miami-Dade for the same time period.
205
Even among Miami-Dade government workers, bonuses are "heavily
skewed toward the bureaucracy's top earners. Of the nearly 400 [bonuses],
only 14 went to employees earning less than the county's median salary of
about $45,000. More than half, 211, went to employees earning more than
$100,000. ' 206
200. Tere Figueras Negrete, Field Laborers Sue for Wages, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 9, 2008,
at 1C.
201. Id.
202. Laura Wides-Munoz, Food Firm Prodded on Wage Issue, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 29,
2008, at 3C.
203. Lesley Clark, Tomato Pickers' Pay-Probe Sought, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 16, 2008, at
1C.
204. Nancy Dahlberg, This Trifecta Shows We're Stuck in Our Tracks, MtAMI HERALD,
Apr. 14, 2008, at G3.
205. Id.
206. Matthew I. Pinzur & Charles Rabin, Records Show Bonuses Were Paid, MtAMI
HERALD, Oct. 28, 2007, at 6B.
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6. Unpaid Wages
A Florida court ruled that a bonus agreement entered into by a lawyer
with her paralegal, while in violation of Florida Bar Rules prohibiting fee-
sharing with nonlawyers, was enforceable because the paralegal "was not in
pari delicto" with the attorney.2 7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal dis-
tinguished Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis,2 °8 where the Supreme Court of Flori-
da ruled "that a contingent fee agreement that does not [measure up] to the
Rules of Professional Conduct is void as against public policy." 2°9
7. Wage Gap Between Races
According to a 2007 study, "[i]ncomes among black men have ... de-
clined in the past" thirty years while black women have made gains.21 °
Among the reasons for the gap between black and white wage earners, the
study blamed racial discrimination in employment. 21' "In 2004, a typical
black family had an income that was only 58 percent of a typical white fami-
ly's. In 1974, median black incomes were 63 percent of those of whites. 212
The gap might have been greater but for the role unions have played in rais-
ing African-Americans' wages.213
[A 2008] study found that unions have been especially important
for black Americans, helping them earn 12 percent more than their
nonunion colleagues and increasing the chance that they receive
health and retirement benefits.... Black union members earn an
average of $17.60 per hour, compared to $12.74 for nonunion
black workers.21 4
207. Patterson v. A Law Office of Lauri J. Goldstein, P.A., 980 So. 2d 1234, 1237-38
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
208. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995).
209. Patterson, 980 So. 2d at 1236 (citing Chandris, 668 So. 2d at 185-86).
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B. Health Benefits
1. Health Insurance
In 2007, the United States Senate passed the Mental Health Parity Act,
directing employers to offer identical medical benefits for mental health care
as they do for other medical conditions when it comes to patient deductibles,
copayments, annual and lifetime coverage limits, and covered hospital days
and visits.
21 5
Nationwide, in 2007, the cost of health insurance "rose by 10.1 per-
cent."2 16 In 2007, the seven largest health insurers in Florida "made $550
million in total profits ... irk[ing] those individuals and employers paying
higher health insurance CoSTS. 2 17 In response, some Florida public school
districts have "decided to self-insure-meaning [they] would pay [their] own
medical bills instead of the insurer., 218 For the last decade, Miami-Dade
teachers did not have to pay premiums for health insurance and a 2008 pro-
posal forcing teachers to pay part of their health insurance premiums for the
first time was soundly rejected.2 19 "[B]aby boomers who retire or are laid off
before 65" are finding that it costs "at least $300 in monthly premiums for
single coverage . . . . Early retirees once could depend on employer-
subsidized health plans until Medicare began at 65, but companies hit by new
accounting rules and escalating medical costs have scaled back retiree health
coverage., 220 Recently, however, "a number of insurers have begun to mar-
ket policies specifically geared to the 50-to-64 age group., 221 Florida "law
says that if you have a health policy, an insurer can't dump you, although it
can raise the rates. If you have no coverage, an insurer can reject you for
many reasons.,
2 22
A 2008 Miami Herald survey found that South Florida employers "pay
about 20 percent of [employees' health insurance] premiums, compared with
the national average of 16 percent. For families, South Florida employees
215. See Mental Health Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong. § 712A (2007).
216. Kevin G. Hall, Prices Slam Middle Class, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 17, 2008, at 3C.
217. Phil Galewitz, Health Insurers' Profits Rankle, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18, 2008, at 3C.
218. Id.
219. Kathleen McGrory, Teachers Reject Health Insurance Increase, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
12, 2008, at 8B.
220. Bob Moos, Some Insurers Consider Bridging Health Coverage for the Pre-Medicare
Crowd, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 23, 2008, at IE.
221. Id.
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pay 25 percent of premiums compared with the national average of 20 per-
cent.
' 223
While, nationally, more employers are moving away from Health Main-
tenance Organizations (HMOs) for their employees and toward Preferred
Provider Organizations (PPOs), Florida employers "are more likely to have
workers participate in [HMOs]."224
2. Wellness Programs
Ten "of the 15 states with the largest percentage of obese adults are in
the South. ' 225 "In 2007, 22.9 percent of Floridians were considered obese..
putting Florida 34th among all states."
226
In an effort to reduce their health care costs, employers encourage
healthy habits in efforts known as "wellness programs. 2 7 A 2007 survey
"found that 46 percent of employers offer [wellness programs with] econom-
ic incentives and another 26 percent plan to do so in 2008. ",228 For example,
a 2007 survey found that one third of employers with two hundred or more
employees "offer smoking cessation as part of their employee benefits pack-
age. 2 29 The University of Miami School of Medicine's Wellness program
"focuses on preventative care, lifestyle management and fitness pro-
grams. 23°
"More employers are covering preventive medical care and even pre-
ventive drugs at 100 percent and not subjecting these to a deductible." 231 A
2007 study found that "[pleople will lose weight for money, even a little
money . ..when the payout is as little as $7 for dropping just a few
223. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Insurance Is Top Issue for Many, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28,
2008, at G20.
224. Cindy Krischer Goodman, When a Paycheck Is Not Enough, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28,
2008, at G20.
225. Fred Tasker, More Floridians Packing on the Fat, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 2007, at
4A.
226. Id.
227. Michelle Singletary, Changing Health Plans Could Save You Money, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 30, 2007, at 3E.
228. Id.
229. Milt Freudenheim, Seeking Savings, Employers Help Smokers Quit, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
26, 2007, at Al. Smoking "is blamed for 435,000 premature deaths ... each year" and it costs
over seventy-five billion dollars annually in healthcare. Id.
230. Nancy Cole, Employers Promote Healthy Living, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 31, 2007, at
13G.
231. Editorial, At Open Enrollment, Look for New Healthcare Trends, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 8, 2007, at G21.
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pounds. 232  Fire departments in South Florida "have used a portion of
$660,000 in Fire Act Grants awarded between 2002 and 2006 to buy tread-
mills, recumbent bikes, and other exercise equipment. 233
Relying on the Supreme Court of Florida's precedent that public em-
ployers can refuse to hire smokers, 234 Escambia County government, starting
October 1, 2008, will require all applicants to take a drug test.235 "Any appli-
cant testing positive for tobacco will not be eligible.2 36
3. Domestic Partnership Benefits
To date, "[d]omestic partnerships are recognized in Broward and Palm
Beach counties, and insurance benefits are offered in the Miami-Dade school
district."237 But, in 2008, Miami-Dade County is close to officially recogniz-
ing domestic partnerships for all county employees by "guaranteeing hospital
visitation rights and allowing county workers to buy health insurance for
their partners. 238 In this regard, domestic partnerships are defined as "[a]ny
pair of unmarried adults who live together and are not related by blood...
regardless of sexual orientation. 239
In 2008, "[t]he Florida Attorney General's Office ... agreed to [permit]
employees to use sick leave to care for their [ill] domestic partners. '" 240
Perversely, "pets of Palm Beach Community College employees ...
qualify for discounted group medical insurance . . . but domestic partners
are" not entitled to similar benefits.24'
232. Editorial, Dieting for Cash Works, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 2007, at C1.
233. Charles Rabin, Security Grants Used for Gym Gear, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 6, 2007, at
lB.
234. See City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028-29 (Fla. 1995) (holding that
there was no privacy violation for the city to require job applicants to sign affidavits avowing
they have not used tobacco for a year).
235. Editorial, County Adopts Tobacco-Free Hiring Policy, MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 2008,
at 3C.
236. Id.
237. Steve Rothaus & Matthew I. Pinzur, Dade Weighs Domestic Partner Rights, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 13, 2008, at 5B.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, State Attorney General Allows Sick Leave to Care for Ill
Domestic Partners, ExPREss GAY NEws, Jan. 10, 2008, at 5.
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4. Insuring the Uninsured and Underinsured
The ranks of the uninsured rose "to 47 million in 2006, a one-year in-
crease of 2.2 million. 242 The percentage of employees who enjoy employer-
based health coverage fell "to 60 percent from 64 percent in 2000. " 243 Ac-
cording to a 2008 study, "each percentage-point rise in" the jobless rate amid
an economic downturn increases the ranks of the "uninsured by 1.1 mil-
lion."244 "The number of Floridians under 65 without health insurance rose
from 2.8 million-20.5 percent-in 2000 to 3.7 million, or 24.4 percent, in
2005. ,245
In 2008, Florida enacted a law "aimed at providing low-cost health [in-
surance] to the uninsured by allowing the sale of [bare bones] insurance poli-
cies" that may sell for $150 a month, "about 60 percent less than the average
cost of a policy for a single person in Florida.
'2 46
The policies would be available to any Floridian 19 to 64 who has
been uninsured for at least six months and who is not eligible for
public insurance. In a critical provision, insurers would be prohi-
bited from rejecting applicants based on age or health status....
The low-cost plans have to include preventive services, office vis-
its, screenings, surgery, prescription drugs, durable medical
equipment and diabetes supplies.247
A 2008 study found that twenty-five million Americans are underin-
sured, defined as lacking sufficient coverage to protect them from financial
straits should "they end[] up in the emergency room or [become] seriously
ill."'248 The biggest increase in the ranks of the "underinsured were middle-
class families [shouldering]... medical costs equal to 10 percent... of their
,,211incomes.
242. Kevin Sack, States' Widening of Health Care Hits Roadblocks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
2007, at Al [hereinafter Sack, States' Widening of Health Care].
243. Id.
244. Kevin Sack, Study Warns That Job Losses Will Strain Government Health Costs,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, at A12.
245. John Dorschner, Health Premiums Outpace Incomes, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 29, 2008,
at IC [hereinafter Dorschner, Health Premiums Outpace Incomes].
246. Kevin Sack, New Florida Law Allows Low-Cost Health Policies, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2008, at A22.
247. Id.
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5. Rising Health Costs
"National health spending first exceeded $1 trillion in 1995;" it ex-
ceeded $2 trillion in 2006.250 "Health spending by [employers rose] 5.7 per-
cent in 2006 .... the slowest rate of increase since 1997. ' 251 Private busi-
nesses pay 25 percent of all health costs. 252 Nationwide, "the cost of em-
ployer-sponsored [health] premiums [went up] 6.1 percent in 2007, more
than double the inflation rate. '253 A 2007 study found that "job-bassed [sic]
family health coverage rose from $6,351 to $12,106 from 2000 to 2007.
Workers' share of the premium increased from $1,656 to $3,281.254
In Florida, "the number of employers offering health coverage increased
from 195,622 in 2001 to 209,474 in 2005, although ... [tihe percentage of
people under 65 who had private coverage in Florida fell from 67.6 percent
in 2000-01 to 63.1 percent in 2005-06.,"255 "About "3.9 million nonelderly
Floridians-about a quarter of the state's under-65 population . . . are ex-
pected to spend more than 10 percent of their income on healthcare in 2008.
... That's a 62 percent increase over the 2.4 million who paid more than 10
percent of income in 2000. ,256 "In Florida, 1.21 million non-elderly
people-nearly three quarters of whom have insurance-are in families that
will spend more than 25 percent of their pretax income on healthcare costs in
2008.•257
In Florida, between 2001 and 2005, "[flamily health-insurance pre-
miums [rose] 29 percent ... while median family income remained almost
flat. '258 "The average Floridian spent $5,483 on healthcare in 2004 ....
That's above the national average of $5,283 .... 259
A 2007 study found that Florida faced "$69 billion in lost productivity"
and "$18 billion to treat some 10 million reported cases of the most common
250. Robert Pear, Health Spending Exceeded Record $2 Trillion in 2006, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 2008, at A20.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. Sack, States' Widening of Health Care, supra note 242.
254. John Dorschner, Health Costs Plague Nonelderly, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 19, 2007, at
1 C [hereinafter Dorschner, Health Costs Plague Nonelderly].
255. Dorschner, Health Premiums Outpace Incomes, supra note 245.
256. Dorschner, Health Costs Plague Nonelderly, supra note 254.
257. Families USA, Editorial, Rising Health Costs Take Toll on Floridians, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 22, 2007, at A22.
258. Dorschner, Health Premiums Outpace Incomes, supra note 245.
259. Floridians Pay More, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2007, at 1C.
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chronic ailments in 2003, including diabetes, heart disease, hypertension and
pulmonary conditions. 26 °
6. Health Care Gap by Race and Region
A 2008 study found that "[r]ace and place of residence [play a key fac-
tor] on the course and quality of... medical treatment a patient receives. 261
For example, African-Americans "with diabetes or vascular disease are...
five times more likely than whites to have a leg amputated and that women
in Mississippi are far less likely to have mammograms than those in
Maine. ,262
7. Retiree Health Care
In the face of new federal accounting rules, state and local employers
must disclose each year the cost of present and future liability for retirees'
health care.263 Public employers have a huge financial incentive to reduce
such liability or else risk lower credit ratings, making the cost of borrowing
264
more expensive.
While vested retiree health benefits usually cannot be reduced or mod-
ified without violating either the Contract Clause in federal or state constitu-
tions, public employers are capitalizing on ambiguous contract language to
reduce or eliminate retiree health benefits. 65
An actuarial study conducted for the Broward Sheriffs Office (BSO)
found that "2,005 employees had accrued $270 million in retirement health
benefits. '266 Broward County must pay $40 million a year "to fully pre-fund
those retirement benefits without borrowing.2 167 "Covered BSO retirees and
their dependents get a 2 percent monthly discount for every year of service
260. Monica Hatcher, Fla. Pays High Cost of Chronic Diseases, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 5,
2007, at 3C.
261. Kevin Sack, Research Finds Wide Disparities in Health Care by Race and Region,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008, at A18.
262. Id.
263. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS: A PLAIN-LANGUAGE SUMMARY OF GASB STATEMENTS No. 43 AND No. 45, at 4
(2005), available at http://www.gasb.org/project-pages/opeb-summary.pdf.
264. See id.
265. See Mary Williams Walsh, Government Accounting Body Scrutinizes Rules for
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at C1 [hereinafter Walsh, Rules for Pensions].
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up to a maximum of 50 percent off the total cost of their future health insur-
ance premiums. Retired employees are covered for life.
268
C. Workers' Compensation
Effective January 1, 2008, "[w]orkers' compensation rates paid by Flor-
ida employers [dropped] 18.4 percent," owing to a decrease in the "frequen-
cy of injured workers' claims. 269 Since an overhaul of the system in 2003,
employers' workers' compensation rates have fallen fifty percent, "mainly
because of less fraud and abuse.,
270
"Workers' comp rates are set by job type. Roofers pay some of the
highest rates for the insurance because of the perilous nature of their
work."'27' In 2008, roofers "could see their rates drop more than 20 percent.
That would put workers' comp rate[s] at their lowest level since mid-
1980s. ' '272
In 2003, the Florida Legislature "eliminated hourly fees for plaintiff at-
torneys as part of [an] overhaul of the workers' comp system., 273 Under the
new system, "judges now must follow a lower, set fee schedule for trial at-
torneys when they prevail-10 percent to 20 percent of the award. '274 As a
result, thousands of "employees feel they have been shut out of the legal
system., 275 At the same time, "[w]orkers' comp rates in Florida, at times the
highest in the nation, have come down more than 50 percent.,
276
Even though Florida law presumes job-related stress contributes to
"heart attacks suffered by firefighters and police officers," such public em-
ployees may still be fired if deemed unable to do the job and face the loss of
workers' compensation benefits and health benefits. 7
In 2007-08, Florida courts have ruled on a number of workers' com-
pensation issues. What follows is a sampling of key decisions:
268. Id.
269. Florida Workers' Comp to Drop-Again, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 1, 2007, at 3C.
270. Id.
271. Beatrice E. Garcia, Workers Comp Rate Reduction Ordered, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 24,
2007, at 3C.
272. Id.





277. Jasmine Kripalani, Union Supporting Fired Officers Who Had Heart Attacks, MiAMI
HERALD, Mar. 7, 2008, at lB.
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- A judge of compensation claims erred in denying an award of ex-
penses for water and utility bills-in addition to rent-on the ground
that the expenses "were not medically necessary." '278
• An employer failed to rebut the presumption that heart attacks sus-
tained by firefighters and police officers are covered by workers' com-
pensation under heart and lungs acts, because the employer did not offer
"evidence of a specific non-occupational cause of' the police officer's
heart disease.279
- Injuries sustained when an employee tripped "on a pile of debris left
in a county right-of-way" after a hurricane, while walking from his ve-
hicle parked "in the parking lot of a nearby shopping center" to his
workplace, are compensable under the special hazard exception if clai-
mant's means of travel to and from work was usual, and if claimant was
not expressly banned from parking in the shopping center parking lot by
his employer.28°
- Where "claimant worked an average of 36 hours a week in the year"
before his injury, a question of fact is raised over whether he was a full
or part-time employee.2 8' Calculation of average weekly wages will de-
pend on which subsection of section 440.14(1) of the Florida Statutes
applies.282
* A prevailing employer may recover court costs even if the claim for
workers' compensation "benefits was not fraudulent or frivolous. 283
* A workers' compensation settlement agreement does "not comply
with section 440.20(11) [of the] Florida Statutes if claimant was not
represented by counsel when he signed the release. 284
- Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for claims against an
employer for negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training of a
store manager who allegedly "assaulted and sexually battered" a sales
clerk.8
5
278. Desir v. Nouveau Assocs., 969 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
279. Punsky v. Clay County Sheriffs Office, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D1820, D1820 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
280. Kramer v. Palm Beach County, 978 So. 2d 836, 838-39 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
281. Stubbs v. Bob Dale Constr., 977 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
282. See id.
283. See Guckenberger v. Seminole County, 979 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (per curiam).
284. Vallecillo v. Bachiller Ironworks, 982 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(per curiam).
285. See Doe v. Footstar Corp., 980 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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* A workers' compensation claimant was not the statutory employee of
an employee leasing company where the employee leasing company
was not a contractor in privity of contract with a third party. 86
D. Unemployment Issues
1. Federal Legislation
"[E]mployers pay a federal unemployment tax... -$56 per employee
per year-and state unemployment taxes as well. On average, benefits re-
place about a third of a worker's previous weekly earnings and run out after
23 weeks .... [O]nly about one-third of jobless workers qualify to collect
benefits. 287
In 2007, Congress considered bills that would give "$7 billion over five
years to states that" pass overdue reforms to their unemployment programs
such as offering "better coverage for part-time workers, families with child-
ren, workers who [enroll in] retraining programs and the long-term unem-
ployed., 288 Under a measure introduced in Congress in 2008, the longstand-
ing rule that unemployment compensation claimants "must have worked full
time for at least 20 weeks to qualify for benefits" would be eliminated. 89 In
2008, the United States Senate voted seventy-five to twenty-two to "extend
unemployment benefits by 13 weeks nationwide, with an additional 13
weeks for [employees] in states with high unemployment. ''29°
2. Unemployment Rates
In 2008, the rate of unemployment among Latino workers stood at "6.5
percent, compared with 4.7 percent" jobless rate among non-Latin work-
ers.291 Latinos in the construction industry were particularly hard hit, with
"7.5 percent unemploy[ed] in the first three months of 2008."'292 "[T]he job
market of 2008 is shaping up as the weakest in more than half a century for
286. See Crum Servs. v. Lopez, 975 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
287. Editorial, More Help Needed for Tougher Times, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007, at A20.
288. Id.
289. Carl Hulse, In Close Vote, House Rejects Bill to Extend Aid to Jobless, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 12, 2008, at A17.
290. Pear, Veterans' Benefit Bill, supra note 3.
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teenagers looking for summer work.. ,,293 "Employment among American
teenagers has been sliding continuously for the last decade ...dropping
steadily since the late 1970s, when nearly half of all 16- to 19-year-olds had
summer jobs. 294 In 2008, black leaders in South Florida met to talk about
summer jobs for black teenagers.29 ' For the first time,
[W]omen in their prime earning years... are retreating from the work
force, either permanently or for long stretches ... [aifter moving into
virtually every occupation, women are being afflicted on a large scale by
the same troubles as men: downturns, layoffs, outsourcing, stagnant
wages or the discouraging prospect of an outright pay cut. And they are
responding as men have, by dropping out or disappearing for a while.296
"More and more mid-grade officers and enlisted soldiers are leaving the
military as multiple deployments to war take its toll .... For the Department
of Defense, unemployed veterans are costly. In 2006, the agency paid $518
million in unemployment benefits, and $365 million through the first three
quarters of 2007. "297
Between June 2006 and June 2007, "Florida lost more jobs . . . -
74,700--than any other state in the nation., 298 By contrast, in 2005, Florida
was "No. 1 in jobs created in the entire country. ''299 By the end of July 2008,
"'Florida's job-loss rate will be higher [than] the nation's for the first time
since 2002.', 3 00 The only growth areas were "in the health, education and
the low-paying services fields. 30° Oddly enough, Florida's "unemployment
rate actually went down" during the same period, to 5.5 from 5.6 percent.30 2
"The June 2007 rate was 4 percent." 3 3 While South Florida lost 17,400 jobs
293. Peter S. Goodman, Toughest Summer Job This Year Is Finding One, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2008, at Al.
294. Id.
295. Andrea Robinson, Black Leaders to Discuss Lack of Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, May 1,
2008, at 9B. While Miami-Dade "[C]ounty offers some [summer] jobs through parks and
recreation," the city of Miami Gardens does not. Id.
296. Louis Uchitelle, Women Are Now Equal as Victims of Poor Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2008, at Al.
297. John Milburn, War May Be Ugly, but So Is Job Hunt, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 29, 2007,
at 5C.
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between June 2007 and June 2008, local government employment actually
rose by 4400 new jobs.' °4 For "the first time since 1992 Florida ... expe-
rienced 10 straight months of consecutive job declines in [construction]" in
2007.30'




In 2008, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board investigated
"whether the accounting rules must be changed to stop [government employ-
ers from] systematically undercounting [public] pension costs. '30 7 Cities and
states have used an array of subterfuges to disguise the true cost of future
public pension liabilities. 8 For example:
[M]any places had given retirees retroactive pension increases
without recognizing the added cost. . . .[N]early one-fourth of
large public pension plans had used "skim funds"-accounting de-
vices that allow officials to declare certain investment income to
be "excess," skim it out of the pension fund, and [use] it on other
things. Skim funds are not allowed in the private sector.
30 9
Critics of more stringent accounting rules, however, warn "[t]hese changes
are so daunting and potentially costly that some governments are likely to
stop offering pensions altogether and start giving their workers inferior bene-
fits.
310
2. Deferred Retirement Option Plans
A Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) is a form of retirement
benefit that allows employees to continue working while accumulating a
savings account consisting of the benefits that would have been received had
304. Id.
305. Niala Boodhoo, Labor Pains, MLAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 2008, at 1C.
306. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Layoff Burden Takes Toll on Families, MIAMI HERALD,
July 9, 2008, at Al.
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the employee actually retired.3 ' In other words, it is a chance for an em-
ployee to earn two incomes at the same time, with one of them being saved
and invested without current tax liability.
31 2
In 2007, a public school principal in Weston regretted that he enrolled
in DROP: "The program lets educators earn retirement money and their sal-
ary when they enroll. They collect the money when the five years is up, but
they must stop working. ' 313 The school principal wants to continue as school
principal, but such a decision will cost him dearly.3t 4 If DROP enrollees
return to work as teachers, their retirement payments continue intact.31 5 "If
they return as an administrator, however, they lose 11 months of their retire-
ment checks. '316 In 2008, the Miami-Dade School Board turned down a
school principal's offer to continue working "for $1 a year plus benefits"
after five years elapsed as a DROP enrollee because a "position budgeted at
$1 a year plus benefits could not be filled if [the principal] left before year's
end. , ,317
A 2001 amendment "allowed DROP retirees to work their five years,
take 30 days off and go right back onto the public payroll., 31 8 But this loo-
phole has cost Florida $300 million with "8,000 'retired' public employees
collecting both a pension and a salary, including 131 employees collecting
two state pensions-triple dippers. ' 319 Miami-Dade schools stand to save
$13.9 million by closing the DROP loophole and critics consider ending the
loophole statewide, a "sensible policy. 32°
311. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Davis, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220, 223 (Cal. 2d Ct. App. 2004).
312. See generally id.





317. Kathleen McGrory, Principal's $1-a-Year Pay Offer Turned Down, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 30, 2008, at IA.
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3. Investments
In 2008, "[t]he Florida Senate passed a bill allowing the state to invest
up to 1.5 percent of state retirement funds, or about $1.8 billion, into high-
growth industries in Florida.
3 21
Along with California, Louisiana, and Missouri, Florida refuses to in-
vest state pension funds in companies "doing business in Iran.
' 322
In 2007, the State Board of Administration, the Florida agency charged
with handling investments, "reported that it has more than $2.5 billion in
downgraded investments in several accounts, including the state retirement
fund. 323 Florida's public "pension fund has $756 million in investments that
have fallen below purchase guidelines," largely stemming from "the turmoil
in the mortgage industry."
324
4. Litigation
In 2008, "[a] Broward County police union threatened to file a lawsuit
against Hallandale Beach after the city introduced a law that would ban resi-
dents from serving on the police and fire pension board. 325 After the city
ultimately did pass the measure allowing only city commissioners to serve on
the police and fire pension board, the union claimed "that city commissioners
are serving two offices, which is against state law. 326
In 2007, several South Florida public pension plans brought arbitration
claims against Merrill Lynch, accusing it "of conflicts of interests in its role
as consultant to government pension plans ... [seeking] to generate exces-
sive fees and commissions for itself ... [r]ather than looking out for the in-
terests of city employees. 327 At the same time, federal regulators were "in-
vestigating a Merrill Lynch pension fund consultant for misleading public
321. Retirement Funds Bill OKs Investing in State Industries, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18,
2008, at 3C ("SB 2310 asks state administrators to first consider investing in Florida industries
such as aerospace, computer technology and the life sciences.").
322. Jesse McKinley, California: State to Divest Iran Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2007, at A20.
323. Gary Fineout, $2.5B Falls Below State Standards, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 6, 2007, at
1C.
324. Id.
325. Jasmine Kripalani, Battle Brews over a Board Proposal, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 1,
2008, at 3B.
326. Commissioners Keep Posts on Pension Board, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 6, 2008, at 3B.
327. Patrick Danner, South Miami Takes on Merrill, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 1, 2007, at 1C.
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officials throughout Florida about the fees he collected and the reasons he
,,311recommended money managers.
In 2008, the Jacksonville Police and Fire Pension Fund sued "embattled
American International Group... accus[ing] the insurance giant and a num-
ber of its top executives . . . of understating the company's exposure to the
subprime mortgage crisis in order to inflate its stock price artificially. 329
Although traditional pension plans, known as defined benefit plans, are
more common in the public sector than defined contribution plans, increa-
singly, government employers are converting defined benefit plans into de-
fined contribution plans-e.g., 401(k)s-as yet another way of cutting labor
CoStS. 33 0 In 2008, the United States Supreme Court ruled that employees can
file lawsuits against employers or firms suspected of mishandling their
401(k) accounts.
5. Forfeiture of Pension
A Florida court ruled that a retired police officer, who had given "a
false, sworn statement to investigators to hide the actions of his fellow offic-
ers" and had been adjudicated guilty in federal court of "conspiracy to ob-
struct justice and deprive ... citizens of rights, privileges, and immunities,"
forfeited any portion of his public pension other than his own accumulated
contributions as required by Florida law. 33 Any felony involving breach of
public trust triggers the state forfeiture statute, and the administrative forfei-
ture determination is not a civil proceeding subject to the four-year limita-
tions period under Florida law. 333
A former Broward County Sheriff, who "plead[ed] guilty to mail fraud
conspiracy and tax charges," appealed Florida's decision that his public
pension was forfeited since "his crimes were job-related. 334 The former
328. Jeff Ostrowski, Fla. Fund Consultant Probed, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3, 2007, at 3C.
329. Jenny Anderson, Florida Pension Fund Is Suing A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2008,
at C3.
330. RODERICK B. CRANE ET AL., DEFINED CONTRIBUTrION PENSION PLANS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: A BEST PRACTICE BENCHMARK ANALYSIS 4, 7 (2008), available at http://www.tiaa-
crefinstitute.org/research/articles/docs/DCPlansinPublicSectorCraneHellerandYako.pdf.
331. Carrie Johnson, Supreme Court Rules Employees Can Sue Over 401(k) Misconduct,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2008, at Al.
332. Hames v. City of Miami Firefighters' & Police Officers' Trust, 980 So. 2d 1112,
1113, 1117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
333. SeeFLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(n) (2008).
334. Joan Fleischman, Money Matters, MIAMI HERALD, May 4, 2008, at 8A.
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public official argues that his crimes are not on the list of specific crimes




One study "reported that the emotional toll of workplace bullying is
more severe than that of sexual harassment., 336 The study unearthed a few
surprises: Many "bullying cases involve health care settings ... academia
and the legal profession ... [and] 40 percent of workplace bullies are wom-
en. 337
In 2008, "legislation has been introduced in 13 states to allow people to
sue their employers for bullying or offensive behavior even when the con-
duct doesn't meet standards for discrimination or infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 338 A recent poll "revealed that 37 percent of U.S. workers, or 54 mil-
lion people, have been bullied at work." 339 "[E]mployers generally have a
defense if they have used reasonable care to prevent and/or correct the prob-
lem and employees failed to avail themselves of the measures."
34
On April 30, 2008, the Florida Senate unanimously approved, and on
June 10, 2008, Governor Crist signed, the Jeffrey Johnston Stand Up for All
Students Act,341 a bill that while largely aimed at prohibiting bullying di-
rected at students, also prohibits "bullying or harassment of any ... school
system employee for any reason.' ,342 "Money for 'safe schools' programs-
nearly $77 million statewide . . . would only be released to districts once
their policies on bullying and harassment are approved by the state. '343 In
July 2008, Broward became "the first Florida school district to put in place a
new anti-bullying policy . . . as required by law." 344 "The Florida Depart-
335. Id.
336. Tara Parker-Pope, When the Bully Sits in the Next Cubicle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2008, at F5.
337. Id.
338. Wendy N. Davis, No Putting up with Putdowns, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008, at 16.
339. Id. at 17.
340. Id.
341. Jeffrey Johnston Stand up for All Students Act, ch. 2008-123, 2008 Fla. Laws 1
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 1006.147).
342. Hannah Sampson, Bill Aims to Stop School Bullying, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 28, 2008,
at lB [hereinafter Sampson, School Bullying]; Ch. 2008-123, 2008 Fla. Laws 1.
343. Sampson, School Bullying, supra note 342.
344. Ely Portillo, Schools Get Tough on Bullies, MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 2008, at lB.
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ment of Education will use Broward's policy as a model for the state's 66
other school districts. ' ' "4
2. Violence in the Workplace
On January 7, 2008, a new federal law, the Court Security Improvement
Act of 2007, went into effect, aiming at bolstering security measures for fed-
eral and state judges and prosecutors, among others. 346
Law enforcement officers are "two or three times more" likely to com-
mit suicide. 347 "[T]he stress of the job and easy access to" firearms may ac-
count for this higher risk."4 Between 400 to 450 officers die by their own
hands, "compared with 150 to 200 who die in the line of duty. 349
3. Overcrowded Classrooms
The Broward school district's safety director recommended that a Lau-
derdale Lakes charter school be closed "for packing too many kids into class-
rooms." 350  The school's president "faces 10 second-degree misdemeanor
charges" stemming from the overcrowding and a string of fire code viola-
tions.35'
4. Guns at the Workplace
In April 2008, "Gov[ernor] Charlie Crist signed [the] so-called guns-at-
work legislation. . . allowing employees with concealed-weapons permits to
begin stashing their firearms in their locked cars at work starting July 1.352
"Business groups have heatedly opposed the bill on the grounds it impinges
on their private property rights and their ability to lay the ground rules for
employment., 353 The law exempts the following worksites: "[S]chools, cor-
rectional institutions, nuclear-power facilities, defense and homeland-
345. Id.
346. Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 1, 121 Stat. 2534
(2008) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 566).
347. Alison Leigh Cowan, Police Struggle with a Threat Deadlier than a Criminal's Gun:
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at B 1.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Ani Martinez et al., School Is Cited over Safety, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 2007, at
lB.
351. Id.
352. Monica Hatcher, Governor Signs Gun Law, MIAMi HERALD, Apr. 16, 2008, at 2C.
353. Monica Hatcher, Gun-in-Car Law Approved, MLAmI HERALD, Apr. 10, 2008, at IC.
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security firms and employers whose 'primary business' concerns explosives
and combustibles. 354
In 2008, Florida business groups challenged the constitutionality of the
new guns-at-work law, claiming it "violates private property rights and con-
flicts with the federal Occupational Safety and Hazard Act." '355 It remains to
be seen what impact the 2008 Supreme Court ruling upholding an individual
right to bear arms, District of Columbia v. Heller,356 will have on this issue,
especially in light of the fact that the High Court decision only narrowly ap-
plies to the federal government.
3 7
Walt Disney World claims its employees are exempt from Florida's
new guns-at-work law, citing the law's exemption "for employers with a
federal explosives permit, which Disney has for its massive, daily fireworks
shows. 358 Acting on this assumption, Walt Disney World fired a guard after
he refused "to let Disney authorities search his car. ' 359 "[T]he company
maintains a zero-tolerance policy for employees who bring guns onto the
property.-136
G. Websites and E-mail
"[M]ore governments have turned to clear-cut e-mail and Web policies
aimed at erasing gray areas in cyberspace. ' 36' Florida's public employers are
"reminding employees and [public] officials to be careful what they send,
because on city- or county-owned e-mail accounts, they consider everything
a public record., 362 Florida "law generally requires [government e-mails] to
be kept on e-mail servers or on disk for at least three years. 363
354. Marc Caputo, Disney's Gun Stance Draws Fire, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2008, at IA
[hereinafter Caputo, Disney's Gun Stance].
355. Editorial, Business Groups Sue over New Gun Law, MIA41 HERALD, Apr. 22, 2008, at
3C. "A federal court recently halted a similar ... law in Oklahoma because it ran afoul of
OSHA regulations requiring employers to provide a safe work environment." Id.
356. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
357. See id. at 2799.
358. Caputo, Disney's Gun Stance, supra note 354.
359. Editorial, Disney Fires Guard in Gun-Law Challenge, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 2008,
at 3C.
360. Id.





: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
H. Post-Employment Restrictions
Non-disclosure provisions, barring departing employees from talking
"about the circumstances of their departure or even disclosing the existence
of the agreements" "in order to obtain severance pay or benefits," while
usually found in the private sector, are now also cropping up in public em-
ployment. 364  "Some experts said that the nondisclosure agreements run
counter to the presumption in state law that public employees are free to
speak about the function and conduct of government agencies. '"365 The fear
exists that such confidentiality agreements will silence whistleblowers. 6
A Florida appellate court ruled that a preliminary injunction may be is-
sued to enforce the terms of a non-competition covenant where "'actual
threat of harm exists when an employee possesses knowledge of an employ-
er's trade secrets and begins working in a position that causes him or her to
compete directly with the former employer or the product line that the em-
ployee formerly supported. ''3 67
I. Family Medical Leave Act
[I]f you work for a company with more than 50 workers: You are
one of the 96 million people covered by The Family Medical and
Leave Act of 1993. The FMLA allows you to take time off work
for up to 12 weeks a year and still hang on to your job.368
On December 12, 2007, the United States House of Representatives
adopted the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 confe-
rence report,369 which includes provisions to extend the FMLA to family
364. See Nicholas Confessore, Some Severance Deals at Utility Required Silence, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 22, 2008, at A21.
365. Id.
366. See id.
367. Nelson Tree Serv., Inc. v. Gray, 978 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 278 (Ohio 1st Ct. App. 2000)).
368. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Taking Time off, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 12, 2008, at IC
[hereinafter Goodman, Taking Time].
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members of wounded soldiers.37° Under the measure, families of wounded
military personnel are entitled "to six months of unpaid leave. 37 1
In 2008, the United States House approved a measure, the Airline Flight
Crew Technical Corrections Act, extending FMLA protection to flight atten-
dants and pilots.
372
In 2008, the Department of Labor (DOL) proposed changes to update its
FMLA regulations.373 The changes address "joint employers, waivers of
FMLA rights, . . .the relationship between employer approval," and the
commencement of leave and medical notification requirements.374 One DOL
proposal "would guarantee [employees] up to seven paid sick days a year. 375
In a defeat for employers, the DOL declined to alter the period of time an
employee can take intermittent leave of less than a day.376
Under Florida's 2007 Domestic Violence Leave Law, persons living in
households hit by domestic violence are entitled "to take up to three days off
during any twelve month period to: 1) seek an injunction for protection; 2)
obtain medical care; 3) obtain mental health care; 4) [bolster] household se-
curity ... ; or, 5) [secure] legal [aid] or either prepare for or attend court-
related proceedings. 377




Increasingly, public employees are being disciplined for activities in-
volving the Internet, websites, e-mail, and blogging. Typically, the public
370. BROWN, RUDNICK, BERLACK, & ISRAELS, L.L.P., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE




372. Airline Flight Crew Technical Corrections Act, H.R. 2744, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
(2008).
373. Labor Department Prepared to Issue Proposed Regulations Updating FMLA, 76
U.S.L.W. 2443, 2443 (Jan. 29, 2008).
374. Id.
375. Goodman, Taking Time, supra note 376.
376. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7876, 7893 (Feb. 11, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 825).
377. Loring N. Spolter, Domestic Violence Victims Get New Job Rights, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 24, 2007, at 7G.
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employee makes improper use of an employer-owned computer either at
work or at home. For example, Burger King "fired two employees following
the disclosure that a top official secretly posted blogs slamming a farmwork-
er advocacy group. ' 378 The fired employees "'participated in unauthorized
activity on public websites which did not reflect the company's views and
which were in violation of company policy.' ' 379 A judge on the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was criticized for "contribut[ing] to a Web site that
featured sexually explicit materials" and was weighing whether to disqualify
himself from presiding over an obscenity case.38" A candidate for the posi-
tion of Broward's "airport director lost the job after MiamiHerald.com post-
ed the vulgar e-mails he sent from his last government job, in which he in-
sulted Broward commissioners and the county's main airport."38 ' A "Pom-
pano Beach High School teacher was suspended without pay after an investi-
gation concluded he showed his students his MySpace page, which included
profanity and talk about drugs and sex. 382 A North Florida state representa-
tive "outraged many of Miami-Dade's legislators when he used his state-
issued e-mail account to forward a cartoon implying taxpayers were subsi-
dizing illegal aliens. 383
"A confidential, nationwide list of 24,500 teachers who have been pu-
nished for a wide array of offenses was made available to the public" in
2007.384 "Sexual misconduct, financial misconduct, criminal convictions and
other misbehavior all can bring disciplinary actions against teacher li-
censes."3 85 A Tampa public school teacher had her teacher's license revoked
for "academic fraud" after "she helped students taking the FCAT.,,386 "The
number[] of what is officially called 'academic fraud' [is] tiny when com-
pared to about 15,000 investigations the state has conducted since 1997 for
all types of teacher misconduct, including drug, alcohol, sexual and physical
abuse. 387 In 2007, Broward's school district weighed whether "to fire a
teacher with a history of drinking alcohol at school. 388
378. Laura Wides-Munoz, BK Fires Secret Bloggers, MIAMI HERALD, May 14, 2008, at
3C.
379. Id.
380. Adam Liptak, Chief Judge Contributed to Racy Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2008,
at A17.
381. Gilpatrick, Cities Tighten Rules, supra note 115.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Tanner, supra note 18.
385. Id.
386. Bill Kaczor, Teacher: Penalty Was Excessive, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 2008, at 6B.
387. Id.
388. Teacher May Lose Job over Drinking at School, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 6, 2007, at 3B.
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In 2008, Florida's Judicial Qualifications Commission found that a state
appellate court judge "violated judicial ethics by writing a concurring opi-
nion suggesting that another appellate judge cast a corrupt vote." '389 Appar-
ently, no Florida judge or any other judge on record, "has ever been discip-
lined for what he or she wrote in an appellate opinion. 390
In 2008, the Judicial Conference of the United States released compul-
sory guidelines on how complaints alleging wrongdoing by federal judges
should be processed.391 Judicial wrongdoing covers areas such as conflicts of
interest, bias, incompetence, and claims that a judge's mental or physical
disability undermines his or her ability to manage a case.392
2. Off-Duty Misconduct
A few states, like "Colorado and Minnesota have laws explicitly pro-
tecting all employees from discrimination for engaging in any lawful activity
off premises during nonworking hours." '393
But not Florida. For example, a Key West police officer lost her "job
after pictures she posted on her MySpace page were deemed 'conduct unbe-
coming' of an officer., 394 In another instance, Miami's personnel director
warned all employees about "zooming through highway toll plazas by choos-
ing the automated SunPass lane-without paying" in city vehicles. 395 Mi-
ami's personnel director warned that "'[d]isregard for the law as well as for
city policies will result in disciplinary action.' ,396
"[P]ublic officials have historically been removed from office only for
felonies or misdemeanors having to do with their public duties, such as theft
from city coffers. ' 397 A former Miami City Commissioner sued to be reins-
tated, arguing that his conviction for misdemeanor battery and disorderly
389. Judge Rebuked for Written Opinion, MIAMI HERALD, July 19, 2008, at 6B.
390. Id.
391. See generally JuDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES FOR JUDICIAL-
CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmisconduct/jud-conduct-and-disability-308-app.B-
rev.pdf.
392. Id. Rule 3, at 3-4.
393. Randall Stross, How to Lose Your Job on Your Own Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2007, at 3.
394. Officer Loses Job over Racy Pictures, MIAMI HERALD, July 21, 2008, at 2B.
395. Michael Vasquez, City Employees Rack up Tollbooth Tickets, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
17, 2007, at IA.
396. Id.
397. Michael Vasquez, Ousted Commissioner Sues for a Comeback, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
26, 2007, at 3B.
2008]
213
: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
intoxication while off-duty does not fall within any type of crime that should
disqualify him from reinstatement.398
B. Retaliation Against Whistleblowers
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed down two decisions
prohibiting employers from retaliating against employees who charge age
and race discrimination. 399 In Gomez-Perez v. Potter,4°° by a vote of six to
three, the Court ruled that even though the statute barring age discrimination
against federal employees does not specifically prohibit retaliatory dis-
charges, "that understood in the context of its enactment, the provision did
cover retaliation. ''4° In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,4 °2 by a vote of sev-
en to two, the Court "held that Congress intended to cover retaliation claims
brought under the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that is usually
referred to as Section 1981. " 403
"The federal whistle-blower law, known as the False Claims Act (FCA),
has been a potent tool for keeping government contractors honest since it
was last amended in 1986. In 2008, members of a Senate committee are
weighing changes to the FCA that would make it easier for whistle-blowers
to prevail on their claims of governmental corruption. °5 One contentious
issue is whether the Act "allow[s] government employees to file suit under
the False Claims Act. ' ' 4 6 One senator recommends "allow[ing] government
employees to sue under the [False Claims Act] if they first exhausted all oth-
er channels without success. '4 7 For its part, the Justice Department opposes
allowing "government officials [to] sue contractors on the basis of informa-
tion they collected in the ordinary course of doing their jobs."4 8
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit court split
over whether liability under the FCA requires presentment of a fraudulent
398. Id.
399. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say Law Bars Retaliation over Bias Claims, N.Y. TIMES,
May 28, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Greenhouse, Law Bars Retaliation].
400. 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
401. Greenhouse, Law Bars Retaliation, supra note 407; Gomez-Perez, 128 S.Ct. at 1943.
402. 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
403. Greenhouse, Law Bars Retaliation, supra note 407; Humphries, 128 S. Ct. at 1955-
58.
404. Mary Williams Walsh, Senate Panel Seeks to Alter Law for Whistle-Blowers, N.Y.
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claim to the government.4°9 In Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel.
Sanders,4 1° the Court ruled that proof that "'government money was used to
pay [a] fraudulent claim"' is insufficient to support a plaintiffs claim under
two FCA sections that do not require actual presentment of a claim to the
government.41
In the past year, Congress has also weighed strengthening the 1989
Whistle-Blower Protection Act.
41 2
The reforms would provide stronger outside review protection
for whistle-blowers and would make it more difficult for their se-
curity clearances to be revoked, a common shunning device.
Workers would also be freer to share classified information with
Congress-when necessary to reveal the details of abuse and
fraud-and would have a strengthened court review process for
• . 413
appealing disputed cases.
Other possible changes include "extending whistle-blower protection to
workers at the F.B.I. and national intelligence agencies. 41 4
C. First Amendment
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,4 15 the United States Supreme Court severely li-
mited what public employee speech is protected by the First Amendment by
ruling that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their offi-
cial duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes., 416 Post-Garcetti cases raise thorny questions about what public
employee speech is job-related and therefore, unprotected, and what speech
is not job-related.4"7 For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal
ruled, in Green v. Barrett,4 s that a public employee's in-court testimony is
409. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders (Allison Engine I1), 128 S. Ct.
2123, 2128 (2008).
410. Id. at 2123.
411. Id. at 2125-26 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel Sanders (Allison
Engine 1), 471 F.3d 610, 622 (6th Cir. 2006)).
412. Editorial, Protection for Endangered Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2007, at
A28; see, e.g., Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act, S. 274, 110th Cong. (2007)
(engrossed in Senate), available at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/I 10/s/s274.pdf.
413. Protection for Endangered Whistle-Blowers, supra note 420.
414. Id.
415. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
416. Id. at 421.
417. See, e.g., Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App'x 883, 886 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
418. Id. at 883.
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protected under the First Amendment when speech is not performed pur-
suant to his or her official duties, but is merely based on facts that the em-
ployee learned because of his or her employment. 419
In 2008, "[t]he panel that oversees Florida's public university system
has asked a federal judge to overturn part of a 2006 state law that bans uni-
versities from spending money to travel to Cuba and four other nations on
the U.S. terrorist list. '4 ° The panel contends that "the travel act's prohibition
runs afoul of the academic freedom accorded to universities under the First
Amendment., 421 Surprisingly, "[o]ne of the defendants, the board that runs
the state's university system, has sided with the plaintiffs" that the ban "is an
unconstitutional curtailment of academic freedom. 422
D. Remedies
Under Florida's Whistle Blower Act, a prevailing plaintiff may recover
"back pay and future wages."423 The Act bars employers "from taking reta-
liatory action against employees for objecting to illegal conduct. 424
An issue arose in 2008 over whether a former Miami city attorney who
pleaded no-contest to misdemeanors involving misuse of city funds should
be entitled to $120,000 in severance pay.425 An editorial in the Miami Herald
made its position clear: "City officials who abuse the public trust shouldn't
be rewarded as they slink out the door., 426
The doctrine of "election of remedies" posits that at some point a plain-
tiff in a civil suit must make up his or her mind over which one of two or
more remedies he or she is seeking.427 For example, in a breach of contract
case, the plaintiff must choose whether to sue on the contract and ask for
damages or seek to unravel the agreement through rescission. 8 The two
419. See id. at 886.
420. Gary Fineout, Board: Undo Law on Travel to Cuba, MAmi HERALD, Jan. 2, 2008, at
lB.
421. Id.
422. Editorial, An Unwarranted Curb on Academic Freedom, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 9,
2008, at 20A.
423. Patrick Danner, Ex-Worker Challenges Firing, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2008, at 3C.
424. Id.
425. Opinion, Punish Wrongdoing; Don't Pay for It, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 2008, at
20A.
426. Id.
427. See, e.g., City of Jacksonville v. Cowen, 973 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
428. Jackson v. Bellsouth Teleconms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1279 (11 th Cir. 2004).
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remedies are mutually exclusive.42 9 The issue of election of remedies arose
in a 2007 Florida appellate court case where the issue was whether an en-
forcement officer "had waived his right to" arbitrate his disciplinary dismis-
sal under a collective bargaining agreement by electing to appeal an earlier
suspension "to the Civil Service Board and then having that appeal dis-
missed., 430 The court ruled that whether the plaintiff had waived his right to
arbitration was a question for the trial court, not the arbitrator, but because no




In 2007-08, the United States House of Representatives considered bills
to overturn Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,432 making clear that
the time limit for filing pay discrimination claims begins to run each time an
employee receives a paycheck that reflects discrimination, not only when the
employer makes a discriminatory pay decision. 33 In the Senate version, time
limits for filing pay bias claims begin to run when the employee "knew or
should have known" of the discrimination.434
On June 9, 2008, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Engquist v.
Oregon Department of Agriculture435 that public employees who are the tar-
gets of arbitrary treatment by their employers may not bring a class of one
equal protection claim, unless the discrimination is grounded on "race, sex,
or another protected [class]. 436
In 2007, the Eleventh Circuit rendered two decisions bearing on ele-
ments of the prima facie case for employment discrimination under Title
VII. 43 7 In Crawford v. City of Fairburn,4 38 the court ruled that when an em-
429. Id. (quoting Deemer v. Hallett Pontiac, Inc., 288 So. 2d 526, 527-28 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (per curiam)).
430. Cowen, 973 So. 2d at 506.
431. Id.at504.
432. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
433. Editorial, Pass the Fair Pay Act, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2008, at A20; see Lilly Led-
better Fair Pay Act of 2007, H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007).
434. Fair Pay Act of 2008, S. 2945, 110th Cong. (2008); see Susan Estrich, Remember
Lilly Ledbetter in November, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 2008, at A25.
435. 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
436. Id. at 2148-49; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject 'Class of One' Argument, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 10, 2008, at A15.
437. See Crawford v. City of Fairbum, 482 F.3d 1305 (1 lth Cir. 2007); McMillan v. De-
Kalb County, 211 F. App'x 821 (11 th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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ployer produces multiple legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing an
employee, the employee needs to rebut each and every reason-rebutting one
is now sufficient.4 39 In McMillan v. DeKalb County,440 the court noted a cir-
cuit split over the proper application of the qualified immunity defense in
mixed-motive cases.441
In 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is-
sued a final rule deleting a regulation allowing dismissal of federal employ-
ment discrimination claims when the plaintiff could not be found, was un-
cooperative, or rejected a fair remedy."2 Instead, under the new rule, the
EEOC authorizes dismissal of a charge only when the agency finds no ra-
tional basis for the claim, or the charge does not state a claim on which relief
can be granted." 3
B. Race
The Eleventh Circuit and a federal district court in the Eleventh Circuit
each decided one notable race discrimination case in 2008.'0 In Goldsmith
v. Bagby Elevator Co.,445 the court ruled that an African-American fired after
refusing to sign a waiver of an EEOC charge pending against his employer,
established a causal relation between the filing of plaintiffs complaint of
discrimination and his dismissal, especially since a white employee, who
refused to sign a waiver, was given an opportunity to reconsider. 446 By con-
trast, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in another case that the employer was en-
titled to summary judgment owing to plaintiff's failure "to establish a prima
facie case of rac[ial] discrimination." 447 The plaintiff was unable to show
that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that she was
qualified for the job she lost.448 Even if plaintiff did establish a prima facie
438. 482F.3d at 1305.
439. Id. at 1308.
440. 211 F. App'x at 821.
441. Id. at 822-23.
442. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 73 Fed. Reg. 3387, 3388 (Jan. 18,
2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1601.18).
443. Id. at 3387-88.
444. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008);
Dawson v. Miami-Dade County, No. 07-20126 CIV, 2008 WL 1924266, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
11, 2008) ("Order Granting (1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's
Claims and (2) Denying Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant's
Counterclaim").
445. 513 F.3d at 1261.
446. See id. at 1271-77.
447. Dawson, 2008 WL 1924266, at *19.
448. Id. at *8.
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case, she failed to show that the defendant's non-discriminatory reason for
her dismissal was pretextual. 449 In Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,4 5° the
Eleventh Circuit, along with three other circuits, rejected the EEOC's view
that "a pattern or practice claim may be brought [either] as an individual ac-
tion or a class action as the plaintiff chooses. 45'
A Miami-Dade jury, in 2008, ruled that "Florida International Universi-
ty discriminated against a black employee when it reorganized his depart-
ment and fired him in 2004.
" 452
A former North Miami Police Chief filed a complaint with the EEOC in
2007, "saying she was fired out of retaliation for filing previous complaints
with the same board.... She claimed she was discriminated against based on
race and gender.
453
Presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama disagree on
the issue of affirmative action in employment.454 While McCain backs "an
effort to end state and locally run minority preferences . . . Obama say[s]
policies that consider race need to continue.,
455
C. Gender, Same-Sex, Transsexuals
Since the 1960's, "a number of developments [provide] more opportuni-
ties for pregnancy leave, paid and unpaid, and increased protections for
pregnant women against job discrimination. '456 But, a backlash has recently
emerged from employees without children who oppose special benefits for
pregnant workers and employees with children. 457 "'Childless singles feel
put upon, taken for granted and exploited-whether because of fewer bene-
fits, less compensation, longer hours, mandatory overtime or less flexible
schedules or leaves-by married and child-rearing co-workers .... , 4 8
449. Id. at "19.
450. 516 F.3d 955 (llthCir. 2008).
451. Id. at 967 n.25, 969 n.30 (concluding that a pattern or practice claim against employer
not filed as class action was properly dismissed).
452. FlU Loses Discrimination Lawsuit, MIAMI HERALD, July 23, 2008, at 3B.
453. Carli Teproff, Fired Police Chief Fights Dismissal, Says Bias Involved, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 22, 2007, at 5B.
454. See William Douglas, Rivals Battle on Race Policy, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 2008, at
5A.
455. Id.
456. Roberts, supra note 196.
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Three cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit have addressed the prima facie case for proving sexual harassment.459
In Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,46° the court ruled that "harass-
ment in the form of offensive language can be 'based on' the plaintiff's
membership in a protected group even when the plaintiff was not the target
of the language and other employees were equally exposed to the lan-
guage. 46' In a second decision, the court found that a "[c]ounty exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct any ... harassing behavior, and that
[the plaintiff] unreasonably failed to take advantage of [the] employers [sic]
corrective measures or to avoid any harm to her." 2 In addition, the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that failure to transfer plaintiff to a school resource
officer position at a certain middle school was in retaliation for plaintiffs
complaints about workplace harassment.43 In Dar Dar v. Associated Out-
door Club, Inc.,4 the court ruled that "two sexually inappropriate comments
and two incidents" when a woman's buttocks was touched, were no more
serious than conduct deemed insufficient to constitute hostile work environ-
ment in governing precedent. 45
In 2008, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey signed a new equal
employment opportunity policy that bans discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation at the Department of Justice. 46 Moreover, an organization for
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender employees and contractors of the De-
partment of Justice received permission to use department bulletin boards
and other avenues of communication.467
In 2007, Congress considered a measure, the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA),468 "which would put bias involving sexual
orientation and gender identity in the workplace on the same legal footing as
459. See genrally Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 525 F.3d 1139 (11th Cir.
2008); Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 525 F.3d 1013 (1 1th Cir. 2008);
Dar Dar v. Assoc. Outdoor Club, Inc., 248 F. App'x. 82 (11 th Cir. 2007).
460. 525F.3dat 1139.
461. Id. at 1143. Daily exposure to male-co-workers' use of "bitch" to refer to women
was pervasive enough to be actionable. Id. at 1141, 1147.
462. Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1016 (1 lth Cir.
2008).
463. Id. at 1028.
464. 248 F. App'x 82 (11 th Cir. 2007).
465. Id. at 85-86 (citing Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 585 (1 1th Cir.
2000)).
466. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PoLIcY, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmdleeos/08-eeo-policy.pdf.
467. See Darryl Fears, Attorney General Reverses Curbs on Gay Group at Justice De-
partment, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2008, at A17.
468. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
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discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, religion, national origin,
age and disability." 469 Thirty-one states do not ban sexual orientation dis-
crimination in employment. 7° Before the United States' House passed
ENDA by a 235-184 vote, 71 however, the provision protecting transgendered
employees was eliminated, "fractur[ing] the nation's gay organizations. 472
Some courts accord transgendered workers protection under Title VII
under the doctrine of sexual stereotyping developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,4 73 which outlaws discrimi-
nation against an employee based on "stereotyped notions of appropriate
female [or male] appearance and behavior.9474
In 2008, Broward County made "it illegal to deny housing or jobs to
transgender or pregnant residents. 475 In 2007, "Oakland Park became the
eighth city in Florida to enact legal protections for transgendered people.
West Palm Beach, Miami Beach, Gulfport, Tequesta, Key West, Largo, and
Lake Worth each have included gender identity and expression in their poli-
cies. '4
71
In 2008, gay-rights groups rated eighty-eight hospitals "on how they
treat[ed] same-sex partners. 477
D. Age Discrimination
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed down four decisions
involving age discrimination in employment. In Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki,478 the Court ruled that any document filed with the EEOC that
may fairly be read as a request for agency action to safeguard a worker's
rights, or otherwise resolve a dispute with the employer, counts as a "charge"
that triggers the waiting period for filing a suit under the Age Discrimination
469. Rob Hotakainen, Job Bill Fueling Gay-Rights Debate, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16,
2007, at 21A.
470. Id.
471. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
472. Steve Rothaus, Gay-Rights Legislation Clears House, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 2007,
at 8A.
473. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
474. Jennifer S. Lee, Sexual Stereotypes, Civil Rights and a Suit About Both, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2007, at B4.
475. Breanne Gilpatrick, Transgender Rights OK'd, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 2008, at 1B.
476. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Local Governments Pass Trans Ordinances, EXPRESS GAY
NEWS, Sept. 20, 2007, at 5.
477. David Crary, Gay-Rights Groups Rate 88 Hospitals, MIAMI HERALD, May 13, 2008,
at 4A.
478. 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008).
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in Employment Act (ADEA) 79 In Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,48 the Court ruled that a public
pension plan that intentionally affords differing amounts of retirement bene-
fits to employees based on their age does not violate the ADEA.481 In
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn,482 the Court ruled that evi-
dence introduced by an ADEA plaintiff that other workers at the firm sus-
tained age bias by bosses outside of plaintiff's supervisory chain is "neither
per se admissible nor per se inadmissible. 483 In Gomez-Perez v. Potter,4 4
the Court ruled that federal employees may bring retaliation claims based on
age even though the ADEA is silent on the issue.485
Since 1960, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has imposed
mandatory retirement for airline pilots at age sixty.486 In 2007, thirty House
members asked the FAA to waive its age cap for one year while Congress
framed legislation "to raise the mandatory retirement age., 487 On December
13, 2007, the United States House of Representatives approved legislation,
the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, raising the mandatory retire-
ment age for airline pilots to sixty-five from age sixty.488
In 2008, House and Senate Democrats introduced the Civil Rights Act
of 2008, aimed at entitling state employees the right to sue their state em-
ployers for damages for alleged age discrimination. 89
In 2007, the EEOC published a final rule amending 29 C.F.R. part 1625
to reflect that the ADEA does not bar employers from favoring older workers
over younger ones, even if all employees are older than forty. 9° In 2007, the
EEOC issued a final rule permitting employers to alter, reduce, or eliminate
retiree health benefits once a retiree becomes eligible "for Medicare or com-
479. Id. at 1159.
480. 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008).
481. Id. at 2370.
482. 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008).
483. Id. at 1143.
484. 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
485. See id. at 1937.
486. House Members Request One-Year Waiver of FAA's Age 60 Limit for Commercial
Pilots, 76 U.S.L.W. 2037 (2007).
487. Id.
488. Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, Pub. L. No. 110-135, § 44729, 121 Stat.
1450, 1450 (2007).
489. See Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. § 303 (2008); Civil Rights Act
of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 303 (2008).
490. See Coverage Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
36,873 (July 6, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625).
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parable [s]tate health benefits program[s]" without committing age discrimi-
nation.491
In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
ruled, in Van Voorhis v. Hillsborough County Board of County Commission-
ers,492 that plaintiffs may establish disparate treatment either by direct or
circumstantial evidence.493
E. Disability Discrimination
In 2008, the House of Representatives passed a measure aimed at over-
turning Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ,4' by instructing courts not to
"consider the effects of 'mitigating measures"' in assessing whether a worker
is disabled.49 5 In addition, the proposed legislation would delete the words
"'substantially limits"' and replace it with "'materially restricts' a major life
activity," rendering far more workers disabled under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).496
In 2008, President Bush signed a law that prohibits genetic discrimina-
tion in employment.497 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act bars
employers from dismissing, refusing to hire, or in any way targeting em-
ployees on grounds of genetic information. 498 The law bans the gathering of
genetic information by employers but permits workplace genetic testing only
in specified circumstances, such as monitoring the harmful effects of toxic
workplace exposures.499
In 2008, the EEOC issued an opinion letter discouraging periodic medi-
cal exams for city bus drivers whose job, unlike police officers and firefight-
ers, "does not exist for the [key] purpose of [shielding] the public from out-
side harm. ' 500
491. Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Retiree Health Benefits, 72 Fed. Reg.
72,938 (Dec. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625, 1627).
492. 512 F.3d 1296 (1lth Cir. 2008).
493. Id. at 1300. Employer's statement that he "'didn't want to hire any old pilot"' consti-
tuted direct evidence of age bias that warranted a jury trial under the ADEA. Id.
494. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
495. Robert Pear, House Votes to Expand Civil Rights for Disabled, N. Y. TIMES, June 26,
2008, at A14.
496. Id.
497. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202
122 Stat. 881, 907.
498. See id. § 202(a)(1).
499. See id. § 202(b)(5).
500. EEOC Notes Issues in Periodic Medical Exams for City Bus Drivers, Says Other
Options Exist, 76 U.S.L.W. 2633 (2008).
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In 2007, a New York Times editorial bemoaned the fact that "[it still
takes almost half a year for the average veteran's claim for disability benefits
to be decided in a tortuous process that can involve four separate hearings..
. [and urged] wholesale changes in the veterans' benefit system, which hasn't
been modernized since 1945."' 0'
A 2007 study found that chronic diseases like "diabetes and hyperten-
sion cost the" United States economy over one trillion dollars annually in
lost productivity. 5 2 Another study found that "[elmployers who screen and
guide depressed [employees] through treatment [programs enjoy] an average
of three extra weeks of productivity" from such employees annually.5 3 Fi-
nally, a 2007 study found that seven percent of full-time employees suffered
from depression, women were more likely to suffer from it, and that younger
employees scored "higher rates of depression than older" workers. 5°4 Three
categories of workers battled depression the most: "11 percent of personal-
care workers," 10.3 percent of "[wiorkers who prepare and serve food," and
9.6 percent of healthcare and social workers.5 5
Three Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases dealt with disability is-
sues in 2007.506 In Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A. ,507 relying on
Title VI and Spending Clause precedents, the court ruled that victims of in-
tentional discrimination may recover non-economic damages under the Re-
habilitation Act. 8 In Smith v. Olin Corp.,5°9 the court ruled that in a retalia-
tion case, in assessing the proximity of an adverse employment activity to a
protected activity, the causal connection analysis runs from the date of the
latest protected activity, and not from the earliest ADA protected activity. 510
In Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,51 the court noted a circuit split over
501. Editorial, Slogging on the Home Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at A18.
502. Diseases Take Their Toll, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 4, 2007, at IC.
503. Kyung M. Song, Aid for Depression Benefits Businesses, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 8,
2007, at GB2.
504. Kevin Freking, Depression Hits Care Workers Hardest, MtAMi HERALD, Oct. 14,
2007, at 3A.
505. Id.
506. See generally Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App'x 874 (1 1th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam); Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173 (11 th Cir. 2007); Smith
v. Olin Corp., No. 06-15830 (11 th Cir. May 23, 2007).
507. 505 F.3dat 1173.
508. Id. at 1191-92 (allowing recovery of emotional distress damages).
509. No. 06-15830 (1lth Cir. May 23, 2007).
510. See Brief of Appellee at 38-40, Smith v. Olin Corp., 225 F. App'x 852 (11 th Cir.
2007) (No. CV101-137).
511. 231 F. App'x at 874.
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whether interaction with others, or social interaction, amounts to a "'major
life activit[y]' under the ADA." '
F. Religion
In 2008, "[t]he Bush administration wants to require all recipients of aid
under federal health programs to certify that they will not refuse to hire
nurses and other providers who object to abortion and even certain types of
birth control." '513 "Such certification would also be required of state and local
governments, forbidden to discriminate, in areas like grant-making, against
hospitals, and other institutions that have policies against providing abor-
tion. 514
G. Veterans
"Many veterans have a hard time transitioning from the military life in-
to civilian work., 51 5 One survey "found that 76 percent of veterans felt una-
ble to effectively translate their military skills in civilian terms and 72 per-
cent felt unprepared to negotiate a salary. 51 6
Under the Federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA),517 employers are prohibited "from discriminating
against military personnel. 51 8 In 2008, "the Justice Department settled a
class-action USERRA suit against American Airlines over allegations the
company didn't allow 353 pilots to accrue vacation time and sick-leave bene-
fits while on military leave. 51 9 In 2007, "[t]he Labor Department opened
1,366 USERRA cases. .. [o]f those, 75 were in Florida, down from 81 in
2006. "520 In 2007, "[t]he Defense Department's Employer Support for the
Guard and Reserve, which mediates disputes between employers and reserv-
ists, reported having 100 cases in Florida. '5 21 "A Pentagon survey of reserv-
ists in 2005-2006 ... found that 44 percent [of returning troops] said they
512. See id. at 876 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2003)).
513. Robert Pear, Abortion Proposal Sets Condition on Aid, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at
A17.
514. Id.
515. Milburn, supra note 297.
516. Id.
517. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-33 (2000).
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were dissatisfied with how the Labor Department handled their complaint of




In 2007, the United States House Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on
Economic Opportunity questioned "whether federal money dedicated to find-
ing vets employment is being spent wisely and fairly. 523 The Labor De-
partment "runs a separate Web campaign called HireVetsFirst that aims to
raise employer awareness about the value of hiring veterans. 524
H. Remedies
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,525 aimed at removing most class
action suits from state courts to federal courts where it was thought such suits
would be assessed more objectively.5 26 A 2006 study found that CAFA had
an immediate effect and time-series analysis show statistically significant
increases in class action filings and removals after the effective date of
CAFA for certain natures of suit.
527
A measure introduced in both houses of Congress, the 2008 Civil Rights
Act,528 would, among other things, eliminate the cap on Title VU damage
awards and curtail the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in individual em-
529ployment contracts.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),53° a court must confirm an ar-
bitration award unless it is vacated or modified on grounds such as fraud in
procuring the award or arbitrator partiality.53' In 2008, resolving a circuit
split, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 53z that the FAA's grounds for vacating and modifying
522. Hope Yen, Reservists Want Jobs Back, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 10, 2007, at 1C.
523. Kerr, supra note 1.
524. Id.
525. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
526. Id. § 2.
527. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE 11, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: SECOND INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CrvIL RULES 12-13 (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CAFA-Report-0906.pdf.
528. Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008).
529. Id. § 423.
530. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
531. See id. §§ 9-10.
532. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
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an arbitration ruling are exclusive and may not be expanded by agreement of
parties seeking judicial review.533
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit handed down two decisions involving re-
medies.534 In Advanced Bodycare Solutions, L.L. C. v. Thione International,
Inc., the court ruled that mediation is not arbitration for purposes of com-
pelling the mediation process under the FAA, in contrast with several district
court rulings that mediation contracts are enforceable under the FAA.536 In
Davis, the court joined three other circuits in rejecting the EEOC's view
"that a pattern or practice claim may be brought [either] as an individual ac-
tion or [as] a class action as the plaintiff chooses. 537
VI. PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS
"[U]nion membership as a share of the total work force rose [in 2007]
for the first time in a quarter-century, inching up to 12.1 percent from 12
percent the year before. A total of 7.5 percent of private-sector workers were
in unions, and 35.9 percent of public-sector workers. 538
Surprisingly, "George W. Bush is in line to be the first president since
World War II to preside over an economy in which federal government em-
ployment rose more rapidly than employment in the private sector. '539 "Un-
der [Bush], federal job growth has averaged 0.73 percent per year, but em-
ployment rolls at state and local governments have grown even more rapidly,
at rates of 0.88 percent for state governments and 1.21 percent for local gov-
ernments.' ' 4
According to a 2007 study, the ranks of tenured professors is thinning
out as the ranks of part-time instructors and contract professors have grown,
owing largely to administrators' need for greater "flexibility in hiring, firing
and changing course offerings."' In response, the American Federation of
533. Id. at 1404.
534. See Advanced Bodycare Solutions, L.L.C. v. Thione Int'l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1241
(llth Cir. 2008); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 967 (11th Cir.
2008).
535. 524 F.3d 1235 (1lth Cir. 2008).
536. See id. at 1238-40.
537. Davis, 516 F.3d at 967, n.25, 969 (holding that pattern or practice claim against em-
ployer not filed as class action was properly dismissed).
538. Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership up 311,000 in '07, Biggest Rise Since '83,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2008, at Al1.
539. Floyd Norris, Job Growth Where Bush Didn't Want It, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2008, at
C3.
540. Id.
541. Alan Finder, Decline of the Tenure Track Raises Concerns at Colleges, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2007, at Al.
20081
227
: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Teachers is supporting measures "in 11 states to [require] that 75 percent of
classes be taught by tenured or tenure-track teachers. 542
After five bargaining sessions over raises between the Miami-Dade
teachers' union and the school district, little progress toward a compromise
was made.543 The union "declared an impasse in negotiations," triggering a
procedure whereby "a state-appointed special magistrate ...will issue a
nonbinding opinion .... The School Board will then have to decide whether
to accept the magistrate's recommendation about the raises.
The Police Benevolent Association (PBA) has represented Broward
Sheriffs Office "deputies for more than a decade," but that may change as
deputies vote over whether to stay with the PBA or to switch to the Interna-
tional Union of Police Associations, a rival public union promising "smooth-
er relations between management and the rank and file. 545
VII. CONCLUSION
This survey merely skims the tip of the iceberg of Florida public em-
ployment law in 2007-08. Every stage of employment, from hiring, to the
terms of employment, to discipline and retaliation against whistleblowers, to
employment discrimination, creates a wide array of legal issues at the feder-
al, state, and local levels. As evidenced by the pervasive citation to news
articles, public sector employment invites widespread media attention, and
news stories provide a wealth of insight and supplements the usual source of
legal precedent: constitutional, statutory, regulatory, administrative, and the
common law.
542. Id.
543. See Kathleen McGrory, Unions Intensify Battle over Raises, MIAMI HERALD, July 8,
2008, at IA.
544. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey discusses developments in Florida gambling law that took
place during the period July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008. It was a busy year,
beginning with the publication of the first book on Florida's gambling histo-
ryI and ending with the Florida Supreme Court poised to rule on the validity
of the state's gambling compact with the Seminoles.2
II. ADULT ARCADES
Although Florida prohibits both slot machines and gambling parlors,3 in
1996 it passed the "Chuck E. Cheese Law,"4 which permits "games of skill"
in adult arcades. 5  But because the statute contains no standards, law en-
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University (jarvisb@nsu.law.nova.edu). B.A.,
Northwestern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., New York University.
Member of the Editorial Board of the Gaming Law Review and Economics and co-author of
GAMING LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2004).
I wish to thank the Nova Law Review Staff for allowing me to publish this article without
having it go through the normal editing process. As a result, any mistakes-substantive or
procedural-are my responsibility.
1. See DONALD D. SPENCER, HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN FLORIDA (2007), reviewed in
Robert M. Jarvis, Book Review, 86 FLA. HIST. Q. 434 (2008).
2. See infra Part IX.
3. See FLA. STAT. §§ 849.01 and 849.15 (2008).
4. Id. § 849.161. The law is so named because legislators had in mind the type of
games found in family restaurants like Chuck E. Cheese. See Fred Grimm, Cheesy Loophole
Lets 2-Bit Slot Joints Cash In, MIAMi HERALD, May 24, 2005, at lB.
5. See FLA. STAT. §§ 849.161(1)(a)(1.) and 849.161(2) (2008).
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forcement officials often claim that such machines are being operated as il-
legal "games of chance.
' 6
In Rowe v. County of Duval,7 the First District Court of Appeal reversed
and remanded a trial court's ruling that the Chuck E. Cheese Law was inap-
plicable because the appellants' machines accepted both coins and paper
bills, instead of just the former (as contemplated by the statute).8 The ma-
jority considered this conclusion premature, however, because of the failure
to determine whether the machines were games of skill.9 If they were, the
appellants then would have the opportunity to renew their argument that the
Chuck E. Cheese Law should be extended in light of technological advances
that have made it possible for machines to accept both coins and bills.' ° In a
dissent, Judge Van Nortwick insisted that the statute's wording was clear and
that no remand was necessary. 1
III. BINGO
Bingo's popularity in Florida has been declining for years, putting a se-
rious crimp in the budgets of many charities.' 2 Nevertheless, in Bradenton
Group, Inc. v. State,13 the game managed to produce an opinion that will
serve as a cautionary tale for years to come.
Philip Furtney was the owner of three businesses that collectively made
money by renting out bingo halls.'4 In 1995, prosecutors accused Furtney
and his companies of violating the bingo statute and sought an order of for-
feiture under Florida's RICO statute. 15 In response, Furtney successfully
6. See Fred Grimm, Chuck E. Cheese Exception Begets a Split in Rules, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 20, 2006, at 1 (Broward). See also Amy Driscoll, Senate Panel to Consider New Rules
for Adult Arcades, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 19, 2008, at Al.
7. 975 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. SC08-653, 2008 WL
4291666 (Fla. Sept. 19, 2008).
8. Rowe, 975 So. 2d at 527.
9. Id. at 529.
10. Id. at 528-29.
11. Id. at 529-30 (Van Nortwick, J., dissenting).
12. In an attempt to reverse the tide, the 2007 Florida Legislature passed the "Evelyn
Wiesman-Price Act," which authorizes non-profit organizations to offer "instant bingo" (i.e.,
pull-tab cards). See ch. 2007-228, 2007 Fla. Laws 2186, 2186-88 (amending FLA. STAT. §
849.0931 (2007)), and Jon Burstein, Gambling on Future of Bingo, S. FLA. SUN-SENT., July
29, 2007, at LA.
13. 970 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007), review denied, 987 So. 2d 1210 (Fla.
2008).
14. Bradenton Group, 970 So. 2d at 405 n.1.
15. Id. at 405.
[Vol. 33
230
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/1
FLORIDA GAMBLING LAW
moved for an order requiring the government to post a $1.4 million bond. 6
The dispute eventually reached the Florida Supreme Court, which in 1998
ruled that bingo offenses are not predicate RICO acts, 7 seemingly bringing
the matter to an end. In 1999, however, the government refiled the com-
plaint, and, following numerous pre-trial motions, in 2005 a jury convicted
the defendants of racketeering.1
8
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. 9
Finding that the Supreme Court's 1998 decision had been ignored, the panel
sharply rebuked the state's attorneys:
The defendants' bingo offenses could not form the basis for
RICO liability and forfeiture. Bradenton II [the Supreme Court's
1998 decision] and collateral estoppel barred the action below.
We are intrigued by the State's zealousness in this prosecution in
light of the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Bradenton II and
Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc. v. City of St. Cloud, 837 So.2d 510,
510-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). During oral argument, the State con-
tended that minor changes in the amended complaint, additional
parties and reliance on [the] federal [RICO] statute supported the
revised prosecution. The argument is specious. The American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Func-
tion Standard 3-1.1(b) and 3-1.1(c) (2nd ed. 1986 Supp.) states:
(b) The prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and an ad-
vocate. The prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the per-
formance of his or her functions.
(c) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict.
We recommend this section to the prosecutors for their edifica-
tion and enlightenment.2°
IV. CASINOS
While Florida has no land-based casinos of its own,2' two cases during
the year found Floridians suing over other states' casinos. In FLA Consult-
16. Id.
17. See Department of Legal Affairs v. Bradenton Group, Inc., 727 So. 2d 199 (Fla.
1998).
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ing, Inc. v. Rymax Corp.,2 2 a Florida company called FLA Consulting, Inc.
agreed to assist two New Jersey companies that were seeking casino business
in such places as Connecticut, Nevada, and New Jersey. 23 When the rela-
tionship soured, FLA Consulting filed suit in a Florida state court, which the
defendants timely removed to federal court and then sought to have dis-
missed for lack of personal jurisdiction.24
Finding that the defendants had fair notice that they might be sued in
Florida, and had not only paid FLA Consulting in Florida but had shipped
merchandise into the state and attended two trade shows here, the court had
little difficultly denying the defendants' motion.25 Although the defendants
also argued that their contract with FLA Consulting required all disputes to
be heard in New Jersey, the court held that the parties had operated under a
later contract that lacked such a requirement.26
The other casino case of the period was Certegy Transaction Services,
Inc. v. Travelers Express Co.27 In 2004, Certegy purchased all of the stock
of Game Financial Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Travelers that
provided cash advances to casino customers.2 8 Although Certegy paid Trav-
elers $43 million, the parties agreed that this amount would be reduced if,
within a specified time, Game lost certain customers.2
One of the designated customers was the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Ve-
gas, which Game did end up losing.30 As a result, Certegy asked Travelers to
adjust the purchase price by refunding $4.8 million. 31 When Travelers re-
fused, claiming that MGM had remained a Game customer throughout the
adjustment period (which ended on November 30, 2005), Certegy took it to
21. Proposals to authorize them, of course, have appeared on the ballot three times. In
1978, a plan to allow casinos in Miami Beach failed by a vote of 71%-29%. In 1986, a plan to
allow each county to decide for itself whether to have casinos failed 68%-32%. And in 1994,
a plan to allow casinos at selected sites, including pari-mutuel facilities and riverboats, failed
62%-38%. See PATRICK A. PIERCE & DONALD E. MILLER, GAMBLING POLITICS: STATE
GOVERNMENT AND THE BusiNEss OF BETrING 110-24 (2004), and Florida Department of
State-Division of Elections, Initiatives/Amendments/Revisions,
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initiativelist.asp (last visited July 15, 2008).
22. No. 6:07-cv-1265-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 2714100 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2007).
23. Id. at *1.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *2-*3.
26. Id. at *4.
27. No. 8:06-cv-555-T-24 TBM, 2007 WL 3047142 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2007).
28. Id. at*1.
29. Id.
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court.32 While Certegy admitted that MGM's termination had occurred in
December 2005, it pointed out that MGM had given notice of its intention to
cancel on November 11, 2005."3 Not surprisingly, the court, finding it im-
possible to resolve these factual disputes without a trial, denied the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment.34
V. INTERNET GAMBLING
No internet gambling cases were reported during the survey period, al-
though in November 2007 Attorney General Bill McCollum, responding to
an inquiry from Cedar Grove Police Chief Guy J. Turcotte, reconfirmed that
such betting is illegal in Florida.35 Local newspaper accounts, however, left
little doubt regarding the popularity of web-based wagering.36
VI. PARI-MUTUELS
Despite anecdotal evidence that the growing number of slot machines in
South Florida is leading to an increase in gambling addictions, in January
32. Certegy, 2007 WL 3047142, at *3.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *6-*7.
35. See 2007 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 188. Turcotte decided to seek McCollum's
advice after area businesses began selling telephone calling cards that came with
free sweepstakes points which can be redeemed to play the sweepstakes games. The sweeps-
takes games are displayed on an interactive computer terminal, the object of which is to line up
various symbols and characters in a winning combination. Each ticket contains a configuration
of 3 to 25 symbols; winning combinations of which entitle the bearer to money prizes ranging
in value from $1.00 to $1,000.00. Each terminal communicates with a server, which causes
the terminal's screen to display whether the participant has won any "win credits" which can
be redeemed for cash or prizes.
Id. at 188-89.
36. See, e.g., Saundra Amrhein, Gambling Raid Shuts Internet Site, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 6, 2008, at 3 (South Shore & Brandon Times) (Sun City computer center discov-
ered to be serving as cover for a gambling house); Andrew Ba Tran, 12 Accused of Running
Betting, Loan Sharking Ring, S. FLA. SUN-SENT., May 24, 2008, at lB (internet gambling
operation headquartered in Coral Springs restaurant broken up); Todd Leskanic, Professor
Avoids Jail, Will Repay Club, TAMPA TRtB., May 16, 2008, at 4 (Pasco) (former University of
Tampa accounting professor ordered to repay $120,000 she stole to support her interet gam-
bling habit); 2 Accused of Extortion Over Gambling Debts, MIAMi HERALD, Oct. 3, 2007, at
B3 (Broward County men arrested for threatening gambler who lost $1.2 million placing
internet sports bets).
37. See Amy Driscoll, Slot Machines Get Most Gambling Help Line Calls, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 1, 2007, at B6, and Jon Burstein, Gambling Help Line Reveals Increase in Slot
Addictions, S. FLA. SUN-SENT., Aug. 5, 2007, at 5 (Community News). On the other hand,
slot machines were found to have no measurable impact on the region's crime statistics. See
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2008 voters in Miami-Dade agreed to let their county's pari-mutuels have
them, thereby reversing their March 2005 "no" vote. 38 Yet even as propo-
nents celebrated their victory, the performance of Broward's "racinos ' 39 put
a damper on the party. Due to the high (50%) taxes imposed on them by the
Florida Legislature, the profits generated by Broward's pari-mutuels have
been far below projections, so much so that Las Vegas's Boyd Corporation
has, at least for the time being, shelved its plans to put slot machines in the
Dania Jai-Alai fronton (despite paying $152 million for the property). 4°
Although their financial difficulties are their most immediate problem,
the biggest threat facing the racinos actually lies elsewhere. In Floridiansfor
a Level Playing Field v. Floridians Against Expanded Gambling,41 the Flori-
da Supreme Court, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, kept
alive a challenge to Amendment 4, which paved the way for Broward and
Miami-Dade to have racinos. 42 The dispute is now back before a Leon Coun-
ty circuit court judge for a decision on whether the backers of Amendment 4
Amy Driscoll & Andres Amerikaner, No Rise in Crime With Slots-So Far, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 24, 2008, at B 1.
In an interesting twist, the government in Waite v. Astrue, No. 1:07-cv-00045-MP-AK, 2008
WL 2477657 (N.D. Fla. June 16, 2008) argued that because the plaintiff regularly gambled
(often for long stretches of time), he was not disabled and therefore not did not qualify for
enhanced Social Security benefits. The court agreed and wrote:
The ALl gave weight to Dr. Mata's opinion that Plaintiff was capable of performing simple
work, and found that Plaintiffs gambling activities showed a strong ability to socialize, to ac-
complish demanding tasks, and to be familiar with elaborate game rules and strategies. Be-
cause a [residual functional capacity (RFC)] assessment is based on all of the relevant evidence
in the case record, not just the medical evidence, the Court agrees with the Magistrate that the
AL properly formulated Plaintiff's RFC.
Id. at *1.
38. See Amy Driscoll, Jackpot for Dade Slots, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 30, 2008, at B 1, and
Adrian Sainz, Slot Supporters Win Big in Miami-Dade, ORLANDO SENT., Jan. 30, 2008, at B2.
39. The term "racino," which combines the words "racetrack" and "casino," was coined
by Richard L. Duchossois, a Chicago horseman, and first appeared in print in a 1995 Sports
Illustrated article. See Word Spy, Racino, http://www.wordspy.comlwords/racino.asp (last
visited July 15, 2008).
40. See Amy Driscoll, Analyst: Taxes Hurting Racinos, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 10, 2007,
at B5; John Holland, Miami-Dade Slots Vote Bring High-Roller Plans, But Broward Opera-
tors Say Profits Lacking, S. FLA. SUN-SENT., Jan. 31, 2008, at liB; Thomas Monnay, Slot
Take Disappoints Hallandale, S. FLA. SuN-SENT., Dec. 9, 2007, at IB; Toluse Olorunnipa &
Roberto Santiago, New Casino Put on Hold as Jai-Alai Hedges Bet, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 5,
2007, at B1. An effort to lower the tax rate failed to win approval during the 2008 legislative
session. See Stacey Singer, Track Owners Give Up on Slots, PALM BEACH POST, May 4, 2008,
at IC.
41. 967 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2007).
42. Id. at 833-35.
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failed to collect enough valid signatures to put the initiative on the ballot.4 3
Of course, such a finding would shut down the racinos.44
Meanwhile, three lawsuits during the year shone a spotlight on the
working conditions at pari-mutuels. In Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando
Kennel Club, Inc. ,'4 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a dog track that delibe-
rately withheld the overtime pay of a maintenance worker was liable for li-
quidated damages. 46 Similarly, in Tafarella v. Hollywood Greyhound Track,
Inc.47 and Wajcman v. Hartman & Tyner, Inc. ,48 poker dealers at the Mardi
Gras Racetrack and Gaming Center were granted permission to file "collec-
tive actions" (the employment law equivalent of class actions) after claiming
they had been forced to share their tips with non-tipped employees.49
The period's two remaining decisions both involved licensing dis-
putes.5° In Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation v.
Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n,5l the Florida Supreme Court found that a
statute52 barring Gulfstream Park in Hallandale from broadcasting its races to
nearby Pompano Park was a special law because, as a practical matter, it
applied only to Gulfstream. 3 And because it had been enacted using the
more liberal procedures specified for general laws, the court found that it was
invalid. 4 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Lewis, joined by Justice
43. See Jon Burstein, Slot Machine Lawsuit Sent to Circuit Judge, S. FLA. SUN-SENT.,
Sept. 28, 2007, at 6B, and Amy Driscoll, Slot-Machine Case Sent to Lower Court, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 28, 2007, at B3.
44. The racinos, however, insist they are not worried. See, e.g., Amy Driscoll, Supreme
Court to Hear Anti-Slots Case, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17, 2007, at B 1 (quoting Bruce Rogow,
the racinos' lawyer, as saying, "In the long run, this is much ado about very little.... The
parimutuels will prevail in one fashion or another. We can rest assured that parimutuels will
continue to operate.").
45. 515 F.3d 1150 (1 1th Cir.), rehearing denied, 518 F.3d 1302 (1 1th Cir. 2008).
46. Alvarez Perez, 515 F.3d at 1168.
47. No. 07-60017-CIV, 2007 WL 2254553 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2007).
48. No. 07-61472-CIV, 2008 WL 203579 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2008).
49. See Tafarella, 2007 WL 2254553, at *4, and Wajcman, 2008 WL 203579, at *2.
50. Of course, how a license is interpreted can have enormous consequences. Despite
opposition from one of its leading competitors, see Gulfs!ream Tries to Block Rival, S. FLA.
SuN-SENT., Apr. 10, 2008, at 3B, in June 2008 Mardi Gras was given permission to "stack" its
license with that of the defunct Biscayne Kennel Club to get around regulations that currently
limit pari-mutuels to 12 hours of poker per day per license. See Nick Sortal, Poker Room to
Go 24 Hours, S. FLA. SUN-SENT., June 24, 2008, at 4B.
51. 967 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2007).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 550.615(6) (2007).
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Bell, chided the majority for failing to address the statute's non-severability
clause.55
Lastly, in Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Florida Stan-
dardbred Breeders & Owners Ass'n,56 the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering
sought to have a lawsuit filed against it in Broward County transferred to
Leon County, where it maintains its headquarters. 57 The case had arisen after
the Division granted a slots license to The Isle Casino & Racing at Pompano
Park, despite the track's failure to reach an agreement with its horsemen as to
how to divide future slot monies.58 Finding that the Division was entitled to
assert its common law "home venue privilege," the Fourth District Court of
Appeal ordered the case to be either dismissed or transferred.59
VII. SHIPBOARD GAMBLING
The trial of the three men accused of killing SunCruz Casinos founder
Konstantinos "Gus" Boulis in Fort Lauderdale in 2001 remained pending
during the year, although in June 2008 Adam Kidan, who had purchased the
company from Boulis shortly before the slaying, had his 70-month federal
prison sentence cut in half after he helped officials investigate the circums-
tances surrounding Boulis's death.6°
Boulis's former company and its competitors suffered greatly during the
year, buffeted by competition from land-based operators and the skyrocket-
ing price of fuel. 6' Adding to their woes, in June 2008 Governor Charlie
Crist signed SB 1094, dubbed the "Gambling Vessels/Clean Ocean Act., 62
55. Id. at 810-11 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
56. 983 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
57. Id. at 62.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 62-63.
60. See Vanessa Blum, Fraud Convict's Sentence Halved, S. FLA. SuN-SENT., June 26,
2008, at 3B.
61. See Barry Flynn, Businesses Take More of a Gamble: SunCruz Pulls Out, As Ex-
panded Kennel Club Plans More Action, DAYTONA NEws-J., Jan. 27, 2008, at 1E; Tom Stieg-
horst, Onshore Slots Have Day Cruises Playing Straits Poker, S. FLA. SUN-SENT., Feb. 29,
2008, at ID; Matt Miller, Cruise Ship Layoffs Reflect Losing Battle Against Land Gambling,
ONLINE CASINO ADVISORY, June 29, 2008, http://www.onlinecasinoadvisory.com/casino-
news/land/cruise-ships-struggle-against-casinos-1 800.htm. Nevertheless, a group of local
businessmen continued their efforts to bring another gambling ship (which they dubbed the
M/V LIQUID VEGAS) to Port Canaveral. See Donna Balancia, New Gambling Ship in Town,
FLA. TODAY, Jan. 26, 2008, at IC, and Scott Blake, 3rd Gambling Ship Ready to Roll in July,
FLA. TODAY, June 24, 2008, at 1C.
62. See ch. 2008-231, §§ (1)-(10), 2008 Fla. Laws 2687 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 376.25
(2008)) [hereinafter cited as GV/COA].
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Championed by Senator Mike Haridopolos (R-Melboume), a longtime boats
foe due to his connections with the pari-mutuel industry,63 the law requires
"day cruises ''64 to pay for wastewater pump-out facilities at their home ports
(at present, such water normally is dumped at sea after being partially
treated).65 In addition, the ships will have to pick up the state's oversight
costs.66 Although the legislation's overall financial burden is likely to be
63. While running to fill the seat left vacant by the death of Senator Howard Futch, Hari-
dopolos was criticized for accepting thousands of dollars from the pari-mutuel industry. See
Haridopolos Best in Primary, ORLANDO SENT., Mar. 7, 2003, at A18. After being elected,
Haridopolos immediately introduced SB 2800, which sought to ban casino boats from Flori-
da's waters. See Haridopolos' Gambling Ban a Reckless Move, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 17, 2003,
at 14. When this effort failed, he tried to lift the state ban on nighttime thoroughbred racing
and sought permission for a new track in Ocala. See Steven Isbitts, Bill Sheds Light on Night
Racing, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 17, 2004, at 10 (Sports).
64. Day cruises, also known as "cruises to nowhere," are gambling excursions that nor-
mally last five or six hours and sail just far enough (three miles on Florida's east coast, nine
miles on Florida's west coast) to reach international waters, where they are able to open their
casinos. For a further discussion, see Florida Dep't of Revenue v. New Sea Escape Cruises,
Ltd., 894 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 2005).
65. See GV/COA, supra note 62, at § 4. Cruise ships that embark on multi-day voyages
are expressly exempted, id. § 2(e), as are casino boats equipped with a marine waste system
that "eliminates the need to pump out or dump wastewater." Id. § 8(e).
66. Id. § 7.
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small,67 the perilous condition of the industry makes a court challenge on
federal preemption grounds a strong possibility.68
In the meantime, shipboard gambling produced the year's most dramat-
ic opinion. In Luyao v. State,69 Dr. Asuncion Mendoza Luyao, who had been
given a 50-year jail sentence for overprescribing the painkiller OxyContin,
thereby causing the deaths of six of her patients, was granted a new trial by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal after it found that references to her fond-
ness for gambling on the casino ship MN PALM BEACH PRINCESS had
prejudiced the jury.7 ° According to the court, while Luyao might have be-
67. Neither of the bill's staff analyses included a cost estimate. See Professional Staff of
the Florida Senate Environmental Preservation and Conservation Committee, Bill Analysis
and Fiscal Impact Statement of CS/SB's 1094 & 326, at 8 (Mar. 25, 2008),
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=2008s1094.ep.
doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1094&Session=2008, and Professional Staff of
the Florida Senate Regulated Industries Committee, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement
of CS/CS/SB's 1094 & 326, at 8 (Apr. 15, 2008),
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documentsloaddoc.aspx?FileName=2008s 1094.ri.d
oc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber= 1094&Session=2008.
Elsewhere, however, it has been claimed that the typical casino boat dumps 79,800 gallons of
wastewater per week, see Surfrider Foundation, Florida Gambling Boat Pollution,
http://www.surfrider.org/sebastianinlet/news/gambling.htm (last visited July 15, 2008), and
that the cost to treat 1,000 gallons of waste water is $5. See Lyndsey Lewis, Senate Postpones
Vote on Waste Dumping Bill, BRADENTON HERALD, Mar. 23, 2007, at 10 (Local). As such,
operators can expect to annually pay roughly $20,000 per ship, in addition to the state's ad-
ministrative expenses (which could add another $10,000 a year if, as seems likely, two full-
time staffers are hired). Alternatively, for a one-time cost of approximately $100,000, a casi-
no boat can be equipped with a marine waste system known as "Dragonfly" that makes pump-
ing unnecessary. See Donna Balancia, Dragonfly Creates Buzz in Cruise Ship Industry, FLA.
TODAY, Aug. 22, 2007,
http://www.ajt.com/look/news/articles/0807-DragonflyCruiseBuzz.html.
68. The GV/COA has been crafted to try to avoid running afoul of United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), which makes it clear that states cannot regulate vessel design. By
instead focusing on the ports at which casino boats tie up, and making use of their facilities
optional (annual registration with the state and payment to the port being the only actual re-
quirements), the bill's supporters hope to come within the holding of Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), which gives states a relatively free hand
when overseeing shoreside activities. For a further discussion of what is and is not permissi-
ble, see Stephen Thomas, Jr., State Regulation of Cruise Ship Pollution: Alaska's Commer-
cial Passenger Vessel Compliance Program as a Model for Florida, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 533 (2004), and Laura K.S. Welles, Comment, Due to Loopholes in the Clean Water
Act, What Can a State Do to Combat Cruise Ship Dumping of Sewage and Gray Water?, 9
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 99 (2003).
69. 982 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
70. Id. at 1235.
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come more willing to issue prescriptions as her gambling losses mounted, the
government had not done enough to prove its theory.7'
The period's four other maritime cases all turned on highly technical
points of procedure. In PDS Gaming Corp. v. M/V Ocean Jewell [sic] of St.
Petersburg,72 the Eleventh Circuit reinstated the arrest of the M/V CASINO
ROYALE after slot machines belonging to PDS Gaming, and originally
placed aboard the MN OCEAN JEWEL, were transferred without PDS's
permission to the CASINO ROYALE.73 According to the court, the trial
judge had used the wrong standard in concluding that PDS had failed to
show that it was entitled to have the arrest continued.74
In Azevedo v. Carnival Corp. 7' a slot technician aboard the M/V
CELEBRATION whose appendectomy was misdiagnosed as menstrual pains
was found not to be subject to an arbitration clause and therefore entitled to
sue in state court.76
In In re: SunCruz Casinos, LLC,77 a seaman injured in an elevator mi-
shap aboard the MN SUNCRUZ VIII was permitted to file a late claim in
the line's bankruptcy proceeding, the court finding that at the time of the
original deadline the seaman had mistakenly believed he was fully recovered
from the accident.78
And in Lee v. Oceans Casino Cruises, Inc. ,79 which arose from a colli-
sion between two cars, one being driven by a casino boat employee and the
other by a husband and wife (the latter of whom suffered fatal injuries), the
Third District Court of Appeal held that the defendant vessel owner had
71. Id. at 1236-37. The information about Luyao's gambling habits had been excluded
from her 2005 trial, which ended in a hung jury, but was allowed in by a different judge at her
2006 retrial. See Derek Simmonsen, Former PSL Doctor Luyao May Be Granted a New
Trial, FORT PIERCE TRn., May 29, 2008, at Al.
72. No. 07-10088, 2007 WL 2988798 (11 th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007) (per curiam). Through-
out its opinion the court consistently misidentified the ship by misspelling the word "jewel."
Built in 1982 as the Russian car ferry M/V MIKHAIL SUSLOV, the vessel assumed its
present name in 2004 when it was brought to St. Petersburg. See Caryn Baird & Angie Holan,
Ocean Jewel History, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2005, at ID.
73. PDS, 2007 WL 2988798, at *1.
74. Id.
75. No. 08-20518-CIV, 2008 WL 2261195 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2008).
76. Id. at *8.
77. 377 B.R. 741 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 2007).
78. Id. at 745-48.
79. 983 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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failed to preserve for appeal the question of whether the plaintiffs' lawyer
had improperly impeached one of its experts.8°
VIII. STATE LOTTERY
During the year officials in Tallahassee looked into the idea of privatiz-
ing the Florida Lottery, a step that could net the state between $17 billion and
$31 billion.8' Any such move, however, will likely run into problems, inas-
much as the Florida Constitution prohibits private companies from conduct-
ing lotteries.82
The only lottery case reported during the year was Womack v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue,83 but the decision turned out to be a blockbuster.
Roland Womack and Maria Spiridakos, supported by 59 other past Florida
lottery winners, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit after the Tax Court held that
when future lottery payouts are sold for an immediate lump sum, the money
realized from the transaction is taxable as ordinary income. 84 The players
had argued that the payouts constituted a long-term capital asset, and as such
qualified for the more favorable tax treatment accorded such property. 5 In
rejecting this contention, the Eleventh Circuit wrote:
In defining "capital asset," Congress used the term "property" to
mean "not income"-that is, "property" serves to distinguish as-
sets suitable for capital gains treatment from mere income. "Prop-
erty" in the most general sense means anything owned, which
would also include income and any rights or claims to it. Even if
other statutes use "property" in this broad sense, to exclude substi-
tutes for income in determining what constitutes a capital asset is
80. Id. at 794. According to the court, any other result would "encourag[e] an attorney to
sit silently during trial, await the outcome, and complain only if [there was] an unfavorable
result." Id. at 795.
81. See Gary Fineout, Financial Firms Pushing for Private Florida Lottery, MiAMI
HERALD, Sept. 11, 2007, at B 1; John Kennedy, Crist Suggests Taking Lottery, Roads Private,
ORLANDO SENT., Sept. 5, 2007, at BI; Jerome R. Stockfisch, Would Lottery Lease Be State's
Winning Ticket?, TAMPA TRIB., at 1 (Nation/World). A number of other states, including
California, Illinois, and New York, are considering similar moves. See Nelson D. Schwartz &
Ron Nixon, Privatizing the Prize, N.Y. TtMEs, Oct. 14, 2007, at 3 (Bus.).
82. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7, which provides: "Lotteries ... are hereby prohibited in
this state." As a result, when it was decided in 1986 to have a state lottery, a constitutional
amendment was needed to overcome the ban. Because the language used says, "Lotteries may
be operated by the state," see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 15(a), it is unclear whether the state can
lease its lottery to a private outfit.
83. 510 F.3d 1295 (lth Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 1297-98.
85. Id. at 1302-07.
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consistent with the word "property." No other interpretation of
"property" would harmonize with the statute's purpose, as the very




In November 2007, after 16 years of contentious negotiations, Florida
and the Seminoles signed a gambling compact, thereby giving the tribe the
exclusive right to offer baccarat and blackjack (and, outside Broward and
Miami-Dade, the exclusive right to have Las Vegas-style slot machines). 87
Even before the ink had a chance to dry, however, Marco Rubio (R-West
Miami), the Speaker of the Florida House of the Representatives, filed suit in
the Florida Supreme Court, alleging that the governor had overstepped his
bounds and, in the process, violated the Florida Constitution's separation-of-
powers clause.88
Although oral argument took place in January 2008,89 by June 2008 no
decision had been issued.90 As a result, the Seminoles decided to begin of-
fering blackjack and baccarat, as well as various other table games, at their
Hard Rock casino in Hollywood. 9' Despite a steady rain, the grand opening,
starring actress Carmen Electra, drew a huge crowd, 92 and in the days that
86. Id. at 1304-05.
87. The compact's details are reviewed at length in Robert M. Jarvis, The 2007 Seminole-
Florida Gambling Compact, 12 GAMING L. REv. 13 (2008).
88. See Michael C. Bender, Rubio Seeks Halt to Crist-Seminoles Deal, PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 20, 2007, at 4A; Mary Ellen Klas, Rubio Asks Court to Block Seminole Deal,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 20, 2007, at Al; Alex Leary, Rubio Fights Gaming Pact, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at IA.
89. See Gary Fineout, Justices Question Validity of Crist-Seminole Pact, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 31, 2008, at B2, and Linda Kleindienst, State High Court Asked to Decide on Compact, S.
FLA. SUN-SENT., Jan. 31, 2008, at 3B.
90. The ruling finally came on July 3, 2008, and agreed with Rubio's position. See Flor-
ida House of Representatives v. Crist, 990 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2008). Although this seemed to
spell the end for the tribe's games, five days later a federal judge said they could continue.
See PPI, Inc. v. Kempthome, No. 4:08cv248-SPM, 2008 WL 2705431 (N.D. Fla. July 8,
2008).
91. See Nick C. Sortal, It's A Big Deal: Blackjack Starts June 22, S. FLA. SUN-SENT.,
June 7, 2008, at IB, and Seminole Casino Card Games Begin June 22, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 7, 2008, at 6B.
92. See Amy Driscoll, Amid Glitz, Blackjack's in the Cards, MIAMI HERALD, June 23,
2008, at B 1, and Charles Passy, Casino's Blackjack Debut a Big Deal, PALM BEACH POST,
June 23, 2008, at IA. Despite her fame and good looks, Electra admitted she was an odd
choice to host the grand opening: "I'm not a gambler at all. I'd rather be shopping." See
Madeleine Marr, Carmen Electra: She's A Big Deal, MIAMI HERALD, June 24, 2008, at A8.
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followed South Floridians eagerly lined up for a chance to lose their mon-
ey.93
X. CONCLUSION
While it is already being described as a gambling mecca by some,94
Florida currently poses no threat to either Atlantic City or Las Vegas. But it
is certainly gaining ground fast, and the future looks bright.
93. See Michael Mayo, Seminoles Hold All the Cards, S. FLA. SUN-SENT., June 24, 2008,
at lB.
94. See, e.g., Daniel Chang, Feeling Lucky? With Improved Gaming and Lavish Casinos,
South Florida's the New Sin City, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 21, 2007, at G6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Headlines read "100 Babies Safe Thanks to Safe Haven."1 On May 30,
2008, Florida reached a milestone as a healthy baby boy became the hun-
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
Stacie Schmerling Perez has a B.A. in Law Justice from Rowan University in New Jersey and
a Certification in Child Advocacy from Montclair State University, also in New Jersey. Prior
to attending law school, she worked in the dependency field for eight years as a child protec-
tive investigator, case manager, and supervisor in both New Jersey and Florida. The author
wishes to give special thanks to her family and friends for their continued love, support, and
encouragement, especially her husband Pablo and her mother Sue. She would also like to
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dredth newborn safely relinquished under the State's infant abandonment
law, commonly referred to as the "Safe Haven law."2 The infant's mother,
estimated to be in her twenties, explained that she was going through a bad
time as she handed the infant to a paramedic at a Pinellas County fire rescue
station and walked away.3 The baby boy was named "Nicholas" by those
who "saved" him.4 Nicholas will now be able to be adopted into a loving
home with parents who are ready and willing to care for him, while his
mother can have peace of mind knowing that she gave her son a chance at
life.' In a time where media coverage has increasingly alerted the public to
repeated occurrences of abandoned babies tragically found6 discarded in
dumpsters, trash cans, toilets, canals, and other horrific places,7 Florida's
Safe Haven law is saving babies lives.8
Many women are faced with unwanted pregnancies each year, but un-
fortunately some feel that they have no option other than to keep their preg-
nancy a secret and dispose of the baby after birth.' Florida's Safe Haven law
thank Professor Michael Dale for his guidance and direction, and the staff of Nova Law Re-
view for all of their hard work and dedication.
1. Kelly Allen, 100 Babies Safe Thanks to Safe Haven, SEMINOLE CHRON., June 18,
2008,
http://www.seminolechronicle.comvnews/display.v?TARGET=printable&article-id=485ab8
4982007. Several private adoption agencies recently submitted cases of safe surrenders occur-
ring over the last eight years that had not previously been included in the state's statistics,
thereby putting the number of safe surrenders well over one hundred and indicating that this
milestone may have been reached sooner. Telephone Interview with Nick E. Silverio, Found-
er, A Safe Haven for Newborns, The Gloria M. Silverio Foundation (Oct. 8, 2008).




5. See A Safe Haven for Newborns, Our Mission,
http://www.asafehavenfornewborns.com/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
6. Debbe Magnusen, From Dumpster to Delivery Room: Does Legalizing Baby Aban-
donment Really Solve the Problem?, 22 J. Juv. L. 1, 3 (2001-02).
7. Margaret Graham Tebo, Texas Idea Takes off: States Look to Safe Haven Laws as
Protection for Abandoned Infants, 87 A.B.A. J., 30, 30 (Sept. 2001); Nick E. Silverio, Editori-
al, Help Educate Community About Alternative for Information, SUN SENT., Sept. 8, 2003, at
21A.
8. Gary Taylor, Surrendered Infant Law Turns 8 Years Old, 100 Babies Saved,
ORLANDO SENT., July 1, 2008, at Al; Allen, supra note 1; Brecher, supra note 2.
9. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.asafehavenfornewborns.com/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008). Some of these
women kill their newborn before disposing of the body. See CHERYL L. MEYER ET AL.,
MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE AcTs OF MOMS FROM SUSAN
SMITH TO THE "PROM MOM" 53 (2001). This is known as "neonaticide" or "infanticide" and is
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offers an alternative to the above scenario by allowing parents to anony-
mously surrender newborn babies, approximately seven days old, at any hos-
pital, emergency medical services station, or fire station with no questions
asked, as long as there are no signs of abuse or neglect. 0 Florida was one of
many states to enact Safe Haven legislation in the early 2000s" after what
seemed to be a rash of unsafe infant abandonments.12 Florida's legislation
was prompted by the discovery of six discarded newborns in the span of a
single month in early 2000.13 While some "dumped" babies are fortunate
enough to be found in time to survive, sadly, many are not so lucky.1 4 Critics
of the Safe Haven law argue that it encourages abandonment, 5 it is not likely
to help those it is intended for, 16 and that it deprives children knowledge of
their family and genealogical histories. 7
Part II of this article will discuss the phenomenon of newborn aban-
donment and the reasons why some parents choose to dispose of their child-
ren in such a manner. Part III will discuss the history of infant abandonment
laws. It will begin with a brief introduction of the European system and will
trace how the laws developed in the United States. Part IV of this article will
discuss the history of Florida's Safe Haven law. It will then address the var-
ious provisions that must be complied with in order to legally relinquish a
child in Florida, as well as the rights and responsibilities of the child's par-
ents, the Safe Haven locations, and adoption agencies. It will also outline the
recent amendments to the law. Part V will give an overview of the agency
that promotes Florida's Safe Haven law and will discuss some criticisms of
the law. Part VI of the article will detail the need for certain changes that
will make the law even more effective. Finally, Part VII will conclude that
there is still some room for improvement, but Florida's Safe Haven law is
saving the lives of unwanted newborns.
defined as "[tihe act of killing a newborn child, esp. by the parents or with their consent."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (8th ed. 2004).
10. See FLA. STAT. § 383.50(1), (5) (2008).
11. Child Welfare League of America, Baby Abandonment Project, available at
http://www.cwla.org/programs/pregprev/flocrittsafehaven.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008)
[hereinafter CWLA, Baby Abandonment Project].
12. Tebo, supra note 7, at 30.
13. Shelby Oppel, Lawmakers Want to Have Safe Places for Abandoned Babies, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at lB.
14. Silverio, supra note 7.
15. Adam Pertman, Measure Aims at Saving Abandoned Babies, Statewide "Safe Ha-
vens" Eyed, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 2000, at B3 [hereinafter Pertman, Measure].
16. Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven Laws,
http://bastards.org/mediaroom/babyAbandonment.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
17. David Crary, Baby "Safe-Haven" Laws Criticized, SUN SENT., Mar. 10, 2003, at 3A;
Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven Laws, supra note 16.
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II. THE PLIGHT OF ABANDONED NEWBORNS
A. The Prevalence of Infant Abandonment
Baby abandonment "is when an infant under the age of [twelve] months
is discarded or left alone for an extended period of time in a public/private
setting with an intention to dispose of the baby." 18 It is unknown exactly how
prevalent baby abandonment really is since "[t]he federal government does
not have a formal" system to gather the data, and states do not maintain the
information uniformly. 9 However, in 1998, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services conducted a survey of nationwide media reports
which found that one hundred and five infants were discovered abandoned in
public places throughout the country, thirty-three of which were found
dead.2°
Although baby abandonment is not a new problem, it only began to gain
public attention in the 1990s as "newspaper and media coverage" increasing-
ly publicized instances of abandoned babies found in dumpsters, trash cans,
and other outrageous places.2' Two high profile cases made their way
around the media circuit nationwide. In 1997, Melissa Drexler, an eighteen
year old New Jersey high school senior, gave birth to a baby boy in the re-
stroom at her senior prom.22 Dubbed the "Prom Mom," Drexler hid her
pregnancy from her boyfriend and her parents.23 She delivered the baby in a
toilet, strangled him, and threw his body in a trash can before heading back
to the dance floor.24 Seven months prior to this, college students Amy
Grossberg and Brian Peterson killed their baby minutes after he was bom,
18. Child Welfare League of America, Baby Abandonment: Fact Sheet,
http://www.cwla.org/programs/baby/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008) [hereinafter CWLA,
Baby Abandonment: Fact Sheet].
19. Id.
20. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fam. L. & Child., HB 1901 (2000) Staff Analysis 1, 2 & n.1
(final June 14, 2000), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/House/bills/analysis/pdf/HB 1901 S IZ.Flc.pdf
[hereinafter HB 1901 Staff Analysis]; Magnusen, supra note 6, at 4-5; Janelle A. Weber,
Babies Discarded Despite Abandonment Law in Florida, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Apr. 29, 2001,
at 5A.
21. Magnusen, supra note 6, at 3; Tebo, supra note 7, at 30; Silverio, supra note 7.
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throwing his body in the trash outside of the Delaware motel room Grossberg
gave birth in.25 Grossberg had also concealed her pregnancy.26
B. Parents Who Kill or Otherwise Discard of Their Children
Experts have found that mothers who abandon or kill their infants are
often "motivated by panic, shame, or both," 27 and feel "that they have no
alternative. '28 While these mothers span across "all age[s], ethnicit[ies], and
socioeconomic status[es],"29 they are most often young, single girls who live
with family.3° These girls feel isolated, they are in denial,3' and they conceal
their pregnancies out of fear that they will not be supported, or that they will
be rejected by their family or boyfriends.32 They feel completely alone and
are left in their isolation to deal "with problems that they are not psychologi-
cally or emotionally equipped to handle. 33 Because some girls are in such
"complete denial of their pregnanc[y]," they do not even realize when they
are in labor.34 They typically give birth alone and panic when they see a
newborn, since they never acknowledged their pregnancy.35 Some even
think they are having menstrual cramps or that they have to defecate so they
give birth on the toilet, often passing out from the strain and exhaustion of
labor and leaving the baby to drown or otherwise die from neglect. 36 Others
are in such a dissociative state that they do not remember giving birth and are
shocked when they find out what happened to their child.37 Older women
who abandon their infants often cannot handle the emotional and financial
25. Susan K. Livio, Some Call Newborn Haven Law a Quick Fix, Critics Seek Focus on
Prevention, Aid, STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 30, 2001, at 9.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
29. Id.
30. See generally MEYER ET AL., supra note 9 (describing the common characteristics
throughout multiple cases of mothers who have killed their children).
31. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
32. See MEYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 52-53.
33. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
34. MEYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 53. Some women are in such deep denial that their
bodies do not even change during pregnancy and they continue to menstruate and gain very
little weight. Id.
35. See id. at 53-54.
36. See id.; Jessica Garrison, Few Babies are Finding 'Safe Haven,' L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2003, at Al.
37. MEYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 53-54.
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strain of parenthood, but they realize this too late in their pregnancy for an
abortion."8
The primary goal of the Safe Haven law is to save the lives of unwanted
babies by reducing the number of unsafe infant abandonments. 39 The objec-
tive is to give desperate parents who are clearly unprepared for parenthood
an alternative that allows them to save not only the child, but themselves,
"from a lifetime of guilt and criminal prosecution." 4 Mothers who might
have killed or otherwise "recklessly abandon[ed] their newborns" can legally
drop off their babies at designated locations with no questions asked.4'
I1. THE HISTORY OF NEWBORN ABANDONMENT LAWS
A. European Foundlings
Child abandonment is not a new phenomenon in the United States or
throughout the world,42 and the concept of Safe Havens has been well estab-
lished for quite some time.43 In the thirteenth century, the Catholic Church
introduced the foundling home system in Europe to combat the large number
of abandoned infants." A revolving cradle or "wheel" was placed on the
side of churches or houses, and mothers would place their babies in the
cradle in the middle of the night, ring a bell, and flee.45 The cradle was then
rotated into the church and the baby was saved. 6 Foundling homes became
prominent throughout Italy, and eventually made their way to France, Spain,
and Portugal.47 Thousands of babies were saved in this manner before the
system was abandoned in the nineteenth century.48 However, several other
countries in Europe and even one in Africa currently utilize various methods
of legalized baby relinquishment. 49 Germany uses a "baby slot" system,
38. Livio, supra note 25.
39. Magnusen, supra note 6, at 3; Tebo, supra note 7, at 30.
40. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
41. Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 753, 754-55 (2006).
42. Magnusen, supra note 6, at 3.
43. See Sanger, supra note 41, at 762.
44. DAVID I. KERTZER, SACRIFICED FOR HONOR: ITALIAN INFANT ABANDONMENT AND THE
POLITICS OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL 8 (1993).
45. Id. at 97.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 10.
48. See id. at 158.
49. See Ana L. Partida, Note, The Case for "Safe Haven" Laws: Choosing the Lesser of
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Hungary has various "anonymous drop-off locations," and Johannesburg,
South Africa uses "the revolving crib" system as a form of legalized aban-
donment."
B. Activists Take Action
Grass roots activists in several jurisdictions throughout the United
States also implemented unofficial Safe Haven laws prior to the enactment of
any legislation.5  A nurse in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania began "Baskets for
Babies," after a newborn baby was found discarded in a plastic trash bag
behind her church. 2 She initially lined an old laundry basket with a warm
blanket and placed it on her porch.5 3 After initiating a public-awareness
campaign targeted at young mothers who think they have no options, 608
Pittsburgh families began "leav[ing] their porch lights on" with warm
baskets ready to save a newborn and help a desperate mother. 4 Similarly, a
local television reporter in Mobile, Alabama initiated a movement after she
covered two tragic cases of infant abandonment in 1998."5 With the help of
district attorney, John Tyson, "A Secret Safe Place for Newborns" began. 6
In an effort to save babies from the grim fate of being "dumped," mothers
were permitted to abandon their newborns at hospitals within Mobile and
then walk away with no questions asked.57 Tyson "agreed not to prosecute
the mothers" as long as the infants were brought in unharmed within three
days of their birth.58
C. Texas Paves the Way
In 1999, Texas became the first state to officially adopt a Safe Haven
statute.59 The law allows unwanted newborns to be legally abandoned at
certain designated locations-safe havens-without fear of criminal prosecu-
50. Id.





56. Roche, supra note 51.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The Baby Moses Project, Background & Purpose,
http://www.babymosesproject.org/background.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008); see H.R.
3423, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999), available at
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tion.60 It was enacted after a disturbing pattern of infant abandonments be-
gan to emerge in the state, as thirteen babies were discarded within a ten
month period in Houston alone.6 1 The Texas Safe Haven law has often been
referred to as the "Baby Moses law," based on the Bible story where baby
Moses was placed in a basket by his mother, cast to sea down the Nile River,
and "watched over by an anonymous protector until" being taken in by an
Egyptian pharaoh's daughter, who provided necessary love and care. 62 Like
the Bible story, under the law, newborns are provided with a protector and
the desperate mothers who choose this safe, "responsible alternative to aban-
donment" are provided with anonymity.
63
In 2000, fourteen states, including Florida, followed Texas' lead and
enacted similar legislation.' Between 2001 and 2002, twenty-seven more
states passed infant abandonment laws,65 and as of 2008, "[a]ll [fifty] states
have . . . some version of [a] 'Safe Haven"' law.' Safe Haven laws vary
from state to state, but they all address the ages of children that may be left,
where children may be left,67 and who can leave them.68 Additionally, all
60. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.301-.308 (2002 & Supp. 2007); Tebo, supra note
7, at 30.
61. Houston Fights Foundling Trend, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 30, 1999, at
lB.
62. The Baby Moses Project, http://www.babymosesproject.org/index.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2008); Tebo, supra note 7, at 30.
63. The Baby Moses Project, supra note 62.
64. See CWLA, Baby Abandonment Project, supra note 11.
65. See id.
66. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.
67. Magnusen, supra note 6, at 7-8. The age limit of newborns that can be relinquished
typically ranges anywhere from seventy-two hours up to one year of age. Id. at 7; CWLA,
Baby Abandonment Project, supra note 11. Nebraska was the last state to enact safe haven
legislation and the law stated that any "child" could be abandoned at a hospital, but this
proved to be very problematic since the term "child" was not defined and was interpreted to
include minors up to nineteen. See Timberly Ross, "Safe Haven" Law Backfires, SUN SENT.,
Sept. 27, 2008, at 8A. Since the law became effective in July 2008, thirty-six children were
abandoned, ranging in age from one to seventeen, including nine from one family and several
from out of state. Id.; Age Limit for Nebraska Safe-Haven Law Debated, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 18,
2008, at A18; Boy Left in Nebraska as Law is Changed, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 23, 2008, at A30.
The law was meant to protect at risk infants so state lawmakers were forced to call a special
legislative session due to the unintended loophole. Age Limit for Nebraska Safe-Haven Law
Debated, supra note 67. On November 21, 2008, the law was changed to limit the age at
which children can be surrendered to thirty days old or less. Boy Left in Nebraska as Law is
Changed, supra note 67. Designated Safe Haven locations vary from state to state, and in-
clude anything from hospital emergency rooms only, to emergency medical services stations,
fire stations, clinics, churches, and any appropriate person or suitable location. Magnusen,
supra note 6, at 8-9 & n.62; CWLA, Baby Abandonment Project, supra note 11.
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laws offer anonymity to the parents and either immunity from prosecution, or
an affirmative defense.69
IV. FLORIDA'S SAFE HAVEN LAW
A. The Newborn Baby Dumping Epidemic
Congress began to address the issue of baby abandonment when it
enacted the Abandoned Infants Assistance Act in 1988.' 0 However, the Act
only pertained to "boarder babies," infants who were typically exposed to
drugs or HIV perinatally and abandoned in hospitals.71 By 2000, many states
had also begun to enact legislation geared at addressing the problem of un-
safely abandoned newborns. 72 The legislation provided anonymity and li-
mited immunity to parents who relinquish newborns at certain designated
safe locations; however, Florida had no such law.73
In 2000, Senator John Grant and Representative Sandra L. Murman
sponsored House Bill 1901 after a baby boy, estimated to be approximately
two hours old, was discovered in a garbage bag next to an apartment com-
plex trash can in Tampa. 74 His nurses named him Benjamin, and the lucky
boy survived, although doctors stated that he would not have been so fortu-
nate had he been outside in the morning cold another half-hour or so. 75 Baby
Benjamin was one of six newborns found discarded in a public place
throughout the state in a one month period.76
As media reports continued to indicate that mothers of all ages were ab-
andoning infants in various public places, the Legislature determined that the
newborn abandonment epidemic was of "significant public interest and...
concern." 77 Finding that newborns in Florida and across the country had
"suffered and died as the result of abandonment in life-threatening situa-
tions," that "the parents of newborn infants are often under severe emotional
68. CWLA, Baby Abandonment Project, supra note 11. States vary as to who can leave
a child at a Safe Haven, designating anyone from just the mother, to either parent, to a person
with custody, to a person authorized by the parent, and the broadest category designates any
person at all. Id.
69. Magnusen, supra note 6, at 7-8.
70. HB 1901 Staff Analysis, supra note 20, at 2.
71. Id. at 2 & n.2.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id.
74. See Oppel, supra note 13.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. HB 1901 Staff Analysis, supra note 20, at 2.
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stress," and that "anonymity, confidentiality, and freedom from prosecution
for parents may encourage them to leave a newborn infant safely and thus
save the newborn infant's life,"78 the Legislature almost unanimously passed
House Bill 1901." The legislation amended existing abandonment laws and
specifically focused "on the problem of parents abandoning newborn in-
fants."8 'The legislation was signed by Governor Jeb Bush on June 2, 2000,
and Florida's Safe Haven law became effective on July 1, 2000.81
B. Florida's Fight to Save the Lives of Discarded Infants
1. Legally Relinquishing a Newborn Infant
Until 2008, Florida's statute defined a newborn infant as "a child that a
licensed physician reasonably believes to be approximately 3 days old or
younger at the time the child is left at a hospital, emergency medical services
station, or fire station. 82 Although the Safe Haven law does not apply to
babies older than the age limit, Safe Havens do not reject these children.83 In
August 2007, a "[seventeen] year old mother" dropped off her healthy eight
month old daughter at a Florida fire station saying that she could no longer
care for the child.8 The mother hoped to be protected under the Safe Haven
law, but the protections afforded by it were not available in this case due to
the baby's age.85 Even though the child could not be legally surrendered
under the law, staff at the fire station took her in to avoid a potentially fatal
result that could have occurred had her mother been turned away. 86 The baby
was placed in the custody of the Florida Department of Children and Fami-
lies pending a search for her parents.87
Under Florida law, either parent can legally relinquish a newborn at a
designated Safe Haven location.88 The law presumes that a "parent who
78. Act effective July 1, 2000, Ch. 2000-188, 2000 Fla. Laws at 1944 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 383.50 (2007)).
79. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 2000 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY oFHOUSE BILLS at 389, HB 1901.
80. HB 1901 Staff Analysis, supra note 20, at 4.
81. 2000 Fla. Laws at 1953.
82. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(1) (2007) (amended by Act effective July 1, 2008, ch. 2008-90,
§ 4, 2008 Fla. Laws 1012, 1015).
83. Sanger, supra note 41, at 768.
84. Walter Pacheco & Sarah Langbein, 8-Month-Old Left at Apopka Fire Station,




88. See FLA. STAT. § 383.50(2) (2007).
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leaves [a] newborn infant in accordance with this [law] intended to leave the
newborn infant and consented to termination of parental rights." 89
As originally enacted section 383.50 of the Florida Statutes allowed
parents to leave their newborn infants at hospital emergency rooms or fully
staffed fire stations.90 This offered parents an alternative to abandoning their
baby "in an area that may threaten the [child's] health and safety." 91 Howev-
er, in 2001, Safe Haven designations were expanded to include "emergency
medical services station[s.] ' '92 "Each emergency medical services station or
fire station staffed with full-time firefighters, emergency medical techni-
cians, or paramedics shall accept any newborn infant left with a firefighter,
emergency medical technician, or paramedic. 93 The newborn must be left
with a designated person at one of the designated locations in order to be
afforded protection under the law.94 Consequently, if a newborn is left at a
location that is not a designated Safe Haven, the parents will likely face
harsh legal penalties even if they leave the child somewhere that seems like a
safe place such, as a church.95
2. Anonymity and Immunity: The Enticing Provisions
When a parent leaves a child with a designated person at a designated
Safe Haven location "and expresses an intent to leave the newborn infant and
not return, [he or she] has [an] absolute right to remain anonymous and to
leave at any time," unless there are signs of "child abuse or neglect. '96 Par-
ents relinquishing a child in compliance with the law may be questioned
about relevant medical and family history; however, they do not have to an-
swer any questions,97 and they cannot be pursued if they walk away.98 Fur-
thermore, "[t]he identity of a parent who leaves" a child at a designated Safe
Haven location is confidential and will not be disclosed to anyone except "a
person claiming to be a parent of the [child]." 99
89. Id.
90. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(5) (2000).
91. HB 1901 Staff Analysis, supra note 20, at 4.
92. Act effective May 23, 2001, ch. 2001-53, § 15, 2001 Fla. Laws 326, 337 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 383.50(1), (3), (5), (6), (9) (2000)).
93. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(3) (2008).
94. See id. § 383.50(9).
95. Kelly Griffith, Outreach Has Mission of Saving Babies, ORLANDO SENT., June 3,
2007, at B 1.
96. FLA. STAT. §§ 383.50(5), (10).
97. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 95.
98. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(5), (10).
99. FLA. STAT. § 383.51 (2007).
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Additionally, parents relinquishing a child under the law are immune
from prosecution.' °° A criminal investigation will not be initiated "unless
there is actual or suspected child abuse or neglect" other than the legal aban-
donment of a child at a designated Safe Haven location."°1
3. Protocols After Relinquishment
When a newborn is left with a "firefighter, emergency medical techni-
cian, or paramedic," he or she is to consider this "as implied consent to and
shall ... [p]rovide emergency medical services to the newborn infant to the
extent he or she is trained to provide those services."' 2 After providing ne-
cessary emergency medical services, "[t]he firefighter, emergency medical
technician, or paramedic [is to a]rrange for the immediate transportation of
the newborn infant to the nearest hospital having emergency services."10 3
Similarly, when a newborn is left at a hospital by a parent, this act is
considered "implied consent for treatment" and the hospital is "to perform all
necessary emergency [medical] services and care."' ' Hospitals providing
emergency services are required to admit any newborn left at the facility
while hospitals without emergency rooms may exercise discretion in whether
or not to admit the newborn for treatment. 0 5 Newborns admitted to the hos-
pital in accordance with the law are presumed eligible for Medicaid cover-
age. 106
Fire departments, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and pa-
ramedics who treat or transport a newborn infant, and hospitals and licensed
health care professionals who treat newborns are "immune from criminal or
civil liability for acting in good faith [pursuant to] this section." 107 However,
liability is not limited for acts of negligence.0 8
After a newborn is admitted, hospitals are immediately required to
"contact a local licensed child-placing agency or" the state's "central abuse
hotline for the name of' such an agency in order to facilitate the transfer of
physical custody of the child."° The state adoption information center is
required to maintain "a list of licensed child-placing agencies [able] to take
100. Id. § 383.50(10).
101. Id.
102. Id. § 383.50(3)(a).
103. Id. § 383.50(3)(b).
104. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(4).
105. See id.
106. Id. § 383.50(8).
107. Id. §§ 383.50(3)(b), (4).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(7).
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custody of and place newborn[s]" abandoned under the Safe Haven law, and
the names of these agencies are to be provided to the state's central abuse
hotline on a rotating basis."10 A newborn left at a designated Safe Haven
location is not considered abandoned under the state's child abuse laws, so
there is no requirement for mandatory reporting to the child abuse hotline or
for an investigation by a child protective agency "unless there is actual or
suspected abuse. 1 . However, if there is evidence of "actual or suspected
child abuse or neglect, the hospital" is to report such suspicion to the state-
wide central abuse hotline instead "of contacting a licensed child-placing
agency."'"
12
Once "[a] licensed child-placing agency... takes physical custody of [a
newborn]" from the hospital, it "assume[s] responsibility for all medical
[and] other costs." 13 The agency must immediately seek an emergency court
order for custody of the child, which "remain[s] in effect until the court or-
ders preliminary approval of placement of the [child] in [a] prospective
[adoptive] home."" 4 Within twenty-four hours after taking physical custody
of the child, the child-placing agency must seek "assistance from law en-
forcement" to ensure that the infant is not listed as a missing child with any
of the national or state missing children databases.' Up until 2008, the
child-placing agency was required to "initiate a diligent search" within seven
days of taking custody of the child in order "to notify and to obtain consent
from a parent whose identity is known but whose location is unknown."'" 6 In
addition, "[c]onstructive notice [was required to] be provided ...in the
county where the [child] was abandoned."'"17
4. Change of Heart
A Tampa woman who had cared for her baby boy for the "first three
days of his life," ultimately made the difficult decision that she could not
keep him.""' 8 On Mother's Day 2007, she delivered the clean, swaddled
baby to the Hillsborough County Fire Station in accordance with the Safe
110. FLA. STAT. § 63.167(2)(f) (2007).
111. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(9).
112. Id. § 383.50(7).
113. FLA. STAT. § 63.0423(1) (2007).
114. Id. § 63.0423(2).
115. Id. § 63.0423(3).
116. Id. § 63.0423(4) (amended by Act effective July 1, 2008, ch. 2008-90, § 3, 2008 Fla.
Laws 1012, 1014).
117. Id.
118. Michael A. Mohammed, Mother Asks to Reclaim Baby, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May
16, 2007, at 3B.
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Haven law." 9 Two days later, she went back to the fire station wanting to
reclaim her baby. 20 This was the third time a mother in Florida had asked
for her child back under the State's Safe Haven law. 2 ' Pursuant to the law,
parents of a newborn left at a designated Safe Haven location may reclaim
the child at any time "up until the court enters [an order] terminating... pa-
rental rights."'22 Such a claim must either "be made to the entity [that has]
physical or legal custody of the [child] or to the ... court [where] proceed-
ings involving the [child] are pending."' 123
A "termination of parental rights [petition] may not be filed until [at
least] 30 days after the date the [newborn] was" abandoned.' 24 Until 2008,
"[a] petition for termination of parental rights [would] be granted" if the par-
ents consented to adoption, or if "an affidavit of nonpaternity [was] executed
by a parent;" if a parent "failed to reclaim or claim the [newborn] within the
time ... specified in s[ection] 383.50;" or if parental consent was "waived by
the court.' ' 125 When a parent seeks to reclaim an abandoned infant, the court
may order DNA "testing to establish maternity or paternity."126 The court is
required to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, and can order an "inves-
tigation, home evaluation, and [a] psychological evaluation" of the parent
seeking to reclaim the child in order to determine whether it is in the child's
best interest to be placed with that parent. 27
In addition to the ability to reclaim a child prior to the termination of
parental rights, the birth parent of an abandoned newborn may file a motion
to set aside a judgment of termination of parental rights within one year after
such a judgment has been entered. 128 If "the court finds that a person kno-
wingly gave false information that prevented the birth parent from timely
making known his or her desire to assume parental responsibilities toward
the minor or from exercising his or her parental rights," any "judgment ter-






122. FLA. STAT. § 383.50(6) (2008).
123. Id.
124. FLA. STAT. § 63.0423(5) (2008).
125. FLA. STAT. § 63.0423(5) (2007).
126. FLA. STAT. § 63.0423(7)(a) (2008).
127. Id. § 63.0423(7)(b).
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C. House Bill 7007: Expanding the Law and Eliminating the Stigma
In 2008, House Bill 7007 proposed several amendments to Florida's
Safe Haven law. 130 House Bill 7007 was unanimously passed by both the
House and the Senate."' It was approved by Governor Charlie Crist on May
28, 2008, and the amendments became effective on July 1, 2008.,32
Under the amendments, the term "abandoned" was replaced with the
term "surrendered" throughout applicable statutes. 33 This change was made
because the word "abandoned" has many negative connotations and psycho-
logically, it can discourage women from utilizing the law. 134 The hope is that
some of the stigma associated with giving up a baby will now be taken
away. 3
5
The amendments also extended the time in which a newborn infant may
be safely surrendered from three days to seven days. 136 This extension gives
parents "more time to make a constructive and life affirming decision for the
infant and themselves.' 37 The goal is to prevent unsafe abandonment by
mothers who make the decision that they cannot care for their child after the
child is three days old.
13
The requirement that licensed child-placing agencies conduct "a diligent
search to notify and to obtain consent" from the known parent of a surren-
dered newborn was eliminated by the amendments.139 It has been replaced
with a provision stating that a parent surrendering an infant in accordance
with the law "is presumed to have consented to termination of parental
rights, and express consent is not required."'140 In addition, child-placing
agencies are now prohibited from attempting "to pursue, search for, or noti-
fy" the parent of adoption proceedings unless there is actual or suspected
abuse or neglect. 4 '
130. H.R. 7007, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008).
131. Brecher, supra note 2.
132. Act effective July 1, 2008, Ch. 2008-90, § 3, 2008 Fla. Laws 1012, 1017.
133. See generally id.
134. Id.
135. See Brecher, supra note 2.
136. Ch. 2008-90, § 3, 2008 Fla. Laws at 1016 (amending FLA. STAT. § 383.50(1) (2007)).
137. Allen, supra note 1.
138. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Healthcare, HB 7007 (2008) Staff Analysis 2 (original Feb. 15,
2008), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2008/House/bills/analysis/pdf/h7007.HCC.pdf [hereinaf-
ter HB 7007 Staff Analysis].
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Under the new amendments, a petition for termination of parental rights
may only be granted if "a parent has failed to reclaim or claim the surren-
dered" child within the specified timeframe' 42 The provisions allowing for a
termination of parental rights petition to be granted if a parent consented to
adoption, filed an affidavit of nonpaternity, or if the court waived consent
have been eliminated.
143
Additionally, if a parent leaves a child at the hospital, the newborn must
be left with emergency room staff in order for the surrender to comply with
the law. 1" However, in practice, the surrender of a child anywhere in the
hospital has been treated as a safe abandonment.1 45 Because the identity of
hospital patients is known, another provision has been added to the law in
order to further protect the confidentiality of the birth mother of a surren-
dered newborn.'" If a mother gives birth in a hospital and "expresses [an]
intent to leave the infant and not return," the hospital is now to "complete the
[child's] birth certificate without naming the mother" if she so requests.'47
V. A SUCCESS OR A QUICK Fix?
A. The Gloria M. Silverio Foundation: A Safe Haven for Newborns
Since July 2000, over one hundred newborns have been saved thanks to
Florida's Safe Haven law.'48 All of the newborns who have been legally
surrendered have been placed in homes through private adoption agencies.
149
Much of Florida's success is due to the Gloria M. Silverio Foundation's
(Foundation), "A Safe Haven for Newborns," a nonprofit organization estab-
lished by Nick Silverio in 2001 "in response to the tragedy of newborn aban-
donment in Florida."'50 The mission of "A Safe Haven for Newborns" is to
142. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 63.0423(5) (2007)).
143. Id.
144. See HB 7007 Staff Analysis, supra note 138, at 3.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Ch. 2008-90, § 4, 2008 Fla. Laws at 1017 (amending FLA. STAT. § 383.50(5)).
148. Taylor, supra note 8; Allen, supra note 1; Brecher, supra note 2.
149. Sarah Lundy, Giving a Baby a New Start, ORLANDO SENT., July 4, 2006, at Al.
150. A Safe Haven for Newborns, The Beginning,
http://www.asafehavenfomewborns.comlaboutus.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008); Brecher,
supra note 2. Nick Silverio began the foundation after his wife of thirty-one years, Gloria,
was tragically killed in a 1999 car accident. A Safe Haven for Newborns, The Beginning,
supra note 150; Brecher, supra note 2. Silverio, himself, has been widely credited with rais-
ing the law's profile and saving the lives of newborns that may "have ended up in canals, trash
bins, or toilets." Brecher, supra note 2. Over the past seven years, he has talked about the
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save the lives of newborn infants "in danger of abandonment and to help
preserve the health of their mothers and future of their mothers and fa-
thers."' I Its vision is "[t]o eliminate infant abandonment in Florida thru [sic]
education, prevention and community involvement and to assist pregnant
girls/women to realize a productive future."' 52 The Foundation promotes and
maintains greater awareness of Florida's Safe Haven law. 153 It is also the
primary source for compiling and maintaining information and statistics on
the law's effectiveness."5
Originally established in Miami, the Foundation has "'Partnered' with
the Florida Fire Chiefs Association, Emergency Medical Services, many
[h]ospitals, and many other organizations," and now has chapters in sixty-
seven counties throughout the state. 155 The organization has an advisory
board and a twenty-four hour, seven days a week multi-lingual referral help
line in English, Spanish, and Creole. 56 The help line was initially created to
educate young mothers wanting to know more about the Safe Haven law, but
it has expanded to help girls, women, and mothers in crisis deal with a wide
variety of problems.157 Counselors are available around the clock to speak
with desperate mothers in their moment of need. 158 Mothers can even call in
advance to arrange for the surrender of their child. 59 Baby Iris's mother
found out about the law from literature at a clinic, and she made arrange-
ments with a volunteer at the Safe Haven hotline to surrender her baby a
week before giving birth."6 She contacted the hotline again after delivering
her daughter and met with a counselor who handed the baby over to a wait-
ing firefighter as the mother looked on from the car.16
1
There are more than seventeen thousand Safe Haven locations through-
out Florida. 162 In 2007, the Foundation launched a statewide marketing cam-
paign equipped "with billboards and advertisements on bus-stop [coverings]
and mall benches to educate the public on" Florida's Safe Haven law. 163 The
foundation, its goals, "raising money for the helpline, billboards," and other marketing me-
thods to anyone who would listen. Id.




155. A Safe Haven for Newborns, The Beginning, supra note 150.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Brecher, supra note 2.
159. Lundy, supra note 149.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Foundation sponsors public service announcements for television, radio, and
print, '64 as well as "training videos for Safe Haven locations" and schools.
1 65
Earlier this year, Broward Sheriffs Office emergency rescue vehicles began
displaying stickers promoting the law. 66 Additionally, Polk County officials
have launched an ongoing "campaign to better train [its] fire and rescue per-
sonnel" on the law.
167
Catholic high schools throughout the state have implemented a program
developed by the Foundation in order to educate teens on the Safe Haven
law. 168 Students are given a scenario about a teenage girl who is a successful
student, has a close relationship with her parents, and has lots of friends. 69
She becomes quiet and withdrawn, drops out of gym class, "and starts wear-
ing baggy clothes" after "her boyfriend breaks up with her."' 7° Based on her
behavior, she may be pregnant and trying to hide it.' 71 Students are asked to
play the role of the girl's best friend and get her to talk about the situation.'72
The goal is to get her "to talk to her parents or" another adult that she knows,
but if that fails the goal is to get her to talk to someone at the Safe Haven
hotline. 7 3 The Foundation is hoping to get public schools to implement the
program as well.
74
Unfortunately, although the Safe Haven law provides parents with a
safe, legal alternative to infant abandonment, there is still the occasional tra-
gedy of a newborn dying due to being unsafely abandoned. 175 The Garden of
Innocence is a special place to honor the memory of these precious little ba-
bies. 76 Woodlawn Park Cemeteries donated a plot and headstone which
"provide[s] a dignified, peaceful, final resting place for any newborn that is
abandoned in Florida, tragically resulting in their death.' 7 7 The hope is that
an innocent child never has to be placed in this Garden. 178 However, suppor-
164. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Our Mission, supra note 5.
165. Allen, supra note 1.
166. Joel Marino, Baby Rescued from Garbage, SUN SENT., July 3, 2008, at lB.
167. Griffith, supra note 95.





173. Brecher, supra note 2.
174. Id.
175. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Garden of Innocence,






Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/1
COMBATING THE "BABY DUMPING" EPIDEMIC
ters of the Safe Haven law say that it is worthwhile even if it only saves one
infant's life.
179
B. Critics Take Aim
When Florida's Safe Haven law was enacted, the Department of Health
and the Department of Children and Family Services were required to "pro-
duce a media campaign to promote" it.' 80 The campaign was "to inform the
public" that parents relinquishing a newborn under the law are entitled to
confidentiality, "limited immunity from criminal prosecution," and the right
to reclaim the newborn.' 8' Although "the law went into effect in July 2000,"
there was initially little public awareness since funding for the marketing
campaign did not come through until January 2002.182 Early reports indi-
cated that the law did not work because no one knew it existed. 83 In 2002,
Florida's Department of Health and Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices were finally given one hundred thousand dollars to initiate a media
campaign designed "to inform the public about the law."'" However, even
though Florida's Safe Haven law has been in place for eight years, many
people still do not know it exists. 85
Although the law authorizes the anonymous, legal abandonment of
newborns, infants are still being discarded in unsafe places.'86 Approximate-
ly five newborns are abandoned unsafely each year in Florida. 187 Since 2000,
forty-two newborns have been left in risky places including dumpsters, front
porches, bushes, hotel trash cans, the beach, a canal, and a church. 88 While
eighteen of these infants were found alive, tragically, twenty-four were
not.189 Miami-Dade County has seen the most unsafe infant abandonments
with eight since 2000, followed closely by Broward County with five.190 The
179. Crary, supra note 17.
180. Act effective July 1, 2000, ch. 2000-188, § 7, 2000 Fla. Laws 1944, 1953.
181. Id.
182. Tom Zucco, The Cradle's Empty at Florida's Safe Havens, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs,
Aug. 8, 2002, at ID.
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. See Griffith, supra note 95; see Ani Martinez, Women Reminded of Safe Haven Law,
MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 2007, at 2B.
186. Griffith, supra note 95.
187. Allen, supra note 1.
188. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Babies Abandoned,
http://www.asafehavenfornewborns.comtragedies.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
189. Id.
190. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Babies Statistics,
http://www.asafehavenfomewborns.com/babiesstatistics.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).
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highest number of unsafe abandonments since the law was enacted was in
2003, when nine babies were discovered throughout the state, four of which
were found dead. 9'
During the research for this article, a thirty year old woman gave birth
to a baby and attempted to dispose of the newborn in the trash. 192 On June
14, 2008, Meisha Morant gave birth to the baby girl by herself at a friend's
Broward County home. 193 She never admitted to being pregnant and she hid
her growing belly beneath layers of baggy clothes. 194 After giving birth, Mo-
rant cut the newborn's umbilical cord with scissors and stuffed the baby in a
garbage bag filled with trash. 195 When the homeowner came home, he dis-
covered a trail of blood and found Morant holding the bag with the baby
struggling inside.196 As the homeowner questioned her as to the contents of
the bag, Morant continued to deny that she had even given birth. 97 Baby
Destiny is currently in the care of the couple who found her, while her moth-
er, who could have dropped her off at a fire station five minutes away, is
facing attempted murder charges.' 98
In the summer of 2007, two young mothers were "accused of killing
their newborns in Broward County."' 99 Ashley Truitt, a teenager on a family
vacation from Iowa, delivered a baby girl alone in her Pompano Beach hotel
room.2°" She cut the umbilical cord with a knife, wrapped the crying infant
in towels, placed her in a plastic garbage bag, and threw her down the hotel's
trash chute.20' The baby fell seventy feet to the dumpster beneath where she
died of blunt force head trauma. 0 2 Similarly, Lindsey Scott gave birth alone,
cut the umbilical cord with scissors, and suffocated her newborn with towels
before placing the body in a trash bag outside of her Oakland Park home.0 3
Both girls concealed their pregnancies by wearing baggy clothes and both
191. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Babies Abandoned, supra note 188; see also A Safe
Haven for Newborns, Babies Statistics, supra note 190 (detailing the number of safe and
unsafe infant abandonments in Florida by year and by county).





197. Marino, supra note 166.
198. Id.
199. Martinez, supra note 185.




203. Andrew Tran, Mother Suffocated Newborn, Officials Say Baby Girl Was Breathing,
Medical Examiner Finds, SUN-SENT., July 13, 2007, at lB.
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denied being pregnant when questioned by their parents.2 °4 Neither girl took
advantage of the State's Safe Haven law.2 5 Twenty-three other newborns
have died due to unsafe abandonment since Florida's Safe Haven law was
enacted.2°6
Adoptees rights groups, such as Bastard Nation, oppose the Safe Haven
law.207 Critics argue that it encourages women to abandon their newborns
rather than getting counseling, placing the babies with family, or raising the
children themselves with assistance.28 Some also claim that the law "en-
courage[s women] to conceal their pregnancies," 2°9 and that it discourages
them from obtaining "pre-natal and post-natal medical care. 210 Women who
conceal their pregnancies are more likely to give birth unsafely which can
endanger the health and lives of both the mother and the child.21 1 Critics
argue that legalized abandonment provides a "no hassle" way to get out of
parental responsibility that undermines established and effective adoption
policies.212 Some allege that the law puts forth a message that abandoning a
newborn is "a socially acceptable way of' dealing with a difficult problem
under undesirable circumstances, and that this could actually lead to more
unwanted pregnancies and abandonments.213
Critics say that the law is a "feel good measure"214 and a "bandaid solu-
tion" that does not address the circumstances that cause a mother to kill or
dump her newborn, including "poverty, substance abuse, physical abuse,
shame, and mental illness. 215 Some claim that "the women most likely to
respond to [media] campaigns are not [the ones who are] likely to endanger
their [newborns] to begin with, 2 16 and that "'baby dumpers"' will not utilize
the law.2t 7 They further contend that "it is unrealistic to expect young, trau-
matized" women who have just secretly given birth to seek out a Safe Ha-
204. Id.; DeMarzo, supra note 200.
205. See Martinez, supra note 185. Iowa also has a Safe Haven law similar to Florida's.
DeMarzo, supra note 200.
206. See A Safe Haven for Newborns, Babies Abandoned, supra note 188. Ashley
Truitt's case is not included in Florida's statistics. See id.
207. Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven Laws, supra note 16.
208. Pertman, Measure, supra note 15.
209. Crary, supra note 17.
210. Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven Laws, supra note 16.
211. Crary, supra note 17.
212. Id.
213. Adam Pertman, Politicians Push for Legalized Baby Abandonment at 'Safe' Sites,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2000, at B 1 [hereinafter Pertman, Politicians].
214. Garrison, supra note 36.
215. Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven Laws, supra note 16.
216. Zucco, supra note 182.
217. Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven Laws, supra note 16.
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ven. 218 Most of the mothers who kill their newborns or unsafely abandon
them are confused, upset, and in denial. 219 These girls are extremely unlikely
to drive or ask for a ride to a designated Safe Haven to legally relinquish
their newborn, especially one that is staffed with authority figures.220
Opponents of the Safe Haven law contend that it prevents relinquished
children from knowing their social, medical, and genealogical history.22'
They further allege that research indicates that adoptees tend to be "healthier
mentally, if they [are able to] learn about their personal histories," however,
children relinquished under the Safe Haven law are almost guaranteed not to
have access to this information due to the anonymity provision.222 Critics of
the Safe Haven law also argue that it denies birth fathers, who may not even
know that they have a child let alone that it was relinquished under the law,
their due process rights.223
VI. SHAPING THE FUTURE
The recent amendments to Florida's Safe Haven law will likely help
save more newborns since parents now have more time to make the crucial
decision of whether to give up their baby.224 Additionally, many parents may
be more willing to utilize the law now that their action is considered surren-
dering their child rather than abandoning him or her.22' Furthermore, the
amendments will help newborns legally surrendered under the law achieve
permanency faster since the time consuming requirement of conducting a
diligent search for known parents has been eliminated.226 A court may now
enter an order terminating parental rights, thereby freeing the child for adop-
tion, once the parents fail to claim the child within the allotted timeframe.
227
218. Zucco, supra note 182.
219. Pertman, Politicians, supra note 213.
220. Id.
221. Crary, supra note 17; Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven
Laws, supra note 16.
222. Pertman, Politicians, supra note 213.
223. Bastard Nation: Legalized Baby Abandonment Safe Haven Laws, supra note 16.
The Florida Legislature recognized parental constitutional issues when drafting the Safe Ha-
ven statute and considered the possibility of adding provisions in the future to add further
protections if the need arose. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fam. L. & Child, HB 1901 (2000) Staff
Analysis 1, 7 (final June 14, 2000), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000House/bills/analysis/pdfIHB 1901 S 1Z.Flc.pdf.
224. See Act effective July 1, 2008, ch. 2008-90, § 4(1), 2008 Fla. Laws 1012, 1016
(amending FLA. STAT. § 383.50(1) (2007)).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 1015.
227. Id. § 3(5), 2008 Fla. Laws at 1015.
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However, even though the amendments have expanded the law to help
both the parents and the child, they will not achieve their desired goal of sav-
ing newborns from the grim fate of being discarded unless more people
know about it. Florida's Safe Haven law is finding success, but many people
still do not know it exists. There is a tremendous need for continued promo-
tion of this safe, legal alternative to baby dumping. The Florida Legislature
needs to allot more funding to help promote the law, especially in those
counties most affected by unsafe abandonments. Additionally, the public
and private school systems need to continue to educate teens on pregnancy
prevention so fewer teens and young adults find themselves facing unwanted
pregnancies. Along with the need for increased education, is the need to
eliminate the stigma associated with unplanned, unwanted teenage pregnan-
cies when they do occur. The reality is that some teenagers and young adults
will get pregnant, and they need to know that they will not be rejected by the
community or their families. Girls facing unwanted pregnancies also need to
be informed early about the various alternatives to baby dumping, including,
but not limited to, the Safe Haven law. Hospitals, clinics, and doctors' offic-
es should be required to promote the law by having literature readily accessi-
ble to patients. Finally, hospitals should do thorough medical screenings on
children safely surrendered under the law to check for possible genetic con-
ditions that adoptive parents should be aware of.
VII. CONCLUSION
By allowing parents to surrender newborn infants up to seven days old
at any fire station, emergency medical services station, or hospital with no
questions asked, Florida's Safe Haven law offers parents a safe, legal alterna-
tive to baby dumping.228 While surrendering a newborn under the law is a
compassionate way to protect an innocent baby, it "is the last option. 229
Mothers are urged "to talk to someone" at the Safe Haven hotline before they
give birth.230 They are also encouraged to obtain prenatal care and to either
keep the child or go through the normal adoption process.231 Children sur-
rendered under the law do not have access to their family or medical histo-
ries; however, the purpose of the law "is to save the lives of newborns," and
proponents argue that a newborn safely surrendered "without medical
228. See id. § 4(1), 2008 Fla. Laws at 1016.
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records is prefer[red] to an unsafe abandonment" that is likely to result in
death.232
Supporters of the law have said that it is worthwhile even if one life is
saved.233 Florida has greatly surpassed this goal by saving over one hundred
newborns and counting. 234 The Safe Haven law is not expected to rescue
every baby, however, one hundred infants is quite an accomplishment.235
Eight more newborns were safely surrendered in Florida during the writing
of this article.236 While there is a continued need for greater public aware-
ness and education, Florida's success means that, slowly but surely, the word
is getting out about the law, and babies are being saved as a result.
237
232. Id.
233. A Safe Haven for Newborns, Our Mission, supra note 5.
234. See Taylor, supra note 8; Allen, supra note 1; Brecher, supra note 2.
235. Brecher, supra note 2.
236. See A Safe Haven for Newborns, Babies Statistics, supra note 190.
237. Brecher, supra note 2. For more information about the Gloria M. Silverio Founda-
tion's "A Safe Haven for Newborns," visit http://www.asafehavenfornewborns.com, or con-
tact the twenty-four hour helpline at 1-877-767-BABY (2229). Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, a series of Wall Street Journal articles brought to the American
public's attention a problem that had been brewing for decades.' The prob-
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lem was that hospitals were charging uninsured patients rates that were much
higher than rates that the hospitals accepted as full payment from the gov-
ernment and private insurers.2 The price differences cited in many articles
were astonishing. One article described a woman being charged $14,000 for
a hospital stay, when the same hospital would regularly accept $2500 from
private insurance.3 Similar stories were being disclosed across the country
including here in Florida where typical examples included an emergency
room bill of $12,000 when the hospital accepted less than $3000 as full pay-
ment from private insurers.4 Similarly, in another Florida case, a woman was
charged $48,000 for inpatient care when a private insurance company would
only be billed $7000. 5
In response to the public reaction to these stories and success in class
action suits against the tobacco industry, many class action suits were filed
on behalf of the uninsured to try to stop the seemingly outrageous prices the
uninsured were charged for necessary medical services.6 Under pressure
from the public outcry, threat of legislation, and the cost of defending class
action suits, many hospitals claimed to have changed their policies. 7 Never-
theless, the number of uninsured in America continues to grow and was re-
ported as over forty-six million in 2006.8 The problem is especially preva-
lent in Florida, which ranks third worst in terms of the total number of unin-
sured-close to three million-and in terms of the percentage of uninsured. 9
Furthermore, Florida has one of the highest charge-to-cost ratios in the Unit-
ed States, which means that, on average, Florida hospitals' standard charges
to recognize Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong for her valuable suggestions and guidance.
Finally, the author thanks his colleagues on Nova Law Review for their hard work and dedica-
tion in the editing of this article.
1. See Beverly Cohen, The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured-No
Villians, No Heroes, 51 VILE. L. REv. 95, 98-99 (2006).
2. Id. at 100-01.
3. George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionabilily and
Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 101 (2005).
4. Bob LaMendola, Uninsured Patients Sue Kendall Hospital for Bills; Group Wants
Same Discount as Insured, SUN SENT., May 12, 2005, at 5B.
5. Frank Gluck, Woman Sues over Hospital Bill; She Says Lakewood Ranch Center
Charged Her $40,000 More Because She is Uninsured, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Aug. 9,
2006, at BM1.
6. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 111-14.
7. See Gerald F. Anderson, From 'Soak the Rich' to 'Soak the Poor': Recent Trends in
Hospital Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 786-87 (2007).
8. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Reg., SB 1756 (2007) Staff Analysis 1 (Mar. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2007s 1756.hr
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represent a much higher markup over costs than hospitals in other states.' °
Although hospitals claim to have changed their policies, hospitals are still
free to charge whatever they want and some continue to fight lawsuits re-
garding overcharges to the uninsured."
Although there has been some success in terms of settlements to class
action lawsuits, results from cases where the parties did not settle are now
starting to find their way to the appellate courts for determination of what
each state's laws permit. This article will evaluate the way courts can and
should be utilized to help the uninsured obtain reasonable charges for medi-
cal services.
Part II of this article will discuss the most likely causes of action that an
uninsured party may have against a medical service provider that has charged
the uninsured unreasonable rates. Part I1 evaluates issues that such unin-
sured parties may have with trying to achieve class certification. Part IV is a
case analysis of a federal court case where an uninsured party tried to pursue
a class action against a hospital for overcharging her and other similarly si-
tuated uninsured patients. Part V evaluates the Florida legislative response
to the issue of determining reasonable rates for medical services for the unin-
sured and others that utilize the hospitals services without a pre-negotiated
contract rate. Finally, part VI evaluates the best course of action for an unin-
sured person that believes he or she has been overcharged by an emergency
medical service provider.
II. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACTION
Although commentators have suggested numerous causes of action that
uninsured patients who have been overcharged by emergency medical ser-
vice providers could pursue, the two most viable causes of action under Flor-
ida law appear to be breach of the reasonable price term implied into open
priced contracts and violation of Florida consumer protection law. 2 This
section will evaluate what an uninsured person would need to prevail on ei-
ther of these claims.
A. Breach of Open Priced Contract
Under Florida common law, if a contract does not contain any fixed
price or rate, the contract is considered an open priced contract and the law
10. See generally Anderson, supra note 7, at 783.
11. See id. at 786-87.
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implies a reasonable price to make the contract valid. 13 In Payne v. Humana
Hospital Orange Park,14 the First District Court of Appeal held that under
this rule of law, where the agreement with the medical service provider indi-
cates a patient is to pay the "standard and current rates," a patient is only
bound to pay reasonable charges.15 Even if the patient could have accessed
the service provider's list of charges-commonly referred to as a charge
master-prior to agreeing to the terms of the contract, he or she would not
have been able to truly consent to all of the charges as these charge masters
are generally hundreds of pages long and codified. 16 Thus, unlike situations
where the payor can know the market price based on prior dealings or market
conditions, patients have no real means of determining what charges to ex-
pect prior to accepting the hospital's terms. 7 The inherent nature of emer-
gency room services, where at the time the patient is asked to sign a contract,
neither the hospital staff nor physicians can know which services will be
needed, ensures that Florida courts are likely to continue to consider admis-
sion contracts for emergency room services as open priced contracts under
Florida law.'
8
Many courts around the country, however, have held that prices of hos-
pital admission agreements are definite-therefore, the courts do not need to
imply a fair and reasonable price-where the agreements refer to the hospit-
als' "regular charges," and where the hospitals' price lists are obtainable
through outside sources.' 9 The courts seem to be deferential to the hospitals
since the alternative would be for the hospitals to give every emergency
room patient a contract that was hundreds of pages long listing the prices of
all services even though the patient would never be able to read and under-
13. See Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 1239.
15. Id. at 1241 (citing Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Carr, 297 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974)).
16. Id. at 1242 n.3.
17. See id. at 1242.
18. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REv. 643, 647 (2008).
19. See, e.g., Nygaard v. Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 731 N.W.2d 184, 191-92
(S.D. 2007) (holding that the patients' own allegations that the price terms were present
showed "the charges [were] ascertainable through reference to outside sources" and there was
"no need to judicially impute a fair and reasonable price term"); Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med.
Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the contracts authorized the
hospital to charge patients the rate it normally charged uninsured patients); Shelton v. Duke
Univ. Health Sys., 633 S.E.2d 113, 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that "rates of services
contained in the 'charge master' were necessarily implied in the contract signed by plaintiff').
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stand the entire contents prior to agreeing to treatment. 20 Thus, as one court
concluded, it would be "entirely reasonable and predictable that patients
would agree to pay the hospital's regular rates for whatever services might
be necessary. '21 This logic is especially prevalent in states such as Arizona,
where state law requires the hospital to submit their pricing lists to the state
for approval and publication.22
The question remains whether Florida courts will allow hospitals to dis-
tinguish the language of their form admission contracts from those in
Payne.23 For example, in Doe v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc.,24
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a hospital's form contract had an
indefinite price term because the contract did not have a specific reference to
any extrinsic document from which the patient could have ascertained the
meaning of the word "charges. 2 5 The language of the opinion suggests that
if the contract did indicate a reference to a means of obtaining the standard
charges, then the contract price would be definite and the contract would be
valid.26 In fact, in a recent appeals court decision in Tennessee, the court
made such a distinction indicating that the contract in that case was sufficient
and the price term definite where the contract used the terms "facility's rates
and terms" instead of "charges., 27 The court held that the language of the
contract showed that the hospital had established rates which the patient
20. See DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 05-1665, 2006 WL 2038498, at *4 (D.N.J. July
19, 2006).
21. Shelton, 663 S.E.2d at 116.
22. Banner Health v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 1096, 1101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Arizona law requires hospitals to file their customary rates and charges with the Arizona De-
partment of Health for approval. Id. After the Department of Health approves the rates, the
department then publishes the rates. Id. at 1100. After this, a hospital cannot change its rates
without approval from the department. Id. In this case, the signed admission agreements
stated that the patients would "pay the hospital's usual and customary charges, which are
those rates filed annually with the Arizona Department of Health Services." Id. at 1098.
Based on the Arizona statutes and the reference to the published list in the admission agree-
ment, the court held that the contracts did not contain any open price terms and that the court
would not imply a reasonable price term into the contracts. Banner Health, 163 P.3d at 1101.
23. See generally Hall & Schneider, supra note 18.
24. 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001).
25. Id. at 197. Where the contract contained text that the patient was "'financially re-
sponsible to the hospital for charges not covered by this authorization."' Id.
26. See id. The court held that that the contract without a definite price term was invalid.
Id. The court applied a quantum meruit equitable action to come to the same result as in Flor-
ida-the hospital was entitled to a reasonable price for its services. HCA Health Servs., 46
S.W.3d at 197-98.
27. Woodruff v. Fort Sanders Sevier Med. Ctr., No. E2007-00727-COA-R3-CV, 2008
Tenn. App. LEXIS 11, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2008).
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could evaluate for reasonableness.28 The recent passing of the Health Care
Consumer's Right to Information Act will require hospitals to make certain
financial information as well as the costs for some services publicly availa-
ble.29 Thus, Florida courts may be influenced by Arizona precedent and no
longer consider the price of hospital admission contracts to be fixed if the
admission contracts refer to this publicly available information. °
1. Declaratory Relief
Although the claim that a hospital admission contract implies a reason-
able price term can serve as a defense to a collection suit by a hospital or
collection agency, the uninsured patient has the right under Florida law to
preemptively seek declaratory judgment to determine his or her obligation
under the contract rather than defaulting and waiting for the medical provider
to sue.3 ' Section 86.031, Florida Statutes, states that a plaintiff can seek
declaratory judgment on a contract "before or after there has been a breach of
it."'31 Ironically, the plaintiff that has already paid the hospital's full charges
may not have a cause of action for damages if the court finds that the plain-
tiff paid the bill in full because of a mistake of law-that is, the plaintiff did
not know that the contract was an open priced contract and that the plaintiff
was only required to pay a reasonable fee.33 The patient might be able to
recover the overpayment if he or she can show the hospital indicated it would
not provide the necessary services before payment was received. 3 This is
unlikely to be the case, however, because hospitals usually send their bills
after treatment-again because of the difficulty of knowing what treatment
will be needed in advance.
28. Id. at *8.
29. See Health Care Consumer's Right to Information Act, ch. 2008-47, § 1, 2008 Fla.
Laws 739, 739-40.
30. See Banner Health v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 1096, 1101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
31. See FLA. STAT. § 86.021 (2008).
32. FLA. STAT. § 86.031 (2008).
33. Compare Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1240-41 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff does have a cause of action to recover
overpayment on an open priced hospital contract), with Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach,
686 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a mistake of law regarding the
enforceability of an open priced contract for medical services did not warrant "equitable relief
once payment" had been made).
34. See Hall, 686 So. 2d at 657 & n.6.
35. See generally id.
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2. Determining a Reasonable Price for Emergency Medical Services
Once the uninsured plaintiff has convinced the court that the hospital
admission contract contained an indefinite price term, the plaintiff must also
allege facts that could lead a reasonable juror to infer that the charged price
is unreasonable. 36 The common theme in Florida case law is that determin-
ing the reasonableness of a particular hospital charge is a matter for the trier
of fact to determine.37 The Second District Court of Appeal has offered some
guidance for making this determination by indicating "that evidence of...
contractual discounts, standing alone, is insufficient to prove that.., charges
[are] unreasonable., 38 From this, courts have inferred that reasonableness of
charges is based on a multitude of factors of which evidence of contractual
discounts is one. 39 Florida courts have also been reluctant to hold that a rea-
sonable charge could always be determined based on a multiplier of the
Medicare reimbursement rate.'
In Colomar v. Mercy Hospital, Inc. (Colomar J),41 a federal district
court judge interpreting Florida law in a class action case evaluated Florida
36. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sestile, 821 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
37. Id. (holding that where legislation left the term "reasonable" medical expenses unde-
fined, "[tihe fact-finder must construe the word 'reasonable').
38. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Fernandez, 664 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the hospital was entitled to the full amount of its charges in a
statutory lien against an uninsured's recovery in a personal injury case where the only evi-
dence offered that the hospital's full charges were unreasonable was that it offered discounts
to managed care providers).
39. See ColomarII, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265,1269 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
40. See Merkle v. Health Options, Inc., 940 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (indicating that a Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) could not base its statuto-
ry duty to reimburse non-contracted emergency service providers based on simply a percen-
tage above Medicare reimbursement rates). Section 641.513(5), Florida Statutes, dictates
how an HMO must reimburse non-participating emergency service providers who provide
services for the HMO members. FLA. STAT. § 641.513(5) (2008). The statute requires the
HMO to reimburse the provider "the lesser of: (a) The provider's charges; (b) [t]he usual and
customary provider charges for similar services in the community where the services were
provided; or (c) [tihe charge mutually agreed to by the health maintenance organization and
the provider within 60 days of the submittal of the claim." Id. At issue in this case was how
the court should determine the HMO's liability to the non-participating providers. Merkle,
940 So. 2d at 1196. A court decision establishing a means of calculating "[t]he usual and
customary provider charges for similar services in the community where the services were
provided" could offer guidance on how to determine reasonable charges for uninsured pa-
tients. FLA. STAT. § 641.513(5)(b); see Leah Snyder Batchis, Comment, Can Lawsuits Help
the Uninsured Access Affordable Hospital Care? Potential Theories for Uninsured Patient
Plaintiffs, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 493, 525 (2005).
41. 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
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case law as well as case law from other states to establish a multiple factor
approach for determining whether or not hospital charges were reasonable.42
These factors included an analysis of what other hospitals in the surrounding
market charged for similar services (market analysis), a comparison of the
rate that a hospital actually charges and what it accepts as full payment for
those services from other patients (differential pricing), and an analysis of
the hospital's actual costs for providing the service (actual costs). 43 The fac-
tors had to be analyzed together as no single factor was sufficient to establish
that the charges were or were not reasonable. 44
a. Market Analysis
The first factor, market analysis, simply compares the prices that the
hospital actually charged to the uninsured patient with what other hospitals in
the same market would have charged for those services.4 ' At the pleading
stage, the court may be willing to infer that this factor weighs in favor of the
hospital's charges being unreasonable if the hospital's charges are in the top
twenty-five percent of hospitals nationwide. 46 Nevertheless, the court will
probably require that during discovery, the patient produce evidence that the
charges for the specific services provided were higher than those of hospitals
in the same market.47 Considering that hospitals rarely collect their full stan-
dard rates, the prices actually charged by hospitals are probably not truly
market driven. 48 As a result, other area hospitals might also have standard
charges that could be deemed unreasonable with respect to the cost of pro-
viding the services and with respect to what is actually paid in the communi-
ty for those services. 49 Thus, comparing the standard rates might give a false
sense of reasonableness. 50 This is the reason, however, that a market analysis
is only one of several factors in determining reasonableness.5




46. Colomar 1I, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
47. See, e.g., Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar IV), No. 05-22409, 2007 WL
2083562, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2007).
48. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 18, at 687 (citing testimony that health economist
Gerard Anderson gave to Congress).
49. See id.
50. ColomarII, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
51. Id. For example, data based on standard charges reported by California hospitals
being forced to make their charge masters public illustrates standard charges do vary greatly
among hospitals. See Lucette Lagnado, Medical Markup: California Hospitals Open Books,
Showing Huge Price Differences; State Law Requires Disclosing Charges for Goods, Servic-
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The next factor, price differentials, takes into account discounts that the
hospitals will give to other patients that are covered by private insurance or
government programs.52 Florida courts have held that differential pricing by
itself is not sufficient to establish that prices are unreasonable. 3 This im-
plies, however, that differential pricing, although not dispositive, is an im-
portant factor in determining whether or not prices for medical services are
reasonable. 4 Evidence of differential pricing can be used to support the case
that the hospital's costs, as well as the fair market value of the services are
well below the hospital's standard charges.5 5 A hospital is unlikely to con-
tract with private insurers to accept payments that are below its actual cost of
providing those services.56 Although not binding, some courts from other
jurisdictions have held that the reasonable value should be determined based
on what the service provider normally accepts as full payment for the service
and not what the provider charges.5 This is especially true with respect to
hospital billing where, according to one expert witness, some hospitals re-
ceive their "full published charges in only one to three percent of [their] cas-
es."58 Evidence of differential pricing, therefore, can strongly support a pa-
tient's case that the billed charges are unreasonable.59
es; Big Bills for Uninsured; Why a Leech Retails for $81, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al
(showing that in one case a simple blood test which costs $97 at one hospital costs $1733 at
another). Thus, even if overall the standard rates are in line with others in the community,
there is a chance that at least some of the charges will be out of proportion. See id.
52. Colomar 11, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72 (citing Payne v. Humana Hosp., 661 So. 2d
1239, 1242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam)).
53. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Fernandez, 664 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
54. See id. (holding that the fact that evidence of "contractual discounts, standing alone,
is insufficient to prove that" the hospital's charges were unreasonable, implies that combining
the evidence of these discounts with other evidence could be sufficient).
55. ColomarII, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72.
56. See id. at 1272.
57. Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). "Reasonable value is what someone normally receives for a given
service in the ordinary course of its business from the community that it serves." Id. (citing
Eagle v. Snyder, 604 A.2d 253, 254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
58. Id. at 508. The same expert witness also testified that the same hospital receives
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C. Costs
The other major factor that the trier of fact will need to evaluate to de-
termine if a hospital's charges for particular services are reasonable is the
actual cost to the hospital for providing those services.6" This factor is de-
signed to take into consideration a hospital's internal costs for providing par-
ticular services- evidence of higher costs when compared to other hospitals
could explain why that hospital's standard charges are higher.6' Thus, the
higher than market price rates might be reasonable when considering these
internal costs. 62 As with the other factors, actual cost alone is not dispositive;
therefore, a showing of a high markup from the hospital's actual costs will
not by itself prove that the standard rates are unreasonable.63 Thus, a hospital
with lower costs, but similar prices to area hospitals, will not be penalized for
its efficiency.' Nevertheless, this factor might not be highly probative be-
cause there is little correlation between hospitals' standard prices and their
internal CoStS.
65
A hospital's internal costs will be the most difficult factor for the patient
to prove since almost all of the facts regarding costs are within the hospital's
control.' A court might be willing to look at overall hospital statistics-i.e.,
the hospital's overall ratio of its charges to costs-for the purpose of stating
a claim. 67 After discovery, however, the patient will have to prove that the
charges for the particular services in question greatly exceeded the hospital's
costs for those services. 68 An additional problem with analyzing costs is that
a hospital might be able to show that the cost of treating an uninsured patient
is not the same as treating one that is either insured or covered by a govern-
ment program where the hospital has more assurance that a portion of the bill





65. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 782-83.
66. See Colomar I1, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Colomar IV, No. 05-22409, 2007 WL 2083562, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 20,
2007) (explaining that where the court, in determining whether or not there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to infer that the hospital's charges were unreasonable, indi-
cated that it expected the plaintiff/patient to have provided evidence of the hospital's actual
cost for providing the specific services to that patient and that such an inference could not be
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will be paid. 69 Furthermore, the hospital could argue that the contracts with
some private insurance companies generate volume and that this additional
revenue would have to be reduced from the costs of providing service to pa-
tients covered by such contracts.7°
Even if the patient is able to produce sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer that the billed charges are unreasonable, the trier
of fact will still have to make a determination of what a reasonable charge
should be.71 Some courts and commentators have suggested that a reasona-
ble rate should be based on the hospital's own collection data and should be
the average amount that the hospital has actually received and accepted from
government payers, contracted private insurers, and non-contracted private
insurers. 72 Because the rates paid by government agencies are fixed by sta-
tute and are not the result of any bargaining with the hospital, some have
suggested that the reasonable price an uninsured should be required to pay
should be based only on what the hospital collects from private insurers.73
Rather than setting the reasonable rate as the average of what a provider has
accepted from private insurers, the reasonable rate could be set at either the
maximum or seventy-fifth percentile.74 This would put the hospital in better
position than with most private insurers.75 In Florida, the court might also
look to what the provider of emergency service has accepted as usual and
customary charges from HMOs with which the hospital has no contract for
services provided to those HMOs' members.76 This situation is analogous to
69. Galvan v. Nw. Mem. Hosp., 888 N.E.2d 529, 538-39 (Il. App. Ct. 2008) (holding
that it was not an unfair trade practice to charge uninsured patients twice what insured patients
were charged because the patients were not similarly situated.)
Underlying the plaintiffs claim that charging uninsured patients a higher price
amounts to oppressive pricing is a suggestion that the insured and uninsured pa-
tients are similarly situated. They are not. The plaintiff ignores the obvious differ-
ence between an insured patient and one uninsured. An insured patient by defini-
tion has medical insurance .... In return for the insurance premiums, his insurance
company contracts with a hospital for medical services at a reduced rate. The con-
tract benefits the hospital because payment is guaranteed. There is no such guaran-
tee from uninsured patients.
Id.
70. See id. at 539.
71. See, e.g., Colomar IV, 2007 WL2083562, at *6.
72. See Nation, supra note 3, at 135-36 (suggesting that "[a]n uninsured patient should
[only] be required to pay the average amount [that] the hospital actually [collected] and ac-
cept[ed]" from governmental agencies and private insurers).
73. Id. at 104.
74. See Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., (Maldonado 11) 493 F.3d 521, 526 n. 10
(5th Cir. 2007).
75. See id.
76. See generally Batchis, supra note 40, at 525.
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the uninsured patient since there is no benefit provided by the HMO of refer-
rals as is the case with contracted private insurers.77
B. Violation of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Practice Act
An uninsured patient that has been charged an unreasonable amount for
emergency room services might also have a statutory cause of action based
on the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice Act (FDUTPA).8 One
of the primary purposes of this act is "[t]o protect the consuming public and
legitimate business enterprises from those who engage in unfair methods of
competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce. '79 The act specifically prohibits "[u]nfair
methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."8 The act
also provides for individual remedies that include a declaratory judgment
that a particular act or practice violates FDUTPA and injunctive relief to stop
such violations or prevent them in the future.8 While the Florida Legislature
never defined "deceptive" or "unfair," the Supreme Court of Florida in PNR,
Inc. v. Beacon Property Management, Inc.82 has affirmed the definition of an
unfair practice or act as "one that 'offends established public policy' and one
that is 'immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially inju-
rious to consumers."' 83 The Court has approved the definition of a deceptive
act to be one where there is a "'representation, omission, or practice that is
77. See id.
78. See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2008).
79. Id. § 501.202(2).
80. Id. § 501.204(1).
81. Id. § 501.211(1).
82. 842 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2003).
83. Id. at 777 (quoting Samuels v. King Motor Co., 782 So. 2d 489, 499 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001)). Section 501.203(3)(b), Florida Statutes, states that in determining violations
of the Act, courts should use "[t]he standards of unfairness and deception set forth and inter-
preted by the Federal Trade Commission [(FTC)] or the federal courts." FLA. STAT. §
501.203(3)(b). Thus, although this definition of unfair and deceptive acts is currently used by
many Florida courts, the definition could be challenged because it differs from the FTC's
definition of unfair acts or practices. See David J. Federbush, The Unexplored Territory of
Unfairness in Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, 73 FLA. B.J. 26, 30 (May
1999). The current FTC definition of an unfair act or practice is an act or practice which
"causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable
by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2008). Public policy considerations can now serve as evi-
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likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer's detriment." '84
Although there are no appellate decisions affirming that emergency ser-
vice providers may be violating FDUTPA by charging unreasonable
amounts, there is sufficient case law to suggest that such billing practices, if
proven, would violate the act.85 First, in PNR, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that even a single breach of contract can result in a claim under
FDUTPA if the action which led to the breach of contract would also be
deemed "an unfair or deceptive act" or practice under prevailing case law.86
Furthermore, although some states exclude members of the medical profes-
sion from their deceptive and unfair trade practices acts,87 Florida law does
not have any such exclusion.88 Finally, there are no state or federal laws that
might grant an exemption from FDUTPA to hospitals and authorize them to
charge unreasonable rates to uninsured patients. 89
One main reason that pursuing a FDUTPA claim is so important for the
uninsured patient is that the statute permits the court to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party.90 The recovery of attorney's fees can be especially
important in claims of unreasonable charges for emergency services for two
reasons. First, the uninsured party is unlikely to have the financial resources
to hire a lawyer regardless of whether the party is the plaintiff seeking decla-
84. PNR, Inc., 842 So. 2d at 777 (quoting Millennium Commc'ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v.
Office of the Att'y Gen., 761 So. 2d 1256, 1263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
85. See generally, Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar 1), No. 05-22409, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *21-22 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2006).
86. PNR, Inc., 842 So. 2d at 777 & n.2.
87. See, e.g., Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., 633 S.E.2d 113, 117 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Gaunt v. Pittaway, 534 S.E.2d 660, 664 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)) (stating that
North Carolina's unfair and deceptive trade practices statute specifically excluded "acts com-
mitted by medical professionals"); DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 05-1665, 2006 WL
2038498, at *8 (D.N.J. July 19, 2006) (stating that medical "professionals are not covered by
the Consumer Fraud Act").
88. See Michael Flynn, Consumer Protection Law: Physician Deceptive and Unfair
Business Practices, 71 FLA. B.J. 49, 50 (July 1997).
89. See Colomar 1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834 at *17. Section 501.212(1), Florida
Statutes, states that "[a act or practice required or specifically permitted by federal or state
law" is exempt from FDUTPA. FLA. STAT. § 501.212(1) (2008). Nevertheless, the court in
Colomar I did not find that statutes which permitted the defendants to offer discounts to pri-
vate insurers, nor statutes that required them to produce an itemized bill on request specifical-
ly authorized the defendants to charge unreasonable rates to uninsured patients. Colomar I,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834 at *17.
90. See FLA. STAT. § 501.2105(1) (2008) ("In any civil litigation resulting from an act or
practice involving a violation of this part .... the prevailing party, after judgment in the trial
court and exhaustion of all appeals, if any, may receive his or her reasonable attorney's fees
and costs from the nonprevailing party.").
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ratory judgment or a defendant in a collection suit.9 Second, without the
recovery of attorney's fees, many claims against emergency service provid-
ers would be "negative-value suits" where the cost of attorney's fees exceeds
the total expected recovery from the claim.92
Those pursuing causes of action, under FDUTPA, however, have to be
careful because the explicit language of the statute allows the court to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.9 3 The statute's award of attorney's
fees was even riskier prior to a 1994 amendment when the "award of reason-
able attorney's fees to the prevailing party" was mandatory and not left to the
discretion of the court.94 A recent decision by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal rejected the notion that the trial court judge could only award attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing defendant in a FDUTPA claim if the plaintiffs
claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."95  The court
indicated that the statute clearly left the award of attorney's fees to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.96 The trial judge's decision to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing defendant might have been influenced by the fact that both
parties were charity organizations.97 Unfortunately, another recent decision
to award attorney's fees, which was also upheld by the same district court,
suggests that trial judges are likely to award attorney's fees in contract dis-
91. See Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar II1), 242 F.R.D. 671, 682 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (indicating that class action is not superior because plaintiffs could recover attorney's
fees under FDUTPA). An uninsured patient is most likely going to be from a household "with
less than $25,000" where at least one person does work full time. James McGrath, Over-
charging the Uninsured in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater Share of Uncompensated Medical
Care Costs to the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 173, 193 (2007).
92. See J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1735, 1737 (2006) (addressing how
class action waiver agreements can be unconscionable because they essentially remove one's
right to recovery in cases where the cost of pursuing a claim will exceed the expected recov-
ery for that claim).
93. FLA. STAT. § 501.2105(1).
94. See David J. Federbush, Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees Under FDUTPA, 78 FLA. B.J.
26, 26 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Federbush, Attorneys' Fees].
95. Humane Soc'y of Broward County, Inc. v. Fla. Humane Soc'y, 951 So. 2d 966, 968
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). Prior to this ruling, Mr. Federbush had theorized that the trial
courts would likely only award attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant if the plaintiff's
claims were frivolous because the courts would follow the Supreme Court of Florida's
precedent for other public policy cases such as discrimination cases. Federbush, Attorneys'
Fees, supra note 94, at 29. The plaintiff in Humane Society tried to apply Mr. Federbush's
exact arguments as to why attorney's fees should not be granted, but the court disagreed.
Humane Soc'y, 951 So. 2d at 968.
96. Id.
97. See id. (acknowledging in a motion for fees and costs that "both groups are doing
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putes where the court believes the party adding the FDUTPA claim has only
increased the risk for both parties by adding the extra claim.98 In theory, this
means that if the uninsured patient were to lose, not only would he or she be
liable for the full hospital bill and his or her attorney's fees, but he or she
could also be liable for the hospital's legal fees as well. 99
III. ISSUES WITH CLASS CERTIFICATION
A key for uninsured patients to succeed in using litigation as a means of
redressing their overcharges by emergency service providers is class certifi-
cation."°° Class certification is important because the uninsured face two
major obstacles in pursuing litigation.' °' First, uninsured people are likely to
lack the financial resources to contest the hospital's charges in court. 0 2
Second, even if the uninsured people do have the financial resources, the cost
of litigation might far exceed any gain they hope to achieve-either a reduc-
tion in their debt obligation to the hospital or a return of overcharges they
have already paid.'0 3 If, however, the uninsured can certify themselves as a
class against a particular provider, then they have a much better chance of
success as the cost of the legal fees will be distributed amongst the class and
the risk for the provider will be greatly increased.'04 In fact, in many cases,
once courts granted class certification, hospitals sought prompt settlement. 10
5
Although there was some initial success with class certification, °6 the current
trend in both Florida and federal courts seems to be that class certification for
the uninsured, with respect to the rates they have been charged for emergen-
cy services, is not appropriate."
If the uninsured do certify a class, either the uninsured themselves or
the defending service providers could remove the case to a federal court un-
98. See Mandel v. Decorator's Mart, Inc., 965 So. 2d 311, 313 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (noting that it was "not uncommon for litigants to inject claims of... deceptive...
practices into a contractual dispute" and that the tactic was rarely successful).
99. See id.
100. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 787 (indicating that hospitals were usually quick to
settle once class certification was granted).
101. See McGrath, supra note 91, at 193.
102. See id. (explaining that an uninsured person is more likely to have an income of less
than $25,000, with at least one family member working full time).
103. See Glover, supra note 92, at 1737 (discussing how class action waivers can prevent
potential plaintiffs from ever bringing suits).
104. See generally id.
105. Anderson, supra note 7, at 787.
106. Cohen, supra note 1, 143-45.
107. See, e.g., Maldonado H, 493 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2007).
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der the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.08 According to this Act, the fed-
eral courts will have original subject matter jurisdiction if the amount in con-
troversy exceeds five million dollars, the class action has over one hundred
members, and there is minimal diversity. " Minimal diversity is established
when "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant."'' 0 Although the federal court must decline jurisdiction
if two-thirds of the class and the primary defendants are both citizens of Flor-
ida, many class actions, especially against for-profit hospitals, will satisfy
these requirements."'
A. Numerosity, Commonality, Typicality, and Adequacy Factors
Whether the case is tried in federal or state court will have little bearing
on whether the class can be certified because the Florida and Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requirements for class certification are almost identical."'
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representa-
tive parties on behalf of all members only if: 1) the class is so nu-
merous that joinder of all members is impracticable [(numerosi-
ty)]; 2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class
[(commonality)]; 3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [(typicali-
ty)]; and 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class [(adequacy)]."13
These requirements are generally referred to as the "numerosity, commonali-
ty, typicality, and adequacy factors."'"
4
To satisfy the numerosity requirement, the party seeking to certify the
class must be able to prove with reasonable certainty that the class size will
be so large that joinder of individual members would be impracticable." 5
While it might be easy for an uninsured person trying to certify a class to
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
109. Id. § 1332(d)(2).
110. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
111. See id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I).
112. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 23, with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
113. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
114. Colomar 11, 242 F.R.D. 671, 674 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Satisfying the adequacy
factor for purposes of establishing a class action is not a problem that is unique to patients
contesting the reasonableness of charges for emergency medical services and is beyond the
scope of this article. See id. at 677-80.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
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determine how many uninsured patients received treatment from the same
hospital, this information alone is not sufficient. 1 6 The patient will probably
also have to show that a certain percentage of those patients, like themselves,
are still obligated to pay an unreasonable sum or have already paid an unrea-
sonable amount."7 Since many of the uninsured that were treated at hospit-
als may have already been offered discounts or had their bills subsequently
paid by a government program such as Medicaid, the absolute number of
uninsured patients that were treated would be insufficient." 8 This problem
can be overcome; however, it might require significant expenditure just to
reasonably identify the class prior to filing suit." 9
To satisfy the requirement of commonality, the party seeking class cer-
tification only needs to show that there is at least one "common question of
law or fact" as long as that single common question "affects all class mem-
bers" the same way. 120 The courts in the Eleventh Circuit and in Florida do
not require much to prove commonality.' 2' Nevertheless, uninsured people
trying to show that the hospital charged them an unreasonable amount may
have a difficult time showing commonality, unless they can establish that the
hospital intentionally raised prices for uninsured patients. Without evi-
dence of a common pricing scheme, and considering that some hospitals'
charge master lists comprise of tens of thousands of items, the only common
question would be whether or not the hospital was obligated to charge a rea-
sonable amount.Y13 The defendant hospital could concede that the pricing
term is open and at the same time argue that the prices on its charge master
list are reasonable.2 4 Thus, proving commonality could be difficult if the
hospital wants to avoid class status. 12
5
Even if the uninsured parties could establish commonality, typicality is
even more difficult to prove. 26 In order to satisfy the typicality requirement,
the representative plaintiff must be able to prove the claims of other class
members in proving his or her own claim.'27 Thus, typicality is usually es-
116. See Colomar II1, 242 F.R.D. at 675-76.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 676.
119. See generally id.
120. Id.
121. See Colomar II1, 242 F.R.D. at 676 ("The threshold for commonality is not high.")
(quoting Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213 F.R.D. 484, 490 (S.D. Fla. 2003)).
122. See id. at 680.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 680.
125. Id. at 676-77.
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tablished when the elements required to prove the representative's claims are
the same elements required to prove the claims of the entire class. 28 Courts
across the country seem unwilling to find that, in general, all of a hospital's
charges are unreasonable or even to define a reasonable charge as a percen-
tage of some government established rate-such as Medicare reimbursement
rates. 29 Thus, courts will require that the uninsured prove that each charge
itself is unreasonable.130 Regardless of how this is measured, a representative
member that proves his or her charges were unreasonable, would only estab-
lish that other patients charged the same amount for the same services during
the same time period were also charged unreasonable amounts.' 3' A party
seeking to certify a class could try to convince the court that a reasonable
rate should be calculated based on the range of fees the hospital actually ac-
cepts for those charges.'32 If the court agrees to this definition of reasonable-
ness, the plaintiff might be able to establish typicality as the same source of
hospital records could be used to prove the claims of other class members. 3
B. Predominance and Superiority
Even if the court were to accept that the representative member could
establish typicality, in order to certify a class for monetary damages, the rep-
resentative would still have to show that "the questions of law or fact com-
mon to class members predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members" (predominance). ' 34 To establish predominance, the issues
that are common to proving the claims of the class as a whole must predomi-
nate over issues that only need to be proven for individual claims. 35 If after
all of the issues which are common to the entire class have been adjudicated,
class members must still introduce a great deal of proof specific to individual
claims, then the claim does not satisfy the predominance requirement.
36
Whereas in Florida, courts cannot establish unreasonableness based solely on
price differentials and discounts offered to insured patients, the courts are
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Maldonado I, 493 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2007).
130. See id. at 525-26.
131. Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. at 677.
132. See Maldonado 11, 493 F.3d at 526 n. 10 (rejecting the proposal that a reasonable rate
could be established as a weighted average of amounts the hospitals receive from insurers and
government programs saying that "[ujnder this approach, contrary to common sense, approx-
imately half of the insurers would have negotiated an 'unreasonable' rate").
133. See id.
134. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
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unlikely to find that predominance is satisfied.'37 Each member of the class
will have to prove that his or her individual charges are unreasonable. 38
In addition to proving predominance, the party seeking class certifica-
tion for money damages must also show "that a class action is superior to
other available methods" for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy.'39 The main factor that works against class action being a superior
method to resolve the claims of hospital overcharging uninsured patients is
the difficulty the court might encounter trying to manage all of the claims.' 4°
Since each class member will have been billed for different services and at
different times, each additional member will add to the amount of evidence
the court needs to manage.14 ' Those uninsured people who seek to certify the
class are likely to claim that without class certification they lack the financial
resources to seek a remedy for their injury.142 However, federal courts have
determined that where there is a statutory basis for recovering attorney's
fees, class action is not superior to other methods of adjudication.1 43 Thus, if
plaintiffs include the FDUTPA claim in their complaint, they may actually
hurt their chances of class certification based on superiority alone.'"
C. Injunctive Relief
If the plaintiffs seeking to certify the class seek injunctive relief, then in
addition to the first four requirements, they must show that the medical ser-
vice provider has acted on "grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate res-
pecting the class as a whole."' 4 5 This type of injunctive class relief is gener-
ally applicable when a defendant has charged all of its customers an undiffe-
rentiated fee. 46 Thus, plaintiffs seeking to certify a class for injunctive relief
would need to show that the service providers had some generally applicable
system such as "'systematically raising prices for uninsured patients by a set
percentage.""1 47 Furthermore, based on the Florida definition of reasonable
137. See Maldonado II, 493 F.3d at 525-26.
138. See id.
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).




144. See id. at 680.
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
146. See Colomar 111, 242 F.R.D. at 683.
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charges, a court could not impose injunctive or class-wide relief across the
whole class because an order requiring a service provider to stop "overcharg-
ing" uninsured patients would lack the specificity required for injunctive
relief.148 In fact, many courts see the request for injunctive relief in these
types of cases as a violation of the separation of powers by asking the court
to legislate.
149
D. Florida's Specific Class Certification Issues
Plaintiffs filing their claims in Florida state courts rather than federal
courts must comply with the same class certification requirements. 5 ° More-
over, the Florida courts require evidentiary support before granting class
certification if the nonmoving party objects to the certification.'' Thus, the
court cannot simply rely on the pleadings when one party objects to certifica-
tion and must actually have an evidentiary hearing to determine if certifica-
tion is appropriate.1 52 Florida law allows for an interlocutory appeal of class
certification. 153 The court may find that the "trial court abused its discretion"
if the class determination was made without the evidentiary hearing.'54 This
provides an obstacle to class certification in state courts because the plaintiffs
148. Id.
149. See Howard v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 924 So. 2d 1245, 1259 (La. Ct. App.
2006) (concluding that plaintiffs' request for the court to "establish what constitutes reasona-
ble prices" for medical services was '"a novel and untested theory' ... [and] not appropriate
for class certification"); Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 565-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Plaintiffs here have lost their way; they need to consult a map or a compass
or a Constitution because Plaintiffs have come to the judicial branch for relief that may only
be granted by the legislative branch.").
If the Court were to issue an injunction against [the hospital] to prevent it from
charging "unreasonable" prices, the court would also have to determine what prices
were "reasonable" for not only [plaintiffs] procedure, but every other hospital pro-
cedure. This goes against constitutional Article 111 considerations of justiciability
and separation of powers .... Medical regulation issues have typically been re-
solved by the legislative process. ... It is not within the scope of judicial powers to
decide medical billing procedures and pricing, and the Court may not issue an advi-
sory opinion in this regard.
Urquhart v. Manatee Mem'l Hosp., No. 8:06-cv-1418-T-17-EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48867, at *11-12 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2007).
150. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a).
151. Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Elsenheimer, 952 So. 2d 575, 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., id. at 582 (where Second District Court of Appeal reverses a trial court's
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seeking class certification will need to show that a sufficient number of the
class was overcharged for medical services.155
IV. CASE STUDY: COLOMAR V. MERCY HOSPiTAL, INC.
Barbara Colomar, who at the time did not have medical insurance and
did not qualify for any governmental assistance, went to Mercy Hospital in
Miami, Florida, because she was having trouble breathing after exposure to
pesticides in her house.'56 Prior to receiving any treatment at the hospital,
Colomar signed an "Authorization and Guarantee" form in which she agreed
to "pay any and all unpaid bills ... which are not covered by insurance or
otherwise paid.' 57 The authorization form did not indicate what treatment
she would receive or how much she would be charged. 158 Colomar's treat-
ment at the hospital for her respiratory problems lasted approximately twen-
ty-six hours.'59 Colomar later received a bill from the hospital for $12,863.'6




After Mercy Hospital allegedly threatened to damage Colomar's credit
if she did not pay the bill in full, Colomar filed suit on behalf of herself and
other uninsured patients who had received treatment at Mercy Hospital.
162
Colomar did not allege any problems with the care that she received at Mer-
cy, but rather alleged that Mercy Hospital had breached its contract with her
by charging her an unreasonable amount and that Mercy had violated
FDUTPA with its unfair billing practices. 163 The case was removed to feder-
155. See id. Florida has allowed class certification for physicians that are contesting the
reimbursement they have received from HMOs with which they had no contract for emergen-
cy services they provided to the HMOs' members. See Merkle v. Health Options, Inc., 940
So. 2d 1190, 1200 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006). Those claims are based on a Florida statute
that requires the HMOs to reimburse them at the reasonable and customary rate. Id. at 1196.
The court will face the same challenges in determining the usual and customary rates in those
cases as it will when determining reasonable rates for the uninsured and managing the physi-
cians as a single class. See id.
156. Colomar I, No. 05-22409, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2,
2006).
157. Id. at *6.
158. Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. 671, 674 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
159. Colomar I, No. 05-22409, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *5.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *5.
162. Id. at *2-3, 5; Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. at 673.
163. Colomar 1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *6. In her first amended complaint,
Colomar had also alleged that the hospital had been unjustly enriched and had violated its duty
of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at n.3. The court dismissed these two charges along with a
claim alleging that Mercy violated FUDPTA via deceptive practices that would lead the ordi-
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al court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which gave the federal
court original jurisdiction over certain class action cases with at least minim-
al diversity.'r
A. The Good: Cause of Action Exists
In denying Mercy's motion to dismiss Colomar's second amended
complaint, the court acknowledged that a cause of action does exist in Flori-
da for uninsured patients that claim to have been charged unreasonable
amounts by hospitals. 165 In her second amended complaint, Colomar alleged
that although she was charged $12,863, the hospital's internal costs for the
services she received were only $2,098.166 She also alleged that Mercy, on
average, charges uninsured patients four times the Medicare reimbursement
rates.'67 Furthermore, she alleged that hospitals owned by Mercy's parent
corporation ranked "among the top 13% of all hospitals nationwide in
charges" and "in the top 10% of hospitals nationwide in terms of cost-to-
charge ratio"-charging uninsured patients, on average, four times the actual
costs.
68
The court agreed that because the contracts with uninsured patients had
open pricing terms, Mercy was obligated to charge Colomar and other unin-
sured patients that signed similar agreements reasonable amounts.' 69 The
court held that under Florida law, the court had to analyze several nonexclu-
sive factors to determine if the charges were reasonable. 70 First, the court
examined the overall market for hospital services to determine if Mercy's
charges were within the range of what other hospitals in the community
would charge for similar services. 7 ' Because the court was only analyzing
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court was willing to infer from the al-
leged facts that Mercy's charges were more than what most hospitals charged
for the same services. 172 The court noted that if Mercy's charges were not in
the top twenty-fifth percentile, then the court would most likely have inferred
nary uninsured patient to believe he or she would be charged at a discounted rate. Id. at *16,
*22.
164. Id. at *4.
165. See Colomar 11, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2006).




170. Colomar II, 461 F. Supp. 2d. at 1269.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1270.
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that the charges were similar to other similarly situated hospitals.'73 Even if
this were the case, however, the court could still hold that the charges were
unreasonable based on other factors. 74
The second factor the court looked at was the price the hospital charged
other patients for the same services.'75 The fact that the hospital will accept
much lower payments from other patients implies that the actual value of the
services may be less than what the hospital charges. 176 In this case, Colomar
had alleged that the hospital offered significant discounts to insured patients
and those covered by government benefits. 77 The court held that proving
this differential pricing along with other factors could support the allegation
that the charges were unreasonable. 178
Finally, the court analyzed the hospital's actual costs to determine if the
price was reasonable. 79 Colomar alleged in her complaint that the hospital
had charged her more than six times the cost of treating her. 80 Accepting the
allegations as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the court held
that it could not conclude as a matter of law that the charges were reasona-
ble.' 8' The court then held that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to sup-
port a claim that Mercy's charges for the services it provided to Colomar
were unreasonable. 8 2 The court also held that the same facts were sufficient
to support a claim that the hospital's billing methods constituted an unfair
practice in violation of FUDPTA 83 Furthermore, even though Colomar may
not have suffered any monetary damages since she had not yet paid an unrea-
sonable amount, the court held she was entitled to declaratory judgment to
determine the amount she lawfully owed." 4
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1271.
175. Colomar 11, 461 F. Supp. 2d. at 1271.




180. Colomar I, 461 F. Supp. 2d. at 1273.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1274.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1273 (determining she had not yet suffered monetary damages because she had




: Nova Law Review 33, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
B. The Bad: Case Not Suitable for Class Certification
After her initial success, however, Colomar suffered a major setback
when the court denied her motion for class certification. 185 The court first
held that Colomar failed to prove that the class size was "'so numerous that
joinder of all members [was] impracticable."",186 Although Colomar was able
to identify "over 24,000 uninsured patients" that Mercy treated during the
class period, Colomar was unable to show which of those patients had either
paid the full bill or at least were never offered discounts or write-offs. 8 7 The
court was unwilling to infer that a minimal number of these uninsured pa-
tients had either paid or were still liable for an unreasonable portion of their
bills without further evidence from Colomar. 188 The court implied that Co-
lomar would establish the requirement of numerosity if she could specifically
identify forty such members.1
89
Nevertheless, even if Colomar could prove that the class size was suffi-
cient, the court would most likely still have denied class status because of the
fact specific nature of proving that Mercy's charges were unreasonable.1 90
That is, each bill from each class member would have to be evaluated sepa-
rately and compared with market conditions, internal costs, and other con-
tractual prices to determine if each charge were unreasonable. 9' Proving
that Mercy's charges to Colomar were unreasonable would not prove that
charges to any other class member were unreasonable. 92 Colomar requested
that the court analyze Mercy's average charges to all class members to de-
termine the reasonableness of the charges.193 The court refused this proposal
indicating that averages would not prove that a particular charge was unrea-
sonable. 194 Thus, the court held that Colomar's claim failed to satisfy the
requirements of commonality and typicality."9  Although Colomar might
have been able to show some question of law in common under commonali-
ty, it was unlikely that she could show that proving her claim would neces-
185. Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar II1), 242 F.R.D. 671, 673 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
186. Id. at 675 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at676.
189. See id. at 675-76.
190. Colomar 11, 242 F.R.D. at 677 n.7 (indicating that although plaintiff might be able to
plead sufficient facts to satisfy numerosity and commonality, this effort would prove futile
because of inherent problems with proving the other factors).
191. See id. at 677.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 678.
194. Id.
195. Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. at 677-78.
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sarily prove any other class member's claim. 96 The court also held that the
difficulty in obtaining reasonableness of each particular charge to every pa-
tient prevented the case from meeting the requirements of class certification
for money damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) or in-
junctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). 197 The main
problem was that Colomar did not allege any facts showing that the hospital
was raising its prices by a set percentage to uninsured patients."' The com-
plaint was that the undiscounted prices the hospital charged were unreasona-
ble.' 99 Because each charge would have to be evaluated separately, the case
would become extremely difficult to manage as a class, and therefore class
action was not "superior to other available methods" for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.2° Colomar had argued that without class
action status, plaintiffs would be deterred from bringing suit due to a lack of
financial resources to hire a lawyer.21  The court's response was that the
statutory claim under FDUTPA allowed recovery of legal fees so that class
status was not superior in this case.20 2
C. The Ugly: Insufficient Evidence to Prove Price Was Unreasonable
Although failing to have her class certified was a major setback, Colo-
mar's next setback was even greater when the court granted summary judg-
ment to Mercy Hospital because Colomar had failed to produce enough evi-
dence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that Mercy's charges
were unreasonable.2 °3 The court emphasized that its holding did not indicate
that the hospital's charges were reasonable, but that Colomar had not pro-
duced sufficient evidence to carry her burden.2 °4
196. Id. at 677.
197. Id. at 681-83.
198. Id. at 683.
199. Id.
200. Colomar Il, 242 F.R.D. at 681-82.
201. Id. at 682.
202. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 501.2105 (2008)).
203. Colomar IV, No. 05-22409, 2007 WL 2083562, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2007).
204. Id. Colomar's failure to produce sufficient evidence might have been particular to
her case rather than indicative of challenges that face other uninsured patients that believe
they were charged unreasonable amounts. Id. For example, the undisputed facts showed that
she was only charged 155% of the Medicare reimbursement rate rather than the 436% that she
alleged Mercy on average charges uninsured patients. Id. at *5 & n.4. Colomar's own expert
witness had testified that charges in the range of 150% of Medicare would be reasonable. Id.
at *5. Furthermore, she did not introduce any evidence to show what Mercy's actual cost to
treat her was even though she originally alleged that Mercy's cost was just over two thousand
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V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A common theme among the courts across the country seems to be that
resolving medical billing issues is a legislative function.205 While the courts
are equipped to analyze individual cases to determine if prices are reasonable
for a particular service on a particular date, the courts are not empowered to
make more far reaching resolutions.0 6 This section will focus on the actions
that the Florida Legislature has taken to address issues with the open-ended
nature of medical service pricing in the absence of contractual agreements.
There are five major situations where patients are treated in the absence
of contractual agreements that prevent hospitals from charging their standard
rates.27 The five classes are the uninsured, those covered by insurance but
going to a provider that has not contracted with the insurance company, pa-
tients seeking treatment after automobile accidents that are covered by car
insurance Personal Injury Protection requirements, and patients seeking
treatment for work related injuries that are covered by workers' compensa-
tion plans.20 8 Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fee
schedule for cases where patients are being treated for ailments or injuries
covered by workers compensation insurance. 2°9 Just recently, the Florida
Legislature imposed maximum reimbursement rates for most services that
are covered by Personal Injury Protection policies for those that seek medical
treatment related to an automobile accident. 210  For most non-emergency
services, this maximum rate is set to 200% of the Medicare reimbursement
rate.21 In the case of emergency services, the maximum reimbursement rate
for hospitals is set to be "75 percent of the hospital's usual and customary
charges," and for physicians' services provided in a hospital, the maximum
reimbursement is set to be "the usual and customary charges in the commu-
nity., 212 According to the legislative history, this maximum reimbursement
rate was added because determining "the amount of reasonable charges is
dollars. Colomar IV, 2007 WL 2083562 at *6. Finally, she relied on nationwide market data
rather than comparing Mercy's prices to other local hospitals. Id. at *5.
205. See Urquhart v. Manatee Mem'l Hosp., No. 8:06-cv-1418-T-17-EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48867, at *11-12 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2007); Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F.
Supp. 2d 562, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Howard v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 924 So. 2d
1245, 1259 (La. 2d Ct. App. 2006).
206. See Maldonado 11, 493 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2007).
207. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 781.
208. Id.
209. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(12) (2008).
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often litigated in Florida courts between providers and insures which further
increases CoStS. '213 Only time will tell if these provisions will reduce the
amount of litigation between the providers and insurers given the reference
to usual and customary charges in the statute.214
The Florida Legislature has also tried to address the issue of protecting
the uninsured from being overcharged in several ways. In 2007, a bill was
introduced that would have required hospitals to charge any uninsured pa-
tients with a "household income of less than $125,000," a fee no higher than
the highest contracted fee the hospital has agreed to accept for the same ser-
vice from private insurers.215 The bill was never passed, perhaps because of
concerns from lobbyists for health insurance companies that such a bill could
discourage providers from negotiating with health insurance companies-
since lowering rates with the insurance companies would also lower the max-
imum they could charge to some uninsured." 6
Although this bill to set a maximum that health care providers could
charge to some uninsured patients failed, the Senate has passed two new laws
in 2008 which may help in some situations. The Health Care Consumer's
Right to Information Act, among other provisions, requires health care pro-
viders to automatically provide estimates to uninsured patients for any sche-
duled non-emergency medical services and requires the providers to auto-
matically inform the patients of any "discount or charity policies" that might
be available from that provider.217 The act also requires hospitals to disclose
their standard charges for some of the most common services as well as other
pertinent financial information that is to be made publicly available by the
Agency for Health Care Administration.218 While this act may help the unin-
sured shop for reasonable rates and pre-negotiate prices with the service pro-
viders for non-emergency services, the bill will probably do little to help in
dealing with overcharging for emergency services. Actually, the bill could
hurt the patient's chances of proving the charges are unreasonable if they
were readily available before the emergency situation arose.
Even though the Florida Legislature may believe that price transparency
will help the uninsured make more informed decisions, the primary focus of
213. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins., HB 13C (2007) Staff Analysis 8 (Oct. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007C/House/bills/analysis/pdf/hOO13Cc. JEC.pdf.
214. See FLA. STAT. § 641.513(5)(b) (2008).
215. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Reg., SB 1756 (2007) Staff Analysis 1 (Mar. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2007s1756
.hr.pdf.
216. Id. at 3.
217. Health Care Consumer's Right to Information Act, ch. 2008-47, § 3, 2008 Fla. Laws
739, 740.
218. See id. at 739, 742-43.
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the legislature for resolving this crisis is to reduce the number of uninsured
Floridians.2 9 A new law which passed in May, 2008, creates the Cover Flor-
ida Health Care Access Program °.22  The program creates a special type of
health insurance that does not have to meet the same level of minimum cov-
erage as other health insurance programs. 221 The hope is that private insur-
ance companies will be able to offer affordable health insurance plans, with
premiums of only around $150 a month, with this minimal coverage.2 2 The
plan has been criticized because the law allows for the insurance companies
to cover so little as to make the plans undesirable. 23 Nevertheless, as long as
this minimal coverage at least guarantees contractual discounts similar to
those which other insurance plans provide, the program could help to alle-
viate the issue of determining reasonable charges as there would be fewer
forced to pay without pre-negotiated rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because Florida law requires that determination of a reasonable charge
be based on multiple factors which require individual analysis of each
charge, class certification will probably remain elusive for uninsured patients
that seek declaratory or injunctive relief.224 Nevertheless, all is not lost.
Case law shows that Florida courts will most likely consider the hospital
admission contracts, especially in emergency care situations, to be open
priced contracts and will therefore infer a reasonable price term.225 Although
the cost of litigation may prevent potential plaintiffs from seeking declarato-
ry relief to have the courts clarify how much is actually owed, the patients
can use this as a defense if they are sued by the hospitals or physicians that
provided the emergency services for the charged prices. Courts may even
place a higher burden on hospitals to prove their costs are reasonable when
they are the plaintiffs in the action. Furthermore, the uninsured debtor might
even be able to use unconscionability as a defense in such actions. Finally,
the uninsured patient can file a counterclaim for a violation of the FDUTPA.
Since many of the hospital contracts require the patient to pay legal fees as-
219. See Act effective May 21, 2008, ch. 2008-032, § 3, 2008 Fla. Laws 677, 680 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 408.9091 (2008)).
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See Bob LaMendola, Uninsured? Don't Hold Your Breath for Coverage, SUN SENT.,
May 10, 2008, at Al.
223. See id.
224. See Colomar I, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2006).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/1
PROTECTING THE UNINSURED
sociated with debt collection, the patients have little to lose should they not
prevail on their claim of the FDUTPA violation. On the other hand, if the
court finds that the charged prices are unreasonable, the court is unlikely to
award legal fees to the hospital even if the court does not believe the hospit-
al's actions are an unfair or unconscionable act as defined by the statute. The
fact that the hospital is actually trying to enforce the full debt via the courts,
however, may make the trier of fact more inclined to find that the billing
practices are unfair.
Thus, the best strategy for uninsured patients that believe they have
been charged unreasonable amounts and cannot reach a reasonable settle-
ment with the hospital, is to pay a reasonable amount-perhaps paying what
Medicare would reimburse since this information is readily available-and
forcing the hospital to bring legal action to collect the rest. The patients will
have the right to dispute any reports to collection agencies and the hospital or
collection agencies cannot attach any liens or other means of payment with-
out court orders. Alternatively, the uninsured patient might contact the office
of the state attorney-the enforcing authority under FDUTPA-and persuade
the office to bring a claim on the patient's behalf."6 Under FDUTPA, the
enforcing authority can seek to impose a $10,000 civil penalty for every vi-
olation in addition to the remedies available to individuals.227 Proving that
one has tried to make a reasonable settlement agreement which the hospital
has refused might be persuasive in convincing the state attorney to pursue the
claim.
Thus, although the courts are probably not the appropriate means in
Florida of changing the practice by preventing medical service providers
from overcharging uninsured patients, the courts may offer some protection
to individuals who have already been overcharged.
226. See FLA. STAT. § 501.207(1)(c) (2008).
227. FLA. STAT. § 501.2075 (2008).
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